


INTERIOR OF HALL OF SACRIFICE (AGNIHOTRAŚĀLĀ) AT THE POONA MĪMĀṄSĀ VIDYĀLAYA

In the left foreground, the square fireplace for the *āhavanīya* fire. Adjoining it on the right, the *vedi*. Behind this, the semicircular fireplace for the *dakṣiṇāgni*. On the extreme right, the circular fireplace for the *gārhapatya* fire.

THE MĪMĀṄSĀ NYĀYA PRAKĀŚA

OR ĀPADEVĪ: A TREATISE ON THE MĪMĀṄSĀ SYSTEM BY ĀPADEVA

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT TEXT, AND GLOSSARIAL INDEX, BY

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PREFACE

This book is the outcome of my stay in the city of Poona, August and September, 1926. During this period I read the Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa with Pandit Wamana Sastri Kinjawadekar, Head of the Poona Mīmāṅsā Vidyālaya, which is affiliated with the New Poona College. With the help of Pandit Kinjawadekar's oral explanation (in Sanskrit) of the text I then made a rough English translation, which I have since thoroly revised with the aid of Chinnaswami's commentary in the edition to which I refer as "C," and of other works. I have also attempted to trace, so far as possible, all the quotations from Vedic and other texts contained in the book. It would be of some interest to study in this way all the quotations in the Bhāṣya on the Jaimini Sūtras. The results could not but throw light on the history of Vedic tradition. Chinnaswami made a start towards tracing the quotations of our text, but his references are not always accurate or reliable, and are furthermore not as complete as they might be.

The Mīmāṅsā system has attracted little attention in the west. The little that has been written about it, as in Keith's handbook (*The Karma-Mimansa*), or even in Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (Volume 2), the work of an Indian scholar, deals chiefly with the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the system. But these are relatively unimportant, from the point of view of the Mīmāṅsā itself. They are, therefore, practically ignored in the Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa, which is nevertheless recognized as the best introduction to the system. (So Chinnaswami describes it in his Sanskrit introduction, p. 1; and he unquestionably voices the general opinion of Hindu pandits.)

As it appears here, the Mīmāṅsā may best be described as a system of legal logic. It undertakes to lay down principles by which the laws of the Vedic ritual may be interpreted. For it regards the entire Veda as a code of law—ritual law, of course. The sole purpose of the Veda is to lay down a beneficent course of human action. But—especially when regarded from this view-

point—the Veda appears to be confused and unsystematic. It needs to be systematized and codified. The Mīmāṅsā worked out a system of principles of interpretation and interrelation of the various elements in the Veda. Its object is to formulate a set of rules or logical principles by which the real meaning of the Veda, and the interrelation of its various parts, may be understood, and so applied to human action—duty, or *dharma*.

The historic importance of the system lies in its application to various departments of Indian literature and culture. In the first place, as we might expect, the commentators on Vedic texts were as a rule trained Mīmāṅsakas. Especially the commentaries on the Brāhmaṇa and Sūtra texts can hardly be understood without some familiarity with Mīmāṅsā technique. (This is somewhat less true of the commentaries on the *mantras*, the Saṁhitās, because the Mīmāṅsā deals with them only in an ancillary way, regarding them as only subordinate elements in the Veda; see 203, 239 ff. of this work.) Secondly, Hindu law is deeply indebted to the Mīmāṅsā for its principles of interpretation. The "legal logic" worked out in connexion with the code of the ritual could be, and was, equally applied to the interpretation of secular law. This has long been recognized. See e.g. Ganganath Jha, *The Prābhākara School of the Pūrva Mīmāṅsā*, Allahabad, 1911, pp. 308–317; Keith, *Karma-Mimansa*, pp. 97–107; and especially P. V. Kane, *A Brief Sketch of the Pūrva-Mīmāṅsā System*, Poona, 1924, pp. 26–39, in which the author, a distinguished lawyer of present-day India, shows how the Mīmāṅsā rules of interpretation still possess the greatest practical importance for the interpretation of Hindu law, and are and should be recognized by the courts.—Furthermore, the Mīmāṅsā contains not a little that is interesting from the point of view of theoretical linguistics, as will be shown later. When the time comes to write a general history of linguistic theories, this school will play an important part in the Indian section of that work.[1]

In no other work, probably, are these rules stated as succinctly and clearly as in this Āpadevī or Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa; certainly in none that has been translated. It is, in fact, the

[1] On this subject see my article, "Some Linguistic Notes on the Mīmāṅsā System," in *Language* (the organ of the Linguistic Society of America), 4.171–177.

most familiar introductory work to the system known in India. It is the favorite text used by Hindu pandits to initiate their pupils into the Mīmāṅsā. Its only possible rival is the Arthasaṁgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara (edited and translated by Thibaut, Benares Sanskrit Series No. 4, 1882).[2] This text is, however, too brief to be clear in many parts, as Thibaut rightly says in his Preface. He there says that he would have preferred the Āpadevī, but selected the Arthasaṁgraha simply because of its much smaller bulk. Our text is more complete and much more lucid. On the other hand, it far surpasses in brevity and clarity the long-winded and fine-spun writings of Kumārila, which have been translated by Ganganath Jha (see the Bibliography). It seems, therefore, worth while to make it accessible to western scholars. It has never before been translated into any language.

Altho the text has been repeatedly printed in India, and altho I have not had access to manuscripts of it, it has seemed desirable to reprint the text also along with the translation, because anyone using the latter will certainly wish to refer constantly to the former, and because the Indian editions are not readily accessible and are little known in the west.

I have added a Glossarial Index, which is intended to combine the features of an index of important Sanskrit words and a glossary of technical terms. Among the latter I include not only special terms of the Mīmāṅsā, but all terms peculiar to Indian philosophical and grammatical systems which occur in the work, and which might not be easily comprehensible to one not familiar with these fields. I hope that in this way the book may be made fairly clear and simple even to students of Sanskrit who have had no previous acquaintance with these technical departments of literature.

F. E.

New Haven, Connecticut
January, 1929

[2] Thibaut's introduction to this work contains a very valuable tho brief sketch of the important points of the Mīmāṅsā system; it deserves to be much better known than it is. Nowhere else in any occidental language can there be found so lucid and excellent a summary of this part of the system.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

I. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TEXT HERE PRINTED

THE text of the Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevī has been repeatedly printed in India. I have had access to three editions, and the text as I present it is primarily based upon two of these, viz.:

B. = Āpadevapraṇītaḥ Mīmāṅsānyāyaprakāśaḥ. (Āpadevī.) ayaṁ Bākre-ityupāhva-Gaṅgādharabhaṭṭa-sūnunā Mahādeva-śarmaṇā ṭippaṇyādiyojanapuraḥsaraṁ saṁskṛtaḥ. sa ca Mumbayyāṁ Pāṇḍuraṅga-Jāvajī ity etaiḥ svīye Nirṇayasāgarākhya-mudraṇayantrālaye saṁmudrya prakāśitaḥ. (tṛtīyāvṛtti.) śākaḥ 1844, sana 1923.[1]

C. = The Mimâmsâ Nyâyaprakâsa of Âpadēva (sic). Edited with an original Sanskrit commentary by Veda Visarada Pandit A. Chinnaswami Sastri (Alias Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri), Professor of Mimansa, Benares Hindu University. Printed Published & Sold by Jai Krishna Dass—Hari Dass Gupta, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Vidya Vilas Press, Gopal Mandir Lane, Benares City. 1925.

These two editions agree almost precisely as to the text, barring misprints which are relatively not numerous. There are few points at which their text is in any way doubtful, and practically none that are of any importance. I have recorded in the notes to my reprint of the text all variants which occur in either of these editions, barring obvious misprints which I have ignored. Both editions quote a certain number of variant readings, usually of trifling consequence. B. is, according to the editor's introduction, based on one manuscript and three printed texts; the basis of C. is not stated by its editor.

I have also referred to the edition printed in *The Pandit*, N.S., Vols. 26 and 27 (Benares, 1904 and 1905), under the editorship, apparently, of Ganganath Jha (Upādhyāyopanāmakena

[1] The *ṭippaṇī* referred to consists of a very few scattered notes of little value.

śrī-Gaṅgānātha-śarmaṇā pariṣkṛtaḥ, according to the title-page which accompanies the last instalment of the text). This text differs more from the other two than they do from each other. But many, perhaps most, of the differences are obviously senseless corruptions, or glaring misprints (both categories being regrettably common). Few of them have seemed to me worth recording. I have therefore not thought best to burden my notes with the readings of this edition—which I call P.—except where the text is more or less doubtful, especially where B. and C. differ.

Be it understood, then, that my text agrees with that of B. and C., barring evident misprints, except when my notes quote variants from one or both of them; and that P. agrees with my text as to readings on which I quote variants from either B. or C., unless I quote the reading of P. also, but that otherwise I have *not* quoted the variants of P.

Only once have I felt it necessary to emend the text, against all three editions. This case occurs in 232; for my reasons see note in the Translation *ad loc.*

No divisions of any kind appear to have been made in the text by the author. Even the division into two parts, which I have retained following the edition C., is found in neither of the other editions and was probably made by Chinnaswami himself; at least it certainly does not go back to the original author. For convenience of reference, I have divided the entire work into short paragraphs, numbered consecutively thruout. Each verse receives a separate number in this enumeration.

II. CONTENTS OF THE WORK

The Āpadevī—to use the brief designation of Āpadeva's work which has become familiarly known in India—professes to summarize the essential doctrines of the whole Mīmāṅsā system. As indicated by the first sūtra of Jaimini, this system has as its purpose the exposition of duty (*dharma*), which means any matter set forth in the Veda as having a useful purpose (3). The entire Veda is useful as bearing on duty (9,363). For we are commanded to study the entire Veda (see *adhyayana-vidhi* in Glossarial Index); and as what is not useful could not be an object of required study, this proves that all the Veda must be useful; *ānarthakya*, meaninglessness or uselessness, is ruled out in any

part of the Veda. This principle of *ānarthakya* is applied in Hindu law; a statute or legal principle must be interpreted in such a way that no part of the code shall be rendered void or meaningless (Kane, *A Brief Sketch of the Pūrva-Mīmāṅsā System*, p. 27).

The central element in the Veda is the collection of injunctions (*vidhi*) to perform specific ritual acts, such as sacrifice. And in these the central or principal element is the verb which enjoins the act. This leads to an analysis of the verbal expression of an injunction, which is found primarily in an optative verb-form such as *yajeta*, "he shall sacrifice." (That other, non-optative forms may be used in the same sense is a minor detail which our text ignores, evidently regarding it as unimportant; many such forms are found in actual Vedic injunctions which it quotes later on.) This analysis, begun in 3–9, is finisht only at the end of the work, 367ff.

The optative form *yajeta* is divided into the root *yaj*(*i*) and the ending (*e*)*ta*. This ending in turn contains two elements, psychologically speaking (both exprest by the same identical formal element): one which expresses general verbality, the other optativeness. All verbal endings express the former, but only optative forms the latter. Both these two elements in the ending express efficient-force, *bhāvanā*. This term *bhāvanā* is of the most fundamental importance in the Mīmāṅsā system. The *bhāvanā* of the injunctive verb is the heart of the heart of the whole Veda. Each and every part of the Veda must be related, in some way, directly or indirectly, to it. That is, the Veda consists primarily of a collection of injunctions; all its other parts must be shown to be related to them, and have a right to exist only thereby; and the heart of each injunction is the efficient-force, the *bhāvanā*. This word is a noun of action from the causative of the root *bhū*, 'to come into being,' and means accordingly 'a causing to come into being,' a bringing-about, tendency to produce something; or, as I have rendered it, 'efficient-force.' See my article (cf. Preface, footnote 1) in *Language*, 4.174ff.

This efficient-force is exprest by the optative ending—which accordingly is the principal part of the word; the root depends psychologically upon it. This, by the way, is universally true of all words, both nouns and verbs; the root or stem is regarded

as invariably subordinate to the ending (see Glossarial Index s. v. *pratyaya*, *kāraka*, and cf. *Language* 4.173).

Since there are psychologically two parts to the optative ending, and both express efficient-force, it follows that there are in-junctive forms two efficient-forces. One is that which expresses optative or injunctive force; it is called "word-efficient-force," *śābdī* or *śabda-bhāvanā*. The other expresses general verbality, and is called "end- or fruit-efficient-force," *ārthī*, *artha-*, or *phala-bhāvanā*. This is subordinate to the former, being that which it effects. For the optative force prompts to the performance of the action indicated; it is "a causing to come into being" of the "end-efficient-force," which in turn is a "causing to come into being" of the action denominated by the root. For instance, "he shall sacrifice" means "he *shall* (injunctive) bring-into-being (verbality) something by a sacrifice."

As stated, the entire Veda must in some way or other be brought into relation to one of these efficient-forces. Now every efficient-force has three dependent elements; it requires an end or object produced, a means or instrument, and a manner of performance. These answer the questions "what" ("does the force cause to come into being?"), "by what?" and "how?". The injunctive or "word-efficient-force" has as its end the "end-efficient-force;" for it stimulates the person, e.g. the sacrificer, to start to perform the action. Its means is knowledge of the meaning of the optative and similar forms; for it is thru that knowledge that one understands, and is prompted by, the injunctive efficient-force. Its manner of performance consists in the explanatory-passages, *arthavāda*, which glorify sacrificial actions and so help to stimulate men to wish to perform them.

The injunctive efficient-force is called "of-the-word" in Vedic injunctions because it resides in and is based upon nothing but the independent word of the Veda. In worldly injunctions it is based on the will of the person who delivers the injunction, and expresses his command or wish. But according to the Mīmāṅsā the Veda has no personal basis; it expresses the will or desire of no one, not even of God, of whom it is quite independent. The Veda is eternal, uncreated, and absolute. God is concerned in it only to this extent, that at the beginning of each world-aeon he "remembers" the Veda from past world-aeons and reveals it to

men. So, since Vedic injunctions have no other basis than the Veda itself, their injunctive efficient-force is called "of the word," being rooted in the word alone.

The end-efficient-force has as its end the fruit or object of the rite to be performed, such as "heaven;" for it leads to that. That is why it is called the efficient-force of the end or fruit (cf. note on Translation, 3). It has as its means the root-meaning of the verb, such as "sacrifice." That is, *yajeta svargakāmaḥ*, "who desires heaven shall sacrifice," means "by sacrifice he shall effect (attain) heaven," *yāgena svargaṁ bhāvayet.* It has as its manner of performance the numerous subsidiaries, *aṅgāni*, subordinate elements which go to make up each ritual performance, as indicated by applicatory injunctions, *viniyoga-vidhi* (see below).

Different teachers of the Mīmāṅsā undertook to formulate more precisely the exact psychological values of each of the two efficient-forces. Our author, at the end of the work, viz. in 368ff., summarizes the views of two opposing schools, those of Someśvara and Pārthasārathimiśra; both are subdivisions of Kumārila's school. Āpadeva clearly agrees with Pārthasārathimiśra, whose views in general he adopts. Both these masters agree that the word-efficient-force means primarily just a general and unspecified impellent force (*pravartanā*), and Someśvara thinks (368–374, especially 372) that it cannot be more precisely defined than as an activity (*vyāpāra*) based on the Vedic word alone, for which a synonym is instigation (*preraṇā*), in the form of a general impellent force (*pravartanā*). But Pārthasārathimiśra (375–382), while agreeing that general impellent force is all that it means primarily, holds that since such a general notion could not be responsible for human action, to be effective it must suggest something more specific, by secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*). And this more specific implication he finds in the fact that the action instigated is a means of attaining a desired end. That is, the Vedic injunction suggests—tho indeed it does not *say* definitely—that "by performing such an action (exprest by the end-efficient-force) a man may obtain a desired end," and so instigates him to perform it; this is the *implied* meaning of the injunctive or word-efficient-force, tho all that it means primarily is an impulsion—"do so and so."

As to the meaning of the end-efficient-force, also, these same teachers differ. Someśvara holds (384–387) that it means an effort or energy (*prayatna*), and that a synonym for it is *karoti*, "does," which according to him has the meaning of "makes an effort, exerts energy," and which is used as a synonym for any active verb; thus "he cooks" means "he does cooking," "he sacrifices" means "he does sacrifice;" while if the subject does nothing, but let us say is blown by the wind, we do not say "he does (anything)," but "he is swayed by the wind." But Pārthasārathimiśra (388–391) holds that this is over-specific, pointing out cases in which it cannot hold; he argues that the end-efficient-force expresses simply the notion of general activity conducive to the bringing into being of something else (this same activity being specified by the meaning of the verbal root, as e.g. *yaj-*); so that "he shall sacrifice" means "he shall operate in such a way that by a sacrifice a desired result will ensue."

Returning now to the beginning of our text: after the preliminary analysis of the word-efficient-force, ending in 9, it proceeds in 10 to list the five divisions of the Veda: injunctions (*vidhi*), formulas (*mantra*), names (of rites, *nāmadheya*), prohibitions (*niṣedha*), and explanatory-passages (*arthavāda*).[2] Of these, prohibitions are a kind of negative injunctions; while formulas, names, and explanatory-passages will be shown to have importance only indirectly, as related to injunctions or prohibitions. The major part of our text is devoted to injunctions, as the principal part of the Veda according to Mīmāṅsā theory.

First, in 10–12, injunctions are classified as primary injunctions, injunctions of secondary or accessory matters (*guṇa*), and "particularized" or "qualified" injunctions, which enjoin both things—the primary rite and an accessory. This leads to a long digression in which it is proved that in these last the accessory must be understood as a modifier of the rite, or (as it is phrased) with implication of a possessive suffix; e.g. *somena yajeta* is understood as *somavatā yāgena* (*phalaṁ*) *bhāvayet*, "with a sacrifice containing soma he shall effect (the desired end)."

When this has been finally disposed of, in 62 we come to the

[2] The broader division into *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* (in which latter category is included all that is not *mantra*) is nowhere specifically laid down in our text, altho it is repeatedly mentioned, e.g. in 203–208.

principal classification of injunctions, as "originative" (*utpatti-*) injunctions, injunctions of application (*viniyoga*), of performance (*prayoga*), and of qualification (*adhikāra*).

An originative injunction (63–65) is one which simply enjoins the rite itself in general terms.

An injunction of application (66) is one which indicates the relation of some subsidiary matter to its principal, as "he shall perform the oblation with sour-milk."

This leads, in 67ff., to a detailed treatment of the six *pramāṇas*, modes of evidence, by which one may determine that a certain thing is subsidiary to another thing, that is related to it in dependence. These *pramāṇas* are direct-statement (*śruti*), word-meaning (*liñga*), syntactic connexion (*vākya*), context (*prakaraṇa*), position (*sthāna*), and name (*samākhyā*). In the order named, each prevails over the following ones, so that in case of doubt as to what subsidiary element belongs to what principal thing, a careful analysis of the logical basis of the various alternatives will always decide the matter. This section is one of the prize pieces of the Mīmāṅsā, and one must admit that it contains a great deal of subtle and ingenious analysis.

Thus we find a sentence "With Indra's verse he worships the householder's fire." The word "Indra's verse," *aindrī*, refers to Indra by *liñga*, "word-meaning" (literally, "mark, tag, label"),[3] and so it might be inferred that this verse goes with worship of Indra; but the direct-statement that it goes with worship of the householder's fire annuls this, since *śruti* is stronger than *liñga* (89). The reason for this is that *liñga* can make application only by implying *śruti;* that is, when we hear the word *aindrī*, we might imagine that it means "with this verse one is to worship Indra,"

[3] Ganganath Jha, *The Prābhākara School* etc., p. 187 etc., and Keith, p. 89, render this 'indirect implication.' In a sense all the *pramāṇas* except *śruti* involve 'indirect implication,' and indicate application only by implication of *śruti*. But to render *liñga* in this way is incorrect. For *liñga* is a synonym of *sāmarthya*, 'force' or 'meaning' or words, or of *śakti* (see 100), which means always primary or direct meaning of a word. The word *aindrī* means, simply and directly and not by implication, "Indra's verse" or at least (something) "belonging to Indra." The application of the verse so designated is, indeed, made only by implication, but this is just as true of the remaining four pramāṇas. The word *liñga* has no such meaning; quite the contrary.

because of the 'tag' *aindrī*, "Indra's verse." But before this imaginary *śruti* or direct-statement can be aroused by implication thru the 'tag' *aindrī*, the direct-statement actually found in the text, "with Indra's verse he worships the householder's fire," shows that the verse belongs to the worship of the householder's fire; and so there is no chance for the 'tag' to work by implying a different direct-statement.—In the same way each of the succeeding modes of evidence works only by implying all the preceding ones, up to direct-statement; for the details see the text. So syntactical-connexion or connected-utterance in a single sentence (*vākya*) is weaker than word-meaning (103f., see note in Translation of 104), but stronger than *prakaraṇa*, context, where the two things are mentioned in the same context but not in the same sentence (114f.); this *prakaraṇa* therefore makes application by suggesting an implied *vākya*, an implied connexion of the two things in the same sentence, which then implies *liṅga*, which implies *śruti*, and so the application is made. Context, *prakaraṇa*, is in turn stronger than *sthāna*, position, because in context there is a mutual interdependence of the two things, the principal and the subordinate; each has a need which is satisfied by the other; while in things related by *sthāna* only the subordinate thing, mentioned in a "position" near the principal thing, is felt to have a need of the thing to which it is related, while the principal thing has no such need (159f.). But position is in turn stronger than 'name' (*samākhyā*), the weakest of the six *pramāṇas*, which determines relationship only thru the etymological or derivational meaning of an expression (176–181), as when it is inferred that the *hotṛ* priest is to drink a certain draught because it is served in what is called the "*hotṛ*-cup." The weakness of this inference is in full accord with a well-known and very sound Mīmāṅsā principle that etymology, *yoga*, is an unsafe guide to interpretation; it is only to be resorted to when all other helps fail, and is always overruled by establisht conventional usage (*rūḍhi*). This is what is called the *rathakāra-nyāya*, from the stock illustration that is given of it (see 98, 229). Many a modern western scholar has sinned against this excellent philological principle by interpreting words according to their derivation, instead of searching the texts themselves to find how the word is actually used.

After the discussion of the six *pramāṇas* which help to establish

application (*viniyoga*), we come in 182ff. to a classification of subsidiaries, *aṅga*. The most important classification of them is into *saṁnipatyopakārakāṇi* and *ārādupakārakāṇi*, those which affect or assist in the rite indirectly by helping to fit some *guṇa*, material substance or the like, for use in it, and those which affect it immediately, not thru the means of any subordinate matter.[4] The former prevails over the latter; that is, when there is doubt as to whether something is connected with the main rite or with a subordinate matter, the latter has the preference (186ff.). But both kinds of subsidiaries relate in reality not to the external form of the rite, but to the mystic *apūrva* which it is to produce (192ff.).

This *apūrva* is one of the most important concepts in the Mīmāṅsā system. It designates the mysterious, transcendental power generated by a correctly performed ritual act (the correct performance including the presumption that the performer is qualified to perform it), and it in turn produces, in the fullness of time (often after the death of the sacrificer), the "fruit" which is the promised reward of the act. Not only has every rite as a whole an *apūrva*, but each subordinate action that belongs to it has a subordinate (*utpatti*-, 'productive') *apūrva* of its own; see my Glossarial Index s. v., and the passages in the text quoted there.

With 196 we come to the treatment of *prayoga-vidhi*, the injunction of performance. This means an injunction governing the order of parts of the rite, and it is usually implied rather than directly-stated. Subtle reasons are given in 196ff. for making the assumption. In connexion with this matter of order, too, we find six *pramāṇas* or modes of evidence, each stronger than the ones which follow it; they are listed in 199, and explained and differentiated in the following sections.

The fourth kind of injunction, that of *adhikāra* or qualification, is treated in 225ff. It designates the person who is qualified to perform a rite and expect its fruit; or, as we should sometimes prefer to put it, the circumstances under which a rite is to be performed. Ordinarily the circumstances of the qualified person

[4] Ganganath Jha, *The Prābhākara School* etc., p. 181, and Keith, p. 88, have exactly inverted the meaning of these two terms. See my Glossarial Index, s. vv.

are specifically stated in the injunction of qualification. But certain necessary qualifications are always understood, viz. the necessary knowledge (gained only from Vedic study), possession of the sacred fire in the case of fire rites, and capacity (physical power). The former two bar out non-Aryans, and women as independent agents (but a wife has joint qualification with her husband, who supplies the necessary knowledge; and the Veda specifically authorizes certain non-Aryans to perform certain specific rites). Capacity applies to all optional rites (*kāmyāni*), but not to permanent (*nityāni*) ones; these must be performed as well as one can all one's life long, even if bodily strength is lacking to perform them completely.

This closes the first part of the text, as it is divided in Chinnaswami's edition, and the treatment of *vidhi*, injunction. With 239 we take up *mantras*, formulas. According to the Mīmāṅsā their only purpose is to remind us of something connected with the sacrifice. Or if it is impossible to interpret them thus, as the text admits it is in a few cases (248), then they have a purely transcendental effect, for they can not possibly be meaningless, being part of the Veda.

This transcendental (*adṛṣṭa*) effect is a matter of which we hear much in other connexions (see my Glossarial Index s. v.). It is a convenient peg on which to hang anything for which no reason can be discerned. For every part of the Veda must have some purpose in relation to the efficient-force (*bhāvanā*) of some injunction (or prohibition). Any subsidiary, if it has no visible effect upon the rite, must be assumed to have an invisible effect; for instance, when rice is husked, there is a visible effect, but when rice is sprinkled with water, no effect is visible, yet there must be one, otherwise the sprinkling would not be enjoined. This is the *adṛṣṭa* of which we hear so much. However, the Mīmāṅsā teaches, very sensibly, that the use of this principle must be restricted as much as possible—that when a visible purpose is discernible, no *adṛṣṭa* must be assumed. For otherwise, the whole ritual would tend to be resolved "into a string of performances of which nobody would understand how they came to be combined" (Thibaut, *Arthasaṁgraha*, Introduction, p. xii).

Now, the *mantras* used at the various rites must all have some effect, and to our minds that effect would seem clearly to have

been *adṛṣṭa* in character—mystical and supersensuous, rather than of any practical import. But in accordance with the principle just laid down, the Mīmānsā insists that we must try to find a visible purpose for them as far as possible. And in the vast majority of cases, it claims, such a visible purpose is discernible, namely: the *mantras* mention some element of the sacrifice, most commonly its deity, and so serve to remind the participants thereof. Thus they are of practical and "visible" use in the sacrifice. Only in the relatively few cases where no such use of the *mantras* can be discerned may they be interpreted as invisible in effect. The principle is an excellent one, altho it seems (as pointed out by Thibaut, l. c.) that it is carried too far in this instance.

Most curious to our minds is the next grand division of the Veda, 'name,' *nāmadheya* (249ff.). This applies to words which are names of rites, such as *agnihotra, udbhid.* They seem to us hardly to deserve being classified in this way, on a par with injunctions, formulas, and explanatory-passages. For unlike the other grand divisions, they do not comprise complete sentences, but are only isolated words, occurring in sentences which belong to some of the other categories, most commonly injunctions.

The reasons why the Mīmāṅsā considers this classification necessary may be illustrated as follows. In such an injunction as *agnihotraṁ juhoti* or *juhuyāt,* "he shall offer-oblation with the *agnihotra,*" the word *agnihotra,* if considered an integral part of the injunction, must stand in some relation to the efficient-force, the *bhāvanā.* The only possible value it could have would be to state some accessory (*guṇa*), as for instance the place in which, or the deity to which, the oblation is offered (*agnau,* or *agnaye, hotram asmin*). But both of these *guṇas* are laid down elsewhere. And an injunction can only lay down something which is not elsewhere enjoined; otherwise it would be meaningless, which is contrary to the principle of *ānarthakya* (above, p. 4 f.). Hence the word *agnihotra* is merely a name, qualifying the sacrifice; the sentence means *agnihotreṇa homena* (*phalaṁ*) *bhāvayet.* So the word *agnihotra* stands outside the injunction, as an extra modifier describing the oblation, because of "another authoritative passage setting forth that (*guṇa* which might otherwise be designated by the word)" (273ff.).

There are three other reasons, besides this, which are taught by the Mīmāṅsā as justifying the assumption of a "name." I shall mention here only one of them—the avoidance of what is called "split of the sentence," *vākyabheda*. This compels us to assume that in the injunction *citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ* the word *citrā* is the name of a rite, because any other interpretation involves "split of the sentence" (265ff.). This, like *ānarthakya*, is a logical fault of which we hear much in the Mīmāṅsā; see Glossarial Index s. v. *vākyabheda*. It means this: except in an originative injunction, not more than one thing may be enjoined at one time. That is, each section or sentence of the ritual code should deal with only one thing. Otherwise confusion would ensue. A single sentence should be devoted to laying down a single thing. Only in an originative injunction, laying down the general nature of a rite, is it felt that more than one subsidiary matter may be enjoined also, along with the main injunction, because the subsidiaries are really included in the main injunction, and so the unity of the subject-matter does not suffer thereby (12); in such a case we have a "particularized injunction," as we saw. But otherwise, to enjoin two things at once involves *vākyabheda;* the sentence is split. And this must be avoided. This is an excellent legal principle, and is taken over from the Mīmāṅsā into Hindu law (Kane, *op. cit.*, p. 37f.). It is regrettably true that it is very hard at times to avoid admitting "split of the sentence" in both Vedic injunctions and legal maxims; but the principle is none the less sound, and we must approve the attempts of the Mīmāṅsā to apply it as far as possible—sometimes with great subtlety.

We come now, with 320ff., to the fourth grand division of the Veda, prohibitions, *niṣedha* or *pratiṣedha*. These are a kind of negative injunctions. It is first shown very subtly that in them the negative goes regularly with the optative part of the ending, which expresses the injunctive or word-efficient-force, because that is the principal element in the verb, which is itself the principal part of the injunction. Therefore the negative cannot go with the root-meaning of the verb, nor with another word, because these are dependent on the ending, and what is dependent on one thing cannot be combined with something else; else the sentence "bring the king's servant (*rāja-puruṣa*, in which 'king'

depends on 'servant')" might be taken to mean "bring the king." Therefore the negative goes with the injunctive efficient-force, upon which all the rest of the sentence depends. And so the prohibition means the opposite of what the injunctive efficient-force means. Since the meaning of the latter is impellent-force (above, p. 7), the meaning of its negation, the prohibition, is deterrent-force.

Then follows (329ff.) an explanation of certain cases in which, for special reasons, it is impossible to assume a prohibition, but instead we must assume a positive command to perform some action, the negative then going not with the injunctive efficient-force but with either the root-meaning of the verb ("one shall perform an action opposite to the action denoted by the verb") or with a noun ("one shall perform the action of the verb in relation to something else than this noun"). In both these cases we have not prohibitions but exclusions, *paryudāsa*.

One of the two conditions which require us to assume an exclusion rather than a prohibition in negative sentences is "the contingence of an option, *vikalpa;*" that is, the fact that if we assume a prohibition, we should find ourselves in this dilemma, that the Veda both commands and prohibits the same thing (341ff.). This is known as "option," and naturally is by all possible means to be avoided; any interpretation which makes it unnecessary is to be preferred. It is said to involve no less than eight faults (318, see note here in Translation). Yet the Mīmāṅsā honestly admits that there are cases where the assumption is unavoidable. So in the case of negative sentences, sometimes we cannot avoid this dilemma, and must then admit that the same ritual act is enjoined and elsewhere prohibited in the Veda (359). It is apparently understood that in such cases either course may allowably be followed.

The fifth and last of the grand divisions of the Veda, *arthavāda* or explanatory-statement, is very briefly treated in 364–367. Explanatory-statements glorify sacrificial acts that are enjoined, or stigmatize prohibited acts. Thus they constitute, as we saw (p. 6), the manner-of-performance to the injunctive (or prohibitive) efficient-force; they are the "way" in which the instigatory power tends to instigate man to perform (or avoid performing) the acts in question.

The work closes with the statement (393) that duty as laid down in the Veda leads to the fruits assigned to each act if performed with a view to attaining them; while if they are performed as pure acts of devotion to God, it leads to supreme beatitude. This is proved by the quotation from the Bhagavad Gītā: "Whatever thou doest, eatest, offerest in oblation, givest in alms, or performest as penance, that do as an offering to me." And this, tho *smṛti* and not Vedic *śruti*, is authoritative, because according to Mīmāṅsā doctrine true *smṛti*, when properly understood, is based upon the Veda and not inconsistent with it, and therefore is equally authoritative (altho, when it appears to be inconsistent with it, the Veda prevails, because it alone is independently authoritative; *smṛti* must be interpreted in such a way as not to clash with Vedic *śruti*).

In this brief summary I have omitted many topics which are treated incidentally in the course of the work. One of these deserves special mention, namely the matter of *atideśa*, "transfer." According to the Mīmāṅsā, the rules for the various Vedic rites are not entirely unrelated one to another. This is evident from the fact that with many of them only very incomplete statements are found of their details. This circumstance is explained by the theory that they are modifications or ectypes, *vikṛti*, of other rites, which are called archetypes, *prakṛti*. A *prakṛti*, archetype or primary form of a rite, is one in which all the elements which make it up (*aṅga* or *dharma*) are directly prescribed (*upadiṣṭa*), or at least (cf. 156) not understood as transferred (*atidiṣṭa*) from any other rite. A *vikṛti* or modification, on the other hand, is a rite in which the details are in part, that is so far as not specifically prescribed, "transferred" from some more primary rite. The general rule by which this transfer takes place is called *codaka*, rule of transfer (not to be confused with *codanā*, a synonym for *vidhi*, injunction). It derives its force from comparison, *upamāna* or *upamiti*. That is, we see that one rite, whose details are incompletely prescribed, resembles another rite in some respect (usually in respect to the deity addrest, or the material used in it); and this comparison suggests that the details of that other rite are understood as applying to this rite, by *codaka*. For instance, the *jyotiṣṭoma* is the archetype, *prakṛti*, of soma-rites in general; the *agnīṣomīya* (first animal-sacrifice at the soma-rite) is the

archetype of animal-sacrifices; and the *darśapūrṇamāsa* of *iṣṭis* in general. A rite may be a modification of one rite and still serve as archetype to other rites (cf. 222). For details, see the references in my Glossarial Index under the Sanskrit words mentioned.

III. THE AUTHOR

What is known of Āpadeva is derived chiefly from the statements of his son, Anantadeva, in his Smṛtikaustubha; the apposite verses are quoted by Chinnaswami, p. 3. He came of a family of Maratha brahmans, distinguisht for learning and religious devotion. The family tree, as stated, went back to one Ekanātha, great-grandfather of our author, who lived "on the banks of the Godāvarī" and was both learned in the Vedas and a devotee of Krishna. This can hardly be the same as the well-known Maratha poet-saint Eknath, altho he lived at Pratiṣṭhāna (Paithan), also "on the banks of the Godāvarī;" this Eknath died in 1609, and apparently had only one son, named Hari.[5] Our Ekanātha must have been an older man (see next page). He had a son Āpadeva, also a scholar and a righteous man. His son, the father of our author, was Anantadeva, himself a famed Mīmāṅsā specialist as well as a pious devotee of Krishna. He taught his son Āpadeva, who pays homage to him as his *guru* in verse 2 of the Āpadevī, and quotes him as authority on a point of Mīmāṅsā technique in 143. Keith's statement (p. 13) that our author was the "pupil of Govinda" seems to be baseless, and is perhaps due to a misunderstanding of 396 *govindaguru-pādayoḥ*, which means "the feet of Govinda (Kṛṣṇa) and my Teacher (Anantadeva)," not "of my Teacher Govinda." There is no reason to suppose that Āpadeva had any other teacher than his father.

Āpadeva is described in the Smṛtikaustubha as the author of the "Nyāya Prakāśa," a constant source of the nectar of boundless learning, and a knower of "both Mīmāṅsās," that is, the

[5] See Justin E. Abbott, *Eknath*, Poona, 1927. For Eknath's only son, Hari, see pp. 211 ff.; for the date of Eknath's death, p. 263.—It is, however, extremely likely that the coincidences of name and location are not entirely meaningless; that is, that the poet-saint Eknath belonged to the same distinguisht family as his (younger?) contemporary, our Āpadeva.

Uttara M. or Vedānta as well as the Pūrva M. This fact is evidenced by his authorship of a commentary on the Vedāntasāra, called Dīpikā, to which he himself alludes, tho not by name, in 395. It is said (Chinnaswami, p. 4) to have been printed at Benares and at Śrīrañga (Trichinopoly). We hear also (loc. cit.) of a commentary on the Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra composed either by him or by his son Anantadeva.

This Anantadeva, son of our Āpadeva, was himself a noted scholar. Besides the above-mentioned Smṛtikaustubha, he wrote a commentary on his father's Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa, called Bhāṭṭālaṁkāra, which according to Chinnaswami (p. 5) has been edited and printed by Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Lakshmaṇa Śāstri; I regret to say that I have not had access to it.

Both the Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa and its commentary, the Bhāṭṭālaṁkāra, were criticized by the Mīmāṅsā writer Khaṇḍadeva, in his Bhāṭṭadīpikā, as specifically stated in the Prabhāvalī, a commentary on that work by Śambhubhaṭṭa, pupil of Khaṇḍadeva. Since Khaṇḍadeva died at Benares in 1665 (Chinnaswami, p. 3; Keith, p. 12), this justifies us in assuming the early part of the seventeenth century as the approximate date of Āpadeva.

That he was a pious worshipper of Krishna is abundantly evident from 1, 393, 396, and 397 of the Āpadevī.

We shall show in the next chapter that he was a follower of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṅsā, that is the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Of later Mīmāṅsā writers he quotes Maṇḍanamiśra, and Someśvara; but he was a particularly close adherent of Pārthasārathimiśra, whose views he regularly states as *siddhānta*, that is as the accepted conclusion, after mentioning different views first and refuting them.

IV. SOURCES

Āpadeva does not claim much originality for the doctrines he lays down. For the most part he rests upon older authorities. Most of these, naturally, are Mīmāṅsā texts. Aside from these, grammatical authorities are his chief reliance. Especially Pāṇini is often quoted (tho never mentioned by name), and always with unquestioning acceptance. Among other quotations which seem to be from grammatical works, I may mention those found in

80 and 336, the sources of which I have not discovered; in 304, which seems to be based upon (tho not exactly quoted from) the Kāśikāvṛtti; and in 330, which according to the comm. in C. is taken from Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (or Harikārikā); see note in Translation.

The Bhagavad Gītā is quoted as an authority in 394, and the Mānava Dharmaśāstra in 233, tho neither is named.

Otherwise, the only authorities named or (so far as I know) quoted in the text are Mīmāṅsakas.

First and foremost among these is, of course, Jaimini himself. He is named only in 3, but his individual *sūtras* are frequently quoted, and equally often we have references, without precise quotations, to the parts of the Sūtra where particular topics are discust. These are generally in the form of references to particular *adhikaraṇas*, "topics" or groups of *sūtras*. Sometimes, however, only the book (*adhyāya*) containing the topic is mentioned, commonly by a mere ordinal numeral, as, *tṛtīye*, "in the Third (Book)." Such an ordinal always refers to the books of Jaimini. Occasionally the *pāda* (or, as Āpadeva regularly calls it, *caraṇa*), the major subdivision of the *adhyāyas* of Jaimini, is quoted, without specification of the smaller divisions called *adhikaraṇa* or of the individual *sūtras* (145, 208).

The Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin on Jaimini is mentioned once (291) as authority for a principle, without quotation; and several quotations are taken from it without its being named.

More quotations than from any other author are taken from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṅsā, to which Āpadeva belonged (cf. 396 *bhāṭṭasaṁmatā*). He is not mentioned by name, but is called "the author of the Vārtika," *vārtika-kāra*, 208, 313, or *-kṛt*, 207; that is, author of the Śloka Vārtika (on Jaimini 1, first pāda) and the Tantra Vārtika (on the rest of Book 1 and all of Books 2 and 3). The numerous quotations from these works (especially the TV.), principally verses, are generally introduced by the words *yathāhuḥ*, and are always regarded as authoritative, even when (as happens not infrequently) Kumārila differs from the Bhāṣya. Kumārila's Ṭupṭīkā (a commentary on the last nine books of Jaimini) is not directly referred to in our book; but Pārthasārathimiśra's commentary on it, the Tantraratna, is mentioned.

All other Mīmāṅsakas quoted or referred to by Āpadeva are adherents of the school of Kumārila. The rival school of Prabhākara is not once mentioned. But according to the commentator in C., one of its views is combatted (doubtless following an older Bhāṭṭa writer) in 155.

There is no evidence that Āpadeva was acquainted directly with the writings of Maṇḍanamiśra, a follower (and perhaps directly a pupil) of Kumārila. To be sure, he quotes one verse (381) from that author's Vidhiviveka. But there is little doubt that he quoted it not directly but indirectly, thru Pārthasārathimiśra's Nyāyaratnamālā. For the form of the quotation agrees exactly with that in which this work quotes it, and differs in one word from the original form, at least as printed in the Benares edition of the Vidhiviveka. Reference seems to be made, disapprovingly, to one of Maṇḍanamiśra's views in 64 and 328.

Pārthasārathimiśra is perhaps the next authority used by Āpadeva, in order of time. He wrote commentaries on Kumārila's Śloka Vārtika (called Nyāyaratnākara) and Ṭupṭīkā (called Tantraratna). He also wrote an independent commentary on Jaimini, called Śāstradīpikā, and a quite independent work called Nyāyaratnamālā. Āpadeva mentions him by name three times, and his Śāstradīpikā and Tantraratna are named and quoted (in 145, and in 151, 207, 261 respectively; the former is quoted several other times without being named). The Nyāyaratnamālā is not named but was certainly used by Āpadeva. Chinnaswami, Introduction p. 2, lists a number of passages in which the two works agree almost verbatim. The force of most of these comparisons is greatly weakened by the fact that they are also found in the Arthasaṁgraha, and as a rule in forms which are closer to the Āpadevī than is the Nyāyaratnamālā. I shall show presently that there is some reason to believe that the Arthasaṁgraha was older than the Āpadevī and served as a source for it, instead of vice versa, as Chinnaswami believes. It is, therefore, at least possible that Āpadeva took these passages from the Arthasaṁgraha, and not from the Nyāyaratnamālā directly. But that he had some direct knowledge of the latter is proved by the fact that he follows it verbally in some passages which are lacking in the Arthasaṁgraha. For instance,

Āpadevī 209: prakṛtau nānādeśasthānāṁ padārthānāṁ vikṛtau vacanād ekasmin deśe 'nuṣṭhāne kartavye yasya deśe 'nuṣṭhīyante tasya etc.

Cf. Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 155, l. 15: yas tu prakṛtau nānādeśāvagatānāṁ padārthānāṁ vikṛtāv ekasya deśe sarveṣām anuṣṭhāne vacanāt kartavye sati yasya deśe 'nuṣṭhīyante tasya etc.

In general Āpadeva clearly belonged to the school of Pārthasārathimiśra. When he discusses opposing views on a topic, giving arguments pro and con, he regularly gives the last word to Pārthasārathimiśra, implying acceptance of his views, while stating those of his opponent—usually Someśvara, see below—as *pūrvapakṣa*, only to be refuted. See for instances 276ff., where Someśvara's view agrees with the Bhāṣya but is refuted by Pārthasārathimiśra's view in 279ff.; 303ff., and 312ff.; 368ff., and 375ff.; 384ff., and 388ff. In all of these the *pūrvapakṣa* (Someśvara) is introduced by some such phrase as *kecid ācāryā āhuḥ*, and the *siddhānta* by something like *anye tv āhuḥ*. In some of these instances, at least (notably the last two named), Someśvara himself, in his Rāṇaka, discusses the same questions, stating first Pārthasārathimiśra's view as *pūrvapakṣa*, and then refuting it by his own *siddhānta*. Pārthasārathimiśra also sometimes shows a consciousness of the existence of differences of opinion on these points; e.g. he refers to the view of his opponents as to the meaning of the *śābdī bhāvanā*, in the Nyāyaratnamālā (see note in my Translation, below, 375). However, from such study as I have been able to give to the matter, it seems to me that Someśvara presents a much more clear contrast between his views and Pārthasārathimiśra's; he seems to refer specifically to arguments used by the latter, and suggests a later stage in the controversy. Pārthasārathimiśra, on the other hand, is vaguer and less clear-cut on these points, and seems not to be so definitely conscious of the opposing positions. It seems to me, therefore, that these bits of evidence point to the probability that he was earlier than Someśvara. Of course, this question can not be regarded as settled until the entire works of both authors have been more carefully studied.

Someśvara, to whom we have just been referring, wrote a commentary on Kumārila's Tantra Vārtika called Nyāyasudhā, or

Rāṇaka. It is mentioned and quoted once, under the latter name, by Āpadeva (128); and, as we have just seen, the opinions stated therein are frequently alluded to, and generally rejected in favor of others, especially those of Pārthasārathimiśra.

The relative dates of Āpadeva and Laugākṣi Bhāskara, author of the Arthasaṁgraha (see my Preface, p. v), have never been determined before. It is abundantly evident that one of the two made copious use of the other. From beginning to end the general plan is the same; but more than this, innumerable sentences, and not a few entire paragraphs, are copied out almost verbatim. The Arthasaṁgraha is in general very much briefer than the Āpadevī. It is at times so brief that it suffers from obscurity. And yet there are points on which it is fuller than the Āpadevī (e.g. the treatment of *arthavāda*, 364ff., Arthasaṁgraha p. 25f.), and others on which it is clearer (see e.g. 362, note in my Translation, and the Arthasaṁgraha passage there quoted). It would be laborious and useless to list the passages which one work must have borrowed from the other; for this applies to almost the entire text of the Arthasaṁgraha. Chinnaswami takes it for granted that the Arthasaṁgraha borrowed from the Āpadevī. My own belief is the contrary. My opinion is based partly on the general impression created by the plus parts of the Āpadevī, which seem to me rather like additions or expansions; but more particularly on one or two passages in which the two works express different views, and the Āpadevī distinctly refutes the view of the Arthasaṁgraha, while the latter completely ignores the view of the former. In view of the general habits of both texts, it is hardly likely, I think, that the Arthasaṁgraha, copying from the Āpadevī, would have adopted a view stated as *pūrvapakṣa* and refuted in its source, without even mentioning (still less attempting to refute) the view put forward as *siddhānta* in that source. If it had copied the Āpadevī, it would surely have either (1) adopted the conclusion accepted by the latter, or (2) tried to refute it. Yet it simply adopts without argument the conclusion which the Āpadevī refutes (and refutes very effectively, by the way). The best and clearest instance of this is found in our 352ff. (cf. Arthasaṁgraha, pp. 24, 44). Another case occurs in 204–208 (see especially 208), which is treated much more convincingly than in the corresponding passage of the Arthasaṁgraha, pp. 13, 25 (cf. note in Thibaut's Translation, p. 25).

I believe, therefore, that we must date Laugākṣi Bhāskara before Āpadeva, and regard his Arthasaṁgraha as Āpadeva's most important direct source. So far as I know there is no evidence for the date of Laugākṣi Bhāskara. If it should after all be irrefutably proved that he was later than Āpadeva, we should be obliged to assume that his Arthasaṁgraha is essentially an abstract of the Āpadevī, but a not very successful one.

Finally, Āpadeva refers once to his own father, Anantadeva, as an authority, in opposing a view held by Someśvara (143). After stating his father's view, he proceeds, in 144ff., to express his own opinion, to the effect that even if his father's objection should not be accepted, still Someśvara's position would be unsound. This passage is of particular interest because it is the only place in the entire work where the author expressly claims originality for the arguments set forth.

V. VEDIC REFERENCES

No study has been made of the use of Vedic texts by the Mīmāṅsā school as a whole. For the most part it is clear that the later Mīmāṅsakas limited themselves to the passages used in Śabarasvāmin's Bhāṣya as illustrations of the laws of Jaimini. These were the accepted stock in trade of the school and were discust and workt over again and again, obviously with little reference to the original Vedic texts. This is the custom of scholasticism everywhere. So, at least until very recently, school grammars of Latin continued to use the time-honored examples of grammatical rules, with little attempt to make independent examinations of Latin writers.

Our text, like the rest, deals almost exclusively with Vedic passages inherited from older Mīmāṅsā authorities, and going back ultimately to the Bhāṣya. "Ultimately," that is, as far as our knowledge goes; for we have no older Mīmāṅsā text than the Bhāṣya, except the Sūtra itself which never quotes Vedic passages (tho it often makes verbal references to them). We do not, therefore, know to what extent these passages were recognized even earlier than the Bhāṣya as the standard stock in trade of the school.

It is, however, worth noting that in a very few instances

Āpadeva gives quotations in a form different from the Bhāṣya, and to some extent different from the other older authorities known to me. Perhaps the most striking instance is the passage quoted by Āpadeva (332) as *nekṣetodyantam ādityam.* This sentence occurs in just that form in Manu 4.37, and C. comm. regards it as a quotation from that source. The phrase *tasya vratam,* which is said (332) to precede it, is identified by the comm. with Manu 4.13 *vratānīmāni dhārayet.* This in itself is so far from the reading of the quotation that it justifies suspicions. But when in 339 we find the further statement that these passages have their "fruit" provided by the statement *etāvatā hainasā viyukto bhavati,* it becomes abundantly clear that Manu was not the original source of any of these sentences; for Manu contains nothing resembling this last. If, then, we turn to the Bhāṣya on J. 4.1.3, where this matter is discust, we find that instead of *nekṣetodyantam ādityam,* the injunction reads *nodyantam ādityam īkṣeta, nāstaṁyantam* (also the statement of fruit has *ayukto* for *viyukto*). It cannot be doubted that Āpadeva, or some predecessor, altered the form of the injunction to accord with the text of Manu. The source of the original form is unknown to me; it obviously must have been some prose work.

Another striking case is the mantra *aganma suvaḥ suvar aganma,* 193. This can only have been taken from TS. 1.6.6.1, 1.7.6.1; the form *suvaḥ* for *svaḥ* is characteristic of the Taittirīya school, and moreover this form of the mantra is found only in Tait. and AV. texts. The MS. parallel (1.4.2) reads *aganma svaḥ saṁ jyotiṣābhūma.* But the Bhāṣya (on J. 9.1.4) used the MS. form of the mantra. It also quotes the formula *agner ujjitim anūjjeṣam* in its Maitr. form (MŚS. 1.4.2.16) instead of its Tait. form, which adds *aham* after *agner.* Here then we have a clear case of substitution of a Tait. school passage for one taken from the Maitr. school.

The other instances are less important. In 185 is quoted the sentence *prāyaṇīyaniṣkāsa udayanīyam anunirvapati.* This was probably taken originally from TS. 6.1.5.5, which however reads *prāyaṇīyasya niṣ°* and *abhinirvapati.* The Bhāṣya on J. 11.2.64 also has *prāyaṇīyasya* as in our text of TS., but *anu* for *abhi.* Pārthasārathimiśra (ŚD. p. 817) reads exactly like the Bhāṣya.

In 302 occurs the injunction *śyenenābhicaran yajeta.* Exactly the same form of it occurs in ĀpŚS. 22.4.13. But the Bhāṣya on 1.4.5 reads *athaiṣa śyenena* etc. It is not likely to be entirely accidental that we find in ṢB. 3.8.1 *athaiṣa śyenaḥ,* followed in 3.8.2 by *abhicaran yajeta.* It appears that the original quotation, as found in the Bhāṣya, had been taken from ṢB., with a slight adaptation to fit the necessary scheme of a Mīmāṅsā injunction; but that a later writer had further adapted it to the form as found in ĀpŚS. However, we find (in 302 and 145) two other quotations from the *śyena* rite, which do not exactly coincide with the readings of either ṢB. or ĀpŚS., the only two texts known to me which describe this rite. It remains a possibility that the Mīmāṅsā school used some text that is lost to us.

A few other minor differences from the Bhāṣya readings will be noted later. But nearly all the remaining quotations found in our text follow older Mīmāṅsā writers, and ultimately the Bhāṣya, and were taken therefrom, in the first instance, rather than from the original texts.

The identification of the original sources of these quotations is no easy matter in many cases. Bloomfield's Concordance helps us, of course, only with the mantras; and these are only a small minority, since the Mīmāṅsā is chiefly interested in injunctions, that is Brāhmaṇa passages. Most of the Vedic Brāhmaṇa texts are not indexed sufficiently to help us in the search. I have spent more time than I like to think of in trying to run down these passages. Moreover it is often hard to be sure, at the end of the hunt, that we have trapped the right quarry. Let me illustrate by a single example the difficulties that confront us. In 265 we find the injunction *citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ.* This occurs in TS. 2.4.6.1, in exactly the same form. This is, furthermore, so far as I can discover, the only sacrifice named *citrā* in any publisht Vedic text. Since (as we shall presently see) there is clear evidence that a large majority of the Mīmāṅsā illustrations were taken from texts of the Taittirīya school, we should naturally assume at once that we have here the undoubted source of our injunction. But there are grave difficulties in the way of this assumption. First, the very same paragraph declares that this *citrā* rite is enjoined by the sentence *dadhi madhu payo ghṛtaṁ dhānā udakaṁ taṇḍulās tat saṁsṛṣṭaṁ prājāpatyam.* (Bhāṣya on

J. 1.4.3 transposes *taṇḍulā udakaṁ.*) And unfortunately this sentence does not occur in the context, either in TS, or in its Śrauta Sūtras (ĀpŚS. 19.25.14f., BŚS. 13.36); nor, for that matter, have I been able to find it anywhere else. May we then guess that it came from an older form of the text of TS.? Even this is improbable. For according to 269 (see my note in the Text) this *citrā* sacrifice occurred in close proximity to the offering of a ewe to Sarasvatī—apparently in some form of soma-rite. But the *citrā* rite of TS. 2.4.6.1 is a *kāmyeṣṭi*, and does not fit these requirements at all. We must, apparently, conclude that our injunction refers to an entirely different *citrā.*

At other times the surrounding conditions are all satisfactory, but the passage does not correspond precisely in its language. The question then arises whether the Mīmāṅsā knew a form of the Vedic text in question somewhat different from that which has been accepted in our modern editions—or whether it quoted from a parallel and slightly different text, not known to us—or, finally, whether it simply misquoted. When in 233 we read *etayā niṣādhasthapatiṁ yājayet*, and find in MS. 2.2.4 (18.15) the same injunction with *tayā* for *etayā* (and no other record of this injunction), we may take it as highly probable that MS. is the source of our injunction. But is *etayā* (found regularly in all Mīmāṅsā texts) the reading which was found in the form of MS. used by the Bhāṣya or its source? Or was it merely a misquotation? This is only a very simple and trifling example of a type of problem which frequently confronts us. It seems to me that the future study of Vedic text tradition must take into account these Mīmāṅsā readings of Vedic texts. For at least they go back to the Bhāṣya (according to Keith, between 400 and 600 A.D.), which is a relatively early date—far earlier than any manuscripts used in our modern editions.

This consideration seems to me to justify the attempt which I have made to identify these Vedic passages, used as Mīmāṅsā examples. It should, of course, be completed by a similar study of the passages which do not happen to be quoted by Āpadeva—at least those found in the Bhāṣya and the works of Kumārila. However, the number of such additional passages is much smaller than might be supposed from the comparative bulk of the works. Āpadeva made a point of bringing in most of the stock examples

of the school, at least in passing references. I believe, therefore, that my results will give a reasonably accurate preliminary notion of what would come out of the more complete study suggested.

The great majority of quotations which I have been able to trace at all come from texts of the Taittirīya school, chiefly TS. and TB. Of these I have counted nearly forty, about half of which I regard as practically certain, and the rest probable. There are ten or a dozen more which may come equally well from a Tait. text or from one of another school. Next in importance, but at a great distance, comes the Maitrāyaṇīya school, from which I find five or six virtually certain quotations, and twice as many again that are probable. The Pañcaviṅśa Brāhmaṇa contributes three or four. Other cases are very few, scattering, and uncertain. There is not a single quotation which *must* come from KS., nor from ŚB, AB, or KB.

The Brāhmaṇas (including the brāhmaṇa-parts of what are called the Saṁhitās of the Black Yajur Veda) contribute practically all the cases which can be identified with certainty. Yet there are a few cases that seem pretty clearly to have been drawn from sūtra texts—that is, from *smṛti*, not *śruti*. The Mīmāṅsā, in fact, definitely recognizes the authority of *smṛti* and even lays down certain restricted conditions in which it may be allowed to prevail over *śruti* (see 395 and 96). I have made it a rule to quote all *śruti* passages which might, in my opinion, have something to do with any quotation; but I have not added references to *smṛti* texts when the passage is found in *śruti*, unless for special reasons.

That the original Mīmāṅsā excerptors knew some Vedic texts which are not known to us is certain. For instance, the Bhāṣya itself (on J. 6.3.1) quotes at least two injunctions from the Bahvṛca Brāhmaṇa (see note in my Translation, 237),—a text referred to elsewhere (see Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.* 3.614, and Garbe, Index to text of ĀpŚS., s. v.), and certainly not the same as AB. or KB. This is curious, because the Bhāṣya seldom names the works from which it quotes; in fact I do not remember noticing a single other instance. Ordinarily it identifies the rite with which its quotation is connected, but that is all. Some of the very most commonly quoted injunctions are of uncertain origin; e.g. *somena yajeta*, the originative injunction of the soma

rite (see 12, with note in Translation). There is, indeed, some reason to believe that many if not most of the quotations dealing with the soma sacrifice were taken from some account of it which is unknown to us. When I have been unable to find any possible source for a quotation, I have had to content myself with indicating, so far as possible, the approximate context in which it seems to have occurred—presumably in some lost text. There are few instances where I have not succeeded in finding at least a possible source.

Quotations from texts of the Taittirīya school

yad āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālo ['māvāsyāyāṁ ca pūrṇamāsyāṁ cācyuto] bhavati, 47; TS. 2.6.3.3.
hṛdayasyāgre 'vadyati, 70; TS. 6.3.10.4.
imām agṛbhṇan raśanām ṛtasyety aśvābhidhānīm ādatte, 72; TS. 5.1.2.1.
yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śṛṇoti, 105; TS. 3.5.7.2.
yad āṅkte cakṣur eva bhrātṛvyasya vṛṅkte,121; TS. 6.1.1.5.
audumbaro yūpo bhavati, 135; TS. 2.1.1.6.
samānayata upabhṛtaḥ, 153; TS. 2.6.1.2.
yo vai prayājānāṁ mithunaṁ veda, 153; TS. 2.6.1.4.
aganma suvaḥ suvar aganma, 193; TS. 1.6.6.1, 1.7.6.1 (see p. 24).
saktūn (TS. ĀpŚS. BŚS. add pradāvye) juhoti (TS. ĀpŚS. juhuyāt), 230; TS. 3.3.8.4, ĀpŚS. 13.24.16, BŚS. 4.11 (126.16).
pāṇigrahaṇāt tu (ĀpDhŚ. hi) sahatvaṁ karmasu tathā puṇyaphaleṣu, 233; ĀpDhŚ. 2.14.16f.
agnir jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhā, 284; TB. 2.1.2.10.
agnir jyotir jyotir agniḥ svāheti sāyaṁ juhoti, 286; TB. 2.1.9.2.
agneḥ pūrvāhutiḥ, 288; TB. 2.1.7.1.
vāyavyaṁ śvetam ālabheta; vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā, 365; TS. 2.1.1.1.
barhiṣi rajataṁ na deyam; so 'rodīt..., 366; TS. 1.5.1.1–2 (where rajataṁ is to be supplied from the context).

A shade less certain are the following:
adantako hi saḥ (TS. omits saḥ), 98; TS. 2.6.8.5.

pṛṣadājyenānuyājān yajati, 143; TS. 6.3.11.6.
prāyaṇīyaniṣkāsa (TS. prāyaṇīyasya niṣ°) udayanīyam anunirvapati (TS. abhinir°), 185; TS. 6.1.5.5 (see p. 24).
tasyaitasya yajñakratoś catvāra ṛtvijaḥ, 196; TB. 2.3.6.2 (see note in Translation).
yasyāhitāgner agnir gṛhān dahet so (TS. yasya gṛhān dahaty) 'gnaye kṣāmavate 'ṣṭākapālaṁ puroḍāśaṁ (TS. tr., puro° aṣṭa°) nirvapet, 225; TS. 2.2.2.5.
etāni vāva tāni jyotīṅṣi ya etasya stomāḥ, 313; TB. 1.5.11.2.

With varying degrees of probability the following may also be accepted:
dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt (ju° understood from context in TB.), 33; TB. 2.1.5.6.
payasā juhoti, 60; TB. 2.1.5.4 (reading juhuyāt), cf. KS. 6.3 (51.11) payasāgnihotraṁ juhoti.
darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta, 47; svargakāmo darśapūrṇamāsau (sc. kuryāt), ĀpŚS. 3.14.8.
jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta, 23; svar° jyo° ya° ĀpŚS. 10.2.1.
somam abhiṣuṇoti, 165; abhiṣuṇoti (sc. somam), TS. 6.4.5.1.
vrīhīn prokṣati, 71; enān (sc. vrīhīn) pro° TB. 3.2.5.4; cf. prokṣati (sc. vrīhīn) MS. 4.1.6 (7.17), KS. 31.4 (5.3).
vrīhīn avahanti, 243; avahanti (sc. vrīhīn), TB. 3.2.5.6.
yad āhavanīye juhoti, 73; TB. 1.6.5.4 (reading juhuyāt), 1.1.10.5 (juhvati).
vasante brāhmaṇo 'gnīn ādadhīta, 228; TB. 1.1.2.6, BŚS. 2.12 (53.16)—both reading 'gnim.
varṣāsu rathakāro 'gnīn ādadhīta, 98; cf. BŚS. 2.12 (53.16) var° ratha° (sc. 'gnim ādadhīta).
varma vā etad yajñasya kriyate yat prayājānuyājā ijyante, 121; yat... ijyante varmaiva tad yajñāya kriyate, TS. 2.6.1.5.
rājā rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajeta, 161; rājā svargakāmo (sic!) rājasūyena yajeta, ĀpŚS. 18.8.1. See next, which points to a Taittirīya origin for the Mīmāṅsā quotations about the rājasūya rite.
rājasūyāya hy enā utpunāti, 168; TB. 1.7.6.4.
āśvinaṁ grahaṁ gṛhītvā trivṛtā yūpaṁ parivīyāgneyaṁ savanīyaṁ paśum upākaroti, 212; ĀpŚS. 12.18.12, omitting the

first three words, which seem to summarize the preceding performance; cf. however ŚB. 4.2.5.12 āśvinaṁ grahaṁ gṛhītvopaniṣkramya yūpaṁ parivyayati, parivīya yūpaṁ paśum upākaroti.

yad viśvedevāḥ samayajanta tad vaiśvadevasya vaiśvadevatvam, 312; TB. 1.4.10.5. Placed in the doubtful column because the accompanying injunctions (vaiśvadevena yajeta, etc.) appear to be taken from a Maitrāyaṇīya source.

viṣṇur upāṅśu yaṣṭavyaḥ, 288; see note in Translation ad loc.

nānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karoti, 341; ĀpŚS. 24.13.6.

puroḍāśaṁ caturdhā karoti, 351; TB. 3.3.8.6 (where puro° is understood from the context).

āgneyaṁ caturdhā karoti, 351; cf. āg° puroḍāśaṁ ca° kṛtvā, ĀpŚS. 3.3.2.

The following may, on the face of things, be taken at least as well from another school text, tho they occur in Taittirīya texts. First, a group occurring both in Taittirīya and Maitrāyaṇīya texts:

aindravāyavaṁ gṛhṇāti, 57; ĀpŚS. 12.14.8, MŚS. 2.3.5.4, KŚS. 9.6.6.

indrāgnī idaṁ havir ajuṣetām avīvṛdhetāṁ maho jyāyo 'krātām, 115; TB. 3.5.10.3, MS. 4.13.9 (212.5).

nāntarikṣe na divi, 342; TS. 5.2.7.1, MS. 3.2.6 (23.10), KS. 20.5 (23.6).

aṣṭau havīṅṣi, 309; MS. 1.10.8 (148.5), TB. 1.6.3.3.

sāyaṁ juhoti, 279; MS. 1.8.1 (115.7), 6 (124.11), TB. 2.1.2.7.

agnir jyotir jyotir agniḥ svāhā, 279; MS. 1.6.10 (102.11) etc., TB. 2.1.9.2.

The rest of this group are probably quoted from Maitrāyaṇīya, not Taittirīya, sources:

syonaṁ te sadanaṁ kṛṇomi (TB. ĀpŚS. karomi) ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṁ kalpayāmi, 104; MŚS. 1.2.6.19, TB. 3.7.5.2f., ĀpŚS. 2.10.6.

vedaṁ kṛtvā vediṁ karoti, 199; MŚS. 1.1.3.3; cf. ĀpŚS. 7.3.10, 8.13.2, where the two parts are separated by other words.

vaiśvadevena yajeta, 303; MS. 1.10.8 (148.20), adding paśukāmaḥ; in TB. 1.4.10.1, KS. 36.3 (70.13), vaiś° yajate.

agnihotraṁ juhoti, 273; see note in Translation.

vaiśvadevy āmikṣā, 251; MS. 1.10.1 (140.9), KS. 9.4 (107.4), TB. 1.6.2.5. Certainly not taken from TB.; see āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ etc., 316.

Next, a group found in Taittirīya and other schools, but not in Maitrāyaṇīya texts:—

svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ, 9; TA. 2.15.7, ŚB. 11.5.6.3.

paryagnikṛtaṁ pātnīvatam utsṛjati, 70; TS. 6.6.6.1, KS. 30.1 (182.11).

samidho yajati; tanūnapātaṁ yajati, 204; TS. 2.6.1.1, ŚB. 1.5.3.9, 10, KB. 3.4. Cf. next.

samidhaḥ samidho 'gna ājyasya vyantu, 300; see note in Text ad loc. The only known text which reads the mantra exactly in this form is ŚŚS. 1.7.1 (perhaps also MŚS. 5.1.2.6 may be counted; but the injunction corresponding seems not to occur in Maitr. texts). Since the injunction (see preceding) occurs in KB., may we guess that both were taken from the Kauṣītakin school?

ya iṣṭyā paśunā somena (Bhāṣya on 12.2.25 adds vā, cf. KS) yajeta so 'māvāsyāyāṁ paurṇamāsyāṁ (Bhāṣya pūrṇa°, cf. KS) vā yajeta, 187; yadīṣṭyā yadi paśunā yadi somena yajetāmāvāsyāyāṁ vaiva paurṇamāsyāṁ vā yajeta ĀpŚS. 10.2.8; tasmād iṣṭyā vāgrāyaṇena vā paśunā vā somena vā pūrṇamāse vāmāvāsyāyāṁ vā yajeta KS. 8.1 (84.3). Probably from ĀpŚS.

śyenenābhicaran yajeta, 302; ṢB. and ĀpŚS., see page 25. In the same context occur the next two:

yathā vai śyeno nipatyādatte, evam ayaṁ dviṣantaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ nipatyādatte, 302; ṢB. 3.8.3 yathā śyena ādadītaivam evainam etenādatte. Apparently no correspondent in ĀpŚS. or elsewhere. Cf. preceding and next.

lohitoṣṇīṣā (ṢB. inserts lohitavāsaso, ĀpŚS. lohitavasanā, and both add nivītā) ṛtvijaḥ pracaranti, 145; ṢB. 3.8.22, ĀpŚS. 22.4.23. See preceding two. These three quotations must be either taken from ṢB. (inaccurately—or from an older form of it?), or from some unknown source; not from ĀpŚS.

Quotations from texts of the Maitrāyaṇīya school

Besides those mentioned above as occurring also in Taittirīya texts, the following occur:

aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate, 89; MS. 3.2.4 (20.13).
barhir devasadanaṁ dāmi, 90; MS. 1.1.2 (1.9).
na hotāraṁ vṛṇīte, 139; MS. 1.10.18 (158.3).
indrāgnī rocanā divaḥ, 171; MS. 4.11.1 (159.1).
aindrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet; vaiśvānaraṁ dvādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet; 171; MS. 2.1.1 (1.1) and 2.1.2 (2.5).
etayā (MS. tayā) niṣādasthapatiṁ yājayet, 233; MS. 2.2.4 (18.15).
pracīnapravaṇe vaiśvadevena yajeta, 306; MŚS. 1.7.1.5.

Somewhat less certain are the following:

paśunā yajeta, 74; MŚS. 1.8.6.24; see note in Translation ad loc.
ṛtvigbhyo daksiṇāṁ dadāti, 277; cf. ṛtvigbhyo dadāti, MS. 4.8.3 (110.1). But see the passage. May be from an unknown source.
dīkṣito na dadāti na juhoti, 362; cf. MS. 3.6.5 (66.5) dī° na dadāti, and 3.6.6 (66.12) nāgnihotraṁ juhoti (sc. dīkṣitaḥ).

Still more dubious is this:

yad agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhoti, 276. The only approximation to this which I have discovered is found in MS. 1.8.7 (125.4). But if based on this, it must have been recast. See note in Translation ad loc.

The above passages were found only in Maitr. texts. I append a couple of others which occur also in KS. I believe that they were probably taken from MS., since I have not discovered a single quotation which must have been taken from KS.:

āśvino daśamo gṛhyate, 200; MS. 4.6.1 (78.1); KS. 27.5 (144.11).
āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ, saumyaś caruḥ, 316; MS. 1.10.1 (140.8), KS. 9.4 (107.3).

Quotations from the Pañcaviṅśa Brāhmaṇa

etasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā paśukāmo hy etena yajeta, 36; PB. 17.7.1, omitting the words hy etena, which are however clearly understood; comm. anenāgniṣṭutā.
udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ, 249; PB. 19.7.2 (where udbhidā is understood from the context).

gauś cāśvaś cāśvataraś ca gardabhaś cājāś cāvayaś ca vrīhayaś ca yavāś ca tilāś ca māṣāś ca tasya dvādaśaśataṁ dakṣiṇāḥ, 277; gauś...māṣāś caitasyām eva virāji pratitiṣṭhati, PB. 16.1.10, followed in 11 by: tasya dvādaśaṁ śataṁ dakṣiṇāḥ. It is quite certain that this is the source of our quotation.

pratitiṣṭhanti ha vai (PB. omits ha vai; Bhāṣya ha vā ete) ya etā rātrīr (PB. and Bhāṣya omit rātrīr) upayanti, 118; also, with the variations indicated, Bhāṣya on J. 4.3.17; PB. 23.2.4, 5.4, 9.5, 11.5, 14.7, etc. Always in the same form in PB. Perhaps taken from an unknown source.

Quotations from texts of the Vājasaneyin school

saha paśūn ālabheta, 210; KŚS. 22.3.28 (reading ālabhate).

aṣṭavarṣaṁ brāhmaṇam upanayīta, 228; PGS. 2.2.1, reading upanayet. This is the closest approach to our quotation which I have found; no other GS. seems to have the word aṣṭavarṣaṁ in the corresponding passages. But I am not at all certain that this is the real source. The preceding case from KŚS. is also somewhat uncertain.

Finally, it may be mentioned as an isolated curiosity that there is one quotation—pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ, 244—which according to our C. comm. is taken from the Rāmāyaṇa; and there, at any rate, it does actually occur (see the passage). I have some doubts as to whether the Mīmāṅsakas actually got it thence; but I have not discovered it anywhere else. However, there remains a residuum of cases for which I have found no sources; these were presumably, for the most part at least, taken from works that are lost to us. They are, of course, included in my Index of Quotations, p. 299ff.

VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Vedic Texts, Mīmāṅsā works, and other original sources, arranged in alphabetic order of the abbreviations used for them:[6]

AA: Aitareya Āraṇyaka, Bibliotheca Indica.
AB: Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, ed. Aufrecht.

[6] In most cases I have used the editions employed by Bloomfield in his *Vedic Concordance,* which see for details of date and place of publication. Only when I have used other editions of Vedic works than those there quoted have I thought it necessary to mention these data.

AGS: Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra, ed. Stenzler.
ĀpDhS: Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, ed. Bühler.
ĀpŚS: Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra, ed. Garbe.
Arthasaṁgraha (not abbreviated). [See p. 22f.] Ed. and transl. by Thibaut, Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 4, 1882.
AŚS: Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra, Bibliotheca Indica.
B: the Bombay edition of the Āpadevī, see p. 3.
BŚS: Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, ed. Caland, Bibliotheca Indica, 1904–1924.
C: the Chowkhamba (Benares) edition (by Chinnaswami) of the Āpadevī, see p. 3.
J: Jaimini. Edition: The Aphorisms of the Mimáṁsa by Jaimini, with the commentary of Śavara-svámin. Edited by Pandita Maheśa-chandra Nyáyaratna. Bibliotheca Indica, 2 vols., 1873–1889.—Translation (partial; Books 1–3), by Ganganath Jha, in Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. X, Part 1. 1916. I have not had access to the translation (also partial) by Pt. Mohan Lal Sandal in Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. XXVII.
KB: Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, ed. Lindner.
KS: Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā, ed. von Schroeder (Leipzig, 1900–1910; 3 vols.).
KŚS: Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra, ed. Weber.
LŚS: Lāṭyāyana Śrauta Sūtra, Bibliotheca Indica.
M: Mānava Dharma Śāstra, ed. Jolly.
MS: Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, ed. von Schroeder.
MŚS: Mānava Śrauta Sūtra, ed. Knauer.
Nyāyaratnamālā (not abbreviated). By Pārthasārathimiśra. Ed. by Gangādhara Śāstri. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Vol. 7. Benares, 1900.
P: Pāṇini, ed. Boehtlingk.
P (in quoting readings for the text of the Āpadevī) = the edition of the Āpadevī publisht in The Pandit, see p. 3f.
PB: Pañcaviṅśa or Tāṇḍya Mahā Brāhmaṇa, Bibliotheca Indica.
PGS: Pāraskara Gṛhya Sūtra, ed. Stenzler.
R: Rāṇaka. Edition: Nyâyasudhâ, a commentary on Tantravârtika, by Paṇḍit Sômeshwara Bhaṭṭa. Edited by Paṇḍit Mukunda Shâstri. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Vol. 14. Benares, 1901–1909. (The name Rāṇaka is used for this work in the Āpadevī, 128, and elsewhere.)
ṢB: Ṣaḍviṅśa Brāhmaṇa, ed. Eelsingh (Leiden, Brill, 1908).
ŚB: Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, ed. Weber.
ŚD: The Shâstradîpikâ [of Pārthasārathimiśra], with the commentary.... Edited by Srî Dharmadattasûrî. Bombay, Nirnayasagar Press, 1915. [Note: In this edition the text of the first pāda of the first adhyāya of the work—which is a commentary on the sūtras of Jaimini—is paginated separately from the rest. This causes some confusion in page-references.]
ŚGS: Śāñkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra, ed. Oldenberg.
ŚŚS: Śāñkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, ed. Hillebrandt.

ŚV: The Mîmânsâ-Śloka-Vârtika of Kumârila Bhatta...edited by Râma Śâstrî Tailanga. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Vol. 3. Benares, 1898–1899.—Translation: Çlokavārtika. Translated...by Gangānātha Jhā...Bibliotheca Indica, 1900–1908.

TA: Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Bibliotheca Indica.

TB: Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa; generally reference is made to the Ānandāśrama Series edition (No. 37, Poona, 1898), rather than to the Bibliotheca Indica edition.

TS: Taittirīya Saṁhitā, ed. Weber.—Translation by Keith, Harvard Oriental Series, vols. 18 and 19.

TV: The Tantravârtika...by Bhaṭṭa Kumârila. Edited by...Gangâdhara Śâstrî...Benares Sanskrit Series, 1903.—Translation, by Ganganath Jha, Bibliotheca Indica, 1903–1924.

Vidhiviveka, by Maṇḍanamiśra. Publisht in The Pandit, N.S., Vols. 25–28, Benares, 1903–1906.

Y: Yājñavalkya, ed. Stenzler.

2. Other works chiefly consulted. (For the works on the Mīmāṅsā system by Ganganath Jha, Keith, and Kane, see the Preface, p. iv.)

Caland, W., and Henry, V., L'Agniṣṭoma. 2 vols., Paris, 1906–7.

Hillebrandt, A.: NVMO = Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer. Jena, 1879.

Hillebrandt, A.: Ritualliteratur. (In Bühler's Grundriss.) Strassburg, 1897.

Kinjavadekar, Pandit Vamana Sastri. Agnihotracandrikā. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, No. 87. Poona, 1921.

Kinjavadekar, Pandit Vamana Sastri. Darśapūrṇamāsaprakāśaḥ. A.S.S., No. 93. Poona, 1924.

Schwab, Julius. Das altindische Thieropfer. Erlangen, 1886.

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

THE ELUCIDATION OF THE LAWS OF THE MĪMĀṄSĀ BY ĀPADEVA, SON OF ANANTADEVA

Invocation

1. By a mere particle of Whose compassion all four objects of human desire (religious duty, worldly advantage, love, and salvation) are attained—Him I adore, Govinda (Viṣṇu, in the form of Kṛṣṇa), who loves his devotees.

2. Endowed with infinite noble qualities, fond of devotion to the Infinite, and (himself) Infinite (ananta) in form (in name; a play on the name Ananta-deva),—my Teacher[1] I salute, who (like the Infinite Supreme Being) has the form of Joy.

Dharma; bhāvanā

3. In this (Mīmāṅsā system), as is well-known, the Exalted Seer Jaimini, of supreme compassion, has expounded (religious) Duty in Twelve Books, beginning with (the sentence) "Now therefore the investigation of duty." Here Duty means any matter enjoined by the Veda with a view to attaining a useful purpose. Such as sacrifices and the like. For these are enjoined with a view to attaining Heaven in such sentences as "He who desires Heaven shall sacrifice." This is to be understood as follows. In the word *yajeta*, "he shall sacrifice," there are two elements, the root *yaj*, "sacrifice," and the ending *-ta* (third singular optative, with the meaning of an imperative). Of these (two elements), in the ending also there are two elements, verbality and optativeness (general verbal force, and injunctive force). And verbality is found in all the ten sets of mode and tense formations (finite verb-forms); but optativeness only in the optative forms, nowhere else. In this (ending, tho it has this two-fold function), both verbality and optativeness express merely efficient-force.[2] Efficient-force means a particular kind of operation in an efficient-agent which is conducive to the production of the effect

[1] The author's teacher was also his father, Anantadeva.

[2] Not e.g. the subject (cf. 75ff.).

(or: to the coming-into-being of that-which-is-to-come-into-being). And this (efficient-force) is of two kinds: word-efficient-force and end-efficient-force.[3]

Śābdī bhāvanā

4. Of these (two), word-efficient-force is a particular kind of operation in an efficient-agent[4] which is conducive to man's action (i.e. to the particular action denoted by the verb). And it is exprest by that element (in the ending, as *-ta*) which denotes optativeness (injunctiveness). Because, when one hears the optative form, it is necessarily recognized that "he is impelling me to action; he is engaging in an operation which is conducive to my action." And what is (invariably) recognized from anything, that is the thing exprest by it; as "cowhood" by the word "cow." And this particular kind of operation conducive to action is, in world(-ly injunctions), based on a person (who delivers the injunction), and is a species of will. But in the Veda, since no person is concerned therein, it is based only on a word, that is on the optative or similar ending (with no enjoining speaker, human or divine, behind it). For the Veda is not the work of any person; since it has been established that it is not of personal origin by such passages as the following:

5. "All study of the Veda is preceded by the teacher's study (of it), because this is (and always has been) a universal characteristic of Vedic study, just like Vedic study at the present day."[5]

[3] The "word-efficient-force" is the injunctive force exprest by the "optativeness" of the ending. It is called "of the word" because in Vedic injunctions there is no authority except the "word" of the Veda itself behind the injunction—no person, human or divine, from whom the injunction emanates. This is explained immediately below, and more fully in 368–382. The "end-efficient-force" is exprest by the general-"verbality" element in the verb-ending; it denotes the activity which is enjoined upon one by the injunction; and it is called "of the end" because it leads directly to the "end" (*artha*) or "fruit" (*phala;* whence it is also called "fruit-efficient-force") to be attained by the action which is enjoined. It is defined and explained in 123 and 383–392. The comm. explains *ārthī* as "aiming at the fruit," *phala,* because that is "aimed at, sought" (*arthyate* = *prārthyate*) by men.

[4] The "efficient-agent" is, as will presently be explained, the giver of the command in worldly injunctions; but in the Veda it is merely the verbal expression of injunction, as e.g. the optative ending.

[5] Instead of "the entire study" (i.e. the study of all the Veda, in all its

6. And since the round of existences is beginningless according to the accepted law that each world-aeon is preceded by another world-aeon, and since God is omniscient, all that can be establisht (about the origin of the Veda) is that in this world-aeon God remembers the Veda from past world-aeons and makes it known; but there is no basis for a hypothesis that its essence was got at by any other means-of-knowledge and composed. And so, since there is no personal (author of it, not even God, who is also a person), it (the Vedic injunctive force) is based only on the word. And that is precisely why they call it "word-efficient-force."

7. And this word-efficient-force (like any activity) requires (presupposes) three elements: the end (or aim), the means (or instrument, by which it operates to reach its end), and the manner (method, way in which the operation is performed).

Of these, as for the requirement of end, the "end-efficient-force" is construed as its end; this also has (the same) three elements, which will be set forth later (392). The reason (for this construction) is that it is denoted by the same (verbal) ending (*-ta*), so that we have a direct-statement (of the two things) in one common element.[6] Altho number etc. are also denoted by the same verbal ending,[7] nevertheless they are not construed as the end (of the injunctive efficient-force) because they are (obviously) not fit (to serve as such).

8. As for the requirement of means, (the hearer's) knowledge of (the meaning of) the optative etc. endings is construed as the means (to the word-efficient-force). And it is not the means in the sense that it produces the efficient-force (as its *cause*), as

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branches or schools), which is the comm.'s interpretation, I render "all study" (i.e. study at all times). Similarly Ganganath Jha, Transl. of ŚV., p. 551.—The verse is part of an argument for the eternality of the Veda, from the *regressus ad infinitum* of its study, handed down from teacher to pupil. The ŚV. says that the same argument would apply to finite texts like the Mahābhārata but that we know their authors' names. The Vedic *ṛṣis* are not really authors of the Veda.

[6] See 69, 74 for this "mode-of-evidence." The question is, "what is enjoined (by the injunctive efficient-force of the opt. ending)?" Most naturally, "the end-efficient force" exprest by the same ending; i.e., the action which one is enjoined to perform.

[7] The ending *-ta* also indicates singular number, and tense, etc.; but of course it would be absurd to suggest that any of these is the "end" of the injunctive force.

proximity (of the senses to the objects of sense) produces knowledge of forms and other (objects of sense); for (in that case) before there is knowledge of the optative endings etc. the word-efficient-force could not exist, just as before there is proximity (to the senses) knowledge of forms etc. can not exist. But rather, (it is the "means") only in the sense that (as *instrument*) it makes for the production of the efficient-force's effect (or end). For knowledge of the optative endings etc. produces the end-efficient-force which is the effect (aim) of the word-efficient-force, as an ax produces cutting. Therefore knowledge of the optative sign etc. is construed as its means.[8]

9. As for the requirement of manner, (the sacrificer's) knowledge of the glorifications (of ritual acts) is construed as manner. And this knowledge of the glorifications is produced by the explanatory-passages (*arthavāda*), such as "Vāyu verily is the swiftest deity."[9] For these explanatory-passages, finding no use in expressing their own (direct or literal) meaning, by implication express glorifications of ritual acts. Because if they did nothing but express their own (direct) meaning, it would follow that they would be meaningless. And this is out of the question, because they are covered by the rule of study, and hence cannot be meaningless. For the injunction to study, namely "One should engage in study (of the Veda)," in declaring that the entire Veda should be studied, indicates that all the Veda contains only useful meaning, since what is meaningless (or, useless) could not be an object of (required) study.

Vidhi

10. And the Veda, of which we have been speaking, is composed of injunctions, formulas, names, prohibitions, and explanatory-passages.

[8] The Sanskrit word *karaṇa*, "means," means both "cause" and "instrument;" this is the whole point of the above discussion, which hardly has any bearing in English.

[9] On *arthavāda* see 364–367.—Summing up: the injunctive force produces the final force (the activity designed to be instigated)—thru the hearer's knowledge of the meaning of the injunctive form as its instrument, and with his knowledge of the *arthavādas* praising the rites to be performed, as its "manner" (on this term see 126f.); on hearing the "praises" of rites in the *arthavādas*, one is further stimulated to perform them.

Of these, an injunction derives its meaning from (or, has its function in) enjoining something that has a useful purpose. And it (always) enjoins something that is not (previously or otherwise) establisht (by any other authority or motivation). Thus, the injunction "He who desires Heaven shall offer the Agnihotra" enjoins the (otherwise) unestablished oblation as having a useful purpose; it means "By the Agnihotra-oblation he shall effect (the attainment of) Heaven."

11. But where the rite has been establisht in some other way, there we have an injunction of merely an accessory, with reference to it. Thus, in the injunction "He shall offer oblation with sour-milk," the oblation has been already establisht by the injunction "He shall offer the Agnihotra (who desires Heaven)," and therefore (we cannot say that the oblation is enjoined here, but) only the sour-milk is enjoined with reference to the oblation; it means "By sour-milk he shall effect the oblation (which has already been enjoined)."

12. But where neither (the rite nor its accessories) have been enjoined, there a particularized injunction occurs, as stated in the words: "If not taught by another."[10] Here the word 'taught' means 'prescribed.' Thus in the injunction "He shall sacrifice with soma,"[11] since neither the sacrifice (itself) nor soma (its material) have been establisht (otherwise), we have an injunction of the sacrifice particularized by soma (as its material); it means "He shall effect the desired end by means of a sacrifice of soma." And there is no split of the sentence (*vākya-bheda*, see Index) in the injunction of both these things, because the thing particularized (by its accessory) is really a unit (not two separate things are enjoined, but one, which is described by one of its qualities).

[10] The sūtra teaches that a rite and its various accessories may all be laid down in a single injunction, provided none of them are laid down elsewhere. But if the rite has already been enjoined, only a single accessory can be enjoined with reference to it in one accessory-injunction.

[11] Constantly quoted in Mīmāṅsā literature; according to Bhāṣya on J. 3.1.13, the full form should be *ya evaṁ vidvān somena yajate*. But for this, we might guess that it was quoted from ĀpŚS. 10.2.8, *yadīṣṭyā yadi paśunā yadi somena yajetāmāvāsyāyāṁ vaiva paurṇamāsyāṁ vā yajeta*—which is appropriate in context and is quoted (inaccurately) by the Bhāṣya on J. 12.2.25 (cf. the close parallel KS. 8.1, end). I have found no other possible source. Cf. 74, note; 187.

Viśiṣṭa-vidhi involves matvartha-lakṣaṇā

13. And in a particularized injunction there is (necessarily made) an implication of possessive indication; thus, (in the sentence just quoted) the word soma implies possessive indication; it means "(a sacrifice) having (characterized by) soma." For without implication of possessive indication no construction of the word soma is possible.

For first, if 'soma' and 'the sacrifice' be understood as of the same form and both be construed as merely means to the efficient-force, understanding "with soma (and) with the sacrifice he shall effect the desired result," then in the injunction of both these things (independently) there is split of the sentence; and since 'soma' like 'sacrifice' is (on that assumption) means to the fruit-(=end-)efficient-force, it (soma) assumes a principal position and can not be for the sake of the sacrifice (and subordinate to it), and can not be the material for the sacrifice; and since the need for a means felt on the part of the fruit-efficient-force exprest by the (general verbality in the) ending (*-ta*) has been satisfied by the 'sacrifice,' which is got from the same word (in its radical part, *yaj-eta*), there would be no occasion to construe as means (to that same thing) the 'soma' which is got from a separate word (so that 'soma' would really have no part to play, whereas it should express the material for the sacrifice and be dependent on it).

14. And if (the words 'soma' and 'sacrifice') be given different constructions, then, in the first place, the construction cannot be "By the sacrifice (he shall effect) soma," because the sacrifice must be construed as means to the fruit-efficient-force that is exprest by the verb ending, since it is got from the same word (*yaje-ta*, which contains both the root *yaj-*, 'sacrifice,' and the ending that denotes verbality), and therefore it (sacrifice) cannot be construed (as means) with an efficient-force of which soma would be the action (effected). And also because this would mean that the sacrifice was for the sake of soma. And this is out of the question, because it would mean two unseen-results. For the sacrifice cannot serve the purpose of the soma in any visible way, because the sacrifice produces no visible effect upon soma, such as beating produces upon rice (viz. removing the husks). Therefore it would have to be assumed that it had some unseen (transcendental) effect on soma, like sprinkling upon rice.

15. Now then: if the sacrifice is for the sake of soma, then we should have to assume that soma (instead of the sacrifice) is construed as the means to the fruit efficient-force. And the means of an efficient-force has been defined (8) as that which brings about the end which the efficient-force is to effect. And soma cannot produce the (end or) fruit (of the sacrifice) except in some unseen way, since it is reduced to ashes by (being poured into the fire in) the oblation enjoined in the sentence "He offers oblation with the (soma-)cups."[12] Therefore, because two unseen-results would have to be assumed, the sacrifice cannot be for the sake of soma, and we cannot understand the construction "By the sacrifice he shall effect soma." And also because soma, which presents itself as a means (by its instrumental ending), cannot be construed as end (as if it were an accusative).

16. Suppose then we construe it "By soma he shall effect the sacrifice." Then, to be sure, we have no case of two unseen results, since soma is then used for the sake of the sacrifice, as its means, and so is provided with a quite visible use, namely, the production of the sacrifice. Nor do we have the (aforesaid) difficulty of construing soma as end when it presents itself (by its form) as means; for it is construed precisely as means. But still, we have a difficulty of precisely this same sort (viz., taking a word in a construction not warranted by syntactic form), namely, that the sacrifice is construed as end, whereas, since it has not been (previously) establisht, it must be construed as means to the (end-)efficient-force.

17. (Objection:) But in the word 'he shall sacrifice' the sacrifice is not presented as either means or end, since there is no instrumental or other (i.e. accusative) ending to express that; but rather there is stated merely a connexion of 'sacrifice' (which is the meaning of the root) with the efficient-force (exprest by the ending). And the sacrifice may be connected with the efficient-force (verbality) as both means and end. So, taking the means-element (of this relationship), it may be connected with the fruit (as means thereto), and taking the end-element, it may be connected with the accessory (soma, as its end).

[12] I have not discovered this in any Vedic text. The comm. says that Pārthasārathimiśra takes *graha* to mean the cups, the vessels in which the soma is offered, while the Rāṇaka understands it as the juice itself. In fact, of course, it may mean both. Cf. 36.

18. To this we reply: Not so. Even if (in the word 'he shall sacrifice') a mere connexion of sacrifice with the efficient-force (verbality) is establisht, nevertheless, in case it presents itself as means, it cannot be construed (also) as end, because of the contradiction; and because the two triplets of contradictory things would result.[13] So, after the word has been construed as means, "by the sacrifice he shall effect Heaven," it would be necessary that afterwards a construction as end should be meant, "By soma he shall effect the sacrifice." And that means a split of the sentence.

19. And it is not proper to say that the mere fact of sacrifice in itself (without defined relationship) is construed with the efficient-force (of the verb) in itself, exprest by the ending. Because only (words having the force of) dependent case-forms (*kāraka*) can be construed with verbs (not nouns undeclined, that is without specified relationship).

So it is establisht that 'soma' cannot be construed with 'sacrifice' in either coördination or non-coördination (like or unlike construction).

20. (Objection:) But, just as in response to the need for a means for the efficient-force exprest by the ending of the word *yaje-ta*, "he shall sacrifice," the sacrifice is construed as the means, in the same way, since it also needs a manner-of-performance, soma may be construed as the manner-of-performance to that same efficient-force; and so we dispose of the implication of possessive indication.

21. To this we reply: No. Because the word *somena*, 'by soma,' with its instrumental ending expresses means, and therefore soma cannot designate the manner-of-performance. If it be suggested that in this word the being the manner-of-performance is (secondarily) implied, then it is better to assume the implication of possessive indication in the word 'soma' itself, in its stem-form

[13] The "triplets" are: *vidheyatva*, the being the object of an injunction; *guṇatva*, the being an accessory; and *upādeyatva*, the being the goal, aim, or object of an undertaking; to which are respectively opposed *anuvādyatva*, the being the object of a supplementary reference; *pradhānatva*, the being the main thing; and *uddeśyatva*, the being a thing "establisht" and taken as a starting-point. If the sacrifice is taken as means to the action leading to the fruit, it must be characterized by the first three things; if as the end of an action of which soma is the means, then by the second three. It cannot be both at once.

(rather than in the declensional ending of the word[14]), by the rule "But an implication of something irregular (should be made) in a subordinate (rather than in a principal)." If however it be argued that implication should be applied to the ending rather, as being the last part, according to the rule enjoining no contradiction with what goes before ("with what has taken place"), as stated in the (sūtra-)section containing the words "The Veda rather, because it is found above;"[15] even so soma could not be construed as the manner-of-performance. Because a material thing cannot be a manner-of-performance, since only an action can be that, and a material substance can only be a subsidiary element. And that is why, since it cannot be used as a manner-of-performance, a material substance is not subject to 'context,'[16] as is said in this verse:

22. "Verbs (or, actions) in the context do not take qualities or material substances in place of manner-of-performance, except by intermediate connexion with an action, (which must be) implied by the sentence (by connected utterance)."

23. We shall explain this below. And further: the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" is, surely, the originative injunction of the sacrifice, not an injunction of qualification; because its injunction of qualification is "He who desires Heaven shall

[14] That is, we should understand *somena* as implying *soma-vat-ā*, "by that which has soma," with implicational connotation in the stem, but with the same meaning indicated by the case-ending. The Mīmānsā theory is that the principal part of a word is the ending, and that the stem is subordinate to it.

[15] The section discusses the prescription *uccair ṛcā kriyate, upānśu yajuṣā, uccaiḥ sāmnā* (MS. 3.6.5 [66.9] and 4.8.7 [115.1], inverting order of last two phrases) as to whether it refers to the Rig, Yajur, and Sāma Vedas, or simply to stanzas, formulas, and chants, this latter being the primary meaning of the words *ṛc* etc., while by "implication" only they mean the Vedas. Since the preceding *arthavāda*-passage refers to the three Vedas, it is decided that these must be referred to in the injunctions. This seems to suggest that implied meaning should be assumed rather in a subsequent passage, when needed to make it consistent with something that precedes; that is, you should take what comes first in a primary sense, and then if necessary apply secondary connotations to what follows. In the present instance, this would mean taking the stem of *somena* in a primary sense, and the ending in an implicatory sense.

[16] This subject is fully explained in 122ff., and the verse quoted again in 127.

sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma."[17] And in an originative injunction there is no need felt for manner-of-performance, since this need could not arise clearly, because it would be obscured by the need for the specific desirable end to be obtained (which is not stated in an originative injunction, and is a much more pressing "need" than that for mere procedure). So it is establisht that soma cannot be construed as manner-of-performance to the (end-)efficient-force. Therefore in a particularized injunction, since there is (otherwise) no possibility of construction, we must unavoidably assume implication of possessive indication.

Pūrvapakṣa suggestion that somena yajeta is a guṇa-vidhi

24. (Objection:)[18] But granting this: still, in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" we have no particularized injunction; for this is too complicated,[19] and makes necessary the implication of possessive indication. But rather it should be taken as an injunction of an accessory only, like the sentence "He offers oblation with sour-milk;"[20] because the force of the injunction passes over to the accessory. As it is said:

25. "Always when another word is directly-stated in syntactic connexion with the verb, since the force of the injunction passes over (to that other word), we are to understand that the verbal root is a mere reference."[21]

[17] Cf. ApŚS. 10.2.1 (*sva° jyo° yaj°*). I have not found a closer approach to the words of our text (which are very commonly quoted in all Mīmāṅsā literature, and always in this form); nor have I discovered the quotation in a *brāhmaṇa* text. The two kinds of injunction named are defined 63 and 225.

[18] The objection which begins here continues thru 46.

[19] "Overloading," *gaurava*; see Index. The "overloading" here consists in assuming that the sentence enjoins both the sacrifice and the accessory soma (hence "particularized"), whereas the objector suggests that the sacrifice has been enjoined elsewhere, and this sentence enjoins only the accessory soma, which is simpler.

[20] The Bhāṣya on J. 4.3.5 specifically distinguishes this injunction (which I have not found in this exact form) from *dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*, on which see 33. Cf. also 11.

[21] "Reference"—sc. to the verb of the originative injunction; that is, here the verb merely refers to that, and does not enjoin a hitherto unenjoined rite; it is the accessory which is enjoined here. It means "He shall effect the (elsewhere enjoined) sacrifice by means of soma;" not (as in the originative injunction), "He shall effect a desired end by the sacrifice."

26. And it should not be said that soma cannot be enjoined with reference to the sacrifice because the latter has not been establisht. For the sacrifice has been establisht by the sentence "He who desires Heaven shall sacrifice with the jyotiṣṭoma." And it should not be said that this cannot be the originative injunction because it is an injunction of qualification; for one and the same sentence may be an injunction of both these kinds, as in "He who desires cattle shall sacrifice with the *udbhid*(-rite)." And on this interpretation we do not need implication of possessive indication in "He shall sacrifice with soma." For if this were a particularized injunction, then because there would be no other way of construing it, we should have to assume that. But if the sacrifice is enjoined in "He who desires Heaven shall sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma,*" there is no need to imply possessive indication anywhere. Not, first, in this latter sentence, because the name-word (*jyotiṣṭoma*) is construed in mere coördination[22] (with the word for 'sacrifice'), thus: "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*, the sacrifice, he shall effect (attainment of) Heaven." Nor yet in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma," since here (only) soma is enjoined with reference to the (otherwise establisht) sacrifice, thus: "With soma he shall effect the sacrifice."

27. (Objection to objection:) Here it might be said: But even in a supplementary reference an implication of possessive indication is necessary. And that is why it is said:

28. "Either in an (originative) injunction, or in a supplementary reference to it, the sacrifice must be taken as means (to the verbal efficient-force). The instrumental ending (of *yāgena* understood in the root *yaj*) connected with it does not lose its power of expressing that."

29. And so, just as in a particularized injunction, so in an injunction of an accessory also we still need implication of possessive indication.

30. (Objector's reply:) We reply: Not so. For implication of possessive indication is admitted (when and) because there is no way of construing the accessory. But it is (only) when the meaning of the root ('sacrifice') is construed as means to the efficient-force that this is the case. And in an injunction of an accessory the meaning of the root is not construed as means; for

[22] See 249, 256ff.

there is no ground (for so taking it). For in the sentence "He offers-oblation with sour-milk" the oblation is not directly stated as means, since there is no instrumental ending or other thing which expresses that. If it be suggested that it is implied (as regularly in originative injunctions),—No; for here it is the accessory which must be enjoined, and it needs an end (an expression of the object towards which it is to serve), and in response to this need it is suitable that the implied functioning of the root-meaning ('oblation') should be only as end, thus: "With sour-milk he shall effect the oblation." And there is no rule-of-limitation that the meaning of the root must be construed only as means to the efficient-force, not in any other way. For otherwise there would be no possible basis for the objector's remarks in the first (section) of the sixth (Book of the Sūtra).

31. For in (Jaimini) 6.1(.1) it is suggested that, because it is directly-stated by the same word, the sacrifice might serve as the end (aim) to the end-efficient-force, which we shall describe later (383ff.) and which is exprest by the verbal-ending in sentences like "He who desires Heaven shall sacrifice;" and this is then refuted (in 6.1.2) on the ground that it (the sacrifice) is not an object of human desire. And if the root-meaning could be construed only as means to the efficient-force, then the very suggestion that it might be construed as end could not arise, and so the first section of the Sixth (Book) would become meaningless.

32. And further: in the section on the Vājapeya the suggestion is made and rejected that the root-meaning could be construed in two ways at once; while if it could only be construed as means, even the suggestion of construing it in two ways at once could not arise. And (yet) we find both the suggestion and the refutation of this double construction set forth.

33. And there is this further reason why the root-meaning cannot be limited to construction as means. Namely, in the section on desires as related to accessories, it is stated that it is construed as the substratum. The argument is as follows. In the sentence "With sour-milk he shall make oblation for one desirous of power," it is clear that the oblation is not enjoined, since that is enjoined in another sentence;[23] nor the oblation's connexion with the fruit, because then the word denoting an

[23] Viz., *agnihotraṁ juhoti*, see 273.

accessory (sour-milk) would be meaningless; nor does it enjoin its connexion with the accessory, because then the word denoting the fruit would be meaningless; nor does it enjoin its connexion with both of them, because when the rite has been establisht the enjoining of more than one thing (in relation to it) means split-of-the-sentence. As it is said:

34. "When the rite has been establisht, more than one accessory can not be enjoined (at once). But when it has not been establisht, even many are enjoined with a single effort (sc. in a particularized injunction)."

35. And here the word 'accessory' is used with implied extension of meaning (to include anything which it may be desired to enjoin); just as the word 'rite' (is used to include anything that has been 'establisht'); because split-of-the-sentence occurs when more than one thing is enjoined in supplementary-reference to a single thing.

36. And that is why, in the section[24] on the singular number of the (soma-)cup, it is said that it is not intended to enjoin singular number of the cup in the sentence "He cleanses the cup,"[25] because if both singular number and cleansing were enjoined with reference to the cup (previously enjoined in the sentence "He makes oblation with the cup")[26] there would be split-of-the-sentence. (In other words, it means that he is to cleanse all the various cups, as many as may be used; the rule does not restrict the cleansing to one, despite the singular number.) —And that is also why in the section[27] on the *revatī*-verses, it is

[24] Here what has been 'enjoined' is not strictly a 'rite' but a cup.

[25] According to Bhāṣya on J. 3.1.13, the full quotation is *daśāpavitreṇa grahaṁ saṁmārṣṭi*. The context referred to is evidently that described in Caland and Henry, *Agniṣṭoma*, §132, n. 3; see the sūtras there quoted and note especially ĀpŚS. 12.14.9–11. The *brāhmaṇa* passages (TS. 6.4.7, MS. 4.5.8, KS. 27.3, ŚB. 4.1.3.1–19) seem to have no reference to the matter, and I do not find the injunction as quoted anywhere.

[26] See 15.

[27] This is an illustration of the implied extension of meaning of the word "accessories" in the verse last quoted; the fruit, e.g., which is here mentioned, is not an "accessory" properly speaking.—See the Bhāṣya on the sūtra quoted for a clearer discussion. The injunction quoted is a close parallel in form to one which immediately precedes it (PB. 17.6.1–2), and the objector suggests that our injunction refers back to it, in short that we are still dealing with the same action. This is refuted in the way briefly indicated in our text.

said that in the sentence "Upon the *revatī*-stanzas (those beginning with RV. 1.30.13) of that same (agniṣṭoma called Agniṣṭut) having made the Vāravantīya (*sāman* as) *agniṣṭoma-sāman*, with that, verily, one desirous of cattle shall sacrifice," since if a connexion between the Vāravantīya-sāman (on the one hand) and the *revatī*-stanzas, the *agniṣṭoma-sāman*, and the fruit (on the other) were enjoined, there would be split-of-the-sentence, therefore another (new) efficient-force (i.e. a different action) subordinate to the (other) efficient-force must be enjoined (and this injunction can therefore not refer back to the preceding action as suggested by the objector).

Therefore (in the sentence "With sour-milk" etc.), the oblation being establisht, we cannot have an injunction of both (fruit and accessory as related to the oblation). Nor yet can a different oblation be enjoined (as in the case of the "*revatī*-section," just quoted), for that would be too complicated; it would involve abandoning the topic under discussion and implied assumption of a different topic, and also implication of possessive indication.[28]

37. Nor yet is it proper to assume that sour-milk alone (without an operation, an 'efficient-force') is enjoined as means (of attaining the fruit). For no thing by itself, not attended by some operation, can be the means (to anything), since the concept of means is limited to a state of being invariably accompanied by the operation of some agent.

38. If you ask: "What then *is* enjoined here?",—it is the instrumentality of the sour-milk, got from the instrumental ending of the word *dadhnā*, 'with sour-milk,' which is enjoined as means to the fruit-efficient-force, since this (instrumentality) is the meaning of the ending and therefore prevails over the (concept) 'sour-milk' (the meaning of the stem; the stem being subordinate to the ending). And so the meaning of the sentence is: "By the instrumentality of sour-milk he shall effect power." And in response to the question "What is that (action) which is in-

[28] For then we should have to assume that this was the originative injunction of a new rite; and since it includes several things, it would have to be a particularized injunction; and it has already been proved, and admitted even by the objector (26), that this necessitates possessive implication, as *dadhimatā homena indriyam bhāvayet*.

herent in[29] this instrumentality?" the oblation, which presents itself in the same vicinity, is brought into relation with it as substratum (*āśraya*). And so it is establisht that the root-meaning may be construed as substratum.

39. Let us pursue the theme further. It is then establisht that the root-meaning is not necessarily construed as means; but rather it serves sometimes as means, sometimes as end, and sometimes as substratum. In an injunction of an accessory it is construed only as end; on that assumption there is no need for implication of possessive indication.

40. And further: if we assume implication of possessive indication in an injunction of an accessory, we must say on what ground (by which of the six modes-of-evidence listed in 67) the accessory is shown to be subsidiary to the root-meaning? Surely not direct-statement, since on this assumption the stated instrumental ending would be evidence that the possessive-indication, rather than the accessory, was subsidiary to it (since the word implied would be e.g. *somavatā*, "with that-which-has-soma," the case-ending being attacht to the possessive suffix; not "with soma"). If connected-utterance, that is syntactical-connexion, be suggested—would it prove it independently, or with implied understanding of (the stronger modes-of-evidence) word-meaning and direct-statement? Not the former, since that would be contrary to the section[30] dealing with the (relative) strength and weakness (of the six modes-of-evidence); for there it is stated that syntactical-connexion proves dependence only by implied understanding of word-meaning and direct-statement. And on the second assumption, to reject the directly-stated form which we would have before us (the instrumental case-form, *somena*) and then understand by implication another directly-stated form, or a

[29] *pratiyogin*, a technical term of the modern Nyāya school; in any relation (*saṁbandha*) between two things, one, the *pratiyogin*, is in relation to the other, the *anuyogin*. They are not thought of as interchangeable. Thus, "the jar (*pratiy.*) is on the ground (*anuy.*);" a quality (*pratiy.*) resides in a thing (*anuy.*). Here, oblation is "contained" or implied in the instrumentality and so is its *pratiyogin*.

[30] Which proves that each "mode" in the list, in the order named, is stronger than the following ones, and that all except the strongest ("direct-statement") prove connexion only thru implied-understanding (*kalpanā*) of the stronger "modes."

recurrence of the same one (*somavatā*), would be resorting to useless labor. And in the case of a particularized injunction we have recourse to this (it is true, but only) because there is no other way (of construing the sense).

41. However, suppose we assume that another directly-stated form is understood. Even then: is it the injunction which that form accompanies, that is the injunction which we actually have before us, that enjoins the accessory as subsidiary to the root-meaning, or some other injunction that is understood? If you say "one that is understood"—no, because then the directly-stated injunction would become meaningless (would have no function). For then it would not enjoin the accessory, since by hypothesis that function is performed by the understood injunction; nor yet the root-meaning, since that is enjoined by another sentence (by the originative injunction of the rite, to which the injunction under discussion is assumed to enjoin merely an accessory).

42. If then you say that it is just the directly-stated injunction, (which we have before us), accompanied by the directly-stated (case-) form which is understood by implication, that enjoins the accessory as subsidiary to the root-meaning, then in that (injunction) how is the root-meaning to be construed? If you say "as means,"—no; for there would be no such construction possible. For you cannot construe thus: "With sour-milk, with the oblation (he shall effect the desired end)."[31] If its construction be taken rather as end, that is, meaning "With curds he shall effect the oblation,"—no, because that overlooks the assumption (made by our opponent, against which we are arguing) that even in a supplementary reference the root-meaning can be construed only as means (that is, it would grant our case), and the meaning which it is desired to have the sentence express would be admitted quite without implication of possessive indication. Therefore in an injunction of an accessory there is no implication of possessive indication.

43. But as for the (verse quoted from the Tantra) Vārtika (above, 28) "Either in an (originative) injunction or in a supplementary reference" etc., that applies when the matter is con-

[31] It was assumed to start with that the "accessory" was construed as "means." In that case the root-meaning cannot also be thus construed.

sidered superficially, not going to the bottom of it. The proof of this is as follows. As long as the sentence "He shall offer the agnihotra oblation" is not perceived, and only the sentence "He offers oblation with sour-milk" is perceived, so long, if people know that by the rule of the first (section) of the Sixth (Book) the oblation cannot be the end (of the verbal efficient-force), and their minds are fixt in careful reflection on the section dealing with (the theory of) each word (of the injunction, as being related to the fruit),[32] and on the section on the meaning of the efficient-force,[33] they will understand it as follows; "With an oblation containing sour-milk he shall effect the desired end." For in the section dealing with each word, first the doubt is raised whether in sentences (particularized injunctions) like "He shall sacrifice with soma" the accessory and the root-meaning are (both) construed as means to the fruit-efficient-force, or only one of them. And after first suggesting that all (words in the sentence) might be so construed, because thus they all would get connexion with the main idea and because there is no ground for a distinction (between them), it is finally decided that only one thing can be the means to the fruit-efficient-force, because this is simpler. For the being the means to the efficient-force consists in producing the end effected by the efficient-force; and since this end, that is something like Heaven, cannot be produced without an unseen element (since we do not see Heaven obtained), therefore if more than one means were assumed, it would follow that we must

[32] Reference is here made to the subject of the first part of the Bhāṣya on J. 2.1.1, and (more fully) TV. pp. 338–339, where it is first suggested that each word of an injunction should be directly connected with the fruit or desired end, since this is the "main thing" (*pradhāna*), but this is refuted by proof that only *one* thing can be the means to the fruit.

[33] This name (in which *bhāva* = *bhāvanā*, TV. p. 340) is ordinarily given to the entire adhikaraṇa 2.1.1, sūtras 1–4, which includes therefore the passage referred to in the preceding note. Here it seems to refer specifically to the Bhāṣya on 2.1.4, which argues that the "transcendental" or "unseen end" of the performance can be connected only with the main action, the "root-meaning," which serves as its means; not with an accessory; or—perhaps rather—to the much fuller discussion of this same subject in TV. pp. 340ff., which is only part of the TV. treatment of the J. passage in question, but to which alone Jha in his Translation (p. 473) applies the term *bhāvārthādhikaraṇa*.

assume more than one unseen-element (which is inadmissible, see Index s. v. *adṛṣṭa*). Therefore only one thing is the means.

44. But in the section on the meaning of the efficient-force, the doubt is then raised: "If only one thing, then even so, is it material-things and accessories which are the means to the fruit-efficient-force, or the root-meaning?" And first it is suggested that material-things and accessories might rather be the means to the efficient-force, by the rule that "Things that have come-to-be (materialized) are taught (as leading) to things that are to come to be." But it is then said that the root-meaning is rather the means to the efficient-force, because the directly-stated form found in the (same) word prevails (the root, such as *hu*, 'offer-oblation,' is found in the same verb-form which expresses by its ending the efficient-force). And so, that other sentence being not perceived, and it being temporarily assumed that even in an injunction of an accessory the root-meaning is the means, there is understood implication of possessive indication in the word denoting an accessory; such is the conclusion.

45. But when the other sentence, "He offers the agnihotra oblation," is perceived, which enjoins the oblation, then it is perceived that since the other sentence enjoins the oblation, here only on accessory is enjoined in supplementary reference to it, and so there is no implication of possessive indication. That is why Pārthasārathimiśra says "This is an injunction of an accessory in the final analysis, not considered superficially (at first glance)," —in dealing with the section on the (butter-) sprinkling and the *agnihotra*.[34]

46. Or else this passage from the (Tantra) Vārtika may be taken to refer to injunctions of qualification, because such injunctions as "He (who desires cattle) shall sacrifice with the Udbhid" (discust in the context of the Vārtika passage) are in-

[34] This section explains that both *agnihotra* (see below, 273ff.) and *āghāra* (in the sentence *āghāram āghārayati*, "He performs the sprinkling," sc. of the *Āhavanīya*-fireplace with ghee, crisscross from corner to corner) are "names" of rites, because they cannot denote accessories (as would appear, perhaps, at first glance), since these have been enjoined in other injunctions. In the case here under discussion, the sentence "he offers oblation with sour-milk" may appear at first glance to be an injunction of a rite, but is found to be one of an accessory (sour-milk), when it is perceived that the rite is elsewhere enjoined.

junctions of qualification. For in them, whether the sacrifice is enjoined, or is referred to after being establisht in (another) originative injunction, in either case the root-meaning must be construed as means, and so the instrumental ending must express that. Because otherwise no construction would be possible.

Therefore there is no implication of possessive indication in an injunction of an accessory, because it may be construed (literally) without any implied meaning. And so in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" we have no particularized injunction, but rather an injunction of a mere accessory, while the sacrifice is enjoined in the sentence "He who desires Heaven shall sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma*." This is the only proper view, since otherwise we should have implication of possessive indication.[35]

Refutation of suggestion that somena yajeta is a guṇa-vidhi

47. To all this we reply: Altho it is true that no implication of possessive indication would be necessary if this sentence enjoined (merely) soma in supplementary reference to the sacrifice,[36] still we cannot take the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" as an injunction of soma with reference to the sacrifice, because the sacrifice is not (otherwise) establisht. And it cannot be maintained (as was argued in 26) that because the sacrifice is establisht by the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc., a mere accessory is here enjoined with reference to it. For that is an injunction of qualification and so cannot be an originative injunction. An originative injunction is one which merely indicates the general nature of a rite. And this ("With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc.) only indicates the connexion of a particular fruit with the (already) enjoined rite; (so) it is an injunction of qualification. For what indicates connexion of a particular fruit (with a rite) is an injunction of qualification; just as the sentence "With the new- and full-moon rites he who desires Heaven shall sacrifice" is an injunction of qualification, not an originative injunction, because it enjoins only the connexion of a particular fruit with the rite (already) enjoined in the sentence "For Agni the (cake) on eight potsherds" (etc.).

[35] Here ends the objector's long argument which began with 24. Now begins the refutation of it.

[36] That is, we grant that such implication is not required in injunctions of mere accessories.

48. (The objector speaks again:) We may agree that the sentence beginning "With the new- and full-moon rites" cannot be an originative injunction, because then the sentence "For Agni the (cake) on eight potsherds" etc. would be meaningless. For then the latter would not enjoin the rite, since that is enjoined by the sentence "With the new- and full-moon rites;" nor could it enjoin accessories, because to enjoin several accessories when the rite has been (otherwise) establisht means split-of-the-sentence. Therefore it is proper to say that this sentence is the originative injunction, and the sentence "With the new- and full-moon rites" etc. is an injunction of qualification. But: if we assume that the injunction of qualification "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc. is also an originative injunction, as in the case of "With the *udbhid* who desires cattle shall sacrifice," then nothing becomes meaningless. And no split-of-the-sentence results in "He shall sacrifice with soma," because this is an injunction of an accessory and enjoins soma alone (i.e. a single thing) with reference to the sacrifice.

49. To this we reply: Not so. Even if there is no split-of-the-sentence in "He shall sacrifice with soma," nevertheless in the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc. both the general nature of the rite and its connexion with the fruit would be enjoined, and that does constitute split-of-the-sentence, being much too complicated. Whereas if it merely enjoins connexion with its fruit of the rite enjoined in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma," this is not the case. But in the sentence "He (who desires cattle) shall sacrifice with the *udbhid*," we are (to be sure) obliged to resort to that interpretation, for lack of a better one, since there is no other sentence (that enjoins the rite itself).

50. And it cannot be claimed that also in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" there would be split-of-the-sentence if the general nature of the rite is enjoined, and also the accessory (soma). For the accessory is not enjoined by the directly-stated ("heard") injunction, since a particularizing injunction is implicitly understood (to enjoin that). For in every particularized injunction there is always implicitly understood a particularizing injunction.[37] But if "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc. is the originative

[37] That is, e.g. "He shall sacrifice with soma" implies an additional injunction: it plainly states "He shall effect the desired end by sacrifice," but it also implies "he shall effect the sacrifice by soma."

injunction, then both the general nature of the rite and its connexion with the fruit must be enjoined by the directly-stated injunction itself, and this constitutes a serious split-of-the-sentence, being much too complicated. As it is said:

51. "When there is diversity of the directly-stated (literal) functionings (meanings) of words, it becomes too complicated. But when the words stop with (are limited to) expressing (directly, primarily) a single thing, there is no objection to the (indirect) hinting of (various) meanings."

52. And let it not be said that even if there is no split-of-the-sentence in taking "He shall sacrifice with soma" as an originative injunction, there is nevertheless need for implication of possessive indication. For we admit that, since split-of-the-sentence is much worse than implied meaning. For implied (indirect) meaning is a fault of a (single) word, while split-of-the-sentence is a fault of a whole sentence; and as between a word and a sentence, it is more proper to assume a fault in a mere word, by the rule "But the assumption of irregularity (should be made) in what is subordinate."

53. And that is why it is said in regard to the sentence "When he has a son born to him and while his hair is black he shall lay the (sacred) fires," that, since there would be split-of-the-sentence if having a son born and having black hair were both enjoined in supplementary reference to the (already enjoined) laying of the fires, it is understood that the two words denote by implication a (single) particular sort of condition (namely, 'young manhood'). Therefore, where split-of-the-sentence would otherwise ensue, implied meaning is rather to be assumed. Hence the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" is the originative injunction, rather than "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc., because otherwise we should have serious complication involving split-of-the-sentence.

54. And further: in taking "He shall sacrifice with soma" as the (originative) injunction of the sacrifice we have an injunction whose meaning depends on direct-statement, while if it be taken as an injunction of an accessory a meaning is enjoined which depends on syntactical-connexion, which is not proper when it is possible to take the injunction as having a meaning based on direct-statement. As it is said:

55. "An injunction of a meaning based on syntactical-connexion

(relation between two separate words) is not according to rule when we may take it with a meaning based on direct-statement (in the same word)."[38]

56. "Meaning based on syntactical-connexion" means "meaning based on another word." And in the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc., too, the injunction has a meaning not based on syntactical-connexion (but on direct-statement), because in it the same sacrifice is enjoined (over again, tho previously enjoined) as leading to the fruit,[39] and because that is admitted even by (our opponent) who says that it is (also) an originative injunction (i.e. both agree that it means "by the sacrifice he shall attain the fruit," one word—the verb—stating both action and means). Therefore the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc. is only an injunction of qualification.

57. And further: an (originative) injunction, (that is one) which states the general nature of the rite, is to be admitted where the nature of the rite is indicated. And there are two elements in the nature of the rite, the material (used) and the deity (addrest). Now to be sure in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" the deity is not indicated, since the soma-sacrifice is not manifest. That it is not manifest means that no deity is prescribed for its own (direct) purpose (*per se*), not that none exists at all; because there are the deities of the various (soma-) cups enjoined in the sentences "He offers the (cup) of Indra-Vāyu" etc., and because the deities which serve the purpose of the draughts also incidentally assist in the sacrifice (to which the draughts belong). But nevertheless the material, at least, is indicated; and by that also the general nature of the sacrifice can

[38] The argument here is that the "means"—which is always the thing primarily enjoined—is exprest by the same word (*yajeta*) that expresses the efficient-force if it means "By the (soma-containing) sacrifice he shall effect the desired end." This constitutes direct-statement or *śruti;* more specifically, *ekapadaśruti,* "direct-statement in the same word" (see 69, 74). But if it means "By soma he shall effect the sacrifice," the means is exprest by one (dependent) word, the efficient-force by another; this is *vākya,* "syntactical-connexion."

[39] For it is impossible to *enjoin* the fruit (which is not under man's control); hence an injunction of qualification, whose purpose is to state the fruit to be gained, can enjoin nothing more than the sacrifice, tho that has been enjoined already (comm.).

certainly be known. (Whereas) in the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma* he who desires Heaven shall sacrifice" neither the material nor the deity is stated. Therefore if this were the originative injunction, knowledge of the particular nature of the sacrifice would be subject to various difficulties, since e.g. what should be enjoined is not sacrifice in general, but rather a particular sacrifice. Therefore this is not the originative injunction of the rite.

58. (Objection:) But it may be said: In that case however the sentence "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" would also not be the originative injunction of the rite, because its nature is not stated, and because it is stated in "He offers oblation with sour-milk," this rather would be the originative injunction. And that would be contrary to the section on the (butter-)sprinkling and the *agnihotra*. For there it is stated that "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" is the originative injunction, and "He offers oblation with sour-milk" etc. are injunctions of accessories.

59. To this we reply: True. Altho in the sentence "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" the nature (of the sacrifice) is not ascertained, because the word *agnihotra* is a name (and not a description of the nature of the rite) by the rule of (another passage) setting forth that, as we shall explain below; nevertheless we admit it as an originative injunction, because otherwise it would be meaningless. And (in so doing) the sentence "He offers oblation with sour-milk" is not made meaningless, since it enjoins an accessory. Therefore it is proper to say that the sentence "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" is the originative injunction of the rite. And (in regard to the soma-sacrifice) the sentence "With the *jyotiṣṭoma*" etc. does not become meaningless (by denying to it originative function), because it applies as an injunction of qualification. Therefore, when there is found an (originative) injunction of the rite in a sentence which states its nature, why assume it in one which does not state it?

60. And further: if the originative injunction of the rite were found in the sentence "He offers oblation with sour-milk," then the sentence "He offers oblation with milk" could not enjoin milk in supplementary reference to that rite, since it would annul the sour-milk prescribed in the originative injunction. For when an accessory prescribed by an originative injunction is annulled, no

other accessory can be enjoined, since the need (for one) was satisfied by the one prescribed by the originative injunction itself. Therefore this sentence also would have to enjoin a different rite, particularized (by the accessory 'milk'). And this would be too complicated, since it would necessitate the assumption of more than one unseen-result (i.e. one for each of these several rites). But if "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" is the originative injunction, then the question would arise as to what are the materials for the rite enjoined by this sentence; and instantly, like (the proverbial) "doves to the threshing-floor,"[40] the (material) accessories are enjoined by the sentences "He offers oblation with sour-milk," "with milk," etc. And so there is no need to assume more than one unseen-result, and consequently no complication.

61. Therefore it is proper to say that the originative injunction is "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation," but that "He offers oblation with milk" etc. are injunctions of accessories. But there is no difficulty in admitting that "He shall sacrifice with soma," which states the nature of the rite, is the originative injunction; because in either alternative there is equally only one unseen-result. Therefore it is proper to consider no other sentence than "He shall sacrifice with soma" as the originative injunction.

Enough, then, of the consideration of this extended discussion which grew out of the discussion of injunctions. Let us proceed with the main theme.

It is then establisht that an injunction enjoins as having a useful object something which is not (otherwise) establisht.

62. And this injunction is of four kinds, originative injunction, applicatory injunction, injunction of performance, and injunction of qualification.

Utpatti-vidhi

63. Of these, an originative injunction is one which merely indicates the general nature of a rite; as, "he offers the agnihotra

[40] A grammatical proverb, quoted by my pandit thus: *vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ, khale yathāmī yugapat patanti: tathāiva sarve yugapat padārthāḥ, parasparenānvayino bhavanti.* "As doves, old, young, and infants, rush instantly to the threshing-floor (to get the grain), so the meanings of words instantly (all together) become closely associated with each other."

oblation." And in an originative injunction the action (i.e. the root-meaning) is construed only as means (to the efficient-force), thus: "By the oblation he shall effect the desired end;" and not as end, thus: "He shall perform the oblation." If this (latter) were the case, since there would be no way of construing any other object, no connexion could be establisht between the object (supposed to be the oblation) and the fruit (of the rite) which is (to be) made known in the statement of qualification. But if it be taken as means, "By the oblation he shall effect the desired end," the question is naturally raised "What is that desired end?", and so the connexion with the particular fruit (stated in the injunction of qualification) ensues.

64. And let it not be said: "Since in an originative injunction there is no word that expresses the desired end, how can the sentence mean, By the rite he shall effect the desired end?" For the direct-statement of the injunction itself points to a desired end (cf. 375ff.). For this (statement), which impels a man towards one of the objects of human desire, must indicate nothing but the fact that the rite is connected with a fruit (or desired end). Therefore it is correct to say that in an originative injunction the action is construed as means. And that is why, in such (injunctions) as "With the *udbhid* he shall sacrifice," the word *udbhid* (a "name" of a sacrifice) is used in the instrumental case, because the construction applies, thus: "By the *udbhid*, (which is) the sacrifice, he shall effect the desired end." But for those[41] who say that the meaning of the optative (injunctive) verb-form is the being the means to a desired end, for them there is no way at all of construing the names of rites which have instrumental endings. For you cannot say "The sacrifice is the means of effecting the desired end by the Udbhid;" for the dependent case-power (*kāraka*) deduced from the instrumental ending is incapable of construction with a word possessing gender and number and can only be construed with a verb.

65. But (replies the opponent who holds the above-mentioned view) your own construction of names of rites found in the accusative case-form in originative injunctions of rites like "He offers the *agnihotra* oblation" is impossible. For you cannot say "By the oblation he shall effect the *agnihotra*."

[41] Referred to are the grammatical school (Vāiyākaraṇikas) and certain Mīmāṅsakas, viz. the school of Maṇḍanamiśra (comm.).

(To this we reply:) True. (But) you must understand that the directly-exprest accusative form is a reference to the fact that it (the *agnihotra*, or the like in other similar cases) is to be accomplisht, which is implied from the sense (of the passage); for, as we have seen, the oblation is construed as means, and nothing can serve as means unless it is accomplisht. And since there is no way of construing it (as accusative), it implies the meaning of the instrumental, as in the injunction "He offers barley-grits." So that it means "By the Agnihotra oblation he shall effect the desired end," as stated by Pārthasārathimiśra. And so there is no failure of construction of names of rites which appear in accusative forms.

So it is establisht that in an originative injunction the action (the root-meaning) is construed as means (to the efficient-force).

Viniyoga-vidhi; six pramāṇas

66. An applicatory injunction is one which indicates the connexion of a subsidiary with the main action, as: "He offers oblation with sour-milk." For this enjoins the connexion with the oblation of sour-milk, the subsidiary character of which is revealed by its instrumental case-form; it means, "By sour-milk he shall effect the oblation."

67. And there are six modes-of-evidence which accompany this (applicatory) injunction: direct-statement, word-meaning, syntactical-connexion, context, position, and name. An injunction that is accompanied (or, assisted) by one of these indicates subsidiariness, which means the condition of being an invariable concomitant of an activity undertaken (by some one, as the sacrificer) with reference to an outside goal. Another equivalent expression[42] for this is dependence.

1st pramāṇa; śruti

68. Of these (six modes), direct-statement (*śruti*) means independent words (words which indicate their meaning directly, expressly, and immediately). And it is of three kinds: injunctive, denotative, and applicatory.

[42] Used by Jaimini (comm.). The favorite expression in J. is, indeed, *parārthatva* (e.g. 3.1.2).

69. Of these, injunctive direct-statement includes optative and other (injunctive verb-) forms. Denotative direct-statement is that of (nouns that name things as subsidiaries in the rites), rice-grains and the like. And applicatory direct-statement occurs when a word's connexion (or, application) follows immediately from merely hearing it.

And this (last) is of three kinds: that which consists of case-endings (which indicate relation to another word than that in which they occur), that which is denoted by one common element in a word (which has several implications), and that which is denoted by (different elements of) one word.

70. Now among these, direct-statement by case-endings indicates subsidiariness, for instance in "He shall sacrifice with rice-grains,"[43] where by direct-statement of the instrumental case is indicated the fact that the rice-grains are subsidiary to the sacrifice.

And let it not be said: "When the sacrifice is limited to the cake by the prescription of the originative injunction,[44] how can rice-grains be (employed as) a subsidiary of it?" For this is quite possible because they are the primary material (source) of the cake; just as the (*agnīṣomīya*) animal[45] is a subsidiary in the sacrifice because it is the primary material (source) of the heart and other (members) which constitute the oblation. And let it not be said: "Why should not the animal itself, directly, be a subsidiary to the sacrifice?" Because it is slaughtered, and it is the heart and other (members) which are portioned out. For it is that which is portioned out that constitutes the oblation, such as the cake etc.; for the sentence reads: "He portions out from the middle and from the fore part (of the cake)."[46] And it is the heart and other (members) that are portioned out, not the animal, since the sentence reads: "He portions out (part) of the heart first." Therefore it is only the heart and other (members)

[43] Apparently reference is made to the rice used in preparing the cake-offering at the new- and full-moon rites; cf. next note. I have not found the injunction.

[44] Viz., *yadāgneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ* etc., TS. 2.6.3.3; see 47.

[45] Enjoined by TS. 6.1.11.6 *agnīṣomīyaṁ paśum ālabhate.*

[46] This looks like a condensed statement of the actions prescribed in KŚS. 1.9.2, 6; ĀpŚS. 2.18.9; Bhāradvāja ŚS. (as quoted by Hillebrandt, *NVMO*, p. 109, n. 3, last line) 2.17.

that are the oblation, while the animal is the primary material.—But in the sacrifice of the Pātnīvata (animal)[47] the animal is, indeed, directly subsidiary, because it is enjoined that it shall be set free alive, in these words: "He releases the Pātnīvata (animal) when it has been taken around the fire." But where there is slaughtering, there the animal is only the primary substance; this much is proved. In the same way the rice-grains also are subsidiary to the sacrifice, thru being the primary substance (of the cake), as is shown by the direct-statement of the instrumental form.

And (in the injunction "He buys the soma for a ruddy, yellow-eyed, year-old cow"[48]) the instrumental case-form also shows that ruddiness is subsidiary to the purchasing. And let it not be said: "This (ruddiness) is (an) immaterial (quality), how can it be subsidiary to the purchasing?" For this applies to it thru its being a modifier of the primary substance, the yearling.

71. In the injunction "He besprinkles the rice-grains," the direct-statement of the accusative case-form indicates that the sprinkling is subsidiary to the rice-grains. And this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains in their natural form, since for that it would be useless; for there is nothing lacking in the natural condition of the rice-grains even without the sprinkling (i.e. it has no visible effect on them). But it is concerned with effecting the transcendental-result, with the idea that only if sprinkling is performed upon the rice-grains, then the sacrifice performed with them will have its transcendental-result, and not otherwise. Therefore, by direct-statement of the accusative form, assisted by 'context,'[49] is exprest the subsidiary character of the sprinkling, which consists in its effecting the transcendental-result, by the indirect means of making (the rice into) grits (fit for sacrificial use). Thus in all subsidiaries, also, we must understand that they are useful in effecting the transcendental-result.

[47] Described TS. 6.6.6; cf. ĀpŚS. 14.7.12. The animal is "for (Tvaṣṭṛ) with-the-wives (of the gods)."

[48] *aruṇayā piñgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇāti*, Bhāṣya on J. 3.1.12. I find no passage closer to this than TS. 7.1.6.2 *rohiṇyā piñgalayaika°* etc.; cf. TS. 6.1.6.7 *aruṇayā piñgākṣyā krīṇāti*. Other parallels are more remote.

[49] The fourth mode-of-evidence, see 116ff. The relation of the act of sprinkling the rice-grains to the main rite to which it is subsidiary is shown by 'context.'

72. Likewise in the injunction: "He takes the horse's bridle with the formula, 'I have taken this bridle of the Right,'" by direct-statement of the accusative form (*aśvābhidhānīm*, 'horse's bridle') the formula is made subsidiary to the horse's bridle. It is not true (as might be claimed) that this application is proved by syntactical-connexion (*vākya*). If that were so, then since word-meaning (*liṅga*) is stronger than syntactical-connexion, before syntactical-connexion could make (the formula) subsidiary to the horse's bridle, word-meaning (of the word *raśanā*, 'bridle,' occurring in the formula) would make it subsidiary merely to the (two) bridles (here concerned),[50] just as it makes the words "I make for thee a pleasant seat" subsidiary to the sitting. But on the assumption that the application is made by direct-statement, then before word-meaning establishes subsidiariness (of the formula) merely to the (two) bridles, direct-statement (which is stronger than word-meaning, see below) will have made application to the horse's bridle, just as in the sentence "With Indra's verse he reverences the householder's fire" the direct-statement of the instrumental case shows that Indra's verse is subsidiary to the act of reverencing the householder's fire (and not to Indra, as word-meaning would make it). So it is correct to say that the formula is subsidiary to (taking) the horse's bridle. And therefore this application is based on direct-statement rather (than syntactical-connexion).

73. The sentence "When (or, that) he offers oblation in the *Āhavanīya* fire"[51] indicates by direct-statement of the locative case-form that the *Āhavanīya* fire is subsidiary to the oblation.

[50] The view combatted is that the mere utterance of the formula in syntactical-connexion with the sentence which mentions the horse's bridle is enough to prove the dependence on it alone. But the formula mentions only 'bridle,' not 'horse's bridle;' and since that 'word-meaning' would be stronger than 'syntactical-connexion,' as will be proved presently, therefore (if we disregarded the syntax 'directly-stated' in *aśvābhidhānīm*) we should have to suppose that the formula was connected with taking hold of either or both of the two bridles (of a horse and an ass) which are concerned in the performance here dealt with, and not with the horse's bridle specifically.

[51] Very frequently quoted in Mīmāṅsā literature, and always in this precise form. Cf. TB. 1.6.5.4 (reading *juhuyāt*), and 1.1.10.5 (*juhvati*).

And in the same way other applications are to be understood from direct-statement of case-forms.[52]

74. In the sentence "He shall sacrifice with an animal"[53] by direct-statement in one common element (of a word) is shown dependence of singular number and masculine gender on the instrument (all exprest by the ending *-nā* in *paśunā*, 'with an animal'). Also by direct-statement in one common element is shown dependence of the (singular) number exprest in (the ending, *-ta*, of) the verb 'he shall sacrifice' on the efficient-force; and by direct-statement in (different parts of) one word, the dependence (of this same singular number exprest by *-ta*) on the sacrifice (exprest by the root *yaj-* in the same verb-form).

Subject is implied—not exprest—in the verb-form

75. And let it not be said: "How can this (singular number), which is immaterial, be a subsidiary of the sacrifice?" For this is quite possible, thru its being an attribute of the agent. And the agent is to be understood (in connexion with the verb-form) by implication. For the verb expresses the efficient-force; and since this cannot exist without an agent, it implies the latter.

76. (Objection:) But why say that the agent is understood by implication? Why is it not simply exprest by the verb? For

[52] The comm. quotes instances of dative, ablative, and genitive forms.

[53] The comm. says that this sentence does not actually occur in this form, but is a free rendering of *yo dīkṣito yad agnīṣomīyaṁ paśum ālabhate*, TS. 6.1.11.6. (This sentence in the same form is referred to frequently in the Bhāṣya, e.g. on J. 4.1.11.) Cf. however MŚS. 1.8.6.24 *ṣaṭsu-ṣaṭsu māseṣu paśunā yajeta*. Like *somena yajeta* (? cf. 12, n. 11) this injunction might perhaps also be deduced from ĀpŚS. 10.2.8 *yadīṣṭyā yadi paśunā yadi somena yajetāmāvāsyāyāṁ vaiva paurṇamāsyāṁ vā yajeta*, which is quoted (inaccurately) by the Bhāṣya on J. 12.2.25; or from the close parallel KS. 8.1, end. Cf. 12, 187, and Introduction, p. 27 f.—The points made about it are: (1) The noun-ending *-nā* denotes not only instrumental case-relation, but also singular number and masculine gender; hence the animal to be used in the sacrifice (which use is indicated by the instrumental form) must also be a single one (not more), and male. (2) Also the verbal ending *-ta* in *yajeta* is singular; since this ending also denotes the "efficient-force" (cf. 7), the subject of that "efficient-force" is understood to be singular; and (3) since the root *yaj*, 'sacrifice,' is contained in the same word, it is a single person who is to perform the action of 'sacrifice' denoted thereby.

when the verb is heard, the subject also is immediately understood, just as the efficient-force is. And it is not proper to say: "Since the agent is implied just by the efficient-force, why assume that it is exprest by the verb?" In that case, (we reply) on the assumption that the efficient-force is implied rather by the agent exprest by the verb, there would be no expressing of it (the efficient-force) either (by the verb; it is as easy to assume that the verb directly expresses the agent, which then implies the efficient-force, as vice versa). And further: the efficient-force is not exclusively connected with the agent alone, for it is also connected with other case-powers (noun-dependents-on-the-verbal-idea, *kāraka*). Therefore it would not instantly imply the agent alone (rather than some other dependent-noun, as e.g. means), since there is no special reason for this distinction. But the agent is associated with the efficient-force only, not with any other dependent-noun, by the rule: "Since accessories are dependent on something else (viz. the chief matter), there can be no interdependence between them, since they are equal (all subservient; hence there can be no dependence between the agent and another dependent-noun)." Therefore since it (the agent) would instantly imply (suggest) the efficient-force, it rather must be exprest by the verb. But why should not the efficient-force, rather, be understood by implication?

And further: on your assumption there would also be no use for instrumental and other endings to express means and so forth, because these values also could be got by implication (from the verb) as well as the agent-value.

77. And further: if the agent were not exprest, how could the notion of singular number be construed with it? For it is not proper to say that something verbally exprest is construed with something not verbally exprest; otherwise there would ensue a violation of logic[54] and so forth.

And further: (on your assumption) there would be no syntactical agreement in such a sentence as "Devadatta cooks." For there can be no syntactical agreement of the word Devadatta merely with the verb as expressing the efficient-force, since there

[54] *ūha;* the "and so forth" includes *atideśa,* 'inference,' *anuṣaṅga,* 'consequence,' and *adhyāhāra,* 'supplementation' (comm.). These are all technical Nyāya terms.

is no common-meaning-basis between them (one is a noun, the other a verb); but the syntax fits only on the assumption that (the verb) expresses the agent (with which 'Devadatta' is then in apposition).

78. But if the subject is not exprest, it is quite clear that there is a violation of the rule of grammatical authority which says "The verbal endings denote the agent."[55] And also, if the subject were not exprest, it would follow that we should say "By-Devadatta cooks." For the instrumental case is enjoined when the agent and the means are not exprest (by the verb),[56] so that if the subject is not exprest by the verb the instrumental would have to be the case expressing the agent. But when the agent is exprest, and just because it is exprest, the instrumental does not hold, because it applies when (the agent) is not exprest (by the verb). But the nominative rather holds, and we say "Devadatta cooks," because the nominative is the case of the exprest agent, or because it expresses the mere stem-meaning of the word.

79. And the fact that it expresses only the stem-meaning of the word does not make the nominative form meaningless. Because it is necessary (rather than the bare stem) in order to establish the number and gender, and because good grammar does not permit the use of the bare stemform alone.

And so if the agent were not exprest (by the verb), the correct construction would be "By-Devadatta cooks." Therefore it is proved that the agent must be exprest by the verb. Thus the objector's viewpoint may be summarized.

80. To all this we reply: Only that is the (primary) meaning of a word, which cannot be got by any other means, according to the rule: "The meaning of a word is (exclusive, i.e.) not to be got from anything else (by implication)." That is why (in such a phrase as "A hamlet on the Ganges") the word 'Ganges' does not have the (proper or primary) meaning of 'bank,' since that meaning comes to it only by secondary implication. And that is

[55] *laḥ kartari;* this is implied by Pāṇini 3.4.69, which refers back to and supplements 3.4.67. (The comm. wrongly makes reference to Pāṇ. 1.4.22.)

[56] P. 2.3.18 (with which 2.3.1 must be understood). This rule governs such cases as "By-Devadatta action is performed," *devadattena kṛtam,* or *kriyate.*

why the (primary) force (of a word) is not found in a meaning which depends on syntactic-connexion. And so (since the agent cannot be part of the real meaning or 'force' of the verb, but) since (on the contrary) determination of the agent is effected (by the verb) only by implication, in that, namely, the efficient-force exprest by the verb, being incomplete without an agent, implies one: why (therefore) attribute to the verb the function of expressing it?

81. And it is not a case of indifferent-choice (between the two alternatives, whether the agent or the efficient-force is primarily exprest by the verb). For the agent is that-which-is-characterized-by-action. And so, in determining what is to be exprest by the verb, by the rule of the section on kind (or form),[57] we must assume that *action*, for which another synonym is efficient-force, is exprest, not that-which-is-characterized-by-action, viz. the agent; for this would be more complicated (less natural and simple).

And it is not correct to say that because the efficient-force is connected also with other case-powers it would not immediately imply the agent, to the exclusion of them. For it is not connected with any other case-powers, such as the instrumental function, in the same exclusive way that it is with the agent. For we observe that in such expressions as "(he) stands" it does not imply them (but does imply the agent). Therefore it first implies the agent only, and no other case-power. And that is why the number denoted by the verb-form is connected (with the agent, the subject, and) not with any other case-power, because none presents itself first (before the agent).

82. And that is just why instrumental and other (oblique) case-forms are (necessarily) used to express means etc., because there is no such exclusive connexion of the efficient-force with them as to cause it necessarily to imply them; and also because even before (without) direct expression of a verb-form, the direct expression of instrumental case-forms etc. produces a clear apprehension of the notion of means etc. (i.e. tho the notion of e.g.

[57] The rule of J. referred to is that the primary meaning of a word must be not of a category different from its nature; specifically, in this case, since a verb denotes action, it can "mean" primarily only an action, not an actor or one-characterized-by-action (as the agent).

means is indeed dependent on that of an action, to be exprest by a verb, still it is fully exprest by the instrumental case-form, which is not true of the nominative case-form, which needs the verb-form to be clearly understood as denoting an agent).

Nor should it have been said that "Number is verbally exprest, how can it be construed with the agent which is not verbally exprest?" For we admit that the agent is implied. And just as (in the phrase "a hamlet on the Ganges") the implied meaning 'bank' (instead of 'Ganges') is construed with the verbally exprest 'hamlet,' so the implied agent is construed with the singular number (exprest in the verb). That is why there is syntactic correlation in "Devadatta cooks," because the agent is implied (by the efficient-force exprest by the verb; so the nominative "Devadatta" agrees appositionally with it; it means properly "(he) cooks, namely Devadatta").

83. And it is not pertinent to say "When primary meaning is possible, why admit secondary implication (instead)?" For (the meaning assumed by our opponent, viz. the denotation of the agent by the verb, is not a primary meaning, since) it has been establisht that the meaning of a word is that which can be got from nothing else. Otherwise we might as well say that even such a phrase as "Devadatta is a lion" is a case of primary correlation (i.e. all distinction between primary and implied or figurative meaning would be lost). And furthermore: even in the opinion of one who claims that the agent is exprest by the verb, still the syntactic correlation in "Devadatta cooks" is not primary. Because in his opinion the verb expresses the agent case-power only in the form of a word-force that is separate (from the material thing, Devadatta, which possesses that force), just like an instrumental case-ending (in sentences where the agent is not exprest by the verb, in which case it is exprest by an instrumental, see above; the ending is, of course, general, the specific agent being indicated by the stem to which it is attacht); and hence by the rule of the section on kind (or form, see 81) it cannot express a material object possest of that force, while the word 'Devadatta' expresses only a material object. And so, because (the two elements, 'Devadatta' and the agent-power exprest in the verb) have different bases of meaning (one an abstract force, the other a material substance), even in his opinion the syntactic

correlation between them cannot be primary, but only based on implication. So there is no difference (between his position and ours in this respect).

84. And it should not be said (as was said by the objector, 78) that the agent must be exprest by the verb because of the authority of the grammatical rule "The verb-endings express the agent." For the question of what expresses any meaning to be exprest is not in the province of grammatical science, since that is to be determined by consequence or inconsequence according to logic.[58] But suppose it is subject to grammatical rules; even so, this rule does not go to prove that the agent must be exprest by the verb. On the contrary, it only goes to prove that when the agent is singular the verb-form is singular, when dual dual, and when plural plural. Because this rule must be taken as forming a connected whole with the rule "The singular and dual are used when one and two (persons) are meant (respectively), and the plural when many are meant."

85. But as for the statement (of the objector) that if the agent were not exprest the instrumental case would be required, "By-Devadatta cooks," this is not true. For the instrumental is used to set forth either the agent or the number associated with the agent. Here, however, the agent is obtained by mere implication from the efficient-force (of the verb), so that the instrumental is not needed to express it; while its number is set forth by the verb-ending itself, so that it is not needed to express that. As it is said:

86. "For the (instrumental) ending makes clear the idea either in regard to the number (of the agent) or in regard to the agent (itself); and in this case both of these are determined by the efficient-force and the finite verb-form."

87. But where the number associated with it is not exprest by the verb, there the instrumental is in fact used, as in "By-Devadatta porridge is cookt." Therefore there is no difficulty in not having the subject exprest (by the verb). Enough, then, of this lengthy discussion. Let us proceed with the subject.

We have now, therefore, set forth the three-fold application by direct-statement.

[58] *nyāya;* whereas grammar deals with what words are good usage and what are vulgar (comm.).

88. This direct-statement is stronger than word-meaning and the other modes-of-evidence. For in word-meaning and the rest the applicatory word is not actually present, but inferred. And before these modes-of-evidence can infer the applicatory word, the application will have been already made by a directly-stated word in the text, and so their power of inferring (a word) will have been nullified. That is why direct-statement is stronger.

89. For this reason in the case of the sentence "With Indra's verse he reverences the householder's fire,"[59] before by word-meaning the dependence of Indra's verse on reverence to Indra can be inferred, direct-statement[60] in the text shows it to be dependent on reverence to the householder's fire. Therefore Indra's verse is dependent on reverence to the householder's fire.

2d pramāṇa; liṅga

90. Word-meaning (*liṅga*) is capacity (power, or meaning, of words). As they say: "Word-meaning is defined as the capacity of all objects (words)." It indicates dependence, as the dependence on the act of cutting (the strew) of the formula "I cut the strew, a seat for the gods." For this (formula) has the capacity (meaning) of indicating the cutting.

91. And this word-meaning is of two kinds, that which requires another mode-of-evidence to make clear the general connexion, and that which does not. Of these, when something can never occur without something else, the subsidiariness of the latter to the former is determined by word-meaning alone, without the help of those (other modes-of-evidence). An example is the knowledge of the meaning (of Vedic texts),[61] which is subsidiary to the performance of the rites; since without knowledge of the meaning the performance is impossible.

92. When a thing can happen without another thing, the subsidiariness of the latter to the former requires other evidence, as

[59] MS. 3.2.4 (20.13). According to this text, 'Indra's verse' means *niveśanaḥ saṁgamano vasūnām*, MS. 2.7.12 (91.7), etc. (see Conc.). In spite of this plain statement, the Bhāṣya on J. 3.3.14, p. 285, says that it means *kadā cana starīr asi*, MS. 1.3.26 (39.1), etc. (see Conc.). TV, p. 769, quotes correctly *niveśanaḥ* etc. (line 1), observing (line 4) that "some" say *kadā cana* etc. is meant. Our comm. follows the Bhāṣya.

[60] Viz. of the accusative ending in *gārhapatyam*, "householder's fire."

[61] To be gained by the "rule of study," cf. 227ff.

in the case of the subsidiariness of the formula just quoted to the cutting. For one might remember and perform the cutting by some other means, even without the formula.[62] Therefore the formula is not necessary for the cutting absolutely or primarily, but rather serves for the indication of the cutting as a means of attaining the transcendental-result. And this fact is not understood from the word-meaning alone, because the word-meaning indicates only cutting (in general). Therefore we must accept the help of context and the other (modes-of-evidence), to make clear the general connexion. For from the fact that the formula is recited in the context with the new- and full-moon rites, the conception is formed that "this formula indicates something connected with the transcendental-result of the new- and full-moon rites." For otherwise its recitation in this context would be meaningless. The question being then raised, "What is the thing connected with that transcendental result which is to be indicated?", it is next understood by word-meaning that it is the cutting of the strew (in connexion with that rite). Since the formula is thus shown by word-meaning to serve the purpose of pointing out that "this (cutting) is connected with the transcendental-result in that it helps to prepare the strew," it is not open to the charge of being meaningless. Therefore it is proved that the formula "I cut the strew, a seat for the gods" is first understood thru context as connected with the new- and full-moon rites, and then thru word-meaning as subsidiary to the cutting (of the strew).

93. But in the case of the formulas of after-recitation to Pūṣan,[63] first their general connexion with the sacrifice is understood by their name (*samākhyā*) of "recitation-after-the-sacrifice," and then (since the first one contains the word *pūṣṇaḥ*, 'of Pūṣan') by word-meaning their connexion with the Pūṣan-sacrifice is understood.

94. (Objection:) But before their general connexion with the

[62] The Mīmāṅsā teaches (cf. 203, 239ff.) that the only use of formulas (*mantras*) is to remind people of acts to be performed. They are "subsidiary" to those acts in that sense, that they serve to remind of them.

[63] ĀpŚS. 4.10.1, *pūṣṇo 'haṁ devayajyayā* etc.; cf. KS. 5.1 (44.12). Really only the first of these formulas is addrest to Pūṣan, as the comm. observes.

Pūṣan-sacrifice can be understood by 'name,' their general connexion with the new- and full-moon rites will rather have been inferred by 'context' because that is stronger than 'name.' And that is why it is said that the fore-sacrifices, altho they are recorded in the Brāhmaṇa called by the name "of-the-cake," are shown by context to be subsidiary to the collected (*sāṁnāyya*) and whispered (*upāṅśu*) offerings as well (as the cake-offerings).[64] And further, even the name of "recitation-after-the-sacrifice" would not indicate a general connexion with the Pūṣan-sacrifice, but with sacrifice in general; but then by context particular connexion would be indicated rather with the new- and full-moon rites. Therefore, since by context connexion with them, rather, would be instantly understood, it is clear that those (after-recitations) must serve their purpose instead. For (since in those rites there is no sacrifice to Pūṣan) the word Pūṣan may, by its etymological connexion with the verb *puṣṇāti* 'prospers,' refer somehow or other to Agni or some other (god).

95. (To this we reply:) Not so. For when the formula of after-recitation to Pūṣan is heard, this is what is understood:

[64] Comm. explains: there are six *yāgas* in the new- and full-moon rites; some of them are cake-offerings, but the *sāṁnāyya* and *upāṅśu-yāja* are not. Whatever is treated in the section called "of-the-cake" should belong by "name" only to the cake-offerings. The fore-sacrifices are treated there; but since "context" prevails over "name," they go with all six *yāgas*, not with the cake-offerings alone.—There is a difficulty here, probably due to the fact that the Mīmāṅsakas of old used Tait. texts having a different arrangement from the texts we have. The fore-sacrifice *mantras* occur in TB. 3.5.5.1, and the *brāhmaṇa* to them is TS. 2.6.1; neither of these is included in a "cake" section, yet all the evidence seems to indicate that the Mīmāṅsā used the Tait. school texts in dealing with the fore-sacrifices (cf. especially 153). For that matter, I do not find the name "of-the-cake" applied to the section containing them in any other text. The "cake" section (*mantra*) of TS. is 1.1.1–13; there was also a "cake"-*brāhmaṇa*, apparently roughly equivalent to TB. 3.2 and 3, but quoted by a *pratīka* not occurring in our version of those sections, see Weber, *ISt.* 3.375 and 385. Cf. also our 179 and 180.—No other Vedic school texts accessible to me seem to fit the conditions as well as the Tait. Neither MS. nor KS. appears to contain the brāhmaṇa on the fore-offerings (the mantras occur there, see 300). The brāhmaṇa appears in KB. and ŚB. (see 204), but if the passages concerned are called "of the cake," I have found no evidence for the fact; and the mantras are not found in these schools in any place so designated.

"Because of the meaning of the term Pūṣan, this formula must be intended to refer to him, just as the cutting-formula is intended to refer to the cutting (of the strew)." There is no call for context and the other (modes-of-evidence) here in such a way that one of them could prevail over (the stronger mode-of-evidence 'word-meaning') as that on which it depends. On the contrary, since only by implication of syntactical-connexion, word-meaning, and direct-statement could context apply (the after-recitations) to the purpose of the new- and full-moon rites, (since each weaker mode-of-evidence can apply only by implying the stronger ones), therefore word-meaning must prevail (over context) as that on which it depends. Therefore, when by word-meaning its purpose in indicating Pūṣan has been understood, since simply indicating him (in general) would be useless (meaningless, purposeless), it must be said that it intends to indicate Pūṣan as a means of accomplishing a transcendental-result. And then the question naturally arises, "What is that transcendental-result?" Whereupon, thru word-meaning assisted by the 'name' of 'recitation-after-the-sacrifice' it is understood that it has the purpose of indicating the deity who is connected with the transcendental-result of the Pūṣan-sacrifice. So, even tho context is stronger than name, yet because the former is overruled by word-meaning, name, weak tho it is, acquires superior strength thru being supported by the yet-stronger word-meaning, and so becomes, rather (than context), the mode-of-evidence that determines the general connexion; because even a weak individual prevails if supported by a stronger one.

96. That is why, tho tradition (*smṛti*) is weaker than revelation (*śruti*), it prevails (over revelation) by being supported by a thing (to be done), such as e.g. the requirement to sip water,[65] which is more important (than a mere accessory, *guṇa*, such as

[65] Upon sneezing, yawning, etc.; comm. quotes the *smṛti*-injunction as *kṣutajṛmbhaṇādinimitte ācāntena karma kartavyam.* The Bhāṣya on J. 1.3.5 quotes merely *ācāntena kartavyam.* I have not discovered it in this form; the idea that sneezing and yawning require special purificatory rites is familiar, see e.g. AGS. 3.6.7, HGS. 1.16.2, ĀpGS. 9.2.—The point illustrated is that a *thing* (*padārtha*) is something to be done, a primary matter, whereas *order* is a secondary matter, being merely an inherent-element (*dharma*) in "things;" hence sipping-water is more important than the order of performance.

order); and hence when one sneezes just after the making of the grass-brush (*veda*, and before the making of the *vedi* which follows immediately according to *śruti*), it is said that he should abandon the order of the Vedic rites, which is a (mere) accessory (subordinate quality, *guṇa*) resident-in (*dharma*) a thing (to be done, *padārtha*, i.e. the Vedic rites), and sip water instead (of proceeding to the making of the *vedi*). As it is said:

97. "Even very strong men of city or country are overcome by even very weak men, who are supported by the king."

98. But it is not possible to take the word Pūṣan as referring somehow to Agni or some other (god), because of its establisht usage (or, conventional meaning) in its special sense (as name of a god), as determined by common Vedic use and by such remnants (final parts) of sentences as the one which says "For he is toothless;" and because conventional meaning is stronger than etymological meaning which depends on consideration of the meaning of the parts (of the word). And that is why in the sentence "A carpenter shall lay the (sacred) fires in the rainy-season," the word 'carpenter' is used as a synonym for *saudhanvana*, a particular (non-Aryan) caste, because conventional meaning prevails, and not in the etymological meaning of an Aryan who makes wagons (*ratha-kāra*, carpenter, means literally 'wagon-maker'), because etymological meaning is weaker. This is set forth in the Sixth (Book of Jaimini).

99. Therefore it is proved that after their general connexion has been understood by name, the (particular) connexion of the Pūṣan-after-recitation-formulae with the Pūṣan-sacrifice is establisht by word-meaning. As it is said:

100. "The name (of the formulas), 'sacrifice-after-recitations,' applies them to the rite (sacrifice in general); and then in compliance with word-meaning they are fixt upon the rite having him (Pūṣan) as deity."[66]

101. So we have establisht the fact that word-meaning makes (special) application of an object the general connexion of which has been establisht by another mode-of-evidence.

102. Now in applying formulas, word-meaning applies them only in the primary sense (of the applicatory word), not in a

[66] Note *śakti* for *liñga;* contrast Keith, p. 89, 'indirect implication!' Cf. Introduction, p. 9, note 3.

secondary sense. For the primary sense comes to mind first, and hence, since the frame of mind tending to make application stops right there (upon application based on the word's primary sense), it would be too hard to suppose the forming of an application in a secondary sense afterwards (because no need would be felt). And that is why it is said that the formula "I cut the strew, a seat for the gods" is subsidiary by word-meaning to the cutting of the *kuśa*-grass (used for the strew), since that is the primary meaning (of the word 'strew'), and not to the cutting of (some other grass such as) the bundle of *ulapa*-grass.[67]

103. Now this word-meaning is stronger than syntactical-connexion and the other (modes-of-evidence). For they do not make application directly, but by implying word-meaning and direct-statement; and (not by implying direct-statement alone, without implication of word-meaning), because, since application could not be made by implication of direct-statement of a word without meaning, they are dependent on word-meaning also as something that must be implied. And so, before they can imply a direct-statement by first implying word-meaning, the word-meaning that is already made will have implied direct-statement and so made the application. Thus it is stronger than they.

104. That is why the formula "I make for thee a pleasant seat, I make it comfortable with a stream of ghee"[68] is subsidiary to (the making of) the seat, by word-meaning, not to the placing (of the cake upon it) by syntactical-connexion, because that is weaker.

[67] Used as a torch in carrying the sacred fire, cf. KŚS. 25.3.7–8.

[68] MŚS. 1.2.6.19 (rather than TB. 3.7.5.2–3 [and ApŚS. 2.10.6] as suggested by comm.; our text follows MŚS. in reading *kṛṇomi* for *karomi* of TB. ApŚS.). This is the first part of a *mantra* the continuation of which reads: "on this, the immortal, sit down (O cake), rest on it friendly-disposed, O marrow of the rice-grains." (The true reading in MŚS. 1.2.6.22 c is like that of TB.; Knauer's text should be changed; nearly all his mss. read thus.) The first part goes with the making of the seat, because it mentions the seat; the second with the seating or placing, because it mentions that. Thus, by "word-meaning," the two parts are connected with different acts. Yet they form a single connected sentence, and so "syntactical-connexion" would make them both subsidiary to the same act, either the making of the seat, or the placing of the cake upon it. But word-meaning prevails and annuls this.

3d pramāṇa; vākya

105. Syntactical-connexion (*vākya*) means connected-utterance. Connected-utterance may be defined as the enunciation together of two things which are really principal and subsidiary to each other, altho there are no case-forms, such as accusative etc., to indicate such relationships as object etc. (which would constitute cases of "direct-statement by case-endings"). As in "Who has a ladle of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound;"[69] for here there is no direct-statement of a case-form, such as accusative etc., but nothing more than the mentioning together of the ladle and the being-made-of-parṇa-wood;[70] and from that alone is inferred the fact that being made of *parṇa*-wood is subsidiary to (qualifies) the ladle.

106. And (this qualification of the ladle) is not purposeless, because the word ladle suggests by implication the transcendental-result. So that the sentence means: "He shall effect the attainment of the transcendental-result which comes from holding the portioned-out oblation with (a ladle characterized by) *parṇa*-quality." And so it is understood that that transcendental-result which is aimed at is obtained only if the ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood, not otherwise; so the *parṇa*-quality is not purposeless. And the phrase "from holding the portioned-out oblation" must not fail to be included; for otherwise the *parṇa*-quality would apply also to the (spoon) *sruva* and other (sorts of ladles).[71]

107. And this *parṇa*-quality, tho prescribed in a detacht-rule, does not apply to all rites (archetypes as well as modifications), because this would mean repetitiousness in the case of the

[69] Keith, "hears no evil bruit," i.e. evil report about himself; this may be the true meaning. The MS. and KS. parallels read "is not deaf."

[70] From our point of view the adjective ending *ī* in *parṇamayī* might be considered a direct-statement of the agreement of the word with *juhū;* but the Mīmāṅsā does not recognize this, because it might modify any feminine entity, or be used as a substantive itself. As we saw, "direct-statement" connects entities only when they are exprest by parts of the same word, or when one of them is a dependent noun-case.

[71] Which might be understood as included in the term *juhū* from its etymology (*hūyate 'nayā, iti juhūḥ*); but by *rūḍhi,* conventional usage, *juhū* means only a particular ladle, not anything with which oblation is made.

modifications, to which it must also be applied (without other prescription) by the rule of transfer. But it applies (only) to archetypes. So it is stated: "To the archetypes alone, to avoid repetitousness."

108. Here the word 'archetype' is not to be understood as meaning 'that (ritual form) from which a modification gets its subsidiary elements;' for if it meant that only, *parṇa*-quality (of the ladle) would not apply in the *gṛhamedhīya*-rite, since no modification gets its subsidiaries from the *gṛhamedhīya*, because there is no reason (for such a process; that rite has no modifications). But instead the word archetype means a rite which does not get its subsidiaries by the rule of transfer. Such as the new- and full-moon rites. For in them the subsidiaries are not got by the rule of transfer; for there is no need for that, since they are stated in the context itself. And in such rites as the *gṛhamedhīya* also the subsidiaries are not got by the rule of transfer; for the portions of butter and other (subsidiaries specifically enjoined in it) have their contributions (to the result of the sacrifice as a whole) already establisht, and so there is no need (of supplying others).

So where the rule of transfer has no application, there detacht-rules come in.

109. But the being-seventeen (use of seventeen *sāmidhenīs* or verses in dedication of fire-sticks), tho a detacht rule, does not apply to the archetype, because the archetype is restricted to the being-fifteen; but rather it goes with the modifications. And not even with all of them, because that would mean that it would annul the being-fifteen, which is (in general) required by the rule of transfer (in modifications). But it goes with (only) those like the Friend-finding rite, in connexion with which the being-seventeen is found definitely stated.[72] As they say:

[72] In the new- and full-moon rites, fifteen "fire-stick verses" are recited, each accompanying the laying of a stick on the fire (TS. 2.5.8.2, *pañcadaśa sāmidhenīr anv āha*); cf. Hillebrandt, *NVMO.* p. 74ff. (Strictly speaking only eleven different verses are recited; they are found in TB. 3.5.2; the first and last are repeated three times each, making 15 in all.) The optional (*kāmya*) *iṣṭis* (described in TS. 2.2–4, MS. 2.1–4, etc.) and all other *iṣṭis* are modifications of the new- and full-moon rites. A "detacht statement" prescribes for *iṣṭis* 17 fire-stick verses. It reads, according to the Bhāṣya on J. 3.6.9 and 10.8.17–19, *saptadaśa sāmidhenīr anu brūyāt*, which I

110. "And thus this being-fifteen is establisht for the archetype, and for modifications where there is no further direct-statement of the being-seventeen."

111. And this sentence (specifically prescribing the being-seventeen at the Friend-finding etc.) is not purposeless (i.e. it is not a mere duplication of the detacht-rule for the being-seventeen), because it, standing in the context of the Friend-finding etc., makes restricted-application (to these rites) of the being-seventeen, which is (otherwise prescribed) only (as) a detacht-rule. Restricted-application is the limitation to specific cases of a general rule. As they say:

112. "A general rule, when not clear (in its application), shall be restricted (by a restrictive statement) to specific cases."

113. Now a detacht-rule is a general rule, while that which stands in the context of the Friend-finding etc. is a specific rule.

Enough of this. Let us proceed with the subject. The subsidiariness based on syntactical-connexion is, then, establisht.

114. Now this syntactical-connexion is stronger than context. For context is not directly applicatory, since it consists in a requirement (need of complement, *ākāṅkṣā*) felt. And it is not the requirement itself that proves (dependence), but rather when

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have not found in just this form; cf. TS. 6.3.7.1, *saptadaśa sāmidhenīr anv āha*, at the kindling of the fire for the *agnīṣomīya* animal at the soma rite. The Mīmāṅsā doctrine, as set forth in the text and elsewhere, is that this applies not to the archetype (where 15 are prescribed), but only to modifications where it is specifically laid down. This accords with ĀpŚS. 24.3.30 *saptadaśeṣṭipaśubandhānāṁ yatra śrūyante.* (On the other hand BŚS. 13.1 prescribes *saptadaśa sāmidhenīḥ* for optional *iṣṭis* in general, naming certain exceptions which, like the archetype, have 15; cf. also BŚS. 23.1.) As an example our text, following TV. p. 1078 l.2, quotes the "friend-finding" rite; the Bhāṣya on J. 10.8.17–19 quotes this with several others. This rite seems not to be known to our Black YV. texts. Most curiously, fifteen, and not seventeen, fire-stick verses are required for it in ŚŚS. 3.7.2 and KŚS. 5.12.18, the only original authorities on the subject known to me.—According to MS. 1.7.3 (111.13ff.) and KS. 9.1 (104.5ff.) there are differences of opinion as to whether 17 or 15 fire-stick verses should be used in the *punarādhāna*. KS. 23.8 (84.17) says that the *prāyaṇīyā iṣṭis* at the soma rite are performed with 17; so also MS. 3.7.2 (76.7), which however alludes to a conflicting opinion that only 15 should be used. According to KS. 24.8 (99.18) the *ātithyeṣṭi* also has 17; and cf. KS. 12.7 (169.8), a *kāmyeṣṭi*.

a statement is perceived as requiring (some complement), there arises such a thought as this: "Surely this statement must be coördinated in the form of one unitary statement with some (other) statement." And therefore context, which has requirement as its nature, is an evidence for syntactic-coördination of one statement with another. And so, before context can make an application by inferring a syntactical-connexion, (an already existent) syntactical-connexion will have created word-meaning and direct-statement and so made the application. That is how syntactical-connexion is stronger than context.

115. That is why, in the formula "O Indra-Agni, you have accepted this oblation, you have made it thrive, you have made superior splendor," when by word-meaning the words 'Indra-Agni' have been shown to be subsidiary to the new-moon rite (of which Indra-Agni are an establisht deity), then by syntactical-connexion the words '(you have accepted) this oblation' etc. (that is, all the rest) are also made subsidiary to the new-moon rite, but not to (both) the new- and full-moon rites by context;[73] because syntactical-connexion is stronger than context.

4th pramāṇa; prakaraṇa

116. Context (*prakaraṇa*) is interdependence (or mutual requirement, mutual need for complement, *ubhaya-ākāṅkṣā*); as in such things as the fore-sacrifices. For when it is said "He offers (to) the fire-sticks,"[74] since there is in this injunction no statement of any special desired-end, there is felt a requirement (need of statement) of the benefit to be gained; that is, the question is raised: "What is he to effect by offering (to) the fire-sticks?" Also in the injunction of the new- and full-moon rites, there is felt a requirement of the producer of the benefit (promist to their performer), that is, the question is raised, "How is he to gain heaven by the new- and full-moon rites?" Therefore, by reason

[73] This formula occurs in a group of formulas most of which apply both to the new-moon and to the full-moon rites, and therefore might be supposed itself to apply to both. But the words 'Indra-Agni' by their specific meaning belong to the new-moon rite alone; and the rest of the formula must go along with them, because syntactically connected with them.

[74] The first of the (normally five) fore-sacrifices (*prayājas*). Cf. 300.

of the mutual requirement, the fore-sacrifices etc. are shown to be subsidiary to the new- and full-moon rites.

117. (Objection:) But if in the injunction of the fore-sacrifices etc. no special desired-end is stated, then let heaven be assumed as the fruit by the All-conquering rule. For in the chapter on the All-conquering (rite), since no fruit is directly stated in the injunction "He shall sacrifice with the All-conquering,"[75] and since a fruit must infallibly be assumed because it is impossible that an injunction could be stated unless there were a fruit, it is declared that heaven is the fruit, because it is a universal object of desire. So it is said: "It shall be (understood as) heaven, because that is (an end) common to (desired by) all without distinction."

118. Or else, let the fruit be assumed to be supplied in the explanatory-matter, by the Night-sessions rule. For in the section on the Night-sessions[76] we are told that since there is no direct-statement of fruit (in the injunction), and since a fruit must infallibly be assumed because it is impossible that an injunction could be stated unless there were a fruit, therefore the fruit is that known as "firm-establishment" which is mentioned in the explanatory-passage referring to the injunction, viz. "They are firmly-establisht, verily, who revere these nights;"[77] because to supply heaven, not mentioned (anywhere), and to assume its connexion (as fruit) with the (rite) in question, by the

[75] The Mīmāṅsā tradition itself seems doubtful as to what is meant by this rite. The Bhāṣya on J. 4.3.10 quotes the full injunction thus: *sarvebhyo vā eṣa devebhyaḥ sarvebhyaś chandobhyaḥ sarvebhyaḥ pṛṣṭhebhya ātmānam āgurate, yaḥ satrāyāguratè, sa viśvajitātirātreṇa sarvapṛṣṭhena sarvastomena sarvavedasadakṣiṇena yajeta.* I have failed to find this. But C. comm. rejects the Bhāṣya statement on the ground that this injunction itself indicates the purpose of the Viśvajit, namely to help towards the fruit of the *sattra*. The comm. says that the Viśvajit mentioned in the *ekāhakāṇḍa* is meant. If this refers to TS. 7.1.1–3, no *viśvajit* is mentioned there. If it refers to ĀpŚS. 22.4.11, there also a purpose is mentioned in 12, *sarvasyānnādyasya prasavaṁ gacchati.* I have found nothing appropriate in the *ekāha* section of BŚS (book 18). PB. 20.9.1 is also unsuitable as naming a fruit (*paśu*); nor do the *viśvajit atirātras* of TS. 7.1.10.4, 7.2.2.2 and 3.2, fit the requirements.

[76] *rātri-sattra*, or simply *sattra*, a soma rite covering more than twelve days.

[77] PB. 23.2.4, 5.4, 9.5, 11.5, 14.7 etc. (always reading *pratitiṣṭhanti ya etā upayanti;* Bhāṣya on J. 4.3.17 *pra° ha vā ete, ya etā upa°*).

rule of the All-conquering section, is harder than to assume as the fruit of the (rite) in question that which *is* mentioned in the explanatory-statement. This is stated as follows: "Ātreya says, (this explanatory-statement gives) the fruit, because it is directly stated; for (only) when it is not directly-stated (even in the explanatory-matter) should it be inferred (as heaven)."

119. Therefore, since either by the All-conquering rule or by the Night-session rule (the fore-sacrifices etc.) can be assumed to have independent fruits as their objects, why assume that they are subsidiary to the new- and full-moon rites?

120. (To all this we reply:) Not so. If they were assumed to be aimed at independent fruits, their connexion (with them) would be determined by one-sided requirement ('position,' see 159). For in that case the fruit would not require a means of accomplishment; for only a directly-stated fruit requires a means of accomplishment, and it would not be directly-stated in that case. And so, since there would be no requirement on the part of the fruit, the connexion with an independent fruit would be based only on the need of supplying what is to be effected by the fore-sacrifices: "What (fruit) is he to effect (by them)?" (would be the only question). But if we make them refer to the new- and full-moon rites, it is mutual requirement that determines (the connexion), because the fore-sacrifices require an end to be attained, and on the other side the manner of operation (of the new- and full-moon rites) needs to be stated. And it will be shown (159) that mutual need is stronger than one-sided need. And therefore it is correct to say that (the fore-sacrifices) are for the purpose of the new- and full-moon rites, and not for any independent fruit of their own. This is meant (by the following): "In the case of material-substances, preparatory-acts, and (subsidiary) rites (actions), because they are subsidiary (to the main rite, they "serve its purpose"), a direct-statement of their fruits shall be (regarded as mere) explanatory-statement."[78]

121. Now a statement of fruit in the case of a material-substance is found in such (explanatory-)passages as "Who has a ladle of parṇa-wood hears no evil sound." A statement of fruit

[78] That is, such statements are mere 'glorifications' of these subsidiary things, like all *arthavāda*, and are not to be felt as parts of injunctions; such things have no proper 'fruits' of their own.

in the case of a preparatory-act is found in such as "When he anoints (his own eye), he at the same time puts out his enemy's eye." A statement of fruit in the case of a (subsidiary) rite is found in such as "This verily is a coat-of-mail that is made for the sacrifice, when the fore-sacrifices and after-sacrifices are offered."[79] The word 'rite' must here be understood in the sense of an action directly-contributory (to the main action),[80] since preparatory-acts (which are indirectly-contributory) are mentioned separately. Enough of this!

Prakaraṇa applies only to actions

122. Now this 'context' can make application of an action alone, not of material-substances or qualities (accessories); but of these latter it can make application (only) thru their connexion with an action. If you ask why—listen!

123. In the injunction "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice," the verb-part (of the ending *-ta*, in *yajeta*) expresses the end-efficient-force; it means "he shall *effect* (something)." And this requires three elements: *what* shall he effect, *by what means*, and *in what manner*. Now as for the requirement of end (to be effected), by the rule of the first (section) of the Sixth (Book) heaven is construed as the end: "he shall effect (attainment of) heaven." As for the requirement of means, by the rule of the section (of the sūtra) on the meaning of the efficient-force the sacrifice (*yāga*), derived from the (root-part of the) same word (*yaje-ta*), is construed as means: "by the sacrifice he shall effect heaven." Then as for the requirement of manner, "how (is this to be done)?", the various (subsidiary) actions mentioned in the same context, and which have no directly-stated fruit, they only

[79] This implies the answer to the second part of the objector's argument above (118), that the fruit of the fore-sacrifices should be understood from the explanatory-statement (*arthavāda*). Altho the latter does indeed seem to mention a 'fruit,' that fruit in this case is obviously just contributory to the main sacrifice (*kratvartha*), not directly beneficial to man (*puruṣārtha*); and in any case, by the Sūtra quoted, such *arthavāda*-statements could not in the case of subsidiaries designate any really independent fruit, since subsidiaries must have as their primary function the furtherance of the main rite.

[80] *ārādupakāraka;* on this term, often misunderstood by modern translators and commentators, see below, 183, and Index, s. v.

are fit to be construed as the manner-of-performance, because they themselves require something which they are to serve. Because in every-day life it is only actions which we see satisfying the requirement of manner-of-performance ('how-coming-to-be'). For if it be askt "In what manner (how) can one cut with an ax?", the word 'hand' alone does not supply the answer, even if it be stated, thus: "The hand (is the manner)." But rather it is only (the acts of) raising and lowering, exprest in words such as: "By raising and lowering (the ax) with the hand." And the hand itself may be so construed only thru this means (indirectly, as being concerned in the actions of raising and lowering). This is a commonplace.

124. And further: the requirement of 'how-coming-to-be' (one of the words translated 'manner' above) means a requirement of manner (*prakāra*, 'way, method') inherent in the means. Because the suffix *-tham* (in *ka-tham*, 'how') means 'manner.' Manner (*prakāra*) is a species that divides a genus (a special variety of some broader category). And the genus (in this case, the means) is exprest by the verb and (therefore) consists only of actions. For in the phrase "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice" this is the meaning: "By-sacrifice (as means) it is so to be acted that heaven shall result." And a species of a genus which is an action must likewise be (some form of) action. For a species of brahman, such as a wandering-mendicant, cannot be a non-brahman. And so it is proper to say that only an action can be construed as satisfying the requirement of manner ('how-coming-to-be'), another name for which is the requirement for a special kind of action inherent in the means (i.e. the sacrificial action as a whole).

125. And since these specific actions inherent in the means (the sacrifice) consist of nothing but actions, from the initial laying-of-the-sacred-fires to the final feeding-of-brahmans, it is proper that they should be taken-up (that their relation to the sacrifice should be determined) by context. And their connexion with the means consists simply in their contributing to it (helping to effect it); for without them the sacrifice could not produce the transcendental-result. For there can be no splitting produced by the ax without the actions of raising and lowering.

So it is establisht that an action alone can be construed as satisfying the requirement of manner. And that is why the

traditionalists say that material-substances and deities can be so construed only by way of (being concerned in) the accomplishment of the sacrifice. And as for the requirement of manner in modifications (*vikṛti*), it is declared that the accomplishment of the service (rendered by such subsidiary actions to the sacrifice) is transferred.[81]

126. And if a material-object were fit to be construed as fulfilling the requirement of manner-of-performance, then all the running-around on the part of the book-makers (ritual authorities) to the end of performances would be useless.[82]

And for this reason only an action can play the part of an obligation (*itikartavyatā*);[83] since (only) something taken to satisfy the requirement of manner (which, as we have seen, must mean an action) can be an obligation, a so-to-be-done-ness, and since the word 'so' (*iti*) denotes manner (like *kathaṁ* in *kathaṁ-bhāva*, above). The 'so'-manner of the 'to-be-done' thing is 'so-to-be-done-ness' (obligation). And, as we have said above, manner is a species that divides a genus. And a species of a 'thing-to-be-done' can only be a 'thing-to-be-done' (that is, an action). Therefore a material-object cannot be an obligation or 'so-to-be-done-ness,' but only an action. But a material object etc. (or a quality) can only be a subsidiary element, and that too by direct-statement and other (modes-of-evidence), but not by context. As they say:

127. "Verbs (or, actions) in the context do not take qualities or material substances in place of manner-of-performance, except by intermediate connexion with an action, (which must be) imparted by the sentence."

128. And that is why the dependence of formulas like "I cut the strew, a seat for the gods" is determined by word-meaning, and not by context: as is stated in the Rāṇaka in the conclusion

[81] That is, from the archetype (*prakṛti*); so that there is no need for their statement. 'Context' in its usual sense cannot apply to modifications: 129ff.

[82] You could simply take the material things required, and do nothing!

[83] This word, literally 'so (*iti*)-to-be-done-ness,' is otherwise used as a precise synonym of *kathaṁ-bhāva*, 'how-coming-to-be' or 'manner-of-performance.' But it also means 'duty, obligation,' and in this paragraph clearly has a tinge of that meaning, being thus faintly distinguisht from *kathaṁ-bhāva*.

of (its statement of) the remarks of the objector in the section on explanatory-passages. (It is true that) sometimes a statement[84] that a material-object serves as manner-of-performance (occurs, but it) is to be taken as meaning that it is a subsidiary-element (in an action), because of the evident-tendency (*svarasa*) of many authorities, and because of the convincing character of what we have said above.

So it is establisht that context applies to actions alone.

Mahā-prakaraṇa; applies only in prakṛti

129. And this context is of two kinds: great-(chief-)context, and intermediate-context. Of these, the context that refers (some subsidiary) to the fruit efficient-force (i.e. of the main action) is great-context. And it is this which governs the fore-sacrifices etc. And it occurs only in archetypes. Archetypes are those (forms of rites) where there is definite prescription of all subsidiaries; as e.g. the new- and full-moon rites. And in these context, that is mutual-requirement, applies, because (without it) the (double) requirement is not satisfied (as shown above).

130. But in modifications (great) context does not apply. A modification is a (form of rite) where there is no definite prescription of all subsidiaries, (but where some at least are "transferred" from the archetype), such as Sūrya's rite.[85] And whatever new subsidiaries, such as the *upahomas* ('subordinate-oblations'), are definitely stated in these, cannot be applied by context. In the case of those (new subsidiaries, i.e. such as are not found in the archetype), even if they require a statement of the end which they are to effect, still in the main action there is no requirement of manner-of-performance, because that need is satisfied simply by the subsidiaries (transferred) from the archetype. And let it not be said: "Because the archetypal subsidiaries are not recited here (in the modification) and are therefore not immediately-perceptible, while the (new) subsidiaries of the modification are recited here and so are immediately perceptible, the latter rather (than the former) satisfy the need (of manner in the modification)." (This does not hold), because

[84] The comm. quotes such a statement from the Nyāyaratnamālā.

[85] Enjoined by *sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvapet*, MS. 2.2.2 (16.1), TS. 2.3.2.3, BŚS. 13.24. Bhāṣya on J. 9.1.4 seems to refer to MS.; cf. 193, n. 130.

even tho they are recited, their contribution (useful-effect, on the main action of the modification) is not establisht, and so they cannot satisfy the need offhand (on the instant), while the archetypal subsidiaries can satisfy it, because their contribution is establisht (by their already-known use in the archetype).

131. And there is no lack of means to bring them in (to the modification), for they are brought in by the method known as comparison (or, analogy, *upamiti*). For upon the appearance of the injunction of Sūrya's rite, since it is performed with a vegetable material (viz. rice), and since it has a single deity (Sūrya, and not more), these similarities cause it to be compared to Agni's rite (a part of the new- and full-moon rites), just as when one sees a buffalo it is compared to a cow. And as soon as comparison is made with that, its meaning is made known thereby. This efficient-force (of Sūrya's rite) has three elements (like any efficient-force). Two of them, the end[86] to be effected by it, and its means (the Sūrya-sacrifice), are found in the statement of Sūrya's rite itself. Hence there is felt a need of statement (only) of manner-of-performance. And the manner-of-performance of Agni's rite is supplied by transfer, following in the wake of its contribution (to the main efficient-force); and the meaning comes out: "He shall effect holy-splendor, by Sūrya's rite, contributing to it (by subsidiary acts) in the same way as in Agni's rite." And so, since this (manner-of-performance) alone satisfies the requirement felt, context does not apply to the modification. And the new subsidiaries (peculiar to the modification and differing from those of the archetype) are applied to it only by position (172), which means one-sided requirement (not by context or mutual requirement).

132. And let it not be said: "Why should not the archetypal subsidiaries themselves be applied to the modification by context?" Because they also have had their requirement (of end) satisfied by contributing to the archetype.

133. (Objection:) But while the archetypal subsidiaries, having no (longer a) requirement (of end), can be applied to the modification only by position, nevertheless the new subsidiaries (of the modification) have a requirement (of end), and the modification

[86] Viz. 'holy splendor,' *brahmavarcasa*, TS. 2.3.2.3, BŚS. 13.24, MS. 2.2.2 (16.1).

also has a requirement (of manner); so let their connexion be establisht by context; and since context makes application instantly ahead of position (159ff.), connexion would be made first with the new subsidiaries, rather than with the archetypal subsidiaries.

134. To this we reply: It is true that context is instantly applicatory (ahead of position). However, the relative weight of the thing-to-be-evidenced counts for more than the relative weight of the mode-of-evidence. And hence it is right to say that connexion must be made rather with the archetypal (subsidiaries), which present themselves in the way described above, because their contribution is establisht, rather than with those (new ones) of the modification, because their contribution is still to be establisht. And the modification requires things which will contribute to its effect (as the archetypal subsidiaries will, as shown by their use in the archetype), not just (any) things as such. So connexion is properly made first with the archetypal subsidiaries. And therefore context does not apply to a modification.

135. But when something is enjoined in a modification (not as a strictly new member but) in further allusion to a subsidiary of the archetype (already enjoined there), that is taken by context; as when *udumbara*-ness (is enjoined) in allusion to the sacrificial post in the words "The sacrificial post is of *udumbara*-(wood)." If it be said: "But it cannot be taken by context because it is not an action, and only actions can be taken by context"—we reply, True. But nevertheless the *udumbara*-ness that is enjoined certainly does raise the question: What (end) is one to effect by it? And it cannot be said: "Since it is enjoined in further allusion to the sacrificial post, and since the post is by its nature of invisible (transcendental) effect, that answers the question as to what the *udumbara*-ness is good for, as the *āhavanīya*-fire does with the laying of the (sacred) fires."[87] Because the post is not exclusively invisible in its effect. For if that were its nature, its quality of being made of *khadira* and other (kinds of wood) would be exclusively invisible in effect. And that is not

[87] The *āhavanīya*-fire contributes to the transcendental-result of the sacrifice. The laying of the fires leads to it, and therefore needs no other end.

the case. If it were, there could be no acceptance of the use of *kadara*-wood as a substitute when no *khadira*-wood is at hand, because there can be no substitution in the case of things which are invisible in effect. For there is no evidence to prove that the invisible effect producible by *khadira* would be produced by *kadara*. Therefore there is no substitution in the case of things which are invisible in effect. This is stated thus: "(There is) no (substitution) in the case of deities, (the sacrificial) fires, words, and rites, because they have another purpose."[88] Here the word 'other purpose' means 'invisible purpose.'[89] And the authorities[90] state that *kadara* and other (woods) may be taken as substitutes. Therefore the post is not by its nature exclusively invisible in effect, but rather the traditionalists[91] say that the post belongs to the class of preparatory acts with visible and invisible effects (cf. 183).

136. And so the post alone does not answer the question as to what *udumbara*-ness is good for, because a visible preparatory act can be performed in other ways also. And hence the *udumbara*-ness does (as we said) have a need (of expression of its end). And the modification also has a need for (expression of) manner-of-performance. And this is satisfied when the contributions (of the subsidiaries of the archetype), and the objects which go along with them, are brought into connexion with (the modification); but it is not satisfied by being connected with the contributions alone. And so, just as there is a requirement of means with the efficient-force of the (injunction to offer sour-milk for one desirous of) power, and when sour-milk is construed as the means, since a

[88] The comm., following the Bhāṣya of Śabara, explains 'words' as meaning formulas, *mantras* (i.e. words spoken at the sacrifices).

[89] The Bhāṣya does not take the sūtra's meaning in this way. It does not say that all the elements listed necessarily are invisible in effect, but holds that they are 'unsubstitutable' because their purposes are mutually exclusive, one has a 'different purpose' from another. Thus what is addrest to one deity cannot be addrest to another, etc.

[90] I have failed to find this stated, either in the authorities quoted by Schwab, *AI. Tieropfer*, p. 2, or elsewhere (e.g. KB. 10.1). BR. s. v. *kadara* refer to comm. on KŚS. 7.4.19, but this is evidently a wrong reference.

[91] Comm. says this means "Pārthasārathimiśra etc.," and quotes from this authority statements to the above effect. The comm. also mentions "cutting-off and fashioning (with tools)" as examples of "preparatory acts (*saṁskāra*) with visible effects," and "sprinkling and anointing" of "invisible" ones.

material-object cannot play the part of means (cf. 33–38), that requirement continues until the oblation-act is construed as substratum to it, and is not satisfied when sour-milk alone is construed; and the oblation, taken as substratum, is said to be taken simply in response to the requirement of means, while no fourth requirement (in addition to end, means, and manner) known as 'substratum' is set up: just so the modification's requirement of manner is not satisfied when the contributions (i.e. the contributing acts) alone are construed (as manner); it continues until the objects that go along with them are construed.[92] And so the objects that are taken as going along with the contributions are taken as responding to the same requirement of manner.

137. Now among these objects those which belong to the archetype, tho they are indeed taken as responding to the requirement of manner, are not to be so taken by context, because they have no (longer any) requirement (of end), since they have contributed to the archetype. But such things as *udumbara*-ness have such a requirement because they do not contribute to any other (rite); and they are enjoined as going along with the animal-fastening post to hold good up to the point where *khadira*-ness is to come into effect. So it is right to say that they are taken (as subsidiaries) by context, since a mutual need exists. For if *khadira*-ness had been enjoined as going along with the post, then the modification would have no need of complement, and so *udumbara*-ness could not be taken with it by context. But this is not the case, because *khadira*-ness does not fall under the rule of transfer.[93]

138. (Objection:) But if *udumbara*-ness is enjoined only until *khadira*-ness is to come into effect, then its annulment of *khadira*-ness would be an annulment of the unestablisht, like the annulment discust in the Third (Book).[94] For annulment is of two kinds, annulment of the unestablisht, and of the establisht. Of these,

[92] The 'contributions' are performed with objects, which are therefore needed with them.

[93] In 141f. it is explained how *khadira*-ness of the post (altho prescribed in the archetype) is not subject to the rule of transfer.

[94] The other kind, annulment of the establisht, is discust in the Tenth Book. Cf. Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 179, l. 5.

the annulment discust in the Third is annulment of the unestablisht. For in it, before a weaker mode-of-evidence can start to make an application, a stronger one (steps in and) makes the application. An annulment of something else by an (influence) indicated by this statement is annulment of the unestablisht; because the weaker mode-of-evidence never gets a chance to come into effect.

139. But when an archetypal subsidiary, which would be applied to a modification by the rule of transfer, is annulled by either (1) contradiction, or (2) breakdown of meaning, or (3) prohibition, then we have annulment of the establisht. Such as the annulment of the archetypal *kuśa*-grass by the contrary injunction to use arrow-grass;[95] or the annulment of husking (grains) in the case of (golden) *kṛṣṇala*-berries due to breakdown (of meaning) because of the use of huskless materials;[96] or the annulment of the choosing of the *hotar* in the manes-offering thru the prohibition "He shall not choose a hotar." And the annulment of *khadira*-ness by *udumbara*-ness must rather be taken as annulment of the establisht, like the case of arrow-grass and *kuśa*-grass. And if *khadira*-ness did not come within the scope of the rule of transfer this could not be, because it would not be establisht.

140. (To this objection) we reply: Annulment of something else by something applied by the modes-of-evidence treated in the Third (Book) is certainly annulment of the unestablisht. And context is treated in the Third (Book). So the annulment of something else by *udumbara*-ness applied by it (context) can only be annulment of the unestablisht. For there is no inherited rule to the effect that annulment of archetypal subsidiaries by modificational ones can only be annulment of the establisht.

141. But in the last analysis it is, after all, annulment of the establisht. And it cannot be said: "How can the annulment of *khadira*-ness be annulment of the establisht, when *khadira*-ness has not been establisht because it does not come within the scope of the rule of transfer, or if it does, then by that very fact the requirement (of manner in the modification) would be satisfied

[95] In the hostile-magic rite prescribed TS. 2.1.7.7. This is an example of *pratyāmnāna*, 'contradiction.' It is dealt with by the Bhāṣya on J. 10.4.2, first *varṇaka*.

[96] In the *āyuṣkāma-iṣṭi*, MS. 2.2.2 (16.8); quoted in J. 10.1.1, 2d *varṇaka*.

and so *udumbara*-ness could not be applied by context?" For in the case of annulment of the establisht things are not establisht by the rule of transfer. If they were, there could be no annulment, because they would have been establisht by sound-authority (*śāstra*). But rather, it (the rule of transfer) establishes in reality only those things which are not annulled in the modification. And it is these things that are establisht by the words "as in the archetype." From which arises the human delusion to this effect, that "Just as it was done in the archetype, so it must be done in the modification;" that is, that all archetypal things must be done.

142. And so *khadira*-ness etc., establisht by (this) delusion, are annulled by *udumbara*-ness etc. which are establisht by sound-authority. So that this annulment really is annulment of the establisht. And a requirement felt in an injunction can never be satisfied by something establisht by a delusion. Therefore, since a mutual-requirement, or in other words 'context,' must arise, it is correct to say that context applies to the modification the *udumbara*-ness etc. which are there enjoined in further allusion to archetypal subsidiaries.

143. Some teachers say that in the same way the speckled-butter enjoined in allusion to the archetypal after-sacrifices in the words "He offers the after-sacrifices with speckled-butter"[97] is also taken as a subsidiary of the modifications by context. But my revered father (Anantadeva) says as follows: The speckled-butter is enjoined in further-allusion to the after-sacrifices. Now this (use of speckled-butter) would be meaning-

[97] This feature, says the comm., applies to certain modifications of the new- and full-moon rites, such as the *paśucāturmāsya* (i.e. the Varuṇapraghāsa, cf. Hillebrandt, Ritualliteratur, p. 116). That the after-sacrifices of this rite are performed with speckled-butter is shown by ŚB. 2.5.2.41; and the Bhāṣya on J. 10.4.50 connects the injunction here quoted with the *cāturmāsya*. However, the Bhāṣya on J. 5.2.16 connects the same injunction with the after-sacrifices to the *agnīṣomīya* animal, which are also performed with speckled-butter; and in fact the injunction is cited by our comm. himself from TS. 6.3.11.6, which belongs to the *agnīṣomīya* animal. ŚB. 3.8.4.8 prescribes speckled-butter for the after-sacrifices of animal-rites in general. Since the *agnīṣomīya* is the archetype of all animal-rites, this feature would apply by transference from it to the *paśucāturmāsya* and all others. But what, then, is the "archetype" in which the after-sacrifices are performed with plain (unspeckled) butter?

less as applied to their exoteric (primary, natural) form (because they could be performed just as well with ordinary butter; hence the restriction must be for the transcendental-effect); and they (the after-sacrifices) cannot naturally imply as their object the transcendental-effect of the modification (as a whole), because that is too remote, but rather their own transcendental-effect, because that is nearer, just like the rule of restraint of speech at the consecration-rite.[98] That is why the (Bhāṣya on the) Ninth (Book) says that such things as the purification (*utpavana*, of the butter used in sprinkling the oblation) are employed (only) for the transcendental-effect of such things as the sprinkling (not for that of the whole new- and full-moon rites, to which the sprinkling belongs). And so, since merely the transcendental-effect of the after-sacrifices indicated by the words of the injunction (quoted above) satisfies the requirement (of end) felt in the injunction of speckled-butter, it cannot be taken by context as serving the purpose of the transcendental-effect of the (whole) modification.

144. We however, assuming for the sake of argument that it does serve the purpose of the (whole) modification, say as follows: Or (if my father's argument be not accepted) suppose the speckled-butter does serve the purpose of the modification. Even so it cannot be applied to it by context. For context properly applied *udumbara*-ness because it was enjoined as going with the sacrificial post until *khadira*-ness should become effective, since there was a mutual requirement. If, in the same way, speckled-butter were enjoined as going with the after-sacrifices only until (unspeckled) butter should become effective, then we should have mutual requirement and hence application by context. But this is not the case. For it is not a case of the injunction of some different substance named speckled-butter, which is enjoined to take the place of butter, as *udumbara*-ness was appointed to take the place of *khadira*-ness. Because it is observed in such expressions as "a speckled gem" that the word 'speckled' expresses the quality of

[98] See Bhāṣya on J. 9.1.2–3, 2d *varṇaka*. The rule here quoted in the Bhāsya, *yāvatyā vācā kāmayeta tāvatyā dīkṣaṇīyāyām anubrūyāt*, etc., might pass for an inexact paraphrase of ĀpŚS. 10.4.10. Cf. however *vācaṁ yacchati*, TS. 6.1.4.3, MS. 3.6.8 (71.11). This rule is effective for the *apūrva* of the *dīkṣaṇīyā* alone, not of the entire *jyotiṣṭoma* of which that is a subsidiary.

being varicolored, and hence the word 'speckled-butter' means just 'varicolored butter.' And that is why it is declared that in the recitations[99] the expression 'butter-drinkers' must be used, and not 'speckled-butter-drinkers.'

145. And it cannot be claimed that context is applicatory on the ground that speckled-butter is enjoined only until the archetypal (plain) butter becomes effective. For the word speckled-butter does not enjoin butter particularized by the quality of varicoloredness; because the injunction of a particularized (qualified) thing would be too complicated.[100] But rather, in further allusion to the archetypal butter, the mere quality of varicoloredness is enjoined, as in the phrase "The priests walk forth with red turbans."[101] This is made clear at the end of the fourth quarter of the Tenth (Book): "(The expression 'spotted-butter-drinkers' instead of 'butter-drinkers' is) not at all (to be used in the recitations); because what the text enjoins is a (mere) quality."[102] And the Śāstradīpikā says on this: "What is enjoined is only the quality of varicoloredness in the butter which is already enjoined from the archetype." And so the modification's requirement (of manner) is satisfied by the butter of the archetype, and by the (archetypal) after-sacrifices whose contributions are already establisht; wherefore, context cannot apply to it the afterwards-enjoined quality of varicoloredness, any more than the new subsidiaries (not transferred from the archetype) such as the *upahoma*.

146. For if in place of some quality of the archetype the quality of varicoloredness were enjoined, then until that (archetypal)

[99] Mantras referring to the gods as 'butter-drinkers' (*devāṅ ājyapāṅ āvaha*, TB. 3.5.3.2 etc., *devā ājyapā ājyam ajuṣanta*, TB. 3.5.10.4 etc.), which are used in connexion with the *anuyājas* in modifications exactly in the same form as in the archetype, despite the use of 'speckled-butter' instead of the archetypal plain 'butter.'

[100] It would be 'overloading the sentence.' We saw (12 etc.) that except in an originative injunction only a single thing or quality could be enjoined, not a thing with its quality at once.

[101] This is interpreted as prescribing, not that they shall wear turbans (which by transfer from the archetype they would be wearing anyhow), but that their turbans shall be red.

[102] The comm. explains that the varicoloredness is produced by mixing sour-milk with the butter, with reference to ŚB. 3.8.4.7, *dvayaṁ vā idaṁ sarpiś cāiva dadhi ca* (misquoted, and with wrong reference, in comm.).

quality became effective the modification's requirement would not be satisfied, and since the quality of varicoloredness would be enjoined only for that period, there would be a mutual requirement and therefore application by context. But there is no such quality in the archetype; because the butter and the after-sacrifices are enjoined, instead, before the quality of varicoloredness, and it does not take the place thereof.

147. And it cannot be claimed that context applies on the ground that it is enjoined as going along with the butter only for the period until the archetypal qualitylessness (of the butter) comes into effect. Because qualitylessness is not enjoined, and hence cannot be a subsidiary any more than scratching with the hand (in the following example), and therefore the modification can have no requirement of it. The example is as follows. In the *jyotiṣṭoma* it is enjoined to discard the black antelope's horn (with which the priest is to scratch himself in case of need) at the time of giving the sacrificial fee. But in the Two-night rite etc.,[103] tho this would follow from the rule of transfer, it is not done on the first day, because it is required by the things to be done on the second day before the giving of the sacrificial fee, since the text requires for them that (any) scratching be done with the black antelope's horn.[104] And tho in the *jyotiṣṭoma* scratching with the hand is evidently intended for the time after the giving of the fee (i.e. if it is necessary to scratch then, the hand will suffice), this is not required with the things performed after the giving of the fee on the first day of the Two-night rite etc., because in the archetype thiṣ is only establisht by the sense, and is not required by the authority of the text (which does not command scratching at all).

148. In the same way, because qualitylessness (of the butter) is not enjoined, it cannot be required by a modification. Therefore, since there is no mutual requirement, the speckled-butter is not applied by context. Enough of this long discussion!

149. So it is establisht that great-context is applicatory only to

[103] "And the other *ahargaṇas*" (comm.), modifications of the *jyotiṣṭoma*. In J. 11.3.13–14, where this is treated, it clearly refers to all soma-rites covering more than a single day.

[104] And one must not take up again anything that has been once discarded, nor discard anything that is going to be needed again (comm.).

archetypes (as a rule). But it may apply what is enjoined in modifications in further allusion to a subsidiary the purpose of which has been made clear in the archetype; not, however, a new subsidiary that is merely enjoined (for the first time).

150. Nevertheless, even a new subsidiary which is merely enjoined in a modification, if it is included between two elements enjoined in further allusion to an archetypal element, is also applied to the modification by (a kind of 'intermediate'-)context (cf. just below).

151. Even tho the modification's requirement of manner is satisfied just by the archetypal subsidiaries, still where an element is enjoined in further allusion to an archetypal subsidiary, the requirement of manner is not satisfied until that injunction comes into effect (as we have seen above). So, because of the modification's (continued) requirement (of manner), and because the new member enjoined in between (two such modifying injunctions) also has a requirement of end (to be effected), its connexion with the purpose of the modification is properly establisht by context. As in the case of the Āmanahomas.[105] For they are enjoined between two elements enjoined in further allusion to archetypal subsidiaries. This is stated in the Tantraratna and elsewhere. Enuf of this!

Avāntara-prakaraṇa

152. The context of the efficient-force of subsidiary actions which is included within (that of) the fruit-efficient-force (i.e. that of the main action) is called included-context. And this applies, for instance, the stepping-near to the fore-sacrifices. And it is known as 'tongs,' because without it they would all without exception be taken as indicating the manner of the (main) fruit-efficient-force.

[105] MS. 2.3.2 (28.15) *āmanena juhoti;* TS. 2.3.9.3 *āmanam asy āmanasya devā iti tisra āhutīr juhoti.* Cf. J. 4.4.7. The comm. quotes discussions of this case from the Nyāyaratnamālā, ŚD., and Tantraratna; the last is particularly full and quotes what seems to be an inexact form of the *brāhmaṇa* passage of MS., 2.3.2 (29.5) (KS. 12.2 is more remote),—which indicates performance of these *āhutis* between fore- and after-offerings. As appears from BŚS. 13.30, end, these three *āhutis* were to be offered in the Tait. school as well as the Maitr. between the fore- and after-offerings. Hence they are enclosed in a kind of 'tongs' (see next paragraph).

153. By 'tongs' we mean the enjoining of something in between two subsidiaries which are enjoined in further reference to one subsidiary; as in the case of the stepping-near. For it is enjoined just after the injunction, by the words "He takes (butter) from the spoon," of a certain subsidiary enjoined in further-allusion to the fore-sacrifices (themselves a subsidiary of the main action, viz. the new- and full-moon rites). And after it also a certain (other) subsidiary is enjoined, by the words "Who knows the pairing of the fore-sacrifices" etc., in further-allusion to the fore-sacrifices. So the stepping-near, which is mentioned between two subsidiaries of the fore-sacrifices, is subsidiary (not to the main action but) to them, because their requirement (of manner) remains unsatisfied (until the last subsidiary is mentioned). As it is said:

154. "When first a subsidiary (as the taking from the spoon) of something (as the fore-sacrifices) that stands (as subsidiary) in context-relation to another thing (as the new- and full-moon rites) is made known (to be such) by the three (first modes-of-evidence, viz.) direct-statement and the rest (word-meaning and syntactical-connexion), and afterwards another (such subsidiary of the subsidiary) is made known by the same (three modes), that is held to be 'tongs.' "[106]

155. And it cannot be claimed that "the efficient-force of a subsidiary-action has no requirement of manner-of-performance, so how can the stepping-near be taken as manner to the efficient-force of the fore-sacrifices?"[107] For efficient-forces are all alike and they always require a manner-of-performance. When it is said that "By accomplishing a transcendental-effect by means of the fore-sacrifices he shall effect a contribution to the main sacrifice," then any person who does not know how to accomplish a transcendental-effect by means of the fore-sacrifices will clearly require a statement of how the transcendental-result is to be accomplisht by them. And this is satisfied by the subsidiaries included in 'tongs,' and by verbally (directly) stated ones, and

[106] The 'tongs' are the two subsidiaries of the subsidiary (fore-sacrifices), which surround the stepping-near and lift it into dependence on the subsidiary (fore-sacrifices), whereas without that it would be understood as belonging to the main action, being in its general context.

[107] This is the view of the Mīmāṅsakas of Prabhākara's school (comm.).

by injunctions of traditional-authority (smṛti) like sipping-water etc. (cf. 96).

156. And if there are none of these found, then the requirement is satisfied by performance in the natural way (lit. "accomplishment of its own inherent nature"), as with the spoon-oblations.[108] For in them no manner-of-performance is stated other than that the own inherent nature (of the thing stated) is to be accomplisht; nor is any supplied by transfer. There can, in the first place, be no transfer to it of the elements of *yāgas* (sacrifices proper), because *yāgas* and oblations (*homas*) are unlike in character.[109] Nor of those of oblations (*homa*), because there is no evidence to decide specifically what oblation's elements should be applied to what other oblation. So no elements are establisht for it; and therefore, altho the requirement does indeed arise as to "how one shall effect the desired end by the spoon-oblations," it is satisfied by the mere accomplishment of its own inherent nature.

157. In the same way in subsidiary actions where tongs and other (evidences as to manner-of-performance) are lacking, the requirement is indeed felt, but is satisfied by just that (accomplishment of the inherent nature of the rite). But there is not a lack of requirement altogether. Therefore it is proper to say that the stepping-near is subsidiary to the fore-sacrifices.

158. And this included-context is stronger than great-context, (by which the stepping-near would be made subsidiary to the main action, the new- and full-moon rites), because in response to the requirement of a statement of purpose felt in the elements included within tongs the transcendental-effect of (subsidiary actions) such

[108] An absolutely simple offering, made with a spoon; it has no subsidiaries, nor is there any description of it, because none is needed beyond the word 'spoon-oblation' itself. It is simply offered '*svarūpeṇa*,' in its natural way, in the way inherently implied in the prescription. See J. 8.4, especially 10–28.

[109] Comm.: *prakṣepāṅgakoddeśatyāgarūpakriyādvayavṛttijāter yāgatvāt, uddeśatyāgaprakṣepātmakakriyātrayavṛttijāter homatvāc ca.* See J. 4.2.27 for Jaimini's definition of *yāga* = *dravyadevatākriyam* (*kriyā yayā tayoḥ* [*dravyadevatayoḥ*] *saṁbandho bhavati*, Bhāṣya); and 28 for that of *homa* = *tadukte* (*yajatyukte'rthe*, Bhāṣya) *śravaṇāt...āsecanādhikaḥ*. That is, a *homa* adds the element of *pouring* to the elements (a material offered, and a deity to receive it) which characterize a *yāga*. Or: a *homa* is a *yāga* in which the offering is poured.

as the fore-sacrifices presents itself instantly, ahead of that of the main action.

Let us proceed with the subject. It is then establisht that both kinds of context make application.

159. Now this (context) is stronger than position and (name). For where dependence is shown by position, there the requirement of one of the two things has been satisfied by some other means. And it is not proper to connect a thing that has a requirement with one that has not without first arousing (producing) a requirement (where it is lacking). And so, while one-sided requirement is starting to bring about syntactic-connexion and the other (stronger modes-of-evidence) by the method of forming (arousing) mutual requirement, that is context, in the mean time (an existent) context will have instantly brought about syntactic-connexion etc. and so made the application. That is why context is stronger than position.

160. And that is why the rules about dice-playing[110] etc., tho they are recited in a neighboring position to the sprinkling-rite (of the king, *abhiṣecanīya;* one of the six soma-sacrifices of the royal coronation, *rājasūya*), are not subsidiary to that. If they were, their dependence would be due to position, not to context; for the reason that the sprinkling-rite is a modification of the *jyotiṣṭoma*, because it is enjoined by a non-manifest injunction;[111] and so its requirement of manner is satisfied by the elements (rules) of the archetype. But rather, they are subsidiary to the (whole) royal-coronation by context.

161. (Objection:) But in the sentence "The king who desires

[110] ĀpŚS. 18.18.16–18.19.5 (cf. BŚS. 12.15); cf. also TB. 1.7.10.5, and see 168. Treated in TV. pp. 873–4 (on J. 3.3.14), Jha's transl. p. 1211. The TV. quotations seem to be taken (as usual not quite accurately) from ĀpŚS.

[111] That is, one whose *svarūpa*, viz. deity and material, is not stated; cf. 57. Such an injunction, according to J. 8.1.16, is always understood to be a soma-rite and therefore a 'modification' of the 'archetype' of all soma-rites, the *jyotiṣṭoma*. The Bhāṣya on this sūtra mentions as a reason for this the fact that the *jyotiṣṭoma* itself is 'non-manifest;' it has no specification, in its originative injunction, of deity, altho according to the view defended above, 57ff., and seemingly accepted by the Bhāṣya, that the originative injunction of the *jyotiṣṭoma* is *somena yajeta*, the *material* is specified.

heaven's rule shall sacrifice with the royal-coronation (*rājasūya*)"[112] the word *rājasūya*, being a 'name' (of a rite), and so depending on the verb, applies in exactly the same places where the verb applies (namely, to *all* the *iṣṭis* and animal- and soma-sacrifices which together make up the *rājasūya*). And let it not be said: "Why should not the word *rājasūya* be like the word 'new- and full-moon rites' in the sentence 'With the new- and full-moon rites he who desires heaven shall sacrifice'? For here the word 'new- and full-moon rites,' tho a name, is not dependent on the verb (in the sense of applying thruout where the verb applies). For in that sentence the verb 'he shall sacrifice' has the function of designating all the acts found in the context, without distinction, both the Āgneya and other (principal actions) and the fore-sacrifices and other (subsidiary actions). But the word 'new- and full-moon rites' designates only the Āgneya and other (principal actions), not all; so that it is not dependent on the verb."—(This does not weaken our position:) for a word of known meaning explains one of unknown meaning. As they say:

162. "A word (here, *rājasūya*) that is doubtful because unknown, and that is mentioned in the same context with words of known meaning, is interpreted by them. But a familiar word (here, *darśapūrṇamāsa*) is not detacht from its own meaning."

163. And the word *darśapūrṇamāsa* refers to times (viz. the new- and full-moon), and its connexion with the Āgneya and other (principal actions) is understood from their originative injunctions. Therefore the word *darśapūrṇamāsa* is well-known to signify those (only). And let it not be said that because of the plurality of the (chief actions) Āgneya etc., the dual ending of *darśapūrṇamāsa* does not fit (them); for it does fit, because it refers to the two collections of (operations) establisht by the two statements referring to those who know. And so, it having been determined that the word *darśapūrṇamāsa*, 'new- and full-moon rites,' designates (the principal actions), the Āgneya etc., the verb 'he shall sacrifice' also designates only those. For it does not lose its proper meaning in having that sense.

164. But the meaning of the word *rājasūya*, 'royal-coronation,'

[112] ĀpŚS. 18.8.1 *rājā svargakāmo rājasūyena yajeta* is the closest approach to this which I can find in the ritual texts. Yet the Mīmāṅsins always quote it in the above form, reading *svārājyakāmo*.

is not determined. Therefore it must be dependent on its verb. And since that is found to apply to all the *iṣṭis* (minor sacrifices) and animal- and soma-sacrifices without distinction, the word *rājasūya* also, being dependent on it, must designate (all of) the same.

165. And let it not be said: "The word *rājasūya* by its etymology refers to the soma-pressing, since it means 'that at which the king (= Soma) is prest (*sū-yate*);' and that (pressing) is understood by the sentence 'He presses the soma' to take place at a soma-sacrifice; therefore it (*rājasūya*) designates that (soma-sacrifice) only and cannot designate *iṣṭis* and animal-sacrifices." (This does not hold:) for at such soma-sacrifices as the sprinkling-rite the pressing of the soma is not enjoined by any express statement, because such a statement is found in the Jyotiṣṭoma (which is the archetype of all soma-sacrifices, and hence is understood in them by transfer). If it be suggested that the connexion of it (with the *rājasūya* itself) is understood by transfer, no; for a transfer could take place only after the connexion with the fruit has been establisht, and hence could come in here only after the meaning of the statement "The king who desires heaven's rule shall sacrifice with the royal-coronation" has been understood. Because only after this statement has made clear the connexion with the fruit can a transfer (from an archetype) be formed in response to the question of how (the prescribed action is to be performed). So the meaning of that statement must be determined before that (transfer). And since at that time it is not establisht that soma-pressing is meant by it, therefore it follows that *rājasūya* is, as we said, a word of unknown meaning. And that is why the traditionalists declare that the word *rājasūya* is not capable of etymological explanation, like the word 'horse's ear' (as name of a tree).

166. And so, since its meaning is unknown and it is therefore dependent on its verb, the word *rājasūya* designates (all) the *iṣṭis* and animal- and soma-sacrifices (covered by it). And because their requirement (of manner) is satisfied by the various elements of their several archetypes, context cannot apply the dice-play etc. to the *rājasūya*, because there is no mutual requirement (the *rājasūya* equals merely the totality of its parts, each of which has its manner-of-performance provided by transfer). And

it cannot be claimed that tho (these members') requirement (of manner) taken each by itself is satisfied, their requirement as constituting the *rājasūya* (as a group) is not satisfied. For there is no evidence for such a thing as a double requirement (of manner).

167. And furthermore, even their requirement as to manner-of-performance each by itself must arise subsequently to their connexion with the fruit. And that takes place thru their constituting the *rājasūya*, and not each by itself. And since the dice-playing etc. would satisfy their requirement of manner-of-performance once this had come to be felt, upon the establishment of their connexion with the fruit as constituting the *rājasūya*, there could then be not so much as the formation of a transfer (of their individual manners-of-performance from their archetypes). For if there were two statements laying down their connexion with fruits, one applying to their collective nature and the other taken each by itself, then, conformably to the two requirements, we might properly admit also a connexion with both the dice-playing etc. and the subsidiaries transferred (from archetypes). But this is not the case. Therefore, because the requirement has been satisfied by the archetypal elements, context cannot apply the dice-playing etc.

168. (To this objection we reply:) True. And that is why the traditionalists show that the dice-playing etc. are enclosed in 'tongs.' The dice-playing etc. are recited in the midst of elements which are enjoined as relating to the *rājasūya* ('accompanied by *rājasūya*-ness'), such as "For the *rājasūya* he purifies these (waters)." Therefore all of them are subsidiary to the *rājasūya*, just as the stepping-near is subsidiary to the fore-sacrifices because it is recited in the midst of elements enjoined in further allusion to the fore-sacrifices. Therefore it is proper to say that the dice-playing etc. are subsidiary to the *rājasūya* by context.

So it is establisht that context is stronger than position.

5th pramāṇa; sthāna

169. Position (*sthāna*) means common location. And it is of two kinds, common-location in the text, and common-location in the performance. As they say:

170. "Now order, defined as common-location, is required to be of just two kinds; it determines application because of common-position in either text or performance."

171. 'Position' and 'order' (*krama*) mean the same thing. And common-location in the text is again of two kinds, text according to number, and text according to proximity. Of these, in the case of sacrifices enjoined in a certain order like "He shall distribute (a cake) for Indra-Agni on eleven potsherds," "He shall distribute (a cake) for Vaiśvānara on twelve potsherds," to these are applied the verses of sacrifice (*yājyā*) and invitation (*anuvākyā*), "Indra-Agni are the two light-spaces of heaven" etc., according to number (i.e. serial number or order), the first (pair of verses) to the first (sacrifice) and the second to the second. This application is determined by text according to number. For in response to the requirement of purpose for the formula recited first, the action first enjoined naturally presents itself first, because it occupies the same position.

172. But when subsidiaries of a modification are enjoined, not in further-reference to archetypal subsidiaries, and not included within 'tongs,' the fact that they serve the purpose of the modification is shown by proximity-text. For when the question of their purpose arises, it is naturally the transcendental-effect of the modification, which leads to the fruit, that is brought into connexion with them as their end to be effected, because it is near at hand. That is why the rule of the All-conquering (rite; see 117) is not applied to them (i.e. they are not regarded as having an unstated independent object, heaven); and also because if they had independent objects there would be no reason for their being recited in textual proximity to the modification.

173. The properties[113] of the sacrificial animal are applied to the *agnīṣomīya* animal by common-location in the performance. The *agnīṣomīya* animal is 'performed' (sacrificed) on the fasting-day; and these properties are recorded (as to be performed) on that same day in the text. So in response to the question as to their purpose, the transcendental-effect of the animal, which presents itself as the thing to be 'performed' (then), is naturally brought into connexion as the end to be effected. Therefore their application to that purpose is properly indicated by common-location in performance.

[113] Such as *upākaraṇa* (*upa hy enān ākaroti*, TS. 6.3.6.1), *niyojana* (*ni yunakti*, TS. 6.3.6.3), *paryagnikaraṇa* (*paryagni karoti*, TS. 6.3.8.1) and *saṁjñapana* (TS. 6.3.8.3), comm.

174. And let it not be said: "Why should it not be simply by common-location in text?" Because the *agnīṣomīya* animal is mentioned in the text in proximity to the purchase (of the soma, which takes place on a different day).[114] And let it not be said: "If it is mentioned in the text in proximity to the purchase, let its performance take place then too!" For this would be inconsistent with the direct statement: "This animal with two divinities (Agni and Soma) is to be sacrificed on the fasting-day." Nor can it be said: "Since context is stronger than position, why should not the properties of the animal relate rather to the purpose of the *jyotiṣṭoma* (the main sacrifice of which the animal-sacrifice is a subsidiary)?" For it, being a soma-sacrifice, is not suitable to have applied to it the elements of an animal-sacrifice. So, by the rule that "when meaninglessness blocks the way, the relative strength (of the modes-of-evidence) is reverst," it is correct to say that by position these properties are subsidiary rather to the purpose of the animal-sacrifice.

175. Nor can it be said: "Why should they not be applied to that purpose by context, rather?" Because the *agnīṣomīya*-animal's requirement of manner-of-performance has been satisfied by the archetypal properties, whose contribution is previously-settled (by their use in the archetype of the animal-sacrifice). For it has as its archetype the collected-offering (*sāṁnāyya*), since they both have this in common, that their material comes from an animal. This is stated thus: "The collected-offering rather (is its archetype), because (its material) comes from that."[115] The collected-offering is (an offering of) sour-milk and milk. Of these, the animal-sacrifice has the milk-offering as archetype, because (its material) obviously comes from an animal. And since its requirement (of manner) is satisfied by those properties which apply by the rule of transfer from it, the (new) properties cannot be applied to the animal-sacrifice by context, but only by position.

Thus, then, we have briefly described application by position.

176. And it is stronger than name. For in application by position there is a self-evident relation between the two objects,

[114] Viz. at TS. 6.1.11.6. The purchase day is the second, the fasting-day the fourth, of the whole rite.

[115] "Rather"—than the cake as suggested by the *pūrvapakṣa*.

markt by their common location. But in application by name there is no self-evident relation, because the two objects are separate in position. And name does not denote relation; because words taken in their literal senses denote material things and cannot denote relation. The reason for this is as follows. (If such words could denote relation), would the name denote merely relationship in general, or a particular relationship? Not the first; for there would be no use in expressing that (since it could then not indicate connexion with any special thing, and would fail in the purpose assumed by hypothesis); and because this would result in all literally-interpreted words being synonyms (as there can be only one concept of 'relationship-in-general,' which they would all express). And if we take the second alternative, the two related things must infallibly be exprest, since otherwise there would be no particularity in the relationship, and without ascertainment of these that (particular relationship) cannot be ascertained. And so we must infallibly admit that the name must express the two related things. And in that case it would not express the relationship; for by the mere ascertainment of the related things there would ensue ascertainment of it, in the same way in which the meaning of sentences is ascertained (by connected utterance of the related things), and so it would be too complicated ('overloading') to attribute (to the 'name') the power of expressing that (relation, in addition to the related things, since from the latter the former would be understood). As it is said:

177. "Everywhere material objects alone are denoted by words taken in their literal sense; for they never express relationships, since that would be too complicated." Likewise:

178. "[In the word 'cooker,' *pācaka*] the root *pac* signifies 'cooking,' and the ending *-aka* the agent; but no element whatever in the word signifies (the relation), 'an agent connected with cooking.' "

179. And so name does not express relation. But a Vedic name like '*hotṛ*-cup' is like the compound '*Niṣāda*-chief 'in that it does not denote genitive relation.[116] Nor does it denote that

[116] I.e. it means a cup characterized in an undefined way by the term *hotṛ*, as a *karmadhāraya* compound, not a *tatpuruṣa*. Compounds are always to be interpreted preferably as *karmadhārayas*, rather than as *tatpuruṣas*.

sentence-fashion (i.e. as something not exprest by any word in a sentence may be understood from the syntax of the sentence as a whole); because it is a word (not a sentence) and therefore there is no evidence (for such a hypothesis; a word has no syntax). But names such as '(*brāhmaṇa*) of-the-cake' (*pauroḍāśika*) are especially weak, because, being words of the common language, they are dependent on human understanding, and because, having a book as their scope, they can not have this or that object as their scope (i.e. they are too general). And they even denote a book not as being a book, but only as something connected with a cake or the like. For the word 'yearling,' tho it does indeed denote a material object, does not express that as a 'cow,' but rather only as a one-year-old thing.[117]

180. But in application by position there is, on the contrary, a relation establisht by immediate evidence, simply because it is attended by specific mention of the two things (in proximity). And so, before on hearing a name the thought can be formed that "surely there must be a relation between these two things," before that a mutual need (requirement, want-of-complement, = 'context') will be aroused because of the relation immediately-evidenced (by 'position'), and because if that were not aroused there would be no relationship. And before by forming (assuming, on the basis of a name) a relationship (which is not stated), a one-sided requirement (in one party for the other, that is 'position') and (thence) the other (higher modes-of-evidence) can be formed, before that by the requirement in the other party (created in response to a one-sided requirement already present by 'position;' this then constitutes mutual-requirement or 'context') syntactic-connexion and the other (higher modes-of-evidence) will have been formed, and the application will thereby have been made. Thus it is proved that position is stronger than name.

And that is why the purifying-formula is subsidiary (also) to the implements used in the collected-offering (*sāṁnāyya*) because of common-position in the text, rather than to the implements

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because the latter is more complicated (*gāuravāt*), that is, it reads more into the word than is there.

[117] Hence one can use the words 'yearling' and 'cow' together without tautology, as 'a yearling cow;' they are not synonyms (comm.).

used with the cake-offering (alone), because of the name '(book)-of-the cake' (the name of the chapter in which the formula is found).

6th pramāṇa; samākhyā

181. Name (*samākhyā*) is a word taken in its literal (or etymological) sense (interpreted by decomposing it into its parts). And it is of two kinds, Vedic, and belonging to the common language. Of these, the Vedic name *hotṛ*-cup (see above) shows that the *hotṛ*-priest is subsidiary to (belongs to) the consumption of the (contents of the) cup (so designated). The common-language word 'of-the-*adhvaryu*' (*ādhvaryava*) shows that the *adhvaryu*-priest is subsidiary to this or that thing (so described; i.e. that the actions contained in the section so named are done by him). This is a summary statement (of name).

Classification of aṅgāni

182. So we have thus briefly set forth the six modes-of-evidence, direct-statement and the rest.

The subsidiaries (of an action) are those things which are applied to it by an applicatory injunction, such as "He shall sacrifice with the new- and full-moon rites, contributing (thereto) with the fire-sticks and other (subsidiaries),"[118] which is attended by these (six modes-of-evidence). These subsidiaries are of two sorts, consisting of either fixed-elements (*siddha*), or actions (*kriyā*).

183. Of these, fixed-elements are such things as caste (of the person qualified to participate), material (as rice-grains), number (how many things of each sort are to be used), etc.[119] And these serve only visible (exoteric) purposes.

And those consisting of actions are of two sorts, secondary actions and primary actions.[120] These are also known as indirectly-contributing and directly-contributing actions.

[118] I.e. with such subsidiaries as the fore-sacrifices (the first of which is enjoined by the subsidiary injunction *samidho yajati*), the after-sacrifices, etc. (comm.). This injunction is, of course, manufactured on the basis of the implications of the Vedic texts, as interpreted by the Mīmāṅsā.

[119] The comm. mentions, as included in the 'etc.' (*ādi*), quality (as redness, e.g. of the cow used in the soma-purchase), and masculinity (e.g. of a sacrificial animal).

[120] The term used here, *pradhāna-karmāṇi*, does not refer to main

Of these, an indirectly-contributing action is one that is enjoined with reference to a material-substance or other (fixed-element) subsidiary of the rite, such as the husking and sprinkling (of rice) etc. And it may serve a visible (exoteric) purpose, an invisible (esoteric or transcendental), or both a visible and an invisible purpose. Such things as husking serve a visible purpose (removing the husks from rice). Such things as sprinkling (rice) serve an invisible one (having no visible effect on the rice, they must serve an invisible or transcendental end). And such things as the animal-cake-offering[121] serve both visible and invisible purposes. For in so far as this is the offering of a certain material substance, its result is invisible; while in so far as it refers to the deity, its result is visible, namely, in that it serves to call to mind the deity (of the sacrifice).—And this same (secondary or indirectly-contributing action) is also called a dependent action (that rests on something, has an *āśraya*, substratum).

184. And this indirectly-contributing (subsidiary action) is of two kinds, according as it relates to something that is yet to be employed (in the sacrifice), or to something that has been employed. Of these the husking and sprinkling etc. relate to things that are to be employed, because the rice is yet to be used at the sacrifice. (On the other hand) a concluding act is e.g. the consumption of the Iḍā which disposes of the (remains of the) cake and other (offerings) that have been used (in the Iḍā-portion). A concluding act is one which prevents something that has been employed from littering up the place.

185. And an act that attends to something that has been used is weaker than one which attends to something that is to be used, because a thing that is to be used is more important than one that has been used. That is why, in the injunction "In the scrapings of the introductory sacrifice (of the *jyotiṣṭoma*) he shall distribute the concluding sacrifice," the scrapings are for the purpose of the distribution, and not vice versa, because the smeared-dish has already been used. This is stated in the Eleventh (Book).

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sacrificial actions, of course, since only subsidiaries are here considered, but rather (as is stated in the next sentence) to actions which contribute to that directly, instead of indirectly.

[121] A cake offered after the offering of the omentum at the animal-sacrifice, TS. 6.3.10.1.

186. And such an indirectly-contributing subsidiary is stronger than a directly-contributing one.

187. (Objection:) We may allow that such things as husking (the rice) are stronger, because they have a visible purpose, while the directly-contributing subsidiary has an invisible purpose, and when a visible purpose is present there is no reason for assuming an invisible one. But how can such indirectly-contributing subsidiaries as the sprinkling be stronger? For both have an invisible purpose, so that there is no difference between them. Furthermore, the directly-contributing act is an immediate subsidiary of the main action, because it is not enjoined with reference to anything else; but the indirectly-contributing act is a subsidiary of a subsidiary, because it is enjoined with reference to such things as the rice, which are subsidiaries of the main action. And an immediate subsidiary is stronger than a subsidiary of a subsidiary, by the rule: "And in case (a qualifier of the main action) conflicts with a qualifier of a subsidiary, (the former prevails), because (the subsidiary) serves (only) the purpose of that (main action)." And that is why in the case of the injunction "Who sacrifices with an *iṣṭi* (-sacrifice), an animal, or with soma, shall sacrifice at the new-moon or the full-moon," altho there is no distinct statement in the injunction, still the contributory-effect of the two moon-periods (as times for sacrifice) applies to the soma-sacrifice alone (as the main rite), not to (any subsidiary) such as the consecration (*dīkṣaṇīyā*).[122] So how can indirectly-contributing actions be stronger?

188. To this (objection) we reply: Altho there may be no distinction in that both have an invisible purpose, an indirectly-contributing action is stronger than a directly-contributing one. For in an indirectly-contributing action the connexion between the contributing subsidiary and the thing to which it contributes—say, the sprinkling and the rice—is establisht by the sentence (syntactical-connexion),[123] and only the fact that it contributes

[122] This means that the main soma-sacrifice is to be performed precisely at the new- or full-moon, rather than any of its subsidiaries such as the consecration which precedes it.

[123] Because they are mentioned in the same sentence, *vrīhīn prokṣati;* more properly, direct-statement is the applicatory *pramāṇa* here, see 71. But the author's idea seems to be that the mere connected-utterance

has to be understood. But in the case of a directly-contributing action, the connexion of, say, the fore- and after-sacrifices with the new- and full-moon rites has to be understood,[124] and the fact of the contribution as well.

189. And further: in the case of directly-contributing actions context is the basis of application. But in the other case it is rather the syntactical-connexion in the sentence "He besprinkles the rice," which applies it to the (main) rite by making a suggestion of effecting the transcendental-result thru the word 'rice.' Hence it is stronger.

190. As for the claim that it would be weaker by the rule "In case of conflict with a qualifier of a subsidiary, (a qualifier of the main action prevails) because (the subsidiary) serves the purpose of that," this is unsound. For the sprinkling etc. enjoined with reference to the rice etc. is not for the sake of that, because it would be meaningless applied to that in its own form, (it has no effect on the rice), but rather it is for the sake of the rite, by way of preparing the rice (to effect the transcendental result); and because, as will be explained below, indirectly-contributing actions are performed for their (originative or) productive transcendental-results. So both kinds of subsidiaries serve only the purpose of the (main) rite, and the rule about conflict with a qualifier of a subsidiary has no application to this. But (in the example quoted by the objector) the contributory effect of the moon-periods on (subsidiaries of the soma-rite like) the consecration etc. is, in fact, for the purpose of the (subsidiary) consecration etc., because it is employed for its transcendental-result (not that of the main soma-rite). So it is correct to say that it is annulled by the contributory effect of the moon-periods on the main (soma-)rite, because this effect is immediately subsidiary to the main rite. So it is proved that an indirectly-contributing action is stronger than a directly-contributing one.

191. And that is why the stump-oblation, enjoined in the words

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or syntactical-connexion of the two things would be sufficient to prevail over 'context,' even ignoring the case-ending which constitutes direct-statement.

[124] Because they are not mentioned in the same sentence.

"He offers the stump-oblation at (or, on) the stump,"[125] has for its purpose the preparing (or 'honoring,' *saṁskāra*) of the sacrificial post, by way of (preparing) the stump from which the post is cut ('post-cutting-stump'), just as when a garland worn by Devadatta is placed in a specially purified place this is done as an honor (*saṁskāra*) to Devadatta (not to the garland); but the stump-oblation has no directly-contributing effect.[126] This is set forth in the Tenth (Book). So much by the way.

Aṅgāṇi always related to apūrva

192. An action that is merely enjoined without reference to a material substance etc. is a directly-contributing action; such as the fore-sacrifices etc.

Thus, then, we have described all subsidiaries, in their two varieties. And they are not performed for the natural (outward, exoteric) form of the sacrifices and other (rites); for they would be meaningless as far as that is concerned, since it could be effected by other means also.[127] But they are performed only for the transcendental-result. For there is no reason for supposing that the transcendental-result could be produced in any other way, since it is invisible (beyond our ken).

193. And let it not be said: "Since it is thus declared to be related to the main object and invisible (in effect), why should not (a subsidiary action) be performed rather for the fruit (itself, directly)?" Because only the (main, entire) sacrifice is the means to the fruit-efficient-force (to the effecting of the fruit), and the

[125] The stump from which the sacrificial post (*yūpa*) is cut. I can find this injunction only in the form *āvraścane juhoti*, TS. 6.3.3.3, MS. 3.9.3 (116.7), KS. 26.3 (125.11), cf. ŚB. 3.6.4.15. It seems that this must be the rite referred to; the Bhāṣya on J. 10.1.10 identifies it as referring to the *agnīṣomīya* animal.

[126] And therefore is not to be performed in modifications of the archetype where no post is used; this is the point decided by the above rule.

[127] Comm.: "Altho in the case of the indirectly-contributing subsidiaries which have visible purposes (only), the outward form is produced only by that (subsidiary act), as in husking, grinding, etc.; still, because the result could originate in some other way (e.g. the husks might be removed by pulling them off with the finger-nails), the injunction is meaningless (as regards outward form; there is no visible reason, only the transcendental purpose, which determines that the outward form shall be produced precisely in this way rather than in some other)."

subsidiaries are only contributors to that means; wherefore, it being understood that a subsidiary serves the purpose of that (main rite), and since it would be meaningless as applied to that (in its visible, outward form), the subsidiary produces (leads to) only its own transcendental-result,[128] because that is nearest at hand; just as the words of the consecration (*dīkṣaṇīyā*) etc. produce their transcendental-results; and not the fruit, because it is more remote. Hence the subsidiaries are not performed (directly) for that (fruit). And that is why in the Ninth (Book), in (the sūtra) "And of the fruit and deity,"[129] it is said that the formula "We have gone to heaven, to heaven we have gone"[130] (when used) in (Sūrya's rite), a modification (of the new- and full-moon rites) is subject to alteration (*ūha*). But if it were employed for (to designate) the fruit (as heaven), since in modifications like Sūrya's rite the fruit of heaven is not concerned, this formula could not be employed (by transfer), still less subjected to alteration (which can apply only to things which have been

[128] Which means, as stated just below, in the case of indirectly-contributing actions, their own productive (*utpatti*) *apūrvas*, but in that of the directly-contributing ones, the main (*parama*) *apūrva*, to which they contribute directly.

[129] This sūtra (9.1.4) states an objector's view, that the fruit *is* indicated by the formula, which is refuted in the next, 9.1.5, by pointing out that heaven is not, in fact, the fruit of the modification.

[130] TS. 1.6.6.1 and 1.7.6.1; used by the *yajamāna* in this form in the new- and full-moon rites, which are there described; but in Sūrya's rite, according to the Bhāṣya on J. 9.1.5, *brahmavarcasaṁ* is to be substituted for *svaḥ* (cf. also on J. 10.1.45, 10.4.25). The Bhāṣya on J. 9.1.4, furthermore, evidently quotes not from TS. but from MS. 1.4.2 (48.17), since it reads *aganma svaḥ saṁ jyotiṣābhūma;* it also quotes the formula *agner ujjitim anūjjeṣam* as it occurs in MŚS. 1.4.2.16, not in its Tait. form which adds *aham* after *agner* (see Bloomfield's Concordance). The Sūrya's rite referred to is clearly that mentioned in MS. 2.2.2 and TS. 2.3.2.3 (BŚS. 13.24). The Mīmāṅsā doctrine here enunciated is that at this "special sacrifice" the *yajamāna's* formula *aganma svaḥ* etc. (transferred from the archetypal *darśapūrṇamāsa*) is altered by substituting the fruit (*brahmavarcasa*) of this modification for the fruit (*svar*) of the archetype. Reference is clearly made in the Bhāṣya to the MS. (not the Tait.) version; cf. 130 and note; yet our text equally clearly refers to the Tait. version. In the form here quoted the *mantras* are found only in Tait. texts (and those of AV.); and the spelling *suvaḥ* is exclusively characteristic of the Tait. school.

transferred). So it is establisht that subsidiaries are used for the purpose of the transcendental result, since it cannot be shown that they are used for any other.

194. Also among these (two kinds of subsidiary actions), indirectly-contributing actions are employed in the outward form of the sacrifice, by preparing or consecrating a material or a deity or the like; and hence they are for the purpose of an (originative or) productive transcendental-result. And that is why such rules as husking etc., which pertain to grains, do not apply to butter, because they serve the purpose of the (productive) transcendental-result of the Āgneya (cake-offering, in which grains are used), and butter does not serve the purpose of that.[131] Thus it is stated in the Third (Book).

195. But directly-contributing actions, having no effect on the outward form (the materials, deities, or other subsidiary 'fixed-elements'), serve the purpose of the main or supreme transcendental-result (of the whole rite). Now since an (originative or) productive transcendental-result is produced immediately as soon as the outward form of (a subsidiary of) the sacrifice is accomplished, therefore the first indirectly-contributing subsidiary actions are employed to produce it, while the later ones are employed in maintaining it. But since the supreme transcendental result is produced only after the completion of the (entire) sacrificial performance with (all) its subsidiaries, it requires all the directly-contributing subsidiaries to produce it, while one (extra) that is outside the sacrificial-performance is used to maintain it. Thus the Bṛhaspati-promotion (*sava*), which by the sentence "Having offered the Vājapeya he shall offer the Bṛhaspati-promotion" is enjoined as following upon the Vājapeya and as subsidiary to it, is employed in maintaining the transcendental-result of the Vājapeya; for this has been produced before. So it is stated in the Fourth (Book).

So it is establisht that in all cases subsidiaries are for the purpose of the transcendental-result. Let us proceed with the subject. We have now set forth summarily the subject of applicatory injunctions.

[131] What is meant is that acts contributing to one *utpatti-apūrva* are not applicable to rites employing different 'outward forms' (as, husking, applied to one kind of material, is not applicable to another kind of material).

Prayoga-vidhi

196. An injunction which suggests promptness in the performance is an injunction of performance (*prayoga*). And it is nothing but the main injunction[132] entered into syntactic relation in the same sentence with the sentences enjoining subsidiaries. For inasmuch as it instigates the performance of the main action with its subsidiaries, since there is no reason for delay, it enjoins promptness of performance, which is the same thing as avoidance of delay. And let it not be said that there is no more reason for avoidance of delay than for delay. For if there were delay, the result would be that the main action and its subsidiaries would not be united, as it is understood from the connected utterance of the main and subsidiary injunctions that they should be. For it is not commonly said that things are united or performed together if they are performed with delay. And let it not be said: "In that case they would not be performed together (but one after the other in rapid succession), so let them be performed precisely at the same time, rather than without delay; for it is commonly said that two things are done 'without delay' when they are done one after the other without any thing intervening between them in time (but this is not being done at the same time)." For it is impossible to perform a number of things at precisely the same time. And let it not be said: "Why should they not be so performed by providing an equal number of people to perform them?" For the number of the performers is limited by such sentences as "There are four priests at this sacrificial rite."[133]

197. Therefore the main injunction, entered into syntactic connexion as one sentence with the sentences enjoining subsidiaries, enjoins their unity, this being understood from the syntactic connexion, and so enjoins avoidance of delay, it being impossible for the reason stated to perform all at the same time. Thus it is

[132] The 'injunction of qualification,' *adhikāra-vidhi*, is meant; not the 'originative' injunction. There is, therefore, no such thing as a separate *prayoga-vidhi*, as a rule; but cf. 199 below.

[133] The comm. quotes for this TB. 2.3.6. [2]; that text reads first *tasmād darśapūrṇamāsayor yajñakratoḥ, catvāra ṛtvijaḥ;* then *tasmāc cāturmāsyānāṁ yajñakratoḥ, pañcartvijaḥ;* etc. for other rites, in 2.3.6.3–4.

establisht that an injunction of performance is one that enjoins promptness in the performance.

198. And this non-delay takes place when a fixt order is adhered to. For otherwise the performance would be thrown into confusion by the arising of questions whether this is to be performed just after this or after that.[134] So the injunction of performance, itself, in order to ensure the prompt performance of the acts it enjoins, also enjoins a fixt order, as a special attribute of the things (enjoined).[135] Here the word 'order' means a particular arrangement, or a state of being first and later (with reference to each other).

Six pramāṇas for order; 1st, śruti

199. And in regard to this (order) there are six modes-of-evidence, direct-statement, sense, text, position, chief-matter, and procedure. Of these, direct-statement is a verbal expression indicating order. And it is of two kinds, that which indicates order only, and that which indicates it as a qualification of other things. Of these, the statement "Having prepared the grass-brush, he prepares the vedi"[136] indicates order only, because the preparation of the vedi etc.[137] is enjoined by another statement. But the statement "The first draught is for the *vaṣaṭ*-maker (the *hotṛ* priest)"[138] indicates order as a qualification of something else. For it cannot enjoin order alone in supplementary allusion to the draught, because that would break the unity of the subject-matter.[139]

[134] Comm.: "if the performance were carried out in any arbitrary, hit-or-miss way, some things would be performed twice and some not at all, so that the performance would be spoiled."

[135] Not as an independent, different thing enjoined; for that would be 'split-of-the-sentence,' *vākyabheda*.

[136] The 'direct-statement' consists of the gerund suffix *-tvā* in *kṛtvā*.

[137] The 'etc.' includes the prescription of the agent and the number indicated by the verb (comm.).

[138] For the sense cf. ĀpŚS. 12.24.6. No close approximation to the language has been found. It goes with the *mantras* TS. 3.2.5.1–2, to which apparently no *brāhmaṇa* occurs, nor any parallel in the other *saṁhitās*.

[139] Which would mean *vākyabheda*, 'split-of-the-sentence;' see 270. The same word (as *prathamabhakṣaḥ*) cannot contain both a supplementary-allusion to an elsewhere enjoined act of drinking, and an injunction of who

200. This direct-statement is stronger than the other modes-of-evidence. For they prove order by implying direct-statement. And that is why it is said that the Aśvins' cup is offered in tenth place, because of the statement "That of the Aśvins is offered tenth," altho by text-order it would follow that it should be offered third.

2d pramāṇa; artha

201. But order by sense (*artha*) is that in which the decision (as to order) is based on the purpose (to which the things are applied), as in the case of the *agnihotra*-oblation and the rice-gruel cooking. For here, because the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the oblation, its cooking is performed first, on the basis of its purpose. And this is stronger than order by text. For if one performed (the acts in order) according to text (the *agnihotra* first), the establisht purpose (of the rice-gruel) would be annulled, and it would have (only) an invisible purpose. For if it were performed after the oblation it could have no visible purpose (which is contrary to the principle that an invisible purpose should be assumed only when no visible one is discoverable).

3d pramāṇa; pāṭha

202. Order by text is the order of textual statements which indicate things. And from this the order of the things is inferred. For in the order in which the verbal statements are recorded, in that same order they produce, when read, the ideas of the things (of which they treat); and because the order of performance of these things is according to the order of the ideas of them.

203. And this (order by) text is two-fold, formula-(*mantra-*) text and *brāhmaṇa*-text. Now the relative order of the (cakes) to Agni and to Agni-Soma (at the new- and full-moon rites), which is inferred from the order of the several (pairs of) verses of sacrifice (*yājyā*) and invitation (*anuvākyā*), is determined by formula-text.[140]

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shall drink first. These two things could only be expressed separately. Therefore it must be a "particularized injunction," of drinking qualified by the order (cf. 12). The point is made more clear in 270; cf. 315.

[140] The reference is to TB. 3.5.7.1–2, where the *yājyā* and *anuvākyā* verses to Agni (*agnir mūrdhā divaḥ kakut* etc., and *bhuvo yajñasya rajasaś*

And this formula-text is stronger than *brāhmaṇa*-text, because the formula-expressions have a closer connexion with the performance than the *brāhmaṇa*-expressions. For *brāhmaṇa*-expressions stand quite outside the performance, and fulfil their entire function in indicating that such a thing is to be done in such a way; and they are not used again at the time of the performance. But the formulas, as we shall show later, having no other application, remind us of things connected with the performance. And so, since the order of the performance depends on the order in which (its parts) are remembered, and since that order depends on the order of the formulas, the formula-text is more intimately connected (with the performance) than the other, and therefore stronger (as evidence for it). That is why, in the case of the (cakes) to Agni and Agni-Soma, altho according to the *brāhmaṇa*-text the (cake) to Agni-Soma would be offered first[141] and that to Agni afterwards, this order is annulled, and according to the formula-text that to Agni is offered first and that to Agni-Soma afterwards; this order, rather, is prescribed.

204. Order from *brāhmaṇa*-text is order inferred from the order of injunctive expressions, such as the order of the fore-sacrifices inferred from (the sentences enjoining them), "He offers (to) the fire-sticks," "He offers (to) Tanūnapāt"[142] etc. And here, even tho the *brāhmaṇa*-statements fulfil their function in enjoining a thing, nevertheless they are likewise accepted as reminding of the fore-sacrifices, for lack of anything else to do so. And so, since they produce recollection of the things (referred to) in the same order in which they are read, it is proper that the things should be performed in that same order. So it is establisht that the order of the fore-sacrifices depends on *brāhmaṇa*-text-order.

205. (Objection:) Why is it assumed that the *brāhmaṇa*-

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ca netā etc.) are quoted first, and then those to Agni-Soma (*agnīṣomā savedasā* etc., and *yuvam etāni divi rocanāni* etc.).

[141] Because mentioned in the *brāhmaṇa* in TS. 2.5.2.3 (*tābhyām etam agnīṣomīyam ekādaśakapālaṁ pūrṇamāse prāyacchat*), whereas that to Agni is mentioned in TS. 2.6.3.3 (*yad āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālo* etc., see 47).

[142] The words "firesticks, Tanūnapāt" etc. must according to our text be interpreted as names of sacrifices, because if they meant accessories they would duplicate other injunctions, by the rule set forth in 273ff.; see 300.

sentences remind us of things connected with the performance in the case of the fore-sacrifices, when their function is fully performed in making the injunction, and when here also, just as in the case of the (cakes) to Agni etc., there are the formulas of sacrifice (*yājyā*) to remind us of things connected with the performance? And let it not be said: "These (formulas) remind us of the deities, so that the *brāhmaṇa*-texts are accepted as reminding us of the acts." For it would follow from this that they would also have to be accepted as reminding us of the acts in the case of the cakes to Agni etc. And that is not the conclusion sought. If that were the case, formula-text would not be stronger than *brāhmaṇa*-text. For the determining factor which proves the greater power of the formula-text is the fact that the formulas remind us of things connected with the performance, and the other (*brāhmaṇa*) does not. And if we assume that the *brāhmaṇa*-text reminds us of actions, then the *brāhmaṇa*-text would furnish the reminder of the main thing (the sacrificial action itself, to which all else is subsidiary, and which it is the prime function of the *brāhmaṇa*-text to enjoin), and so would be more intimately related (to the performance), while the formulas remind us (only) of deities, which are themselves subsidiary (to the action), and so would be more remotely related to it; therefore *brāhmaṇa*-text, rather, would be stronger than formula-text. And this would be discordant with the section in the Fifth (Book) which begins: "But in case of discordance, (the decision shall depend) on the formulas." For there it is stated that because formula-text is stronger than *brāhmaṇa*-text, the (cake) to Agni is to be offered first and that to Agni-Soma afterwards.

206. But if it be said: "In the case of the cake to Agni etc. the verse-of-sacrifice (*yājyā*) formulas themselves set forth the (sacrificial) actions (indirectly) by setting forth the deities, because the deities constitute the objects with regard to which the material offering is presented,"—the same is true in the case of the fore-sacrifices. For there also the verse-of-sacrifice formulas set forth the deities, because in the fore-sacrifices the deities are based on the wording of the formulas (see 300). And so in the case of the fore-sacrifices the order of the actions must be inferred from the formula-text rather, since the verse-of-sacrifice formulas

set forth the actions by setting forth the deities, and not from the order of the *brāhmaṇa*-text.

207. And let it not be said: "Because (the order of) the formula-text is different, the order of the fore-sacrifices must be inferred from the *brāhmaṇa*-text rather." For if it is different the performance should follow its order rather, because the formula-order is stronger. And (in his comment) on the section on practice the author of the Vārtika declares that the order of the verse-of-sacrifice formulas shall be applied in the fore-sacrifices, in the passage beginning: "the words of the formulas that have such word-meanings (that refer to the several fore-sacrifices by their language) and that are applied in the (same) order." Also in the Tantraratna on the Ninth (Book) it is declared that the deities are presented as accessories (of the sacrifice) by the formulas establisht (as subsidiaries) by (the modes-of-evidence) order and context, (namely) such (formulas) as "O Agni, let the fire-sticks severally taste of the butter." And if the order of the formulas were different this could not be. So how can the order in the fore-sacrifices be determined by *brāhmaṇa*-text-order?

208. To this objection we reply: It is true. Nevertheless, where there are no formulas at all to remind us of the things, as in the case of sacrificial acts enjoined for silent performance, their order might depend on *brāhmaṇa*-text-order. Because then it would (or might) be those (*brāhmaṇa*-passages) that would remind us of things connected with the performance. But the example of the fore-sacrifices was given as illustrating a hypothetical case. Because in them (it is true that) the *brāhmaṇa*-passages do not remind us of things connected with the performance. As the revered author of the Vārtika says on the quarter dealing with the explanatory-passages: "The (*brāhmaṇa*) sentences on the fore-sacrifices etc. fulfil their purpose in establishing the thing (to be performed, i.e. in giving an injunction); tho they have a contact with the outward form (of the sacrifice, i.e. its actual performance), they do not come to be employed (in it, as formulas do)."

Therefore in acts which are provided with formulas, the order is determined by the text-order of the formulas; but in acts which have no formulas, by the text-order of the *brāhmaṇa* instead. This by the way.

4th pramāṇa; sthāna

209. When things occur at different places in an archetype, but must by explicit injunction be performed at the same place in a modification, and their order is determined by the rule that that one, in the original place of which they are (all) performed, shall be performed first, and the other-two[143] afterwards—that is order according to position (*sthāna*).

Position means presentation (appearance, coming-in). For the thing in the original place of which they are (all) performed naturally is the one which presents itself first when the thing that immediately preceded it has been performed; so it is proper that it should be performed first. That is why, when at the Sādyaskra (a one-day soma-sacrifice) the *agnīṣomīya*, *savanīya*, and *ānubandhya* (animals) all have to be sacrificed together at the place belonging to the *savanīya* (in the archetype), the *savanīya* is sacrificed first, because in this place, just after the Aśvins' cup, it is the *savanīya* that most naturally presents itself; and the other two afterwards.

210. To explain more fully: in the *jyotiṣṭoma* there are three animal-sacrifices, the *agnīṣomīya*, *savanīya*, and *ānubandhya*. And they occur at different points: the *agnīṣomīya* on the fast-(first) day, the *savanīya* at the time of the pressing, and *ānubandhya* at the end. Now the Sādyaskra is a variety of soma-sacrifice; and, because (its deity is) 'unmanifest' (unspecified, see 57), it is (to be regarded as) a modification of the *jyotiṣṭoma*. Hence all three of these animal-sacrifices are establisht by the rule of transfer at the Sādyaskra. And the fact that they are all performed together in it is indicated by the statement "He shall offer the animals together." And the fact that this common offering occurs in the place of the *savanīya* follows from its being near the main action (the soma-pressing), and from the fact that (by this means) the removal from the proper places is equal.

211. For if they are offered in the place of the *savanīya*, the *agnīṣomīya* and *ānubandhya* are removed each from its own place only. While if they were offered in the place of the *agnīṣomīya*, the *savanīya* would be removed from its own place only,

[143] The author is thinking of the example quoted just below; hence "other-two."

but the *ānubandhya* would be removed not only from its own proper place, but also from the place of the *savanīya*.[143a] And if they were offered in the place of the *ānubandhya* the same would be true of the *agnīṣomīya*.

212. And so, since all must be offered in the place of the *savanīya*, the *savanīya* must be offered first. For the place of the *savanīya* is immediately after the Aśvins' cup, since in the archetype it is enjoined right after the cup to the Aśvins, in these words: "Having offered the cup to the Aśvins and having tied round the sacrificial post with a triple cord he presents the *savanīya* animal for Agni."[144] And so in the Sādyaskra also, when the Aśvins' cup has been offered, it is the *savanīya* that naturally presents itself next. So it is proper, on account of its position, that it should be offered first, and the other two afterwards, as stated (in Jaimini).

5th pramāṇa; mukhya

213. Order based on the principal matter is the order of subsidiaries in so far as it is inferred from the order of the main action. For if the subsidiaries are performed in the very same order as the order of the principal actions, then all the subsidiaries are equidistant from the principal actions from which they respectively depend. While if they were performed in a different order, some subsidiaries would be over-near to their principals, and others would be over-far removed. And this would be improper, because it would result in a violation of the continuity which follows from the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of the main actions determines that of the subsidiaries too.

214. That is why, with that (ghee) which remains from the

[143a] Since two animals must be displaced from their original positions, it is proper that their displacement should be equal in distance. If the position of No. 1 or No. 3 were chosen, No. 3 or No. 1 would be moved farther then No. 2. By choosing the position of No. 2, the central one, the displacement of the other two is made equal.

[144] ĀpŚS. 12.18.12 (except the first three words, which summarize the preceding sūtra); less close is ŚB. 4.2.5.12, which however contains the words *āś° gra° gṛh°*. Our formula was probably taken from the Tait. school.

fore-sacrifices,[145] first the oblation (of the cake) to Agni is besprinkled, and afterwards the sour-milk to Indra, because the (main) sacrifice to Agni comes before that to Indra. For thus the two acts of sprinkling are separated each from the main act to which it belongs by an equal interval, namely by one intervening act, because between the besprinkling of the Agni-oblation and the sacrifice to Agni there intervenes (just) the besprinkling of the oblation of the Indra-sacrifice, and between the besprinkling of the oblation of the Indra-sacrifice and the Indra-sacrifice there intervenes (just) the sacrifice to Agni.

215. And so first the Agni-oblation is besprinkled, then the Indra-oblation, then comes the sacrifice to Agni, then that to Indra; such is the order establisht by order of the principal acts. But if first the Indra-oblation were besprinkled and then that to Agni, then, since (as explained above) by reason of the order of the verses of sacrifice and invitation the Agni-sacrifice must be performed first (before that to Indra), it would follow that the Agni-sacrifice and its subsidiary the besprinkling of the (Agni-) oblation would be too near together, while the Indra-sacrifice and its subsidiary the besprinkling of the (Indra-)oblation would be too far apart. And this would be improper. Therefore it is proper that the order of sprinkling with the remains of the fore-sacrifices is determined by order of the principal acts.

216. And this order by principal acts is weaker than order by text. For order by principal acts is dependent on the determination of the order of the main acts, which is dependent on other modes-of-evidence, and hence its determination is delayed (or indirect), while order according to text is not so, because it is dependent on merely the order of the text of the Veda, which is independent. Therefore it is more powerful.

217. That is why, altho the (cake) to Agni, the whispered offering, and the (cake) to Agni-Soma are offered in (that) order, the portioning of the butter of the whispered offering is not performed first (before the cake to Agni-Soma), according to order

[145] At the new- and full-moon rites, after the fore-sacrifices, comes an injunction *prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṅṣy abhighārayati* (quoted from Bhāṣya on J. 4.1.33); according to the comm. this is interpreted as above. The substance—not the exact form—of this occurs TS. 2.6.1.6 (cf. ApŚS. 2.17.6), ŚB. 1.5.3.25.

of principal acts, because this is weaker, but after (that) by order of text, because that is stronger.

218. And this order by principal acts is stronger than order by procedure. For when order by procedure is adopted many subsidiaries are separated from their main acts, but when this (order by principal acts) is adopted they are near them. As for instance: in the new- and full-moon rites first the (cake) to Agni is performed, then the collected-offering (*sāṁnāyya*, of sour-milk and milk). And certain subsidiaries[146] of the latter are performed first. Now if, adopting order by procedure, all its subsidiaries were performed first, then the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni, then the (cake) to Agni itself, and then the collected-offering; in that case the subsidiaries of the latter would be separated from their main action by two performances, viz. the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni and that itself. But when, altho some of the subsidiaries of the collected-offering are (necessarily) performed first (by direct-statement); nevertheless all the rest are performed after the performance of the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni, according to order of principal acts, then all the subsidiaries of both the (cake) to Agni and the collected-offering (except those of the latter performed on the first day) are separated (from their principals) by one unrelated thing in each case. For the subsidiaries of the (cake) to Agni are separated from their principal by the subsidiaries of the collected-offering and the latter are separated from their principal by the performance of the (cake) to Agni. So there is no (unequal) remoteness. Therefore order by principal acts is stronger than order by procedure.

6th pramāṇa; pravṛtti

219. When several principal acts are performed together, and their indirectly-contributing subsidiaries have to be performed seriatim, the order of the second and following things being determined by the order of the thing first performed, that is order by

[146] On the first day of the new-moon rite, by TB. 3.2.1 (*mantras* TS. 1.1.1), MS. 4.1.1, etc., a leafy branch is cut and used to drive away the calf from the cow from which the milk for the collected-offering is to be taken, etc.; altho the collected-offering itself comes on the following day. In spite of this, the subsidiaries of the cake to Agni are to be performed before the (remaining) ones of the collected-offering, contrary to "order by procedure," see below. See J. 5.4.3.

procedure. As in the case of the subsidiaries of Prajāpati's (animals). For (in the Vājapeya-rite) the sentence "Having performed the Vaiśvadevī they proceed with Prajāpati's (animals)"[147] indicates by its instrumental ending that Prajāpati's (animals) together with the acts which form their manner-of-performance are to be performed at one time.[148] Therefore they and their subsidiaries such as presentation (of each animal to the deity), tying to the post, etc., have to be performed connectedly (together, that is, each act is to be performed for all of the seventeen animals concerned at once).

220. This connected performance fits the case of Prajāpati's (animals) because the same deity is prescribed for them all and so they can be offered at the same time.[149] It is impossible, however, to perform all their subsidiaries at one and the same time. For a number of beasts cannot be (e.g.) presented at one time. Therefore their 'connectedness' must be effected by performance without separating interval; that is, when one has been presented, the next must (immediately) be presented.

221. Therefore in the case of Prajāpati's (animals), after one action has been performed on all, the second action is then to be performed. So the first action is to be performed beginning with

[147] The comm. (following J. 5.2.1–2, Bhāṣya) connects this with the rite enjoined by TB. 1.3.4.3, ŚB. 5.1.3.7, *saptadaśa prājāpatyān paśūn ālabhate.* The same rite occurs KS. 14.9 (208.19), and in sūtra texts, e.g. BŚS. 11.13, ĀpŚS. 18.2.13, KŚS. 14.2.20. Nowhere, so far as I can discover, is the injunction recorded exactly as in our text, nor as in the Bhāṣya to J. 5.2.2 which reads *paśubhiś* for *prājāpatyaiś.* And nowhere does it follow a rite devoted to the Viśvedevas under this name. It follows the offering of a number of animals to various gods; in most cases the last preceding one is either a cow to the Maruts or a ewe to Sarasvatī. Are these various animal rites collectively referred to as the *vaiśvadevī?*

[148] Comm. explains that the instrumental ending signifies that the word containing it, 'Prajāpati's (animals),' is the means to the fruit-efficient-force. But if so it cannot denote the bare main-act (*pradhāna*) alone, since only with all its subsidiaries complete could that serve as means to the efficient-force. From which the text infers that not only the main act (the united performance of which for all the animals is indicated by the instrumental plural), but each subsidiary act, must be performed connectedly.

[149] The 'offerings' consists in throwing the omentums, *vapā,* of the 17 beasts into the fire at once; this is the *pradhāna,* 'main action;' the slaughtering and dividing etc. are all subsidiary actions.

any one animal; but the second action is to be performed in exactly the same order in which the first was performed, in order that reciprocal connectedness (unity in time) may be attained, which is indicated by the injunction of performance.

222. For by the injunction of performance in the case of the (animal) of the consecration (*dīkṣā*), it is enjoined that its subsidiaries, presentation, tying-up, etc., shall be performed with reciprocal connectedness, or in other words in immediate succession. And this connectedness applies to the *savanīya* animal by the rule of transfer, since it has a living thing as its material and is therefore a modification of the (animal) of the consecration-rite. And from the *savanīya* (animal) this is taken to apply to the (sacrifice of a) group-of-eleven (animals), because the two have the common element of coming at the time of the soma-pressing.[150] And from them it comes to apply to Prajāpati's (animals), because they have in common the use of a (considerable) number (of things offered).[150] And in the case of Prajāpati's (animals), since the sacrifice itself is split up among the several animals, the rules of transfer are also split up among them. And therefore, by the rule of transfer, connectedness, or in other words immediate succession, applies to the presentation, tying-up and other actions which are subsidiaries of each separate animal. Therefore, if the rule of transfer (as thus 'split up') were enforced, it would follow that immediately after the presentation of one beast, the tying-up (of that beast) would have to be performed. But that is not done, since it would be inconsistent with the connectedness of the subsidiaries of all the animals, as indicated by the direct statement (of the injunction quoted above).

223. Therefore when the presentation of one beast has been performed, the tying-up (of that beast), tho it would follow (by the rule of transfer) that it should be performed immediately thereafter, is not performed; but instead, because of the force of the direct-statement, the presentation of the other sixteen beasts is performed. But when they have been presented, then, since

[150] In addition to being animal-sacrifices (comm.); this is really a sufficient ground for the 'transfer,' and the other reasons given seem chiefly intended to exhibit the author's subtlety.—On this series of "transfers" from one animal-sacrifice to another see J. 8.1.13–15. The "group of eleven" animals means that prescribed at TS. 5.6.22 (comm.).

there is no reason to assume an (unnecessary) interval between the presentation and the tying-up of the first beast, the tying-up of the first beast rather (than of any other) is performed. And so the tying-up is performed in exactly the same order as the presentation. And thus between the presentation and the tying-up of each beast there falls an equal interval, of sixteen moments. Otherwise there would be too much interval in some cases and too little in others. And that would not be right. Therefore, in whatever order the first thing is performed, in that same order the second shall be. So it is establisht that order of the following thing based on order of performance of the first thing is order by procedure.

224. Thus, then, we have briefly set forth the function of an injunction of performance, by setting forth the six ways of determining order.

Adhikāra-vidhi

225. An injunction which indicates the ownership of the fruit is an injunction of qualification. The ownership of the fruit means the right to enjoy the fruit to be produced by a (sacrificial) action. Such an injunction is "He who desires heaven shall sacrifice." For by this, which enjoins sacrifice with a view to heaven, the right to enjoy the fruit to be produced by the sacrifice is assigned to him "who desires heaven." But by such injunctions as "When fire burns the house of one who has laid the sacred fires, he shall portion-out for the burning (?) Agni a cake on eight potsherds," which enjoin certain actions on special occasions, such as a fire in the house, there is assured to him who is subject to such an occasion the ownership of the fruit to be produced by the action, which consists in removal of misfortune.

226. And this ownership of the fruit belongs only to him who is distinguisht by the characteristic of the qualified person. And the characteristic of the qualified person is the same which is explicitly stated in the text as the characteristic of the person (who is to sacrifice). Therefore the injunction "The king who desires rulership of heaven shall sacrifice with the *rājasūya*," tho it enjoins the *rājasūya* with a view to the rulership of heaven, does not assure the enjoyment of that fruit to (anyone) who merely desires the rulership of heaven, but to one who, being a king, desires that.

227. There are, however, certain things which are necessary characteristics of the qualified person tho they are not explicitly stated as qualifications of the individual (concerned in the specific rite). Among these are knowledge gained by (following) the injunction to study the Veda, and in the case of rites performed with the sacred fires the being provided with the fires,—a quality obtained from having performed the laying (of-the-fires); and also capacity (the physical power to do the acts ordained). Altho these are not explicitly stated as characteristics of the individual sacrificing, they are yet necessary characteristics of the person qualified (to receive the fruit). For since the injunctions enjoining the later rites have no power of supplying (the necessary) knowledge, they can apply only for the man who has the knowledge gained by following the injunction of study. And since the rites to be performed with the sacred fires depend on the fires, the injunctions of those rites can apply only to one who possesses the sacred fires thru having previously laid them.

228. And that is why no *śūdra* is qualified for sacrifices or other (rites, *iṣṭi* and *homa*); because he does not possess the knowledge acquired thru the rule of study, nor the sacred fires thru having laid them. For Vedic study is permissible only to the initiated (those who have undergone the *upanayana*). And such injunctions as "One shall initiate a brahman at the age of eight" (a *kṣatriya* at eleven, a *vaiśya* at twelve) show that (only) the three (upper) castes are qualified for initiation. And for the laying of the sacred fires, also, only the three upper castes are qualified, by the rules such as "A brahman shall lay the fires in the spring" (a *kṣatriya* in the summer, a *vaiśya* in the fall).

229. And even if by the injunction "A carpenter shall lay the fires in the rains" the laying of the fires is enjoined for a carpenter, which is a synonym for the (non-Aryan) Saudhanvana (a mixt caste), since conventional meaning prevails over etymological meaning (cf. 98), still such a person (as a carpenter) has no qualification for the later rites, because he has not the knowledge produced by (following) the rule of study. And let it not be said: "If he has not that, how can he be qualified even to lay the sacred fires, since the performance of that rite requires that (knowledge) for its accomplishment?" For even tho he has not the knowledge acquired by the rule of study, by the very in-

junction "A carpenter shall lay the fires in the rains" there is attributed to him the knowledge necessary for the mere laying of the fires. Otherwise this injunction itself could not hold. And so, while a carpenter has the necessary qualification for merely laying the fires, he is not qualified for the later rites, for lack of knowledge.

230. And so his laying (of the fires) is not for the purpose of consecrating (or preparing) the fires (for use in later rites), because there is no use of the fires so consecrated in later rites. But rather it is of the nature of worldly fires (having no further sacramental function), and is enjoined as a quite independent principal action by itself, in the manner of the All-conquering rite, and having heaven for its fruit (see 117 above). And the accusative case-form in the word 'fires' is used for the instrumental, as in the sentence "He offers-oblation (with) grits."[151]

231. Let us proceed with the subject. It is then establisht that since a *śūdra* does not possess the knowledge acquired by the rule of study, nor the fires acquired by laying them, he is not qualified for the later rites.

232. (Objection:) But in that case a woman has no qualification, since she is forbidden to study the Veda and so cannot have the knowledge acquired by (following) the rule of study. And let it not be said: "She has, in fact, none!" For it is establisht that a woman is qualified, since in such sentences as "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice" the word "who-desires-heaven" (*svargakāmaḥ*, masculine) furnishes (merely) the end aimed at, and masculine gender is not meant to be enjoined, because it (masculine gender) does not[152] qualify the end aimed at, as in the case of the singular number of the (soma-)cups (dealt with in 36).

233. We reply: this is true. It is establisht that (a woman) is qualified, but not independently, since that is forbidden by such sentences as "A woman does not merit independence." Also because, if she could act independently (in sacrificing), then

[151] That is, it means "He shall perform the laying-rite with the fires as means, and heaven as end (fruit)." For the injunction quoted cf. TS. 3.3.8.4 *saktūn pradāvye juhuyāt;* ĀpŚS. 13.24.16 likewise; BŚS. 4.11 (126.16) *sa° pra° juhoti.*

[152] All three editions omit the negative prefix, but it must be read, as shown clearly by J. 6.1.8: *jātiṁ tu bādarāyaṇo 'viśeṣāt, tasmāt stry api pratīyeta, jātyarthasyāviśiṣṭatvāt.* The authority referred to in our text is J. 6.1.3d adhikaraṇa, sūtras 6–16.

certain subsidiary elements in both (her husband's, and her own independent) sacrificial performances would be lacking. For in the (male) sacrificer's performance the inspection of the butter and other things which are done by the wife would fail, and in the wife's rite the inspection of the butter etc. (which would in that case have to be) done by the (male) sacrificer would fail. Therefore there is joint qualification of a married couple.[153] Because of this joint qualification, thru the sacrificer's knowledge simply his wife also can act, and it does not follow that she is disqualified for want of knowledge. And moreover the sentence "But from marriage there is common sharing in (sacrificial) actions and in the fruits of merit" assures qualification to a woman, just as to the Niṣāda-chief, altho he lacks the knowledge acquired by (following) the rule of study, the qualification for the Niṣāda-*iṣṭi* is assured by the sentence, "With this (*iṣṭi*) he shall cause a Niṣāda-chief to sacrifice." For the word Niṣāda-chief is a *karmadhāraya* compound, meaning a chief who is also a Niṣāda, and not a genitive *tatpuruṣa*, meaning a chief of the Niṣādas. Because if (the element Niṣāda- in the compound) were taken in the sense of a genitive, this would involve implication (of the genitive force, which is not exprest).[154]

234. But there is this much difference: Since the Niṣāda-chief has no knowledge acquired under the rule of study, we must assume from this very injunction itself that he has just the requisite knowledge to perform that act. But the wife, tho she has not even so much knowledge, yet has joint qualification with the sacrificer, and so because he has such knowledge, and simply by that she can act, therefore the injunctions of further rites do not imply the requisite knowledge on her part. However, since the acts which the wife alone performs, such as the inspection of the butter, cannot be performed without (some) knowledge, it is admitted that *so* much is posited for her by the injunctions covering those (acts).

235. So it is establisht that the knowledge acquired under the

[153] That a married couple offer sacrifice *jointly* is laid down in J. 6.1.4th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 17–21.

[154] Whereas the *karmadhāraya* meaning attributes to *niṣāda-* only the meaning which it primarily possesses. Hence a *karmadhāraya* interpretation is always to the preferred to a *tatpuruṣa* (cf. above, 179).

rule of study, and the possession of the sacred fires acquired by laying them, are necessary characteristics of the person qualified to perform the later rites (those that follow the fire-laying).

236. So also capacity is a necessary characteristic of the qualified person, since an injunction cannot apply to a person who has not (the) power (to carry it out), by the rule that "Verbs which express a meaning must be accompanied by power."[155] And in optional rites this capacity pertains to subsidiaries as well as the main action. That is, a person able to perform the main action but unable to perform the subsidiary actions is not qualified to perform an optional rite. For the injunction of the main action is understood as forming a syntactic unit with the injunctions of subsidiaries, and applies only to one able to perform the rite with all its subsidiaries, because the qualification is in accordance with the application.[156] For if there were any direct-statement (in the Sacred Word) inconsistent with limitation of this qualification to one who has the power, then the qualification might be attributed to one lacking the power. But there is no such inconsistency (with a statement in the Word). For the statement about him "who desires heaven" (that he "shall sacrifice") is not inconsistent with limitation of the qualification to one who has the power. On the contrary, if it applied to a person without the power (to perform all subsidiaries), we should find that the necessary accompaniment (of the main action) by the subsidiaries, which is establisht by the syntactic unity of the main injunction with the injunctions of subsidiaries, would be broken. And another reason is that the subsidiaries, which are explicitly stated to be universal (in application), would then be only occasional (or, optional). Therefore only a person capable of performing the action with its subsidiaries is qualified for an optional rite.

237. But regarding the subsidiaries of permanent rites, the rule "to the best of one's ability" holds good. For the explicit-

[155] That is, it must be assumed that they mean something that is possible, not something that is impossible. For a person who lacks the power to carry out injunctions, they are meaningless.

[156] That is, because it is only the complete rite with all its members that has application to the fruit; and the qualification states to whom the fruit belongs.

statement that these are lifelong[157] enjoins the performance of them all one's life. And no one can carry out the performance with all its subsidiaries all his life long. Therefore for permanent rites one who is able to perform only the main part is qualified, while he is to perform as many of the subsidiaries as he can. We shall not discuss this more at length, for it has been thoroly treated by the sages.

238. So it is establisht that an injunction of qualification is one which sets forth the ownership of the fruit. We have thus now explained to the very end the practical uses of injunctions, by explaining their four-fold divisions.

(Here ends the First Part of the Elucidation of the Laws of the Mīmāṅsā, composed by Āpadeva)

(Here begins Part II)

Mantra; niyama-vidhi

239. And formulas (*mantra*) find their use in reminding us of something connected with the performance. But their recitation is not for the purpose of an unseen (transcendental) result. Because it is improper to assume an unseen result when a visible one is at hand. And the fact that the visible result (reminding of elements in the sacrifice) can be produced by other means does not make the recitation of the formulas purposeless. Because it depends on an injunction of fixation (necessary-arrangement) to the effect that the reminding must be done only by the formulas.

240. When two (alternative) instruments are (both) partially (or optionally) establisht, an injunction of one of them in a case where it is not establisht is an injunction of fixation. As they say:

241. "A (new, *apūrva*) injunction is (found) in the case of something wholly unestablisht; a fixation (necessary-arrangement, or restriction) where it is partially so; and where there is establishment on this side and on that (where more than one alternative is equally establisht), exclusive-specification is said to be used (naming the alternative which alone is allowed)."

[157] The comm. quotes as examples *yāvajjīvam agnihotraṁ juhoti, yāvajjīvaṁ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajeta.* These are cited in the Bhāṣya to J. 6.3.1 as from the Bahvṛca Brāhmaṇa; see Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.* 3.614. The quotations seem not to occur in AB. or KB.

242. This verse means: An injunction which sets forth as having a useful purpose something the usefulness of which for that purpose is not establisht by other modes-of-evidence, is a 'new' (absolute, *apūrva*) injunction. As, "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice" and the like. For the fact that sacrifice is useful for gaining heaven is not establisht by any other mode-of-evidence, but by this very injunction alone; so it is a new injunction.

243. But an injunction of something partially establisht is an injunction of fixation; as, "He beats the rice." For by this injunction it is not meant to show that the beating is useful for removing the husks, since that is already establisht by positive and negative examples.[158] But rather it is a fixation, and supplies the unestablisht part. For since there are various (possible) ways of removing the husks, for the event that one should start to abandon beating and take some other means, since in that event beating would be unestablisht, this injunction simply supplies the unestablisht part, in enjoining that. And so in the injunction of fixation the meaning of the sentence is nothing but fixation, which consists in filling in the unestablisht part; it amounts to this, that it enjoins beating in the event of its being partially unestablisht; but there is not, as in the new injunction, an injunction of something as (otherwise) entirely unestablisht.

Parisaṁkhyā-vidhi

244. When both alternatives are simultaneously establisht, an injunction whose business it is to exclude one is an injunction of exclusive-specification. As in the case of "Five five-nailed (animals) are to be eaten."[159] For this sentence does not enjoin eating, since that is establisht by (man's natural) appetite. Nor yet is its business fixation, since eating of both five-nailed and non-five-nailed (animals) is simultaneously establisht (by appetite) and there is no partial non-establishment.[160] So it is just

[158] In ordinary life we see that when rice has been beaten it has no husks left on it, when it has not been, it has them.

[159] Rāmāyaṇa, Kiṣkindhā Kāṇḍa, ed. Gorresio, 16.32, or ed. Krishnacharya, Bombay 1905, 17.37. The five are listed *ibidem* as *śaśakaḥ, śallakī, godhā, khaḍgaḥ, kūrmaḥ* (Gor.), or *śalyakaḥ, śvāvidhaḥ, godhā, śaśaḥ, kūrmaḥ* (Krishn.).

[160] This kind of injunction is really an implied prohibition (of doing other than what is enjoined). Comm.: there would be no sin in not eating the five animals referred to, nor is any fruit (reward) provided for eating them.

an injunction of exclusive-specification, aiming at abstention from the eating of five-nailed animals other than the five (referred to).[161]

245. And this exclusive-specification is two-fold, directly-stated, and implied. Of these, we have a directly-stated exclusive-specification in the sentence "Here only they insert (extra *sāmans*);"[162] since the word 'only' (*eva*) specifies exclusion of all *stotras* other than the (three) Pavamānas (as points for inserting additional sāmans in certain modifications of the soma-sacrifice, Jyotiṣṭoma).

246. But "five five-nailed (animals) are to be eaten" is an implied one, since there is no word which expresses exclusion of others. For this very reason it is tainted by three defects. The three defects are: departure from direct-statement, implication of what is not directly-stated, and annulment of what is establisht. For there is departure from the expressly-stated (permission of) eating of five-nailed (animals, in that the restriction to five such, only, is implied), and implication of the abstention from eating five-nailed (animals) other than those five, which is not directly-stated, and annulment of eating five-nailed (animals) other than those five, which was establisht (by man's natural appetite). And of these three defects two are concerned with words (only), but annulment of the establisht is concerned with meaning. This much by the way.

247. So it is establisht that the recitation of the formulas is not meaningless, because it rests on an injunction of fixation which says that "The formulas only must remind us (of things connected with the performance)." And so it is proper to say that the formulas serve a useful purpose by reminding us of something connected with the performance.

[161] It seems necessary to read thus with C. ed., following some mss. and a Mysore ed. in Telugu characters, instead of B.P. and most other edd. That this is the sense that must have been intended, rather than "abstention from the eating of non-five-nailed animals," seems evident. So also below in 246.

[162] Read with C. *āvapanti* (cf. J. 10.5.22 *āvāpa-*); B.P. and Arthasaṁgraha, ed. Thibaut, p. 18, l.4, *āvayanti*. The full sentence is quoted by Bhāṣya on J. 10.5.22 *trīṇi ha vai yajñasyodarāṇi gāyatrī bṛhatī anuṣṭup, atra hy evāvapanti, ata evodvapanti*. The comm. has a full explanation of the technical point.

248. Now when the formulas can fulfil their function of illuminating the meaning (of the performance) at the point where they are found in the text, they are to be applied at that same point. But when they cannot, then they are (their application is) to be transferred to a place where they can do so, as was explained in the case of the formulas of after-recitation to Pūṣan. But where they cannot be applied anywhere, then, because there is no other way out, their recitation must be understood as having an invisible purpose. But in no case can it be admitted that they are meaningless.

Nāmadheya

249. Names (*nāmadheya*) find their use in defining the meaning of (the performance) enjoined. For instance, in the sentence "Who desires cattle shall sacrifice with the *udbhid*" the word *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice. And by it the meaning of the (rite) enjoined is defined. For by this sentence a sacrifice is enjoined with a fruit as its object, since it is not (otherwise) establisht. And since a general injunction to sacrifice cannot be intended, it must be that a specific variety of sacrifice is enjoined. When therefore the question arises "What is that specific variety?" from the word *udbhid* it is recognized that it is the sacrifice known as *udbhid*. Because the name is construed in correlation (with the noun 'sacrifice' understood as means from the verb 'he shall sacrifice'), thus: "With the *udbhid*, the sacrifice (he shall effect the desired end of cattle)."

250. And the correlation of this (name) with the root 'sacrifice' is not like the word "blue-lotus." For in such compounds as the latter the meaning exprest by the word 'blue,' namely the quality of blue, is different from the meaning of the word 'lotus,' namely a lotus.[163] But by transferred meaning the word 'blue' is understood as meaning a substance (viz. a particular kind of lotus), and so there is correlation. But the word *udbhid* has no other meaning to express than a specific variety of the 'sacrifice' denoted by the root 'sacrifice' (*yaj*, in *yajeta*, 'he shall sacrifice'); since it has (that) specific meaning (only, no more general meaning).

251. And so, because it does not express any other meaning, the

[163] What is meant is that one is an adjective and the other a noun, and in strict logic one cannot be appositional to the other.

correlation of the name (with the idea of 'sacrifice') is not like that of the word "blue-lotus," but rather like the word 'curds' in the phrase "For-the-Viśvadevas curds."[164] For since the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas' is a secondary derivative expressing (the pertaining to) a deity, and since it is recorded in (grammatical) authority that (such) a secondary derivative has the meaning of a pronoun, meaning "this (here, the Viśvadevas) is the deity of that (thing denoted by the secondary derivative)," and because pronouns denote a specific thing that is near at hand, therefore the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas' denotes a specific thing.[165] Then when the question arises: "What is that specific thing which is referred to by the (general) word 'for-the-Viśvadevas?'," since the word 'curds' is near at hand, it is understood that "it is the specific thing known as 'curds.' "[166] As it is said:

252. "It is just this one secondary formation that expresses the curds and the deity together. The proximity of the word 'curds' only furnishes its (specific) object (that to which it applies, *viṣaya*)."[167] Likewise:

253. "The meaning of the dependent (limiting) word (curds) is exprest by direct-statement thru the pronoun ('of-that,' *asya*, in Pāṇini's rule above), and its (the pronoun's) meaning by the secondary suffix; thus they all three mean the same thing."

254. Therefore, as the word 'curds' is correlated with the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas' because it expresses the specific thing denoted by the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas,' so, since there can be no in-

[164] Literally, "Viśvadeva-ish curds." Comm.: as the word 'curds' is correlated with the word 'Viśvadeva-ish' because it, 'curds,' furnishes the particular species denoted by the (general) word 'Viśvadeva-ish,' so the word *udbhid* is correlated with the word 'sacrifice' as specifier.—That is, 'Viśvadeva-ish' is felt as a generic name for a group of things "belonging to the Visvadevas," which is particularized by the word 'curds.'

[165] "This secondary formation cannot denote the deity of just matter in general, but only of specific things denoted by the pronoun 'of-that' in the grammatical rule 'This is the deity of that' " (TV. on J. 2.2.23, p. 532).

[166] 'Curds,' as the specific thing, is already implied in the term 'for-the-Viśvadevas,' which tho general in form, must necessarily imply something specific by its secondary suffix which = a pronoun. So *udbhid* is a specific variety of 'sacrifice;' 'sacrifice' is a general term, but nobody can perform a general 'sacrifice,' but only a particular one.

[167] The comm. says that the word *eva* is out of place in both b and d: it belongs to *eṣa* in b and to *-arpaṇam* in d.

junction of a thing (such as sacrifice) in general, the name (*udbhid*) is correlated with the root 'sacrifice' (*yaj*) because it expresses the specific variety of 'sacrifice' (*yāga*) which is understood from the root 'sacrifice' (in *yaj-eta*). So it is establisht that names find their use in defining the meaning of the (sacrifice that is) enjoined. As it is said: "Because of its (the name's) dependence (on the word 'sacrifice'), since it establishes a specific variety of sacrifice."

255. And there are four reasons for (understanding a word as) a 'name': (1) avoidance of implication of possessive indication, (2) avoidance of split-of-the-sentence, (3) an authoritative passage setting forth it, and (4) representation of it.

Udbhid is a name

256. Now in the sentence "Who desires cattle shall sacrifice with the *udbhid*" the word *udbhid* is taken as a name of a sacrifice to avoid implication of possessive indication.

257. For (first) if it be proposed to take the word *udbhid* as indicating an accessory,[168] the injunction of an accessory in further reference to a sacrifice (enjoined elsewhere, as the *jyotiṣṭoma*), is not proper, because the word expressing the fruit would then be meaningless.[169] And (further) this sentence cannot properly express both an injunction of the sacrifice with reference to the fruit, and an injunction of an accessory with reference to the sacrifice, because that would mean a split-of-the-sentence.[170] Nor (further) can we assume an injunction of a (direct) relation between the accessory (*udbhid*) and the fruit (making *udbhid*, rather than the sacrifice, the means of gaining cattle), because by the injunction of another thing (*udbhid*) the injunction (of sacrifice) would receive a too remote meaning (viz. of the accessory, *udbhid*, which is more remote than the meaning of the root itself,

[168] Such as a spade, as suggested by the *pūrvapakṣa* in J. 1.4.1, on the basis of the apparent etymology of the word *ud-bhid*, 'up-breaking' (the ground).

[169] Because the fruit should be enjoined in connexion with the injunction of the sacrifice itself, not with that of an accessory; and if two things, the accessory and the fruit, were enjoined in one supplementary injunction, we should have split-of-the-sentence (33f., 12).

[170] The idea of 'sacrifice' would then be construed in two ways at once, '*tantra*-wise' (*phalaṁ yāgena bhāvayet, yāgaṁ guṇena bhāvayet*); cf. 32.

'sacrifice'); and because, since the meaning of the root ('sacrifice') would not be enjoined in its own primary sense, and since nothing else, either, would be enjoined as referring to it, therefore the root ('sacrifice') would be entirely subordinate to something else, and there would be no meaning in the root.[171] For in that case (the root) would not supply the means, since the accessory would be construed as means; nor yet the fruit, since cattle would be construed as the end to be attained.

258. But if it be suggested that, assuming that there is enjoined a connexion between the accessory and the fruit, the sacrifice is connected as substratum (*āśraya*, see 38), this is impossible. For in the word 'he shall sacrifice' there is no element that expresses the state of being such a substratum. If it be said that this may be implied, just as in the accepted explanation the state of (the sacrifice's) being the means is implied, this cannot be, because it is much easier to understand the means-relation than the relation of substratum, and so it rather should be implied. (And that for the following reason.) That thing (as, here, the verbal root-meaning) in reference to which an accessory enjoined as leading to the fruit has the function of a noun-dependent (*kāraka*, case-signification), that is a substratum, and the state of being in that relation is substratum-relation (which is therefore not an independent, *niṣkṛṣṭa*, but a dependent relation; it can be formed only in relation to something else, the *āśrayin*—here the accessory); while the means-relation is an independent (primary, abstract) force, and hence is easier (to assume by implication).

259. And further: if a relation between accessory and fruit is enjoined, then either the accessory acting as means (i.e. the meaning of the noun, the stem, qualified by the means-relation denoted by the instrumental ending), or else a means-relation based on it (and exprest by the instrumental ending) must be enjoined with reference to the fruit. But in the case of the first alternative, it is only by indirect implication that the means-concept could be presented as subordinate to the (noun) accessory,[172] since, by reason of its being the meaning of the instru-

[171] If no sacrifice is enjoined, but only some thing, denoted by *udbhid*, is stated as means to the fruit, why bring in the word *yajeta*, 'he shall sacrifice,' at all?

[172] Which relation, rather than the reverse, must hold between them if the thing primarily enjoined is the accessory rather than the means-notion.

mental ending, it (the means-concept) would naturally appear as the main thing (not as subsidiary to the stem of the word, according to the general rule that in any noun-form the ending is the main thing, and the stem-meaning subordinate to it, cf. 322).

260. If however a means-relation based on the accessory (and exprest by the instrumental ending, [*udbhid*]-*ā*) is to be enjoined with reference to the fruit, even then the establishment of a means-relation based on the accessory which would be fit to be construed as means to the fruit-efficient-force (as means of obtaining the desired end) could be only understood by implication. Because the means-case-power (*kāraka*) exprest by the instrumental ending is fit to be construed with a verb, but is not fit to be construed as (a name for the) means. For the means-power exprest by the word 'means' (itself) is fit to be so construed, but not that exprest by the instrumental ending, since that would mean that an instrumental case-form could be derived from the instrumental ending, as from the word (noun-stem) 'means.'

261. And so, then, the establishment of a means-relation based on the accessory which would be fit to be construed as means could be understood only by implication. And the means-relation thus presented by implication, or the accessory serving (by implication) as means,—their functioning as means to the fruit-efficient-force (rather than to the sacrifice) could also be understood only by implication; since the directly-stated instrumental ending ([*udbhid*]-*ā*) would indicate only that the accessory is in means-relation to the sacrifice. That is why on the Fourth (Book) in the Tantraratna it is said that the cow-milking vessel and other (implements) which play the part of means serve the purpose of (getting) cattle (only indirectly and) because they are mentioned together (in the same sentence, i.e. by implication).[173]

[173] The passage referred to in Pārthasārathimiśra's Tantraratna (presumably on J. 4.3.4) deals with the injunction ĀpŚS. 1.16.3, *godohanena paśukāmasya* (*praṇayet*), "he should fetch (water) in the milking-vessel for one who desires cattle." The C. comm. quotes it, as follows: "Altho it (the pail) is shown by connected utterance with the word 'for one desirous of cattle' to serve the ends of man, nevertheless, since it depends upon the fetching, that is the meaning of the ritual performance, it must unquestionably be admitted that it contributes to the sacrificial performance thru that medium (rather than as being the immediate means to the fruit)."

262. And so, since in taking this as an injunction of relation between accessory and fruit there ensue many difficulties, such as the entire dependence of the root-meaning on something else etc., therefore if the word *udbhid* be taken as indicating an accessory we could only assume that the sentence enjoins a (sacrificial) action particularized by an accessory. For in that case nothing but the means-relation, which is easy, is understood by implication with the verb 'sacrifice,' and nothing but possessive indication is understood by implication with the word *udbhid* in its stem part;[174] and so we have an easier solution than by assuming an injunction of relation between accessory and fruit, while (on this assumption) the complete dependence of the root on something else and the other difficulties mentioned do not occur at all; for (e.g.) the very meaning of the root itself ('sacrifice') is enjoined as leading to the fruit. And so, if the word *udbhid* be taken as indicating an accessory, then we must admit implication of possessive indication and accept the injunction as one of a rite particularized by an accessory, thus: "By the sacrifice characterized by the *udbhid* he shall effect (the attainment of) cattle." (Cf. 12ff.)

263. But if we take it as the name of a rite there is no need of implication of possessive indication with the word *udbhid;* because taken quite in its primary meaning it can be construed in correlation with the root 'sacrifice:' "By the *udbhid,* the sacrifice, he shall effect (the attainment of) cattle." And when construction in the primary sense is possible one should not resort to implied meaning. But the thing enjoined lies near at hand in both cases alike (so that on this score there is nothing to choose between them).

264. And let it not be said: "In that case, in the sentence 'He shall sacrifice with soma' (12ff.) also we should assume that soma is the name of a sacrifice, because taking it as enjoining an accessory requires the implication of possessive indication." No; because the well-known conventional meaning of soma is a creeper, and so it could not mean the name of a sacrifice, and hence, as there is no way out, we have to resort to implication

[174] Which is the subordinate part of the word and therefore that with which, if with anything, implied meaning should be assumed. (The implication is *udbhid-vat-ā* instead of *udbhid-ā.*)

(of possessive indication). But the word *udbhid* has no such known and establisht meaning to express; while its etymological meaning, 'that by which (something) is sprouted forth,' may be applied to a sacrifice too, as causing the 'sprouting' of the fruit, just as well as to an accessory (as a spade).

So it is establisht that the word *udbhid* is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice to avoid implication of possessive indication.

Citrā is a name

265. In the sentence "Who desires cattle shall sacrifice with the *citrā*" the word *citrā* is to be taken as the name of a rite to avoid split-of-the-sentence. For here, in the first place, there can be no injunction of a sacrifice particularized by an accessory, since the sacrifice is enjoined in the sentence "Sour-milk, honey, milk, ghee, grain, water, rice, these are mixt together for Prajāpati;"[175] and so it is impossible that this should be a particularized injunction (since there is another originative injunction). And when a sacrifice is once establisht, if a connexion with both its fruit and an accessory is enjoined at once, there is split-of-the-sentence.

266. Then (if we assume that the word *citrā* expresses only an accessory, viz. a material), since the word *citrā* indicates both varicoloredness and feminine gender, and since feminine gender naturally belongs to what has life and so is not fit to enter into the rite under discussion of which sour-milk etc. are the materials, therefore this sentence cannot enjoin an accessory in the rite under discussion, but rather in a rite of which a living thing is the material. And since this sentence would (on this assumption) be a disconnected statement, and since by the rule "only to the archetype, because of non-repetition" disconnected statements apply to the archetype (only), and since by the rule "and from the (animal) of the consecration(-rite, the rule of transfer applies) to the other (animal-rites)" (all) sacrifices of which a living thing is the material have the *agnīṣomīya* (or

[175] This does not occur in the context of TS. 2.4.6.1, nor in the appropriate passages of BŚS. (13.36) or ĀpŚS. (19.25.14f.); and no other known text contains the *citrā* sacrifice, so far as I can discover. The sentence is quoted in the Bhāṣya on J. 1.4.3, transposing *taṇḍulā udakam*. Cf. 269, and my Introduction, p. 25 f.

animal used in the consecration-rite) as their archetype, therefore by this sentence an accessory would be enjoined in further reference to that.

267. And since the (animal) of the consecration-rite is a subsidiary of the *jyotiṣṭoma* (to which that rite belongs), and so there is no independent fruit to be expected, the word "Who desires cattle" could not provide the fruit, but rather would be a further allusion to the 'choice' (of animal) which is establisht as an accessory to the getting of the *agnīṣomīya* animal.[176] And if it be said that in that case there is no split of the sentence, we reply: nevertheless, even if we assume the injunction here of a particularized instrument (i.e. a varicolored female animal), (an assumption which is necessary) because there would be split of the sentence in taking the injunction of (two things), varicoloredness and feminine gender in further reference to the animal of the consecration-rite, even so there is an excessive complication (more implied by the single word '*citrā*' than it could properly signify) involving split of the sentence (after all). And (this same result follows) also because the instrument (the animal) has been establisht (in the main injunction, of the consecration-rite), and therefore a particularized injunction is impossible. And further because the word 'desire' (in *paśukāma*, 'having a desire for cattle') by its natural essence refers to the fruit, and would become meaningless as a mere further reference to the 'choice' (of an animal for the consecration). And there is not necessarily any choice exercised in getting that animal, since there would be no choice if an animal were presented by some one before a choice was made. And so the direct-statement of the word *paśukāma* (if it meant 'choosing an animal'), made as universally applicable, would be annulled.

268. And (the above suggestion is impossible) also because it cannot be that femininity of the animal of the consecration-rite is enjoined, since this is contrary to its masculinity which is prescribed by the originative injunction;[177] like the injunction of

[176] It is suggested that *kāma* in *paśukāma* could = *kāmanā*, 'choice' (as well as 'desire'), and that the sentence might mean "The person choosing an animal (for the consecration) should sacrifice with a varicolored female animal."

[177] Cf. ĀpŚS. 10.29.4 (*ajenāgnīṣomīyeṇa*), etc.; J. 10.4.32, Bhāṣya. quotes *gaur anubandhyo 'jo 'gnīṣomīyaḥ*.

whey in further allusion to the sacrifice of curds (see 318). And further because it is inacceptable[178] to suppose an injunction of varicoloredness by a disconnected statement, which must (therefore) be a general rule, when this is contrary to the black-spotted color which is enjoined by the special (not general) rule, found (not "detacht" but) in proximity to the consecration-rite, which says "The *agnīṣomīya* (= consecration-animal) shall be black-spotted." Just as the injunction of the being-seventeen (fire-stick-verses, can not hold) when it is contradicted by the being-fifteen (directly-prescribed in the archetype itself, see 109ff.).

269. (Objection:) Well then, let us assume that the injunction of varicoloredness and feminine gender is not in further allusion to the *agnīṣomīya* animal. But let us assume that it is an injunction of an accessory in further allusion to the ewe which is subsidiary to the (other) sacrifice (a modification of the animal-sacrifice) enjoined in the sentence "A ewe for Sarasvatī." For the word "With the *citrā*" would then enjoin only varicoloredness, in further allusion to the female instrument (animal, already enjoined). And let it not be said that the injunction of varicoloredness is improper because there is no need for specification (of color) after this has been supplied by the black-spotted color of the archetype (the animal of the consecration, of which the ewe is a 'modification'); for the explicitly-stated varicoloredness would annul the other color (that is merely) transferred from the archetype.

270. To this we reply: Not so. For the single word 'With the *citrā*' could not both allude to the feminine instrument (already enjoined), and enjoin varicoloredness, since that would result in a split-of-the-sentence, consisting of breaking the unity of the subject-matter. Because a thing alluded to (in a supplementary way) and a thing enjoined must be exprest by different words. And that is why in the sentence "The first draught is for the *vaṣat*-maker (the *hotṛ*-priest)" we have a particularized injunction of drinking, and not an injunction of which comes first in further allusion to (an otherwise enjoined) drinking, as is stated in the Third (Book).

[178] According to the rule of J. 10.8.9th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 17–19, that a general rule applies only where there are no special rules to the contrary.

271. And (the above suggestion is impossible) also because if varicoloredness were enjoined in further allusion to the ewe, the word stating the fruit would be meaningless. For if both were enjoined there would be split-of-the-sentence; and (if the fruit here stated belongs to the ewe-sacrifice) there would be no satisfaction of the requirement of a fruit in the sacrifice under discussion (that of sour-milk, honey, etc. to Prajāpati); and it would be harder to supply the fruit (for that) in the manner of the All-conquering rite (see 117). And (the word *citrā* cannot refer to the ewe) also because this assumption would annul the establisht syntactic-connexion between this injunction of qualification, and the originative injunction "Sour-milk, honey" etc., and so cause split-of-the-sentence.

272. But on the assumption that the word '*citrā*' is the name of a rite, the mere connexion of the fruit (here stated) with the rite in question (the sour-milk etc. for Prajāpati), which needs a fruit, would not result in split of the sentence. For the word '*citrā*,' 'varicolored' or 'variegated,' naturally applies to the minor sacrifice in question, because it uses materials of various kinds. So it is establisht that the word *citrā* is to be taken as a name of a rite to avoid split-of-the-sentence.

Agnihotra is a name (tatprakhya-nyāya)

273. In the sentence "He offers the *agnihotra*,"[179] the word *agnihotra* is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice because of an authoritative passage setting forth that. This is as much as to say that the word *agnihotra* is a name of a rite because there is found an authoritative statement (elsewhere) setting forth, or establishing, that accessory (to which the word would otherwise be taken to refer). This is to be explained as follows.

[179] According to the comm. this injunction (which is very commonly quoted in all Mīmāṅsā texts) is taken from TS. 1.5.9.1 (it occurs also TS. 1.5.2.4). But the Bhāṣya on J. 9.4.28 quotes it preceded by the words *ya evaṁ vidvān*. I believe, therefore, that it was taken from MS. 1.8.6 (124.19), where precisely these words occur (cf. also MS. 1.8.1 [115.4], *satyenāgnihotraṁ juhoti ya evaṁ vidvān juhoti*). These passages occur in the *agnihotra brāhmaṇa* of MS., whereas TS. contains no *agnihotra brāhmaṇa*. It is *a priori* unlikely that the originative injunction of the rite was taken (as the comm. would have it) from a passage (in TS.) which does not deal primarily with the *agnihotra* at all.

274. In the first place, an injunction only enjoins a thing which is not establisht by any other means, according to the rule that "an authoritative text finds its meaning (purpose) in something not (otherwise) establisht."[180] And if the word *agnihotra* enjoined an accessory, the accessory that it would have to enjoin is establisht by other authoritative statements. If you ask how, listen.

275. First, if you assume that (*agnihotra*) is a locative compound, and means "that in which an oblation (*hotra*) is offered in the fire (*agni*)" and that fire is enjoined as the receptacle of the oblation, then the injunction becomes meaningless, because this is already establisht by the sentence "When (or, that) he offers (oblation) in the *āhavanīya* (fire)."

276. Then, if you take it as a dative compound meaning "that in which an oblation is offered to Agni (fire)," and supplying the deity, namely Agni, this is wrong; because (the deity) is establisht by another authoritative statement. If you ask "what one?", some[181] reply, it is this, "that (or, when) he offers oblation in the evening to Agni and to Prajāpati;"[182] this is the other authoritative statement which enjoins Agni and Prajāpati as deities in further allusion to the oblation, and on this account the word *agnihotra* cannot provide the deity. And there is no split of the sentence in enjoining both (deities). For if both were enjoined independently of each other, there would be split of the sentence, because the injunction would operate (for each) separately, thus: "He offers oblation to Agni, he offers oblation to Prajāpati." But the direct-expression of the word 'and' shows that the two words are construed with the verb in strict interdependence on one another, so that there is no split of the sentence.

277. That is why in case of the sentence "The sacrificial fee for this (rite) is one-hundred-and-twelve, a cow and a horse and a mule and an ass and goats and sheep and rice and barley and

[180] This doubtless refers to J. 1.1.5. . . *upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe* (Bhāṣya: *pratyakṣādipramāṇair ajñāte 'rthe*).

[181] Bhāṣya on J. 1.4.4, followed by R. ad loc., especially p. 434ff.

[182] Cf. MS. 1.8.7 (125.4) *dvedhā vā idam, agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyam* (sc. *ahauṣam*). This statement, occurring in an *ākhyāyikā*, seems to echo the injunction quoted in our text, and is the nearest approach to it which I have found anywhere. The comm. (on p. 136 of C., cf. below, 285) quotes MS. 1.8.7 for this injunction.

sesame and beans,"[183] which is a further-allusion to the sacrificial fee enjoined by the sentence "He gives the sacrificial fee to the priests," the injunction of the cow etc. (many objects) is permissible, as stated in the Tenth (Book); for there is no split of the sentence, since the cow etc. are all enjoined in interdependence on each other. Otherwise the injunction of several things, the cow etc., in further-allusion to the sacrificial fee, would not be permissible at all.

278. And we have in this statement a conjunction of Agni and Prajāpati as deities, not a condition in which both, conjoined (as a *devatā-dvandva* compound), appear as deity. This is shown by the separate expression of the case-endings expressing relation to the verb. For the meaning of the word 'and' is construed with the meaning of the case-termination (viz. that of the dative in "to Agni" and "to Prajāpati"), since it cannot be independent.[184] And so it is not a case of Agni-Prajāpati as a (united, joint) deity (a *devatā-dvandva*), like Agnīṣoma (Agni-Soma). (Thus it is proved that Agni is enjoined as deity by this sentence, and not by the word *agnihotra*.)

279. But other teachers[185] say: The sentence "that (or, when) he offers oblation to Agni and to Prajāpati in the evening" does not establish Agni (as deity), because it enjoins Prajāpati in further allusion to the oblation. And let it not be said that there is nothing to choose between the two alternatives, and so it is proper to hold that it enjoins both. For an injunction enjoins only that which is not establisht by other means. And just as this sentence does not enjoin the evening-time, because that is establisht by the other sentence "He offers oblation in the evening;" so Agni also is not enjoined, because he is establisht already by just the wording of the formula "Agni is light, light

[183] PB. 16.1.10–11 (after *māṣāś ca*, adds *etasyām eva virāji pratitiṣṭhati;* here ends 10, with *tasya* begins 11; reading *dvādaśaṁ śataṁ*); cf. 295 and note.

[184] Particles cannot be independent, but must always be dependent on something else. Cf. below, 290. What is meant here is that the word 'and' does not express the conjunction of the two deities in such a way as to make them a compound deity of the rite, but merely a conjunction of their syntactic relations.

[185] The school of Pārthasārathimiśra; see ŚD. on J. 1.4.4th adhikaraṇa, pp. 63–68.

is Agni, hail!" And it is undeniable that the wording of formulas may also provide (a statement of) the deity. That is why we are told that in the whispered-(*upāṅśu*) rite the fact that Viṣṇu and the rest (Agnīṣoma and Prajāpati) are its deities is based on the wording of the formulas.[186]

280. (Objection:) But in that case Prajāpati as deity would annul Agni. For the deityhood of Prajāpati is indicated by the dative ending, but of Agni by the wording of the formula. Now while it is true that (grammatical) authority does not attribute to the dative ending the force of determining deityhood, as it does to secondary formations in the rule "This is the deity of that,"—for its rule for the dative is that it expresses donation, viz. "The dative expresses donation;" nevertheless deityhood certainly means the state of being the object to which a presented substance is addrest (in sacrifice). And it is included in the essential meaning of 'donation,' because the condition of being the recipient when a presented object is addrest (in sacrifice) implies donation. Therefore deityhood may surely be establisht by the dative case, because donation is necessarily coexistent with it (deityhood). But the wording of the formula establishes not deityhood (in this technical sense), but merely presence (of a certain god at the sacrifice). And so the wording of a formula is weaker than the dative case. As they say:

281. "By a secondary formation, or a dative, or again by the wording of a formula, the deity is enjoined; but among them each is weaker than the one before it."

282. And so Agni, signified by weaker evidence, is annulled by Prajāpati as deity, signified by stronger evidence.

283. To this we reply: True, he would be annulled if Prajāpati alone were enjoined, (if the statement read:) "He makes oblation to Prajāpati." But while Prajāpati is enjoined, he is enjoined with reference to the oblation in further allusion to Agni who is

[186] Cf. below, 288. The deities of the *upāṅśu-yāja*, the second of the three main offerings at the new- and full-moon rites, are Viṣṇu, or Prajāpati, or Agnīṣoma. See TB. 3.5.7.1–2; ĀŚS. 1.6.1, 1.3.12. Only in the Śrauta Sūtras is the matter really made clear; see Hillebrandt, *NVMO.*, pp. 111, 84, 89, with notes. TS. 2.6.6.4 prescribes the rite but without naming a deity; cf. 288.

establisht by the wording of the formula, and in association with him. For it is easier to assume that Prajāpati alone is enjoined in further allusion to the otherwise establisht Agni, and associated with him, than to suppose (not only) an injunction of them in association (as we are forced to assume, but) also an (originative) injunction of both (deities).[187] And so there is no annulment, because there is no independent injunction (of Prajāpati). And just as from your point of view, since Agni and Prajāpati are enjoined with reference to the same oblation and are therefore equal in value, if on this ground an option were suggested, you would not admit a partial or contingent annulment of Agni by Prajāpati (i.e. that P. might be substituted for A.), since they are enjoined jointly; so the injunction of Prajāpati in further allusion to Agni establisht by the wording of the formula, and in conjunction with him, does not cause (his) annulment. The two cases are similar.

284. But if it be said that, assuming that Agni is based on the wording of the formula, then by force of the wording of the formula "Agni is light, light is Sūrya, hail," which is of mixt character, the evening-oblation would have two deities;[188] we reply, Not so. For, since Prajāpati is not enjoined (by a direct injunction) in conjunction with Sūrya (for the evening oblation) as he is with Agni, therefore Prajāpati, who is indicated by stronger evidence (viz. a dative case-form in an injunction), annuls Sūrya, who is indicated (only) by the wording of the formula.

285. But it may be objected that, if Agni is based on the wording of the formula, since one sentence is sufficient to enjoin Prajāpati,[189] therefore the use of the two sentences, viz. "that (or, when) he offers oblation in the evening to Agni and Prajāpati" and "that (or, when) he offers oblation in the morning to Sūrya

[187] Whereas we assume that Agni has been otherwise enjoined and only Prajāpati is here originatively enjoined, in association with Agni. Understand *samuccitobhayavidhāna* as = *samuccitavidhānaṁ ubhayavidhānaṁ ca;* the first part is a *dvandva*.

[188] Viz., Agni and Sūrya; that is, why would not Sūrya be establisht as deity as much as Agni, by (this other) formula's wording?

[189] As additional deity.

and Prajāpati,"[190] is meaningless. To this we reply: No. It would be meaningless if it were intended to enjoin Prajāpati alone. (But) at the evening oblation Prajāpati conjoined with Agni is intended to be enjoined, and at the morning oblation Prajāpati conjoined with Sūrya, who is establisht (as deity) by the wording of the formula "Sūrya is light, light is Sūrya, hail." And this can not be establisht by a single sentence. Therefore both statements are significant (or, useful).

286. But it may be objected: If Agni is based on the wording of the formula, since this formula-wording is applied in the evening oblation according to the statement "He offers the evening oblation with the formula 'Agni is light, light is Agni, hail;'" and since, therefore, Agni, to indicate whom is that formula's object, is also understood thereby as the deity, joined with Prajāpati, at that same (evening oblation), therefore the word 'evening' in the statement that "that (he offers oblation in the evening) to Agni (and to Prajāpati)" is purposeless (because the time is elsewhere enjoined). And so also the word 'morning' in the statement "that...to Sūrya" etc. And further, since the wording of the formula indicates Agni as particularized by the special quality of light-ness, it would appear that the deity is (not Agni in general but) only a particularized (form of Agni).

287. This also does not hold good. For even if we assume (with the opponent) that (in "that he offers in the evening to A. and P." and "that he offers in the morning to S. and P.") the two deities (Agni and Sūrya,[191] of the evening and morning oblations respectively) are enjoined in further allusion to the oblation, since the wording of the two formulas would then establish them by mere word-meaning (in their respective places—because the formulas mention the two gods, Agni and Sūrya), therefore the injunction of them (the two formulas, as going with their respective rites) would be meaningless. And even if (it be replied that) they are enjoined to reassert (the respective deities

[190] Sūrya and Prajāpati are the deities of the morning part of the *agnihotra,* which is regarded as subordinate to the evening part (of which Agni and P. are deities).

[191] Comm. understands rather "Agni and Prajāpati;" but this can hardly be right, since Prajāpati would not be establisht by the *liṅga* of the *mantras* (not being named in them).

A. and S.) which (may be supposed to) have been cancelled by the injunction of the formula of mixt character ("Agni is light, light is Sūrya, hail"[192]), still the words 'evening' and 'morning' found in these two injunctions would be meaningless; for the two deities which these (two formulas) are designed to indicate are clearly distinguisht (as going with the evening and morning oblations, without the words 'evening' and 'morning'), since they are establisht merely by the separate and distinct statement of the two formulas that are enjoined (the god-names in the formulas being enough to distinguish them). But there is as much resumptive statement[193] in one case as in the other.

288. And also, if we take Agni as based on the formula-wording, it is Agni simply who is the deity, not (Agni) particularized by any quality. For Agni only is mentioned in the sentence "That to Agni etc.," and also in the sentence "The first oblation is for Agni;" and therefore he only (not qualified) is proved to be the deity.

For the case is exactly like that of the whispered (*upāṅśu*) sacrifice, where, altho (the deities) Viṣṇu and the rest (Agnīṣoma and Prajāpati) are also based on the wording of the formula,[194]

[192] TB. 2.1.2.10; which might be said to mix up the two deities and so seem to annul the exclusive deityhood of either at the respective oblations.

[193] *anuvāda*, which I usually render 'further-reference (or, -allusion).' It is, remarkt the pandit with whom the translator workt on this text, a sort of polite term for repetitiousness or meaninglessness. A certain amount of it cannot be avoided, in introducing new elements, since some indication must be given as to what they belong to.—The above passage is summarized by the comm. about as follows: the objector accused us of allowing the two words 'evening' and 'morning' to be repetitious and so meaningless. We reply that his view makes not these two words alone, but the whole injunctions ("he offers oblation in the evening (morning) to Agni (Sūrya) and Prajāpati") meaningless; thus to avoid a scorpion he runs into the jaws of a serpent (out of the frying-pan into the fire)! And even if he tries to avoid this by referring to the "mixed" formula, he will still be as unable as we to show a need for the words 'evening' and 'morning.'

[194] *idaṁ viṣṇur vi cakrame*, see Hillebrandt, *NVMO.*, p. 111. The fact that this alludes to Viṣṇu as taking strides is not regarded as limiting the deity to Viṣṇu Trivikrama or the like; the deity is Viṣṇu unqualified. The deity of the *upāṅśuyāja* is Viṣṇu, or Prajāpati, or Agnīṣoma. Our comm. (p. 134) quotes this and other verses similarly mentioning the other deities from an *aitareyaka*, evidently meaning ĀŚS. 1.6.1, and from TB. 3.5.7.1, 2.

yet the deity is not particularized, because the statement in the explanatory-passage (*arthavāda*) that "Viṣṇu is to be sacrificed to muttering"[195] indicates that the deity is unparticularized.

289. And so, since there is no flaw in basing it on the wording of the formula, and since it is more difficult to understand an injunction of the two deities, therefore only Prajāpati is here enjoined, in further-allusion to the elsewhere establisht Agni, and in conjunction with him. And also because in taking both as enjoined in further-allusion to the oblation we should have split of the sentence.

290. And it can not be said (as was claimed in 276) that there would be no split of the sentence because of the direct-statement of the word 'and' (making a unified statement of the two deities). For the meaning of 'and' is conjunction. And if the word 'and' exprest this conjunction as a principal thing (independently, not in dependence on something else), then, since an independent (principal, main) thing can take several modifiers with it, in enjoining a conjunction of two instruments (dependent nouns, *kāraka*, viz. Agni and Prajāpati), just as in the injunction of the purchase (of soma) particularized by redness etc. (of the cow bartered for soma, see 70), there would be no split of the sentence (since a single unity of two deities would be enjoined). But the word 'and' does not express conjunction as a principal thing, because it has this meaning only in dependence on something else (being a particle, cf. 278 and note).

291. That is why in the Tenth (Book) the author of the Bhāṣya[196] says that the word 'and' is different from the word 'conjunction.' For the word 'conjunction' expresses that mean-

[195] Cf. TS. 2.6.6.4 *ajāmitvāya*, immediately following the injunction of the *upāṅśu-yāja* (*upāṅśuyājam antarā yajati*). See Bhāṣya on J. 2.2.9, which quotes without variant the TS. passage containing this injunction, and then the following statement: *viṣṇur upāṅśu yaṣṭavyo 'jāmitvāya*, which is not found in TS., nor elsewhere so far as I know. The question is naturally raised, whether the Bhāṣya knew a form of TS. which contained the fuller statement here quoted.

[196] In discussing the ten things given as sacrificial fee (see 277), the Bhāṣya says that the words 'and' (*ca*) which occur there do not mean a conjunction (*samuccaya*) of all the things they connect; that is, one is not required to give all of them as fee; rather, they are alternatives; *ca* = *athavā*.

ing as a principal thing, while the word 'and' does not (but only as a qualifier, *viśeṣaṇa*, of other words). For if it exprest the idea in a primary way, then the conjunction exprest by it could be construed with verbs and adjectives. Just as we say "a fine conjunction," "behold the conjunction," so you might employ the expressions "a fine and," "behold the and." And if the word 'and' exprest conjunction in a primary way, like the word 'conjunction,' then just as we say 'a conjunction (aggregation) of *dhava* and *khadira* woods," so we could also use the expression "an and of *dhava* and *khadira* woods."

292. Therefore the word 'and' does not express conjunction as a principal thing, by which, since a single main (primary) thing would be enjoined, there would be no split of the sentence. But it expresses it rather only as depending on the two instruments (dependent nouns, *kāraka*). And if two main (primary) things were enjoined (as must be admitted if our opponent is right in taking this as the primary injunction of Agni as deity), viz. Agni and Prajāpati in conjunction, there would, we insist, be split of the sentence. Just as in the injunction of both cleansing and singular number with reference to the (soma-)cups (see 36).

293. (Furthermore:) Even if the word 'and' could express conjunction in a primary way, nevertheless it could not properly occupy the place of the principal thing with reference to the two instruments (dependent nouns; i.e. it could not be that on which they depend), because the two instrument (dependent-noun) functions, being exprest by the (dative) case-endings, must be dependent on the verb, and so cannot be dependent on the (idea of) conjunction. For an instrument (dependent noun, *kāraka*) may be construed with something else than a verb when it is (exprest by a noun-stem, like *kāraka* itself, or *karaṇa*, and) attached to words ending in primary suffixes etc.; as "a conjunction (aggregation) of agents," "a conjunction of instruments." But when exprest by a case-ending (it can be construed) only with a verb, because case-powers (*kāraka* in the grammatical sense, dependent-nouns, verbal-assistants) can only be construed with that. Therefore whatever (meaning) may be exprest by the word 'and' can only be exprest as subordinate to the instruments, and the two instruments must be the main (principal) thing.

And an injunction of two principal things with reference to one thing would, we insist, be split of the sentence. As they say:

294. "Even tho one instrument (case-form, *kāraka*) may be connected with several words, nevertheless this is not enjoined without repeated verbal endings."[197]

295. And as for the claim that just as there is no split of the sentence in the injunction of several things, cows etc., in further allusion to the sacrificial fee, so also in the injunction of the two instruments (here)—this is not so. For in the sentence "cow, horse" etc. (277) the cow etc. are not enjoined in further allusion to the sacrificial fee; because if they were, there would be a split of the sentence in the manner described. Even if we could somehow avoid the dilemma (of the numerous individual things named) by relying on the word 'and' (to unite them, as suggested by our opponents), there would still be split of the sentence in the injunction of the various things, cow etc., and also of the number one hundred and twelve (which is not joined to the others by 'and'). And because the sentence beginning 'a cow' and ending '(the fee) of this is a hundred and twelve' is quoted all together in the Yajur-Veda school,[198] it is said in the Tenth (Book) that it constitutes one sentence (and so split of the sentence is inadmissible in it).

296. Therefore this sentence is rather the (originative) injunction of the sacrificial fee particularized by both these (things, the number 112, and the objects to be given). And because it is a particularized injunction, there is no split of the sentence. That is why Pārthasārathimiśra says in this and that passage in the Tenth (Book), "It (the fee) particularized by both things (the materials and the number) is enjoined," and "The single (thing, the) sacrificial fee, consisting of various (elements), cows etc., is enjoined."

[197] That is, "...without repetition of the verb-form on which it depends." Specifically, this means that in the present case the meaning advocated by our opponents would have to be exprest by two injunctions, *agnaye juhoti, prajāpataye juhoti*.

[198] The point is that the sentence is found disconnected in the Sāma-Veda school, see 277, note; but in the YV. it is found as one sentence. The closest approach to this sentence which I have found in any YV. text is ĀpŚS. 13.5.4, but the number is not given there (cf. 13.5.1); cf. also MŚS. 2.4.5.9, KŚS. 10.2.11.

297. And this does not make meaningless the sentence "He gives the sacrificial fee to the priests" (assumed by our opponents to be the originative injunction), because this may be (only) a further allusion to it; or because its sole purpose may be to indicate the appurtenance (of the fee) to the regular priests (*ṛtvij;* i.e. it may be an injunction of exclusive-specification, see 244). For by the meaning of the word 'sacrificial fee' it might pertain to both the regular priests, and the cup-*adhvaryus*[199] and other (subordinates). This construction is made impossible by the existence of this sentence, because, as stated in the Third (Book), the cup-adhvaryus cannot be called 'regular-priests;' for this word (*ṛtv-ij*) means "sacrificing at stated seasons" and so denotes only the (seventeen priests) beginning with the *brahmán.*

298. And so there is no split of the sentence in the injunction "Cow, horse" etc., because it is a particularized injunction. But "that he makes oblation in the evening to Agni and to Prajāpati" is not a particularized injunction, because the oblation has been establisht by the sentence "he offers the *agnihotra.*" And so, because if both deities were enjoined conjointly in further allusion to the oblation there would be split of the sentence and too-great complication, therefore this sentence does not enjoin the two deities. But rather, in further allusion to Agni establisht (as deity) by the wording of the formula, it enjoins Prajāpati in conjunction with him with reference to the oblation (as its deity).

299. And so it is not this sentence that establishes Agni (as deity), but rather the wording of the formula. And so, because Agni is establisht thereby, the word *agnihotra* does not furnish the deity (of the rite), but is rather a mere name. So it is establisht that the word *agnihotra* is taken as a name of a rite because of an authoritative passage setting forth that (accessory to which the word might otherwise refer).

300. So also, since the fire-sticks etc. are establisht as the deities of the fore-sacrifices by the wording of the formulas "The firesticks severally, O Agni, may partake of the butter," etc., therefore in such sentences as "He offers the firesticks" the words firesticks etc. are to be taken as names of rites, because of an authoritative statement setting forth that. As it is said:

[199] A group of minor assistants, really no more than servants, who hand implements to the *adhvaryu* and his (major) assistants at the soma-rite.

301. "But since in this case there is another authoritative statement establishing the accessory which it might be desired to enjoin, therefore the establishing of that would be meaningless, and we accept the fact that it is a name."—This by the way.

Śyena is a name

302. In the sentence "One who wishes to practise hostile magic shall sacrifice with the falcon," the word 'falcon' is taken as the name of a rite 'from representation of it' (in an explanatory-passage); which means, because otherwise the representation of, that is comparison with, it could not take place. This is explained as follows. An explanatory-passage (*arthavāda*) expresses glorification of what is enjoined. If now it were a falcon (as material of the sacrifice) that were enjoined here, then the explanatory-passage would have to contain glorification of that. But it is impossible to suppose that a falcon is glorified in the explanatory-passage "Verily as a falcon swoops down and seizes (its prey), so this (sacrifice) swoops down and seizes the hating enemy." Because here by comparison with a falcon (it is clear that) some other thing is glorified. And by comparison with a falcon the falcon itself cannot be glorified; because the thing compared and the thing compared-with must be different things. But when (we assume that) a sacrifice named 'falcon' is enjoined, then the explanatory-statement is capable of glorifying it by comparison to a falcon. And so the word 'falcon' is taken as name of a rite because of representation of it.

Thus we have shown that being a name of a rite is determined by four criteria.

No fifth criterion for names (vaiśvadeva-nyāya)

303. Some[200] say that there is a fifth criterion for names, viz. the greater power of accessories taught in the originative injunction. They say that in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva"[201] the word Vaiśvadeva is taken as the name of a rite for this reason, because the four criteria described, avoidance of implication of possessive indication etc., do not apply.

[200] Someśvara, in the Rāṇaka, p. 470–477, on J. 1.4.13–14. He seems to be closer to the Bhāṣya's view than the opposing opinion given below.

[201] The Vaiśvadeva is one of the four parvans of the *cāturmāsya*.

304. The argument is as follows. In the first place, it cannot be claimed that this is a name to avoid implication of possessive indication, because the secondary formation Vaiśvadeva itself already assigns possessive meaning to the (name of the) sacrifice. For the (grammatical) rule "This is the deity of that" states that secondary formations are used in this meaning.[202] Now altho it is true that (the possessive sense of) the word 'of-that,' which is contained in the secondary formation, is stated by (grammatical) authority to apply to 'hymns and oblations,' so that primarily (the word Vaiśvadeva) should be taken as applying to a hymn or oblation (i.e. material); nevertheless, since (all) pronouns refer to something near at hand, and since here no hymn or oblation (-material) is mentioned in the vicinity, therefore the (possessive idea contained in the) word 'of-that' (which is the meaning of the secondary formation) must refer rather to the (act of) sacrifice, which is near at hand because implied in the word 'he shall sacrifice.' So there can be no question of implication of possessive indication with the sacrifice.[203] And since the word designates a single deity, the Viśvadevas, there is no split of the sentence.

305. Nor (says this school) can it be declared a name because of an authoritative statement setting forth that. For where the accessory which it might be desired to enjoin is establisht by something else, there the word is taken as a name on that ground, as in the word *agnihotra*. (But here Vaiśvadeva cannot be understood as enjoining an accessory, as e.g. the deity of the rite. Because) in this (Vaiśvadeva-rite) are included eight sacrifices, to Agni etc.[204] Now altho, to be sure, the Viśvadevas are establisht as deity of (one of the eight, viz.) the curds-sacrifice, by the words "The curds for the Viśvadevas," still, because they are not so establisht in seven, if the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" were meant to enjoin them (the Viśvadevas as

[202] That is, *Vaiśvadeva* = *viśvadevavat*, "having the Viśvadevas (as deity)."

[203] To make it mean "(a sacrifice) of which the Viśvadevas are the deity;" because the word itself can have that meaning, primarily and without any implication.

[204] Listed MS. 1.10.1 (140.8f.), KS. 9.4 (107.3f.), cf. TS. 1.8.2.1. They are addressed to Agni, Soma, Savitṛ, Sarasvatī, Pūṣan, the Maruts, the Viśvadevas, and Heaven-and-Earth.

deity) in those (seven), there would be no other authoritative statement setting forth that, on the strength of which it would have to be a name.

306. And it cannot be said that this is a name of the curds-sacrifice alone. For in that case the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" would be meaningless. It would have to be a supplementary-allusion to that sacrifice alone, if the word Vaiśvadeva were merely a name for the curds-sacrifice; and there is no possible function which that supplementary-allusion could perform. For the connexion with the curds-sacrifice alone of the eastern cavity (of the *vedi*), enjoined in the sentence "In the eastern cavity he shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva," would be clear even without that sentence; because that (eastern cavity) belongs to the Viśvadevas.

307. But if it is a name for all the (eight) sacrifices in question, to Agni and the rest, then the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" is not meaningless. For then it is a supplementary allusion to (all) the eight sacrifices. And this supplementary-allusion brings them all under a unitary concept, and in so doing establishes the term Vaiśvadeva as a name for all eight in association. And so the word Vaiśvadeva in the sentence "In the eastern cavity he shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" makes supplementary allusion to all eight sacrifices, and establishes the injunction of the eastern cavity with reference to them (all). Were it not for that (other) sentence (*vaiśvadevena yajeta*), this sentence would connect the eastern cavity as place (of offering) only with the curds-sacrifice. And so the use of that sentence is simply to connect with all eight sacrifices the place of the eastern cavity. And thus the word Vaiśvadeva is a name for (all) eight.

308. And an authoritative statement setting forth that cannot be the reason for it, since the Viśvadevas are not establisht as deities in seven (and there is no other accessory than the deity which could be meant by the word). Therefore the word Vaiśvadeva is not taken as a name because of an authoritative statement setting forth that.

Nor yet (can it be so taken) because of representation of that; because no such representation occurs. And so since the four ways named do not furnish grounds for taking the word Vaiśvadeva as a name, the ground must be the greater power of

accessories taught in the originative injunction. This is explained as follows.

309. In the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" we surely cannot have an injunction of deity in supplementary-allusion to other rites than those in question, because such rites can have no place here. Nor can it be an injunction of another (ninth) rite (in this same connexion) particularized by its deity, because that is too difficult; for it would be incompatible with the word-meaning (*liṅga*) of the phrase "eight oblations" which can have no other application (than this set of rites, and excludes a ninth).

310. So it would have to be said (if the word is not a name) that this sentence enjoins the deities in supplementary-allusion to the (eight) rites in question. (Or rather), since the Viśvadevas are already establisht (as deity) for the curds-sacrifice among these (eight), it would have to be said that the sentence enjoins them as deity for the seven (other) sacrifices. But this cannot be, because it is contrary to (the deities) Agni etc. prescribed by the originative injunctions. For such a connexion would take place only in response to a need (which does not exist here). For the need for a deity in the sacrifices to Agni etc. is already satisfied by Agni etc. themselves, who are prescribed (as deities) in the originative injunctions. Hence the injunction of the Viśvadevas cannot apply to them. And so the word Vaiśvadeva is to be taken as a name because of the greater power of accessories taught by the originative injunction. As it is said:

311. "Because it would be contrary to another accessory, a further accessory is not in place (here). Nor is there option (between them), because they are unequal (in authority). Therefore only a name is construable."[205]

312. But other teachers[206] say: Whenever any word alludes to the connexion of any accessory with any rite, if that connexion is establisht by some other authoritative passage, then that word is

[205] In c, as our comm. explains, what is meant is that we cannot admit equal authority, implying freedom of choice, to the statement of the deity by the word Vaiśvadeva which could be understood only by syntactic-connexion (*vākya*), as compared with the direct-statement (*śruti*) in the originative injunctions.

[206] The school of Pārthasārathimiśra. Cf. ŚD. on J. 1.4.13–16; pp. 78–80.

proved to be a name by an authoritative passage setting forth that. And it makes no difference whether that other authoritative passage is an injunction or an explanatory-passage. So with the word *agnihotra*, the other passage indicating the connexion (with the sacrifice) of Agni was just an injunction. Now the word Vaiśvadeva signifies the connexion of the Viśvadevas with the rite; but the connexion of the Viśvadevas with the eight sacrifices is made clear from the explanatory-passage "In that the Viśvadevas sacrificed together, that constitutes the Viśvadeva-quality of the Vaiśvadeva (rite)."

313. And there is no ground for saying that only an injunction can serve as the passage setting forth that (accessory), not an explanatory-passage. For this reason, too, in the sentence "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice with the *jyotiṣṭoma*," where the word *jyotiṣṭoma* is applied to the soma-sacrifice on the ground of (its) connexion with 'lights' (*jyotis*) as made clear by the explanatory-passage "Even these are those 'lights,' namely, the chants of this (soma-sacrifice),"[207] that word is a name because of an authoritative passage setting forth that. So also we must regard it in the present case. For there is no reason to assume a fifth ground (for a name). That is why, in the section on the Vaiśvadeva, the author of the Vārtika sums up the matter thus: "It is (to be taken as) a name for all (the eight sacrifices) simply because of a passage stating that." And the assumption of the "superior power of accessories taught by the originative injunction" in the event of the lack of an injunction of those accessories is a mere (useless) heaping-up of arguments. So it is establisht that the word Vaiśvadeva is a name of a rite because of (another) authoritative passage setting forth that.

314. (Objection:) But in the section (of the sūtra) on the animal-soma sacrifice (of soma with an animal) it is said that the word 'sacrifice' is not to be supplied in such sentences as "He takes the draught for Indra-Vāyu," because it is explicitly stated in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma." By this same rule why not assume that the word 'sacrifice' is not supplied in the words "The curds for the Viśvadevas" either (i.e. that this is not the originative injunction), because it is explicitly stated

[207] The *stomas* or *stotras*, chants of praise, at the soma-rite contain verses, *ṛcaḥ*, in which the word 'light,' *jyotis*, appears.

in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" (i.e. that this is the originative injunction of the curds-sacrifice)? And thus in this same sentence we should have an injunction of a sacrifice particularized by its deity. And since it would need to be supplied with a material, the sentence "The curds for the Viśvadevas" would be the injunction of its material. And thus neither sentence would be a mere supplementary allusion (or repetition). And this would not be incompatible with the word-meaning of the expression "eight oblations" which can have no other application.[208]

315. (We reply:) Not so. If the word 'sacrifice' be not supplied with the sentence "The curds for the Viśvadevas," the question must be answered, "In supplementary-allusion to what are the curds enjoined?" If the material (curds) is enjoined in supplementary-allusion to the Viśvadevas (as it would have to be if 'sacrifice' were not understood in the sentence), then the material would be subsidiary to the deity, not to the sacrifice. And further, the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas,' being a secondary derivative expressing deity, denotes the curds as being that (belonging to 'that' deity), as has been stated (251ff.). So then the injunction of the material in further-allusion to the Viśvadevas would have to be made by the word 'for-the-Viśvadevas' itself, because of direct-statement in the (same) word; just as the verbal root itself furnishes the means for the efficient-force, because of direct-statement in the (same) word, and not any subordinate word, as declared in the section on the meaning of the efficient-force,—just so here. And then there would be a violation of the rule of unified subject-matter (i.e. split of the sentence), just as in the case of the sentence "The first draught is for the vaṣaṭ-maker."[209] Therefore, even for the purpose of an injunction of material in supplementary allusion to the sacrifice, it is clearly necessary to supply the word 'sacrifice' in the sentence "The curds for the Viśvadevas."

316. And so it is not the same as with the rule of the section on the animal-soma sacrifice. For in the sentence "He takes the

[208] Than these rites. For the Vaiśvadeva would refer to one of the eight rites, that of curds to the Viśvadevas.

[209] See 199, 270. The same word cannot both contain a supplementary reference to something elsewhere enjoined, and enjoin something new.

draught for Indra-Vāyu" the word sacrifice is not supplied, because it is an injunction of the draught (not a proper sacrifice), particularized by its deity.[210] And if the word 'sacrifice' is supplied, then the injunction of the rite particularized by the material and the deity in the same sentence, viz. "The curds for the Viśvadevas," is quite proper, since both 'forms' (cf. 57) are expressly stated. And on this assumption the sentence "The curds for the Viśvadevas" preserves the same general sense that is found in the (seven other) sentences "The (cake) on eight potsherds for Agni," "The gruel for Soma" etc. For otherwise they would be dissimilar, they being all injunctions of implied sacrifice, connected with material and deity, and it being an injunction of material alone.

317. And further: if in the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" the word Vaiśvadeva stated the deity, then there would be absolutely no basis for the explanatory-statement "In that the Viśvadevas sacrificed together, that constitutes the Viśvadeva-quality of the Vaiśvadeva (rite)." For by this explanatory-statement it is made clear that the word Vaiśvadeva is applied to the rite because it was performed by the Viśvadevas, and not because that word names the deity of the rite.

318. And further: if the sentence "He shall sacrifice with the Vaiśvadeva" were the (originative) injunction of the sacrifice, then the curds (as material) would not be prescribed in the originative injunction. And so, because it (curds, being not enjoined there) would not annul the use of whey,[211] both curds and whey would be subsidiaries of the sacrifice. And then we should have an option, which has eight faults.[212] Therefore the injunction

[210] It is therefore an originative injunction, not an injunction of an accessory, and has a right to be 'particularized' without causing 'split of the sentence;' but it enjoins only a subsidiary action, and the sentence "He shall sacrifice with soma" is equally originative, since it enjoins the main action.

[211] Which is enjoined in the same vicinity, viz. in MS. 1.10.1 (140.10) *vājināṁ vājinam,* TB. 1.6.2.5 *vājinam ānayati.*

[212] An option is found where two irreconcilable alternatives are both enjoined. As for instance, if one is enjoined to use rice, and elsewhere barley, at a particular rite. The eight faults are enumerated in the comm., as follows: if one uses rice, then with reference to the barley-injunction there is (1) *pratītaprāmāṇyaparityāgaḥ,* abandonment of ascertained

of the sacrifice is contained rather in the sentence "The curds for the Viśvadevas," while the other is a (mere) supplementary-allusion. And whatever is said in a supplementary-allusion must be of such a sort as not to be meaningless (as it would be if Vaiśvadeva were a statement of the deity). Enough of this! It is then establisht that the word Vaiśvadeva is the name of a rite.

319. Thus then we have set forth, by setting forth the four ways (of proving it), (avoidance of) implication of possessive indication and the rest, the fact that a name finds its use in defining the meaning of the (sacrifice) to be enjoined.

Niṣedha

320. Prohibitions (*niṣedha*) serve the ends of man by causing men to turn away from actions which would cause undesirable results. This is to be understood as follows. Just as injunctions, which denote an instigation (to do something), in order to give effect to their own instigatory quality, suggest that the thing to be enjoined, as e.g. a sacrifice, will bring about a desirable result, and so instigate a man to do it, so also prohibitions, such as "He shall not eat *kalañja*,"[213] denote a (negative instigation or a)

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authoritativeness, and (2) *apratītāprāmāṇyaparikalpanam*, assumption of unascertained unauthoritativeness; then if one afterwards uses barley, there is (3) *tyaktaprāmāṇyasya punarujjīvanam*, resuscitation of the authoritativeness that was abandoned, and (4) *svīkṛtasyāprāmāṇyasya parityāgaḥ*, abandonment of the unauthoritativeness that was accepted. And the same four apply if one starts by using barley and afterwards uses rice. Thus eight are counted in all. This is standard Mīmāṅsā doctrine, but is not yet set forth (only vaguely foreshadowed) in the disapproving definition of "option" found in J. 12.3.10 and its Bhāṣya.

[213] See J. 6.2.19–20. The Bhāṣya there reads *bhakṣitavyam* for *bhakṣayet*, and adds: *na laśunaṁ na gṛñjanaṁ ca.*—The meaning of *kalañja* is not entirely clear. There is some authority (Trikāṇḍaśeṣa 3.2.6) for the interpretation "meat killed with a poisoned arrow," while the Śabdakalpadruma (as quoted by BR.) says it means "tobacco." But the most probable interpretation, adopted by the comm., is that it means "red garlic." So Bühler in his translation (in SBE.) of ĀpDhS. 1.17.26 *kalañjapalāṇḍupārīrakāḥ* (Bühler's ed. reads *karañja*, but notes a v.l. *kālaāja;* comm. *raktalaśuna*). The word there occurs in a list of things which may not be eaten. I have found no closer parallel to our prohibition; Manu 5.5 and Y. 1.176 do not mention the word.

determent, and in order to give effect to their own deterring quality, suggest that the thing prohibited, as e.g. eating *kalañja,* will bring about an undesirable result, and so deter a man from it.

321. (Objection:) But (it may be said) how do prohibitions effect a determent? Because, in such phrases as "not he-shall-eat," "not to-be-killed," the meaning of the negative, that is not-being, will be construed with the meaning of the root, because of their close proximity,[214] and so in all such cases it follows that the meaning of the sentence is rather that something excluded by the meaning of the root is (positively) to be done. And so, just as sentences like "he shall sacrifice" mean that sacrifice is to be done, so prohibitions mean that something is to be done other than the meaning of this or that root—but not a determent from something.

322. To this we reply: Not so. In spite of the close association (of negative and root), the meaning of the verbal root is presented as dependent on the meaning of the ending, and so cannot properly be construed with the meaning of the negative. For a subordinate of one thing is not construed with another thing. Otherwise a sentence like "Bring the king('s)-man" might be taken to mean that the king is to be brought. And so the meaning of the negative is not construed with the meaning of the verb, despite their proximity; like ruddiness with (the adjective) "one-year-old."[215] Nor yet is it construed with objects like *kalañja* (as if meaning "he shall eat something that is not-*kalañja*"), because they also present themselves as dependent on their case-powers (the functions of their case-endings), and so are not fit to be construed with the meaning of a separate word like the negative; like the "one-year-old" with ruddiness.

323. And so, being incapable of construction with anything else, the meaning of the negative is construed with the meaning of the verbal ending, because that is the principal element, as ruddiness and the rest are connected with the efficient-force of the (soma-)purchase. And that too not with the end-efficient-

[214] The negative regularly precedes the verbal expression, as in *na bhakṣ-ayet, na han-tavyaḥ;* the objector therefore suggests that it should go immediately with the root, which follows hard upon it (as the first part of the verb), rather than with the ending of the verb, which contains the injunctive notion.

[215] In the sentence enjoining the purchase of soma for a "ruddy one-year-old (cow)," see 70.

force exprest by the part which denotes general verbality, since that also presents itself as subordinate to the instigation exprest by the part which denotes optativeness. Therefore the negative is combined with the part which denotes optative force, because it is the chief element of all (on which everything else depends).

324. And the nature of the negative is this, that it indicates the opposite of the thing with which it is combined. For since in the expression "is not" the negative is combined with the word "is" which is a word of being, the negative denotes the opposite of being, that is non-being. So in this case: the meaning of the optative is clearly instigation. Therefore the negative combined with it denotes the opposite of instigation, that is determent. Because, just as on hearing a sentence of injunction one understands an instigation, "he is instigating me," so on hearing a sentence of prohibition one understands a determent, that is an activity conducive to turning away: "he is deterring me."

325. And so in all prohibitions the meaning of the sentence is simply determent. And thus it is establisht that injunctions and prohibitions are different in meaning. But if the meaning of sentences (of prohibition) were that actions other than (those prohibited, such as) killing etc. were to be performed, they would be alike in meaning, because in both cases alike simply something to be done would be establisht. And that is not correct. As they say:

326. "Just as much difference as is observed in the world between brahman-murder and the horse-sacrifice, even so great is the difference between injunctions and prohibitions." And likewise:

327. "Because they are utterly different in five ways, viz. as to fruit, mental-attitude, object evidenced, qualified person, and indicator, we distinguish between injunctions and prohibitions."[216]

[216] The Rāṇaka (see note in Text) explains these five differences thus: "Fruit:" (of injunctions) desired ends such as heaven, and (of prohibitions) avoidance of undesired ends. "Mental-attitude" (*buddhi*): the hearer realizes that "he is instigating me," and that "he is deterring me." "Object evidenced:" instrumentality for a desired end, and for an undesired end. "Qualified person:" one who, tho desiring a certain desired end, is not instigated to action by any other thing than the injunction, as against one who is instigated by normal inclinations, which are opposed by the prohibition. "Indicator:" the optative etc. unassisted, and the negative joined with the optative etc.

328. In the view of those[217] who hold that the meaning of the optative is instrumentality in gaining a desired end, even in their view the negative joined with the optative must indicate the opposite of that, that is instrumentality in gaining an undesired end.[218] But in any case the negative must be construed with the verbal ending, because that is the principal element.

Paryudāsa, when niṣedha is impossible; two cases

329. However, when there is some obstacle in the way of construing it with that, then, since there is no way out, it is construed with the meaning of the root.

And such obstacles are of two kinds: (1) being introduced by the phrase "His vows are—," and (2) the contingence of an option (i.e. the fact that otherwise an option would result). Because of these two obstacles (when they exist), we must assume in negative sentences an exclusion (*paryudāsa*). When they are not found we have a prohibition rather.

330. "Exclusion is to be understood where the negative is taken with another word (than the verbal ending; i.e. with the verbal root, or a different word, as a noun). Prohibition is to be understood where the negative is taken with the verb(-al ending)."[219]

331. These are the definitions of the two.

[217] The Mīmāṅsaka school of Maṇḍanamiśra (comm.). Cf. 64, 368.

[218] So that formally a prohibition would state that by following such and such a course one would attain an undesired end. The practical result of this would be the same.

[219] The main part of the verb being the ending, that is what is meant by *kriyā* here; the verse is lucidly and correctly explained by the comm. The B. ed. failed to understand it and undertook to emend the text. The two lines are, according to the comm., quoted from the Harikārikā, that is Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (see Colebrooke, *Misc. Ess.* 2.42; the word is there printed Vākyapradīpa), where however (says comm.) they appear as parts of two distinct verses, and with different readings, as follows: *aprādhānyaṁ vidher yatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā, prasajyapratiṣedho 'yaṁ kriyayā saha yatra nañ.* And: *pradhānatvaṁ vidher yatra pratiṣedhe 'pradhānatā, paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottarapadena nañ.* These verses seem not to occur in the six fascicles (Vol. 1 complete, and Vol. 2, fasc. 1–3) which have been publisht in the Benares Sanskrit Series edition of this work, which are all of it to which I have access.

(1) *Introduction by 'tasya vratam'*

332. Now in such sentences as "He shall not look on the rising sun" we assume exclusion (not prohibition) because they are introduced by the phrase "His vows are—."[220] This is explained as follows.

The word 'vow' (or 'solemn duty,' *vrata*) means a thing to be done. And so, since it introduces, as the subject to be set forth (in the following rules), the things that are to be done by the *snātaka* (graduate brahman-student), it must raise the question "What are those things to be done?" And the sentences which follow, "He shall not look on the rising sun" and the rest, can only express things to be done (not to be avoided), since they must state the answer to that question. And if they exprest a different meaning, the former sentence would not be authoritative, because incomplete (leaving a question unanswered). For if "something to be done" is introduced as the thing which is to be stated, and if in the sequel that is not stated, the former statement does not have its question answered (or its need satisfied). And no authority can lodge in something that leaves a question (or need) unsatisfied; for (if it did) then authority would also lodge in (such incomplete statements as) "a cow"—"a horse"—"a man"—(which obviously have no meaning unless they are completed).

333. And further: if it had another meaning the establisht syntactic-unity (or, connexion-in-sense) between the sentence "He shall not look" and its introduction ("His vows are") would not hold.[221] And so it can only be something to be done that must be meant by this sentence. And if it means that, the negative cannot be joined with the verbal ending, because if it were con-

[220] This is taken by the comm. as a free equivalent of the phrase *vratānīmāni dhārayet*, Manu 4.13. It is certain, however, that the example was taken from some other source, a prose work (perhaps the *dharmasūtra* on which Manu was based?). For the *vākyaśeṣa* quoted below (339) does not occur in Manu, even in substance, and is obviously prose. Furthermore the Bhāṣya on J. 4.1.3 reads the injunction, instead of *nekṣetodyantam ādityam*, thus: *nodyantam ādityam īkṣeta, nāstaṁyantam;* which is also evidently prose. Some later Mīmāṅsaka, whom Āpadeva follows, has evidently changed the reading of the injunction to accord with Manu 4.37, leaving the other accompanying quotations unchanged.

[221] That is, there would be no way of telling what the sentence "He shall not look" refers to; that it applies to the *snātaka* would not be clear.

strued with that, it could not express the meaning of something to be done. And (so) the negative is detacht from the ending and combined with the root. And being combined with that the negative does not express a prohibition, because its prohibitive force depends on being combined with the injunctive element only, since prohibitive force is the opposite of injunctive force. But when combined with nouns and (verbal) roots the negative is not prohibitive, because they have no injunctive force. As they say:

334. "But when combined with nouns and root-meanings the negative is not at all prohibitive. It expresses (such things as) "not-brahman," "not-duty," which are simply the contrary of something else."

335. And so, since in the sentence "He shall not look" the negative is combined with the root, the negative and the word 'look' (together) express a certain meaning which is the opposite of looking ("he shall not-look").

336. (Objection:) Altho there is a (grammatical) rule which says that "the negative expresses what is other than that, or contrary to that, or not-being of that," still the (primary) force of the negative is only not-being of the thing that is combined with itself, since that is easier; and not "other than that" or "contrary to that," because these two meanings are connected (with the negative) thru (the meaning of) not-being and are thus more difficult (or more remote); and because it is not proper to assume more than one (primary) meaning for a word. Therefore, if the negative is combined with the root, it must denote only the not-being of the root-meaning, but not a meaning contrary to it.

337. To this we reply: True, the (primary) force of the negative is only not-being. But the (grammatical) rule (quoted) refers to inferential-meaning (*pratīti*), not to (primary) force. And (the verse, 334) beginning "[But] when combined with nouns and root-meanings" also refers to inferential meaning.

338. Nevertheless, since in the sentence "He shall not look" the ending is not combined with the negative, it is obvious that it (the ending) must enjoin something (injunction being the force of the optative ending). Now evidently it cannot enjoin the (action denoted by the) root-meaning, because the negative

indicates the not-being of that. Nor can it enjoin the not-being of that, because not-being cannot be enjoined. And so a certain meaning which is capable of being enjoined by the negative and the word "look" (combined), that is a meaning which is the contrary of looking, is establisht by implication (*lakṣaṇā*, indirect indication; see Index).

339. And this implied concept, the contrary of looking, is the resolution of not-looking, found in the combination "not-look"[222] [shall he], since that is the opposite of looking. For it can only be the *resolution* (not-to-look) that is implied, since, altho there are other concepts which exclude (which might be considered the contrary of) looking, it (resolution, will) is an invariable concomitant of all actions. And just that is enjoined as the thing to be done in the sentence "He shall not look;" it means, "By a resolution of not-looking he shall accomplish (a desired end)." And the question being raised as to the end to be accomplisht, the destruction of evil mentioned in the supplementary sentence "By just that he becomes separated from evil"[223] is construed as the end.

340. And so, because in this sentence a resolution for the purpose of destruction of evil is enjoined as a thing to be done, the syntactic-connexion with the sentence "His vows are" is establisht. So it is establisht that in "He shall not look (on the rising sun)" we must assume an exclusion (and not a prohibition) because it is introduced by the phrase "His vows are."

(2) Contingence of option

341. In the sentence "Not in the after-sacrifices does he say *ye-yajāmahe*,"[224] we must assume the same because of the contingence of an option (otherwise). And that for the following reasons. If here we admitted the connexion of the negative with

[222] *nekṣe*, i.e. the combination *nekṣeta*, "he shall not look," minus the optative ending.

[223] No equivalent of this occurs in the 4th chapter of Manu. See 332 and note. Perhaps render: "From just so much evil he becomes separated." The Bhāṣya on J. 4.1.3 reads *'yukto* for *viyukto*.

[224] On the formula *ye-yajāmahe* see Keith on TS. 1.6.11, n. 3. The word *ye* is most likely a mere exclamation; *yajāmahe* means "we speak the verse-of-offering, *yājyā*." Spoken by the *hotṛ* before he recites the *yājyā*.

the verbal ending, because of its general tendency to combine with the main thing, in that case we should have to say that this sentence prohibits saying *ye-yajāmahe* at the after-sacrifices; the meaning then being, "At the after-sacrifices he shall not say *ye-yajāmahe.*" And that can not be prohibited here without having been previously establisht, since prohibition is dependent on establishment.

342. That is why the sentence "Not in the atmosphere, not in the sky (shall he build the sacrificial fireplace)"[225] is not a prohibition, because building it in the atmosphere (or sky) is not establisht (would never be done, even without this sentence). And that is why the sentence "A brahman is not to be killed" is taken as always (under all circumstances) deterring from killing a brahman. For any man may sometimes be impelled to murder etc., and at other times, when he is not subject to passion and such (base impulses), he is not so impelled. Now if prohibition were not dependent on establishment, then the rule might be effective only for a man who, controlling his passion etc., does not set out to kill; and so it would not deter therefrom a man who set out to murder or the like under the influence of passion etc.[226]

343. But if it is dependent on establishment, the rule of prohibition does not come into effect with respect to a man who is not impelled of himself (to the prohibited act), because it is not applicable to him, and comes into effect only with respect to a man who is impelled by passion etc., by suppressing his passion caused by delusion; whence it follows that it deters from such acts a man who is impelled to perform them.

344. And so the prohibition "A brahman is not to be killed" expresses a deterrent rule of fixation (*niyama*), just as the sentence "He shall beat out the rice" expresses (a positive injunction of)

[225] As the comm. explains, this is a mere pendant to the injunction to deposit gold in the ground before building the fireplace. One should not build it in the plain earth, without previous deposit of gold, any more than in the atmosphere or sky; one is as out of the question as the others.

[226] Comm.: "the rule, having spent its meaning in taking up the field where there is absence of impulse, would lose its authority to suppress the impulse that is establisht by passion." The idea is that if there were no interdependence between the prohibition and the force prompting to perform the (prohibited) act, the prohibition could be understood as meaning simply "those who do not want to do this, need not."

fixation of beating. For just as the rule "He shall beat out the rice" evidently does not apply to a man who is impelled on his own account to beat the rice in order to remove the husks, since then it would be meaningless (an injunction applying by definition to something that is 'unestablisht'), but rather to one who is impelled to (remove the husks by) splitting or other means; even so the rule "He shall not kill" does not apply to a man who spontaneously refrains from killing, because for him it would be meaningless, but rather to a man who is impelled to kill, since the prohibition is of something towards which there is an urge as a thing to be done. The meaning is: "What (was regarded as) a thing to be done, that (is) not (to be done)."

345. And so, since prohibitions are dependent on establishment, if the saying *ye-yajāmahe* in the after-sacrifices is prohibited, we must admit that it is previously establisht. And of course it cannot be establisht by passion (or inclination), as in the case of such things as killing. Therefore its establishment must be said to rest in the authoritative statement "In (all) sacrifices he says *ye-yajāmahe*."[227] And in case of the prohibition of something establisht by an authoritative statement, option would result, since an authoritative statement cannot be completely annulled by another authoritative statement, as can a matter of passion caused by delusion.

346. And let it not be said that the special-rule (or exception) "not in the after-sacrifices" may (completely) annul the general rule "He says *ye-yajāmahe* at (all) sacrifices," just as the footstep rule annuls the *āhavanīya* rule.[228] For two authoritative state-

[227] Cf. ĀpŚS. 24.13.5. The sentence is quoted thus in Bhāṣya on J. 10.8.4. But I have not found it in this form in any Vedic text; and indeed I doubt whether it is anything more than a Mīmāṅsā formulation of common and generally-recognized ritual usage.

[228] The general rule is that oblations are to be offered in the *āhavanīya* fire: *yad āhavanīye juhoti*, see 73. But in certain exceptional cases they are to be offered in footprints of animals, viz. (1) when the cow to be traded for the soma at the soma-purchase is brought from her stall, in her seventh footprint oblation is offered, *saptame pade juhoti*, TS. 6.1.8.1, MS. 3.7.6 (83.4).—(2) At the horse-sacrifice oblation is offered in each footprint of the horse-victim, *aśvasya pade-pade juhoti* (comm.), cf. BŚS. 15.7 (211.12) *pade-pade ha vā aśvasya medhyasyādhvaryur juhoti*. See BŚS. 24.8, where a long list is given of places where special *homas* are prescribed, with the additional statement: *ityanādiṣṭa āhavanīya eva hotavyam* (191.13).

ments may be annulled one by the other when they are independent of each other. For the footstep rule does not depend on the *āhavanīya* rule to enjoin its meaning. But the prohibitory rule does depend on the injunction "He says *ye-yajāmahe* at sacrifices" in order to become effective.

347. And so, just as the prohibitory rule gets force from the fact that its scope is particularization (limitation, of the main injunction), so the injunctive rule also would have force because of (the prohibition's) dependence (on it; that is, in order to be valid it needs to be supplemented by the rule which indicates exceptions to it). And so it is impossible that the prohibition should entirely annul the injunction. And therefore, since what has been enjoined is thereby prohibited, an option would result. And that is not proper. For in the case of an option, the authoritative statement in one case or the other loses authority. For if *ye-yajāmahe* is said at the after-sacrifices, then the sentence "not at the after-sacrifices" loses its authority, just as the rule for barley loses authority if the offering is performed with rice (the standard example of option, see 318 and note).

348. Also a double unseen result would have to be assumed. For the injunction makes known that from saying *ye-yajāmahe* at the after-sacrifices some benefit ensues; and the prohibition, from not saying it—just as from not speaking falsely at the new- and full-moon rites.[229] And since this benefit is in both cases of the unseen type, the assumption of a double unseen result would follow. And so option is not proper. And since it would follow in this case if we assumed a prohibition, we cannot assume it.

349. On the contrary we assume that the negative is combined with the word 'after-sacrifices' and that we have an exclusion. For the negative and the word after-sacrifices together imply what is excluded by the after-sacrifices, and the meaning is: "He says *ye-yajāmahe* at those (occasions) which are excluded by the after-sacrifices." And in this sentence the saying *ye-yajāmahe* is not enjoined as something to be done, since it has been enjoined in the sentence "At sacrifices he says *ye-yajāmahe.*" But rather,

[229] By the rule *nānṛtaṁ vadet*, TS. 2.5.5.6. The prohibition is *kratvartham;* it means that lying at this time would spoil the effect of the sacrifice, in that no unseen-result would ensue from it. Lying is always prohibited *puruṣārtham.*

in supplementary allusion to the saying *ye-yajāmahe* which is enjoined by (that) general rule, it is enjoined that this shall apply to such (sacrifices) as are excluded by the after-sacrifices, the meaning being: "The (rule) that he says *ye-yajāmahe* at sacrifices applies to those that are excluded by (other than) the after-sacrifices."

350. And so the saying *ye-yajāmahe* is establisht as something to be done at other (sacrifices) than the after-sacrifices; because the general rule, requiring (in order to be fully authoritative) a special exception, has its scope establisht by the words "not at the after-sacrifices" as those (sacrifices) which are other than the after-sacrifices. But since at the after-sacrifices it is neither establisht as something to be done, nor yet prohibited, there is no option. And the sentence "not at the after-sacrifices" does not fail of authority, since it indicates by implication the scope (of the injunction) as those (sacrifices) other than the after-sacrifices; and so, assuming that it is an exclusion (not a prohibition), there is nothing that annuls (anything). So it is establisht that in the sentence "not in the after-sacrifices" we must assume exclusion, to avoid option.

Paryudāsa not upasaṁhāra

351. (Objection:) But since on the assumption of exclusion the saying *ye-yajāmahe*, which is establisht for the generality of sacrifices by the rule "At sacrifices he says *ye-yajāmahe*," is limited by the words "not at the after-sacrifices" to those which are other than the after-sacrifices, 'exclusion' would not differ from 'restriction' (*upasaṁhāra*). For in restriction there is limitation of something establisht in general to a specific case, just as the cutting into four parts, which is establisht for the generality of cakes (at the new- and full-moon rites) by the words "He divides the cake in four," is limited to the (cake) for Agni by the words "The (cake) for Agni he divides in four."

352. To this some[230] reply: No, because restriction means limita-

[230] So the Arthasaṁgraha (Thibaut, pp. 24, 44). The comm. attributes this view to Someśvara, and the view of the "others" (353) to Pārthasārathimiśra. I have not found the point discust in either of these writers, and I believe that Āpadeva here polemizes against the Arthasaṁgraha.

tion to that only (which is named in the restrictive rule), while exclusion means limitation to something other than that.

353. But others say: Restriction consists in the limitation to a special case of something establisht in general, and so means a particularizing of the operation of an injunction. But, according to the statement of the authority quoted (330), that "Exclusion is to be understood where the negative is taken with another word (than the verbal ending)," exclusion means combining the negative with something other than the ending, whether the verbal root, or a noun. And so the distinction between the two is perfectly clear by their very nature (by definition).

354. In spite of this it might be suggested that there is no difference if, wherever exclusion occurs, there restriction necessarily occurs too. But this is not the case. For in sentences like "He shall not look on the rising (sun)," altho exclusion is present, restriction is not. For here there is no limitation to a special case of something establisht as a general rule, as in the case of the fourfold division of the (cake) for Agni. For merely a resolution of not-looking is enjoined with a view to the destruction of evil.

355. However, in the example under discussion, if it be suggested that the injunction is one of restriction, because it limits to others than the after-sacrifices the saying *ye-yajāmahe* which was establisht for the generality of sacrifices, there is no difficulty in the way of that suggestion, as far as it goes. For if there were no injunction, then there would be this difficulty: "How could restriction, which is the function of an injunction, be performed by an exclusion?" But there is no lack of an injunction here, because the negative is combined with the word 'after-sacrifices,' and so there is no destruction (by the negation) of the injunctive-power of the injunction (as there would be if it went with the ending, forming a prohibition). For here the exclusion indicates (that the rule is limited in) scope to what is other than the after-sacrifices, just like the word "for Agni" (in the sentence "The (cake) for Agni he divides in four"). But it is the injunction itself which makes the restriction.

356. And it should not be said (with "some," as above) that this cannot be a restriction because it is not a limitation to "that only." What is the meaning of "limitation to that only"?

It must mean either "limitation to things 'for Agni' alone," or "limitation of something establisht in general to a special case alone." If the former, then the (prescriptive) statement of the being-seventeen (109ff.), which is a detacht (and therefore, but for such limiting prescriptions, a general) rule, found in the context of such rites as the Friend-finding, would not constitute a restriction, because it is not a limitation to things "for Agni." If the latter, then just as the fourfold-division, which was establisht only for the cakes (in general), is limited to the (cake) for Agni, even so here there is limitation of something which was establisht for the generality of both after-sacrifices and non-after-sacrifices to non-after-sacrifices (only); therefore there *is* restriction, we say.

357. But there is this much difference. In sentences like that dealing with the (cake) for Agni, the special cases like the (cake) for Agni are brought in under their own names; while in the case under discussion they are indicated by exclusion. But the principle of restriction is just the same. And as for the (above) claim that (exclusion cannot be restriction) because it is limitation to what is other than that, this is not true. For in the sentence "He shall not look," altho there is exclusion, there is no limitation (of any kind). For here there is nothing establisht as a general rule that is limited to what is other than that (as claimed by our opponent); because it is merely an injunction of a (certain) resolution, as has been stated.

358. Enough then: it is thus proved that in the sentence "not in the after-sacrifices" we must assume exclusion, because of the contingence of an option.

359. But where it is impossible to assume that, there, even tho it (an option) may result, we are obliged to assume only a prohibition. As in the sentence "At the *atirātra* (*saṁsthā* of the soma-rite) he is not to take the *ṣoḍaśin* draught."[231] For here the taking of the *ṣoḍaśin* draught at the *atirātra*, which is es-

[231] I do not find either of these passages in the forms quoted. Cf. TS. 6.6.11.4 *atirātre paśukāmasya gṛhṇīyāt* (sc. *ṣoḍaśinam*), and ĀpŚS. 14.2.9. That different authorities prescribed the atirātra with and without the *ṣoḍaśin* is clear, cf. Keith, *HOS*. 18.cxvii (where in line 7 read xx.2.1 for xx.1.1 [of PB.] and in line 10 read vi.6.11 for vi.5.11 [of TS.]); Hillebrandt, *Ritualliteratur*, p. 138. The point is discust in J. 10.8.6.

tablisht by the authoritative statement "At the *atirātra* he takes the *ṣoḍaśin*,"[231] is prohibited. But tho option does indeed ensue, since (the same act) is both enjoined and prohibited, we do not assume an exclusion, because that is impossible. (Namely:) If we assume here that the negative is combined with the word *ṣoḍaśin*, then the sentence would mean "At the *atirātra* he is to take (a draught) other than the *ṣoḍaśin*." And this would be inconsistent with the express injunction "At the *atirātra* he takes the *ṣoḍaśin*." And for the same reason the negative cannot be combined with the word *atirātra* (so as to mean "He is to take the *ṣoḍaśin* at other rites than the *atirātra*"), because this would be inconsistent with the same express injunction. And so, since exclusion is impossible here, we must admit simply a prohibition, and the option also must be admitted, since there is no way out.

360. This then is the net result: Where the phrase "His vows are" does not introduce the statement, and where there is no contingence of an option, we have a prohibition, as in "He shall not eat *kalañja*;" or where, even tho there is contingence of an option, we cannot assume exclusion, there (also) it is a prohibition, as in "at the *atirātra* he does not take the *ṣoḍaśin*."

361. There is however this much difference (between these two kinds of prohibition). Where the prohibition produces an option, the thing prohibited does not produce any undesirable result (for man), since both the injunction and the prohibition are only for the sake of the rite (ritual in character, *kratvartha*). But where no option is contingent, and the establishment (of the thing prohibited) is due to passion (natural inclination), and the prohibition is for man's welfare (*puruṣārtha*), there the thing prohibited is the cause of an undesired result; as in the case of eating *kalañja*.

362. In the case of such sentences as "One who is consecrated (for the soma-rite: *dīkṣita*) does not give gifts or make oblations," however, there is to be sure no contingence of option, because, tho gifts and oblations are establisht by authoritative statements, they are establisht for man's welfare, and are (here) prohibited for the sake of the ritual performance, so that the (respective) purposes (of the injunction and prohibition) are not equal (the prohibition, as *kratvartha*, prevails over the injunction which is

merely *puruṣārtha*); and yet these (acts of giving and offering) are not the cause of undesirable results (as the last paragraph would require that they should be), because they are not establisht by passion (but by authoritative statement).[232] (And) when something is prohibited for the sake of the ritual performance, even if it is establisht by passion (inclination), the doing of that (prohibited thing) results in spoiling the ritual performance, not in any (other) disadvantage (to man, as if it were *puruṣārtha*); as in the case of the prohibition of such things as approaching one's wife[233] (such things are not in themselves evil or injurious, but spoil the unseen result of the rite). (Whereas) when for the sake of man's interest (directly, and not merely ritually) something establisht by passion is prohibited, the thing prohibited would produce an undesirable result. This by the way.

363. Thus it is proved that prohibitions serve the interests of man. In the same way all the Veda is conducive to the interests of man.

Arthavāda

364. Let us proceed with the subject.

So, just as injunctions and other (parts of the Veda), being included under the rule of study, do not lack a useful object (as we have shown), in like manner explanatory-passages also, being included under that, cannot fail to have a useful object. And since they serve no purpose in merely establishing their own (direct or primary) meaning, we must say that they lead to a useful purpose by implication.

365. And these explanatory passages are of two kinds: complements of injunctions, and complements of prohibitions. Of these, such explanatory-passages as "Vāyu, verily, is the swiftest deity" have a useful purpose in that they glorify the meaning enjoined by such injunctions as "He shall offer a white (animal) for Vāyu," of which they are complements.

[232] The treatment of this subject in the Arthasaṁgraha (Thibaut, pp. 25, 45f.) is clearer.

[233] By the prohibition *na striyam upeyāt*, "He shall not approach a woman," in connexion with the new- and full-moon rites, TS. 2.5.5.6, and the *agnyādhāna*, TB. 1.1.9.7, KS. 8.12 (96.1).

366. But explanatory passages such as "He (Agni) howled [; that he howled, *arodīt*, this constitutes Rudra's Rudra-quality]" have their function in showing the evil of the things prohibited in such prohibitions as "Silver shall not be given upon the sacred strew,"[234] of which they are complements.

367. And so explanatory-statements indicate excellence (or the reverse) by implication. And this knowledge (produced by them) of the excellence (of things enjoined, or of the evil of things prohibited) is connected with the word-efficient-force (inherent in the optative ending, 4) as its manner of performance. This was the theme with which we began (9).

Thus then we have completely establisht that the part (of the verbal-ending) which denotes optativeness expresses the word-efficient-force; which has the end-efficient-force, still to be explained, as its aim, knowledge of the optative forms etc. as its means, and knowledge of the glorifications as its manner.

Meaning of śābdī bhāvanā

368. If you ask: "What is this word-efficient-force?" the following reply is given (by some).[235] It is a species of activity conducive to human action. Just this is what the injunction means; for on hearing an optative or similar form, the idea is necessarily formed that "He is impelling me to act." It is not true that the indication of an instrument of a desired result is the meaning of the injunction.[236] If that were the case, the (verbal) injunctive expression (the optative or equivalent form)

[234] At soma-rites some gifts are given within the *vedi*, *antarvedi*, others outside it, *bahirvedi*. Silver belongs to the latter class. My pandit remarked that this practice still prevails and is applied to the home, as being the domestic *vedi;* gifts of silver, he says, are "commonly" (*prāyaśaḥ*) given outside the home. This is explained by the myth of TS. 1.5.1.1–2: Agni once had the property of the gods, and refused to give it up. They sought to take it by force. Agni howled (*rud*); therefore he (Agni) is called Rud-ra. His tears became silver; therefore silver must not be given on the *vedi*.

[235] The reply here given first is that of the school of Someśvara; it is based on his Nyāyasudhā on 1.2.7, p. 29f., and on 2.1.1, p. 559f. It is rejected by our author, who adheres to the school of Pārthasārathimiśra; 375ff.

[236] As held by Maṇḍanamiśra's school, cf. 64, 328.

would be a synonym of the word "instrument of desired result." And it is impossible that they should be synonyms, because they are used together in the sentence "The twilight-worship is thy instrument of desired result, therefore perform thou that;"[237] and because synonyms are never used together. And so an injunction is rather a species of activity. And in worldly injunctions it is based on a person (who delivers the injunction), and is a species of will. But in the Veda, since no person is concerned therein, it is based only on a word, and another synonym for it is instigation (*preraṇā*). This has been set forth (in 4).

369. But (it may be objected) in worldly injunctions this activity for which a synonym is instigation is based on words (uttered by some speaker; it is only as expressing the will of the speaker that it can have meaning); so, since its force could not be grasp without the use of actual speech, how can it be establisht by a word of (Vedic) injunction (which is not spoken by any person but superhuman, self-existent)? To this we reply: That is true.

370. Nevertheless, a child surely ascertains that his mother's action such as giving him the milk of her breast, which is brought about by his own acts such as crying, can be brought about by (his mother's) knowledge of the impellent force, viz. his own will; and so, when he realizes that the activity of grown-people which it is desired to instigate follows immediately on (their) hearing words which instigate by containing an injunction (i.e. an optative or equivalent), he infers that knowledge of the force impellent to (that activity) is its cause. To be sure, since he knows that his own activity as in eating etc. is preceded by knowledge of what constitutes the means of attaining his desires, it would indeed be natural for him to assume that the activity of grown people which it is desired to instigate is also preceded by that. Still, he sees in the case of the aforesaid action of his mother that activity impelled by others (as distinguisht from what is due to natural desires) is brought about by knowledge of the impellent force. And hence, since the activity of grown people which it is desired to instigate is also activity impelled by others, he ascertains

[237] On the *saṁdhyopāsana* see ṢB. 4.5; TA. 2.2 (but this sentence is not found there). It is properly not a *śrauta* but a *gṛhya* rite, cf. Hillebrandt, *Rituallileratur*, p. 74; but the Gṛhya-sūtras seem to contain nothing like the sentence here quoted.

that that same knowledge of the impellent force is its cause (and not knowledge of the means of obtaining desired ends). And by positive and negative examples[238] he ascertains that this knowledge of the impellent force can be produced by sentences which instigate. And in these, by "putting in and taking out,"[239] he ascertains that the force (primary meaning) of the injunctive element (optative form or equivalent) lies in impellent-force.

371. Impellent-force (*pravartanā*) is an operation (in one person) conducive to action (in another). And this operation is of various kinds, consisting of orders etc.; since it varies from case to case, and can therefore not be exprest (in full, or specifically) by the verbal expression of injunction, the idea is formed that only the general notion of impellent force is to be exprest by the verbal expression of injunction. And so on hearing the injunction (the optative form), the will of the speaker, consisting of orders etc., is ascertained only in the form of a (general) impellent-force, not in a particular (specific) form, since only in that form is its (primary) meaning (to be) taken. But only by implication is it ascertained in a specific form (as command, or the like).

372. And so also on hearing the Vedic optative or the like forms, only the general notion of an impellent-force is ascertained. And the question being then raised "What (specifically) is that operation (implied by the impellent-force denoted by the optative)?",—since in the non-human Veda there can be no such thing as the will of the speaker consisting of orders etc.,—the idea is formed that it is a certain operation based on words alone, for which another synonym is instigation.[240] And so the word-efficient-force is an operation based on words alone, for which another synonym is instigation. And that same (word-efficient-force), under the form of a (general) impellent-force, is the meaning of the in-

[238] *anvaya* and *vyatireka;* i.e. by observing that this knowledge is produced when instigatory words are uttered, and not otherwise.

[239] *āvāpa* and *udvāpa;* these terms are substantially equivalent to *anvaya* and *vyatireka.* When a sentence is used containing an optative or equivalent, it is observed that impellent-force is present; when that word is taken out, the impellent-force vanishes.

[240] The siddhānta criticizes this argument, below, as *kḷpta-tyāga,* "going back on what you have assumed;" first it was assumed that "instigation" or "impellent-force" is dependent on something outside, *paraniṣṭha,* and then this assumption is discarded for the Veda.

junction. And this is just what the following passage of the Vārtika means:

373. "The optative endings and the like denote only one (efficient-force, of two, viz. not the end-efficient-force), namely the designation(al)-efficient-force."[241]

374. The word 'designation' (*abhidhā*) means etymologically that which designates (*abhi+dhā*), and so means the same as the word 'injunction' (*vidhi*, from *vi+dhā*). And it is the efficient-force which consists of this operation (or activity) that is denoted by the optative and equivalent forms.—So say some teachers.

375. But others[242] say: It is true that the meaning of the injunction is impellent-force in general, since only in that form is its (primary) meaning (to be) taken. Impellent-force is an operation conducive to activity (in another). And since there can be no such thing as orders etc. in the non-human Veda, we must conceive of some (other) particular species of operation conducive to human activity; because without a specification there would be no complete effectuation of the general impellent force which must be exprest by the injunctive word. Now then in response to the question "What is that specific operation?" the idea is formed that it is simply the instrumentality for (attaining) a desired end, which belongs to the verbal root meaning; (the fact that the enjoined action supplies the means to the desired end is exprest by the optative ending;) because that also is conducive to action. For everyone acts when he knows what constitutes the means of attaining his desired end. If a person does not know the means of attaining his desired end, even if he is instigated by another, he certainly does not act.

376. Even on the theory that instigation is independent (of such knowledge), there is still admitted a knowledge of what constitutes the means for attaining the desired end implied by it; for otherwise the injunction could not have impellent effect. And so, because it is inevitably necessary, it is just instrumentality

[241] The TV. here uses *abhidhā*, designation, as a synonym of the more usual *śabda* (*śābdī bhāvanā*). See 380.

[242] The school of Pārthasārathimiśra, to which our author belongs. Here begins his refutation of Someśvara's views, the statement of which extended from 368 to this point. It is set forth e.g. in the Nyāyaratnamālā, pp. 40–55; see especially 52f.

('the-being-the-instrument') for attaining a desired end that is the meaning of the injunction, (exprest) under the form of a (general, unspecified) impellent force. And so the fact that a word of injunction indicates an operation (or activity) based on something else, a fact well-known to all people, is establisht.[243]

377. And further: We must attribute to a word a certain activity (operation) that is without motion or anything of the sort.[244] And rather than assume (1) that it (this assumed activity or operation, based on a word and therefore without motive force), without being assumed to be the cause either of its own (independent) activity or of activity dependent on something else (since even our opponents cannot avoid assuming that knowledge of instrumentality for desired ends is necessary to bring about action), and known (only) in the form of (general) impellent-force, is (yet) conducive to action; and (2) that the word (of injunction), after being assumed to set forth an operation based on something else (as, it is agreed, 'worldly' injunctions do), (yet in the Veda) indicates an operation based on itself; and (3) that in order to carry into effect the impellent-force of the injunction, the meaning of the verbal root provides the means of accomplishing the desired end; (which three self-contradictory assumptions must be made if the injunctive-element means independent instigation;)—it is better to assume that the meaning of the injunction is the-(enjoined-action's-)being-the-means of obtaining a desired end—which is indispensable in any case—and which is assumed as the cause of its own (the injunction's) activity; (and which is exprest) in the form of a (general) impellent-

[243] Comm. explains: if the optative etc. intimates the instrumentality of attaining a desired end, then, since that instrumentality is based on ritual acts, it is based on something else, as all worldly injunctions are (on the will of the enjoiner); whereas if it means only an independent instigation, it has no basis in anything else.

[244] Such as energy or effort, *prayatna*. Cf. ŚD. on J. 2.1.1, p. 100, l. 8f.: *na hi śabdasya vibhor acetanasya spandaḥ prayatno vāsti*. The word is held by the Mīmāṅsā school to be all-pervading (*vibhu*) and unconscious (*acetana*); therefore motion (*spanda*) and energy are denied to it. So the comm., who quotes passages to this effect from both Pārthasārathimiśra and Someśvara. As a matter of fact the quotation from the latter (R.p. 575, vs. 5) is from his *pūrvapakṣa;* but his *siddhānta*, p. 579, vs. 3, admits the proposition, tho he urges that energy is figuratively transferred to a word. Cf. Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 48 infra.

force. Because this is simpler; and because it makes (the injunction's instigation) based on something else.[245]

378. And let it not be said: "It is to give effect to the injunction's impellent-force that it is assumed to denote instrumentality to the desired end; and (yet) if it does not denote an instigation the injunction would have no impellent-force. Therefore (on this assumption) there is also (*ca* = *api*) nothing to cause the assumption of the root-meaning's being the means to the desired end." (This has no force:) because even in the opinion of our opponents (who maintain that independent instigation is the meaning of the injunctive element), the injunction impels only by indication of an impellent-force; and since the general statement of impellent-force exprest by the injunction would not have full effect without a specification, therefore (we say) it implies the (enjoined action's) being the means to the desired end (just as they, for the same reason, say that it implies an 'instigation').

379. And let it not be said (as was said above, 368) that if the injunctive-element denotes the (enjoined action's) being the means to the desired end, then it would be impossible for it to be used together (with a word of that meaning) in the sentence "The twilight-worship is thy instrument of desired result, perform thou that." Because the injunctive element does not denote this specifically; for it is indicated only under the form of a (general) impellent-force. And we see a word of general meaning used together with a specific word (referring to the same thing) in such expressions as "Drupada, King of the Pāñcālas."

[245] Comm.: our opponents must assume three things: (1) that an assumed element (viz. the general instigation which they say, as we do, is the primary or direct meaning of the injunctive form) is (directly) conducive to action, (2) that the word (of injunction) designates an activity based on itself, and (3) that the meaning of the root is the means of attaining the desired end. While we start from the assured (not assumed) facts that (1) the knowledge of means of attaining the desired end is the cause of activity (which they cannot deny), and (2) the word (of injunction) designates an operation based on something else. All we therefore have to 'assume' is that the enjoined action's being the means of attaining the desired end is the (secondary or implied) meaning of the injunctive element,—which follows easily from the other two. That is, we assume only that the "impellent-force," exprest by the injunctive element in general terms, really means (specifically, and by implication) "the-being-the-means to the desired end."

Therefore the meaning of the injunctive element is just the (root's) being the means of attaining a desired end, (exprest) under the form of a (general) impellent-force. And it is just that, in that form, which is exprest by a word alone (with no utterer behind it); whence it is called the word-efficient-force.

380. Also the meaning of the (Tantra) Vārtika passage quoted (373) is rather the following: The (enjoined action's) being the means to the desired end is 'designated' (by the verbal expression of the injunctive element), and hence is called a 'designation' ('expression'); and it is just that, 'designated' as (exprest in the form of) an impellent-force, which actuates (effects) human activity; for this reason it is called 'efficient-force' (*bhāvanā*); and this (efficient-force of designation) is denoted by the optative and similar forms.[246]—As it is said:

381. "Other than their (the rites') serving as means to desired ends, there is none who impels men to ritual acts; (this, which is both) the cause of (their) activity and (their) religious-duty (*dharma*), is called the impellent-force (of the injunction)."

382. So it is establisht that in the word "he shall sacrifice" the word-efficient-force is exprest by the part (of the ending) which denotes optativeness.

Meaning of ārthī bhāvanā

383. By the part which denotes (mere general) verbality is exprest the end-efficient-force. (Objection:) But what is this end-efficient-force? If you say "an operation (activity) of the agent," no; for then sacrifice and such actions, being his operations (activities), would be the (end-)efficient-force. And this would be not what we want (a *reductio ad absurdum*); because that (sacrifice etc.) is the meaning of the verbal base (root), and cannot be the meaning of the ending.

384. In response to this it is said (by some):[247] It is true that sacrifice is not the efficient-force. But the energy (*prayatna*) which refers to (expresses itself in) sacrifice, and is produced by

[246] Several other alternative explanations of the line in question are offered in the Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 53.

[247] Viz., by Someśvara and his school; see his Rāṇaka on 2.1.1, pp. 576ff. The opposing view of Pārthasārathimiśra, see below, is there set forth as the *pūrvapakṣa*, pp. 574ff.

desire for heaven, that is the efficient-force. And it is just that which is exprest by the verbality-part (of the ending). For on hearing the verb "he shall sacrifice" the concept is formed "He shall exert himself in sacrifice."

385. And in referring to one who performs an action, such as walking, that is attended by energy (effort), we say for instance "Devadatta does walking." And from the fact that we see the word 'does' used in such cases, whereas when he is swayed by the wind or some such (outside) thing we say not "he does (something)" but rather "swaying of him by the wind or something else is produced,"—from this usage it is clear that the meaning of "he does" is an energy (or effort). And we find in regard to the verb that it is used in coördination (or apposition) with the word "does;" for "he shall sacrifice" means "he shall do (or act) by sacrifice," "he cooks" means "he does cooking," "he walks" means "he does walking."

386. And so the fact that the verb expresses an energy is shown by its coördination (or common function) with the idea "does." And let it not be said that in that case an expression like "the wagon goes" could not be used, because a wagon can have no energy (make no effort). For it can be used by (figurative) transference to the wagon of the energy belonging to the driver and the horses. Even in the opinion of those (see below) who say that the efficient-force is merely a general operation conducive to the production of something else, even in their opinion the expression "the wagon goes" can only be used metaphorically, because no activity except going (i.e. no "general" activity conducive to that) is ever attributed to a wagon. And so the end-efficient-force is nothing but an energy. As they say:

387. "But no end-efficient-force except an energy can ever be exprest; and it, exprest by the verb-ending, is the subject under discussion here. With that we are done (i.e. there is nothing more to be said)."

388. But others[248] say: The efficient-force is surely an operation (or activity) of the efficient-agent (i.e., in the case of ritual acts, the sacrificer, *yajamāna*) conducive to the coming-into-being of that-which-is-to-come-into-being (i.e. the sacrifice). This means,

[248] The school of Pārthasārathimiśra. See ŚD. on J. 2.1.1, especially p. 102f.

an operation such that, when it has been performed, a means capable of producing the fruit results. And this is precisely the meaning of the verb. For on hearing the verb "he cuts with an ax," the idea produced is of this character: "He shall operate with an ax in such a way that, the operation being performed, cutting with the ax results." And so in the sentence "Who desires heaven shall sacrifice," the meaning is this: "With sacrifice one shall operate in such a way that, the operation being performed, from the sacrifice heaven shall result." And this operation in one case consists in raising and lowering (the ax), in the other case in (ritual) acts beginning with putting fuel on the sacred fires[249] and ending with the feeding of brahmans;[250] regarding (this) question of the manner of performance, it is defined in detail afterwards (by other injunctions). But from the verb-form (of the originative injunction) alone (the operation is understood) in a general way, as that which is conducive to the production of something else.

389. In a sentence like "The wagon goes to the village," also, the verb-form simply expresses an operation conducive to reaching the village. For it means that the wagon operates in such a way by going, that, when the operation is performed, from the going the reaching of the village results. But the meaning of the verb-form (ending) is here not merely going, since that is exprest by the root. So then, in response to the question "What is that operation?", afterwards[251] it is defined (as to manner) as consisting of separating from and uniting with (advancing to) earlier, later, and intermediate places, by the employment (or understanding) of such a sentence as "By separating (departing) from an earlier place and uniting with (advancing to) a later one, the wagon goes to the village." Just as in the words "By raising and lowering (it), with the ax he cuts."

390. So also in the sentence "Devadatta exerts-energy," the meaning of the verb-form is simply an operation conducive to energy but not energy itself; it means "Devadatta operates in such a way that energy (effort) results." Not energy (effort) itself,

[249] ApŚS. 1.1.2 *agnīn anvādadhāti*.

[250] ApŚS. 4.16.17 *brāhmaṇāṅs tarpayitavai* is identified by the comm. (with an incorrect reference) as the injunction referred to.

[251] Comm., "by other means (than the verb-ending)," *pramāṇāntareṇa*.

because that is exprest by the root. And in response to the question as to what particular sort of operation is meant, it is afterwards defined as consisting of his desire etc., analogously to the raising and lowering (of the ax).

391. And so the verb-form means simply a general operation conducive to the production of something else, because this follows in every case (of conscious and unconscious subjects alike). And it is not merely an energy, because that is not found in such expressions as "The wagon goes," "Devadatta exerts-energy." And it is not proper to assume that the meaning is metaphoric in such cases, because when a primary meaning is possible that is contrary to rule. The meaning of the word "does" also is simply an operation conducive to the production of something else, not merely an energy. For the word "does" is coördinated with (functions parallel to) verbs which have both sentient and insensate subjects.[252] So it is establisht that the end-efficient-force is an operation conducive to the production of something else.

392. And it is just this that is exprest by the verb-part (of the ending, as opposed to the optative-part); it means "he shall effect." And in response to its need for an end, heaven and the like (fruit) is construed as its end. In response to its need for a means, the sacrifice etc. (the root-meaning) is construed as the means. And the fore-sacrifices and other (subsidiaries) are construed as its manner of performance. And so, since by injunctions like "he shall sacrifice" sacrifice etc. is enjoined with a view to heaven etc., it is establisht that sacrifice etc. is a matter of duty, because enjoined by the Veda with a view to a useful end.

Salvation by ritual action

393. And this duty, when it is performed with a view to that with a view to which it is enjoined, produces that (promist fruit). But performed with the intention to offer it to the Exalted Govinda, it produces supreme beatitude. And there is no lack of authority for performing it with the intention of offering it to Him. Because there is the traditional statement:

394. "Whatever tho doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou

[252] And with the latter "energy" would be out of the question. Thus (says comm.) we can say not only "Devadatta cooks" but "The pot cooks," and the pot has no energy (makes no effort).

offerest as oblation or givest in gifts, whatever penance thou doest, Son of Kuntī, that do as an offering to Me."

395. And because this (statement) is valid authority, like the *smṛti*-prescription of the Eighth-lunar-day-rite etc. This is set forth in full elsewhere.[253]

396. What am weak-minded I, compared to this subject cherisht by the followers of (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa? Therefore let this (book) be (regarded as merely) a ("play" or) manifestation of my devotion to the majestic Govinda and to my revered teacher.[254]

397. This is my verbal performance, in the shape of (this) book; may it seem good[255] to the god Govinda, who loves his devotees, and may he be pleased with it.

Here ends the treatise on the Mīmāṅsā entitled
Elucidation of the Laws of the Mīmāṅsā
composed by Āpadeva the son of
the exalted Anantadeva.

[253] Viz. by the author in his commentary on the Vedānta-sāra, where he shows more at length that tho ritual acts are prescribed for special fruits, they may be performed as acts of devotion to God (comm.). The comm. adds that Kumārila (TV. 1.2.7, p. 16f.) has shown that even the tales of the Mahābhārata are authoritative, as *arthavādas*, while its injunctive sections have the force of authoritative *vidhis;* and the Gītā is especially so because it was uttered by the very mouth of the Exalted Vāsudeva. The Eighth-lunar-day-rite is a rite to be performed the 8th day (with subsidiary acts on the 7th and 9th days) of the dark half of certain months; generally the four months of the winter and cold seasons. It is prescribed not in *śruti* but in the Gṛhya Sūtras; references in Oldenberg, SBE. 30.304f.; see particularly SBE. 29.102 n. 1 with references there quoted, and Weber, *ISt.* 17.219f.

[254] His teacher was his father, Anantadeva; not "Govinda" as stated by Keith, Karma Mimansa, p. 13, misunderstanding this passage. Govinda-guru is a dvandva, referring to two persons, not one.

[255] *suśobhanaḥ* is to be understood in this sense, as expressing the author's hope that it will *seem* good to the god; not as a boast.

TEXT

TEXT

ĀPADEVAKṚTAḤ

MĪMĀṄSĀNYĀYAPRAKĀŚAḤ

[ĀPADEVĪ]

śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ

Invocation

1. yatkṛpāleśamātreṇa puruṣārthacatuṣṭayam
prāpyate tam ahaṁ vande govindaṁ bhaktavatsalam.
2. anantaguṇasaṁpannam anantabhajanapriyam
anantarūpiṇaṁ vande gurum ānandarūpiṇam.

Dharma; bhāvanā

3. iha khalu paramakāruṇikena bhagavatā jaiminyṛṣiṇā, athā 'to dharmajijñāsā,[1] ityādinā dvādaśasv adhyāyeṣu dharmo vicāritaḥ. tatra vedena prayojanam uddiśya vidhīyamāno 'rtho dharmaḥ: yathā yāgādiḥ. sa hi yajeta svargakāma ityādivākyena svargam uddiśya vidhīyate. tathā hi: yajete 'ty atrā 'sty aṅśadvayam, yajidhātuḥ pratyayaś ca. tatra pratyaye 'py asty aṅśadvayam, ākhyātatvaṁ liṅtvaṁ ca. ākhyātatvaṁ ca daśasu lakāreṣu vidyate; liṅtvaṁ punaḥ kevalaṁ liṅy eva. tatrā 'khyātatvaliṅtvābhyāṁ bhāvanai 'vo 'cyate. bhāvanā nāma bhavitur bhavanānukūlo bhāvakavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ. sā ca dvividhā, śābdī bhāvanā, ārthī bhāvanā ce 'ti.

Śābdī bhāvanā

4. tatra puruṣapravṛttyanukūlabhāvakavyāpāraviśeṣaḥ śābdī bhāvanā. sā ca liṅtvāṅśeno 'cyate; liṅśravaṇe, ayaṁ māṁ pravartayati, matpravṛttyanukūlavyāpāravān ayam, iti niyamena pratīyamānatvāt. yac ca yasmāt pratīyate tat tasya vācyam, yathā gośabdasya gotvam. sa ca pravṛttyanukūlavyāpāraviśeṣo

[1] J. 1.1.1.

loke puruṣaniṣṭho 'bhiprāyaviśeṣaḥ, vede tu puruṣābhāvāl liṅādiśabdaniṣṭha eva. na hi vedaḥ puruṣanirmitaḥ,

5. vedasyā 'dhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam
vedādhyayanasāmānyād adhunā 'dhyayanaṁ yathā.[2]

6. ityādinā vedāpauruṣeyatvasya sādhitatvāt; yaḥ kalpaḥ sa kalpapūrvaḥ, iti nyāyena saṁsārasyā 'nāditvād īśvarasya ca sarvajñatvād īśvaro gatakalpīyaṁ vedam asmin kalpe smṛtvo 'padiśatī 'ty etāvatai 'vo 'papattau pramāṇāntareṇā 'rtham upalabhya racitatvakalpanānupapatteś ca. tataś ca puruṣābhāvāc chabdaniṣṭhai 'va sā. ata eva śābdī bhāvane 'ti vyapadiśanti.

7. sā ca śābdī bhāvanā 'ṅśatrayam apekṣate: sādhyaṁ sādhanam itikartavyatāṁ ce 'ti. tatra sādhyākāṅkṣāyāṁ vakṣyamāṇāṅśatrayopetā 'rthī bhāvanā sādhyatvena saṁbadhyate, ekapratyayagamyatvena samānābhidhānaśruteḥ. yady api saṁkhyādīnām apy ekapratyayagamyatvaṁ samānaṁ tathā 'py ayogyatvān na teṣāṁ bhāvyatvenā 'nvayaḥ.

8. karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṁ liṅādijñānaṁ karaṇatvena saṁbadhyate. tasya ca karaṇatvaṁ na bhāvanotpādakatvena, saṁnikarṣasye 'va rūpādijñāne, saṁnikarṣāt prāg rūpajñānasye 'va liṅādijñānāt prāk śabdadharmabhāvanāyā abhāvaprasaṅgāt; kiṁ tu bhāvanābhāvyanirvartakatvenai 'va. liṅādijñānaṁ hi śabdabhāvanābhāvyārthībhāvanāṁ nirvartayati, kuṭhāra iva chedanam. ato liṅādijñānasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayaḥ.

9. itikartavyatākāṅkṣāyāṁ prāśastyajñānam itikartavyatātvena saṁbadhyate. tac ca prāśastyajñānaṁ vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā,[3] ityādyarthavādair janyate. te hy arthavādāḥ svārthapratipādane prayojanam anupalabhamānā[4] lakṣaṇayā kratoḥ prāśastyaṁ pratipādayanti, svārthamātraparatva ānarthakyaprasaṅgāt. na ce 'ṣṭāpattiḥ, adhyayanavidhyupāttatvenā 'narthakyānupapatteḥ. tathā hi, svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ,[5] ity adhyayanavidhiḥ sakalasya vedasyā 'dhyayanakartavyatāṁ bodhayan sarvo vedaḥ prayojanavadarthaparyavasāyī 'ti sūcayati, nirarthakasyā 'dhyayanānupapatteḥ.

[2] ŚV. Vākyādhikaraṇa (on J. 1.1.24-26) 366, p. 949, reading in c °*vācyatvād* for °*sāmānyād*.
[3] TS. 2.1.1.1.
[4] B. *alabhamānā* (v. l. text).
[5] TA. 2.15.7; ŚB. 11.5.6.3.

Vidhi

10. sa ca vedo vidhimantranāmadheyaniṣedhārthavādātmakaḥ. tatra vidhiḥ prayojanavadarthavidhānenā 'rthavān. sa cā 'prāptam arthaṁ vidhatte: yathā, agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ,[6] iti vidhir aprāptaṁ prayojanavaddhomaṁ vidhatte; agnihotrahomena svargaṁ bhāvayed iti.

11. yatra tu karma prakārāntareṇa prāptaṁ tatra taduddeśena guṇamātravidhānam: yathā dadhnā juhuyād[7] ity atra homasyā 'gnihotraṁ juhuyād ity anena prāptatvād dhomoddeśena dadhimātravidhānam;[8] dadhnā homaṁ bhāvayed iti.

12. yatra tū 'bhayam aprāptaṁ tatra viśiṣṭaṁ vidhatte. tad uktam: na ced anyena śiṣṭā[9] iti; śiṣṭā upadiṣṭā ity arthaḥ. yathā, somena yajeta,[10] ity atra somayāgayor aprāptatvāt somaviśiṣṭayāgavidhānam, somavatā yāgene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed iti. na co 'bhayavidhāne vākyabhedaḥ, viśiṣṭasyai 'katvāt.

Viśiṣṭa-vidhi involves matvartha-lakṣaṇā

13. viśiṣṭavidhau ca matvarthalakṣaṇā; yathā,[11] somapadena matvartho lakṣyate, somavate 'ti. na hi matvarthalakṣaṇāṁ vinā somasyā 'nvayaḥ saṁbhavati. yadi tāvat somayāgayor aikyarūpeṇa[12] bhāvanāyāṁ karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvayaḥ, somena yāgene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed iti, tata ubhayavidhāne vākyabhedaḥ, somasya yāgavat phalabhāvanākaraṇatvena prādhānyāpātaś ca, yāgārthatvānupapattiś ca, yāge dravyānupapattiś ca, pratyayavācyaphalabhāvanāyāḥ[13] samānapadopāttena yāgena karaṇākāṅkṣānivṛttatvena bhinnapadopāttasya somasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayānupapattiś ca syāt.

14. yadi ca vaiyadhikaraṇyenā 'nvayaḥ, tatra na tāvad

[6] In this form I have not discovered the injunction in any Vedic text. The injunction *agnihotraṁ juhoti* occurs MS. 1.8.6 (124.19) etc.; cf. note in Transl., 273.

[7] This probably refers either to *dadhnā juhoti* (24) or to *dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt* (33).

[8] B. °*mātre vi*°.

[9] J. 1.4.9.

[10] See note in Translation.

[11] C. om.

[12] C. *aikarūpyeṇa*.

[13] BP. om. *phala* (B. v. l. text).

yāgena somam ity anvayaḥ, samānapadopāttatvāt pratyayavācyaphalabhāvanāyāṁ karaṇatvenā 'nvitasya yāgasya somakarmakabhāvanānvayānupapatteḥ, yāgasya somārthatvāpatteś ca. na ce 'ṣṭāpattiḥ, adṛṣṭadvayāpatteḥ. na hi yāgasya somārthatvaṁ dṛṣṭadvāreṇa saṁbhavati, vrīhiṣv avaghātene 'va yāgena some kasyacid dṛṣṭasyā 'jananāt. atas tena tāvat some kiṁcid adṛṣṭaṁ jananīyam, prokṣaṇene 'va vrīhiṣu.

15. tathā yāgasya somārthatve phalabhāvanāyāṁ somasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayo vaktavyaḥ. bhāvanākaraṇatvaṁ ca bhāvanābhāvyanirvartakatvene 'ty uktam. na ca somo 'dṛṣṭam antareṇa phalaṁ janayituṁ samarthaḥ, grahair juhotī[14] 'tivākyavihitahomena tasya bhasmībhāvāt. ato 'dṛṣṭadvayāpātān na yāgasya somārthatvam iti na yāgena somaṁ bhāvayed ity anvayaḥ saṁbhavati; karaṇatveno 'pasthitasya somasya sādhyatvenā 'nvayānupapatteś ca.

16. atha, somena yāgaṁ bhāvayet, ity anvayaḥ; tatra yady api somasya karaṇatvena yāgārthatvād yāganirvṛttir dṛṣṭam eva prayojanaṁ labhyate, iti nā 'dṛṣṭadvayāpattiḥ, nā 'pi karaṇatveno 'pasthitasya somasya sādhyatvānvayānupapattiḥ, karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvayāt; tathā 'py aprāptatvād bhāvanākaraṇatvenā 'nvitasya yāgasya sādhyatvenā 'nvayānupapattis tadavasthai 'va.

17. nanu yajete 'ty atra yāgasya na karaṇatvena nā 'pi sādhyatveno 'pasthitiḥ, tadvācakatṛtīyādyabhāvāt; kiṁ tu bhāvanāyāṁ yāgasaṁbandhamātraṁ pratīyate. yāgasya ca bhāvanāsaṁbandhaḥ karaṇatvena sādhyatvena ca saṁbhavati. tatra karaṇatvāṅśam ādāya phalasaṁbandhaḥ, sādhyatvāṅśam ādāya guṇasaṁbandhaś ca syāt, iti cet,—

18. mai 'vam. yady api bhāvanayā yāgasya saṁbandhamātraṁ pratīyate, tathā 'pi karaṇatveno 'pasthitidaśāyāṁ na sādhyatveno 'pasthitiḥ saṁbhavati, virodhād viruddhatrikadvayāpatteś ca. tad avaśyaṁ yāgena svargaṁ bhāvayed iti karaṇatvenā 'nvaye sati paścāt somena yāgaṁ bhāvayed iti sādhyatvenā 'nvayo vaktavyaḥ. tataś ca vākyabhedaḥ.

19. na ca pratyayābhihitabhāvanāsvarūpe yāgasvarūpamātram anvetī 'ti vaktuṁ yuktam, kārakāṇām eva kriyānvayāt. tat siddhaṁ somasya na yāge[15] sāmānādhikaraṇyena vaiyadhikaraṇyena vā 'nvayaḥ saṁbhavatī 'ti.

[14] See note in Translation.
[15] C. om.

20. nanu yajete 'ty atra pratyayābhihitabhāvanāyāḥ karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṁ yathā yāgaḥ karaṇatvenā 'nveti tathe 'tikartavyatākāṅkṣāyāṁ somasye 'tikartavyatātvena bhāvanāyām evā 'nvayo 'stu, kṛtaṁ matvarthalakṣaṇayā, iti cet—

21. na, somene 'ti tṛtīyayā karaṇatvavācinyā somasye 'tikartavyatātvānabhidhānāt. tatra yadī 'tikartavyatātvaṁ lakṣaṇayo 'cyate, tato varaṁ somapada eva prakṛtibhūte matvarthalakṣaṇā, guṇe tv anyāyyakalpane[16] 'ti nyāyāt. atha vedo vā prāyadarśanād[17] ityadhikaraṇoktāsaṁjātavirodhitvanyāyenā 'ntye pratyaya eva lakṣaṇe 'ti cet, tathā 'pi somasye 'tikartavyatātvenā 'nvayānupapattiḥ; siddhasya vastuna itikartavyatātvābhāvāt, kriyāyā eve 'tikartavyatātvāt, dravyasya kevalam aṅgatvāt. ata eve 'tikartavyatātvābhāvād dravyasya prakaraṇād agrahaṇam. yathā 'huḥ:

22. nā 'vāntarakriyāyogād ṛte vākyopakalpitāt
guṇadravye kathaṁbhāvair gṛhṇanti prakṛtāḥ kriyāḥ.[18] iti.

23. tad etad agre vakṣyāmaḥ.[18a] kiṁ ca somena yajete 'ti hi yāgasyo 'tpattivākyaṁ nā 'dhikāravākyam; jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta,[19] ity asyā 'dhikāravākyatvāt. utpattivākye ca ne 'tikartavyatākāṅkṣā, iṣṭaviśeṣākāṅkṣākaluṣitatvene 'tikartavyatākāṅkṣāyā vispaṣṭam anutthānāt. tat siddhaṁ somasya ne 'tikartavyatātvena bhāvanāyām anvayaḥ. tasmād viśiṣṭavidhāv anvayānupapattyā 'vaśyaṁ matvarthalakṣaṇā vācye 'ti.

Pūrvapakṣa suggestion that somena yajeta is a guṇa-vidhi

24. nanv evam api somena yajete 'ty atra na viśiṣṭavidhānam, gauravāt, matvarthalakṣaṇāpātāc ca. kiṁ tu dadhnā juhotī[20] 'tivad guṇamātravidhānam astu, vidhiśakter guṇe saṁkramāt. yathā 'huḥ:

25. sarvatrā 'khyātasaṁbaddhe śrūyamāṇe padāntare
vidhiśaktyupasaṁkrānteḥ syād dhātor anuvādatā.[21] iti.

[16] J. 9.3.15, reading *anyāya*°.
[17] J. 3.3.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtra 2.
[18] TV. 1.4.3, p. 293.
[18a] C. omits this sentence.
[19] See note in Translation.
[20] See note in Translation.
[21] TV. 1.4.3, p. 290, reading °*saṁkrānte* in c.

26. na ca yāgasyā 'prāptatvān na taduddeśena somavidhānam iti vācyam; jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta, ity anena yāgasya prāptatvāt. na cā 'syā 'dhikāravidhitvena no 'tpattividhitvam iti vācyam; udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ,[22] itivad ekasyai 'vo 'bhayavidhitvopapatteḥ. evaṁ ca somena yajete 'ty atra na matvarthalakṣaṇā. yadi hy atra viśiṣṭavidhānaṁ syāt tadā 'nvayānupapattyā matvarthalakṣaṇā syāt. jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta, ity atra tu yāgavidhāne kvacin na matvarthalakṣaṇā. na tāvad etasmin vākye, jyotiṣṭomena yāgena svargaṁ bhāvayed iti sāmānādhikaraṇyenai 'va nāmapadasyā 'nvayāt; nā 'pi somena yajete 'ty atra, yāgoddeśena somavidhānāt, somena yāgaṁ bhāvayed iti.

27. nanv anuvāde 'py asti matvarthalakṣaṇā. ata evo 'ktam:

28. vidhāne vā 'nuvāde vā yāgaḥ karaṇam iṣyate
tatsamīpe tṛtīyāntas[23] tadvācitvaṁ na muñcati.[24] iti.

29. ataś ca viśiṣṭavidhāv iva guṇavidhāv apy asty eva matvarthalakṣaṇe 'ti cet—

30. mai 'vam. guṇānvayānupapattyā hi matvarthalakṣaṇā 'ṅgīkriyate. yadā tu bhāvanāyāṁ dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayas tadā 'nvayānupapattyā sā 'ṅgīkartavyā. guṇavidhau ca na dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayo mānābhāvāt. na hi dadhnā juhotī 'ty atra homasya karaṇatvaṁ śrūyate, tadvācakatṛtīyādyabhāvāt. kalpyata iti cet, na; guṇasya tatra vidhitsitatvena sādhyākāṅkṣāyāṁ sādhyatvakalpanāyā evo 'citatvāt, dadhnā homaṁ bhāvayed iti. na cā 'yam asti niyamo bhāvanāyāṁ dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvayo na prakārāntareṇe 'ti, ṣaṣṭhādyapūrvapakṣānutthānāpatteḥ.

31. ṣaṣṭhādye[25] hi yajeta svargakāma ityādau pratyayavācyāyāṁ vakṣyamāṇārthabhāvanāyāṁ samānapadaśrutyā yāgasya bhāvyatvam āśaṅkyā 'puruṣārthatvena parihṛtam. yadi ca dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenai 'va bhāvanāyām anvayas tadā bhāvyatvaśaṅkai 'va no 'detī 'ti vyarthaṁ ṣaṣṭhādyam adhikaraṇam āpadyeta.

32. kiṁ ca vājapeyādhikaraṇe[26] tantrasaṁbandha āśaṅkya

[22] PB. 19.7.2; see 249.
[23] B. °*tam.*
[24] TV. 1.4.2, p. 284, reading *ca* for *vā* twice in a.
[25] J. 6.1.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–3.
[26] J. 1.4.5th adhikarana, sūtras 6–8; sūtra 8 with its Bhāṣya is referred to here.

parihṛtaḥ. dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvaye tantrasaṁbandhaśaṅkai 'va na syāt. tantrasaṁbandhaśaṅkāparihārau ca vyākhyātau.

33. kiṁ ca dhātvarthasya na karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvayaḥ, guṇakāmādhikaraṇa[27] āśrayatvena dhātvarthānvayasyo 'ktatvāt. tathā hi: dadhne 'ndriyakāmasya juhuyād[28] ity atra na tāvad dhomo vidhīyate, tasya vacanāntareṇa vihitatvāt. nā 'pi homasya phalasaṁbandhaḥ, guṇapadānarthakyāpatteḥ. nā 'pi guṇasaṁbandhaṁ vidhatte, phalapadānarthakyāpātāt. nā 'py ubhayasaṁbandhaṁ vidhatte, prāpte karmaṇy anekavidhāne vākyabhedāpatteḥ. yathā 'huḥ:

34. prāpte karmaṇi nā 'neko vidhātuṁ śakyate guṇaḥ
aprāpte tu vidhīyante bahavo 'py ekayatnataḥ.[29] iti.

35. atra ca karmapadavad guṇe'tyupalakṣaṇam; ekoddeśenā 'nekavidhāne vākyabhedāt.

36. ata eva grahaikatvādhikaraṇe[30] grahaṁ saṁmārṣṭī[31] 'ty atra grahoddeśenai 'katvasaṁmārgavidhau vākyabhedād grahaikatvam avivakṣitam ity uktam. revatyadhikaraṇe[32] ca, etasyai 'va revatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā paśukāmo hy etena yajeta,[33] ity atra vāravantīyasya revatīsaṁbandhe 'gniṣṭomasāmasaṁbandhe phalasaṁbandhe ca vidhīyamāne vākyabhedād bhāvanopasarjanaṁ bhāvanāntaraṁ vidhīyate, ity uktam. tasmāt prāpte home no 'bhayavidhānaṁ saṁbhavati; nā 'pi homāntaraṁ vidhīyate, gauravāt, prakṛtahānāprakṛtakalpanāprasaṅgāt, matvarthalakṣaṇāprasaṅgāc ca.

37. nā 'pi dadhy eva kevalaṁ karaṇatvena vidhīyata iti yuktam; kevalasya vyāpārānāviṣṭasya karaṇatvānupapatteḥ, kartṛvyāpāravyāpyatvaniyamāt karaṇatvasya.

38. kiṁ tarhi vidhīyata iti cet, dadhne 'ti tṛtīyayo 'pāttaṁ dadhikaraṇatvaṁ phalabhāvanāyāṁ karaṇatvena vidhīyate, pratyayārthatvena dadhno 'pi tasya prādhānyāt. evaṁ ca dadhi-

[27] J. 2.2.11th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 25–26.

[28] TB. 2.1.5.6, ĀpŚS. 6.15.1, *dadhnendriyakāmasya* (sc. *juhuyāt*). Cf. 11 and 24.

[29] TV. 2.2.6, p. 476.

[30] J. 3.1.7th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 13–15.

[31] See note in Translation.

[32] J. 2.2.12th adhikaraṇa, sūtra 27.

[33] PB. 17.7.1, omitting the words *hy etena*, which are however understood; comm. *anenāgniṣṭutā*.

karaṇatvene 'ndriyaṁ bhāvayed iti vākyārthaḥ. karaṇatvaṁ ca kiṁpratiyogikam ity apekṣāyāṁ saṁnidhiprāpto homa āśrayatvena saṁbadhyate. tataś ca siddho dhātvarthasyā 'śrayatvenā 'nvayaḥ.

39. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddhaṁ dhātvarthasya na karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvaya iti. kiṁ tarhi kvacit karaṇatvena kvacit sādhyatvena kvacid āśrayatvene 'ti. guṇavidhau sādhyatvenai 'vā 'nvayaḥ saṁbhavatī 'ti na matvarthalakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanam.

40. kiṁ ca, guṇavidhau matvarthalakṣaṇāyāṁ guṇasya dhātvarthāṅgatve kiṁ mānam iti vaktavyam. na tāvac chrutiḥ; matvarthalakṣaṇāyāṁ tṛtīyāśrutir matvarthasyai 'vā 'ṅgatve mānaṁ syāt, na guṇasyā 'ṅgatve 'pi. samabhivyāhārātmakaṁ vākyam iti cet, tat kiṁ svatantram eva mānam, uta liṅgaśrutī kalpayitvā. nā 'dyaḥ, balābalādhikaraṇavirodhāt;[34] tatra hi vākyaṁ liṅgaśrutī kalpayitvā 'ṅgatve mānam ity uktam. dvitīye pratyakṣāṁ śrutim utsṛjya śrutyantarakalpane tasyā eva vā 'vṛttikalpane vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ samāśritaḥ syāt. viśiṣṭavidhau cā 'gatyā tadāśrayaṇam.

41. kiṁ ca bhavatu śrutyantarakalpanam. tathā 'pi tatsahakṛtaḥ pratyakṣa eva vidhir dhātvarthāṅgatvena guṇaṁ vidhatte, uta kalpitaṁ vidhyantaram. kalpitam iti cen na, śrutavidher vyarthatāpatteḥ. na hi tena tadā guṇo vidhīyate, kalpitavidhyantarāṅgīkārāt; nā 'pi dhātvarthaḥ, tasya vacanāntareṇa vihitatvāt.

42. atha śrūyamāṇa eva vidhiḥ kalpitaśrutisahakṛto dhātvarthāṅgatvena guṇaṁ vidhatta iti cet, tarhi tatra kathaṁ dhātvarthasyā 'nvayaḥ. karaṇatvene 'ti cen na, anvayānupapatteḥ; na hi saṁbhavati, dadhnā homene 'ti cā 'nvayaḥ. sādhyatvenai 'vā 'nvayaḥ, dadhnā homaṁ bhāvayed iti cen na, tathā saty anuvāde 'pi dhātvarthaḥ karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvetī 'ty etad upekṣitaṁ syāt; vivakṣitavākyārthaś ca vinai 'va matvarthalakṣaṇayā 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt. tasmān na guṇavidhau matvarthalakṣaṇā.

43. yat tu vidhāne vā 'nuvāde vā, iti vārtikam, tat pratītim avalambya, na vastugatim. tathā hi: yāvad dhy agnihotraṁ juhuyād iti vākyaṁ nā 'locyate, kevalaṁ dadhnā juhotī 'ti

[34] J. 3.3.7th adhikaraṇa, sūtra 14.

vākyam ālocyate, tadā ṣaṣṭhādyanyāyena[35] homasyā 'bhāvyatāṁ jānatāṁ pratipadādhikaraṇabhāvārthādhikaraṇavāsanāvāsitāntaḥkaraṇānāṁ[36] bhavaty etādṛśī matiḥ: yad, dadhimatā homene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed iti. pratipadādhikaraṇe hi somena yajete 'tyādiṣu kiṁ guṇadhātvarthayoḥ phalabhāvanākaraṇatvenā 'nvayaḥ, utai 'kasyai 've 'ti saṁdihya, pradhānasaṁbandhalābhād vinigamanāvirahāc ca sarveṣāṁ phalabhāvanākaraṇatvenā 'nvayam āśaṅkya, lāghavād ekasyai 'va phalabhāvanākaraṇatvam ity uktam; bhāvanākaraṇatvaṁ hi bhāvanābhāvyanirvartakatayā, bhāvyaṁ ca svargādi nā 'dṛṣṭam antareṇe 'ty anekeṣāṁ karaṇatve 'nekādṛṣṭakalpanāprasaṅgāt. tasmād ekasyai 'va karaṇatvam.

44. yadā 'py ekasya tadā 'pi kiṁ dravyaguṇayoḥ phalabhāvanākaraṇatvam, uta dhātvarthasye 'ti bhāvārthādhikaraṇe saṁdihya, dravyaguṇayor eva bhāvanākaraṇatvaṁ bhūtaṁ bhavyāyo 'padiśyata iti nyāyād ity āśaṅkya, dhātvarthasyai 'va bhāvanākaraṇatvaṁ padaśruter balīyastvād ity uktam. ataś ca siddham etadvākyāntarānālocanadaśāyāṁ guṇavidhāv api dhātvarthasya karaṇatvāśaṅkāyāṁ guṇapade matvarthalakṣaṇe 'ti.

45. yadā tv agnihotraṁ juhotī[37] 'ti homavidhāyakaṁ vākyāntaram ālocyate tadā homasya vākyāntareṇai 'va vihitatvāt taduddeśena guṇamātraṁ vidhīyata ity ālocanān na matvarthalakṣaṇe 'ti. ata evo 'ktaṁ pārthasārathimiśrair āghārāgnihotrādhikaraṇe,[38] phalato guṇavidhir ayaṁ na pratītitaḥ,[39] iti.

46. yad vā, etad vārtikam adhikāravidhyabhiprāyam; udbhidā yajete[40] 'tyādīnām adhikārāt. tatra hi yāgo vidhīyatām, utpattivākyasiddho vā 'nūdyatām, ubhayathā 'pi dhātvarthasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayāt tṛtīyāntasya tadvācitvam; anyathā 'nvayānupapatter iti. tasmād guṇavidhau vinā 'pi lakṣaṇām anvayopapatter na matvarthalakṣaṇe 'ti. ataś ca somena yajete 'ty atra na viśiṣṭavidhānam, kiṁ tu guṇamātravidhānam, yāgas tu jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajete 'ty asmin vākye vidhīyata ity eva yuktam; anyathā matvarthalakṣaṇāpatter iti.

[35] J. 6.1.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–3.

[36] Both adhikaraṇas here mentioned are covered by J. 2.1.1–4; see notes in Translation.

[37] See 273.

[38] J. 2.2.5th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 13–16.

[39] ŚD. p. 136, l. 1, reading *ity ucyate* for *ayaṁ*.

[40] PB. 19.7.2, see 249.

Refutation of suggestion that somena yajeta is a guṇa-vidhi

47. atro 'cyate: yady api yāgoddeśena somavidhau na matvarthalakṣaṇā, tathā 'pi yāgasyā 'prāptatvāt somena yajete 'ty atra na yāgoddeśena somavidhānaṁ saṁbhavati. na ca jyotiṣṭomene 'tyādinā yāgasya prāptatvāt taduddeśena guṇamātraṁ vidhīyata iti vācyam; tasyā 'dhikāravidhitveno 'tpattividhitvānupapatteḥ. karmasvarūpamātrabodhako vidhir utpattividhiḥ; tena ca vihitasya karmaṇaḥ phalaviśeṣasaṁbandhamātram adhikāravidhinā kriyate; phalaviśeṣasaṁbandhabodhakasyā 'dhikāravidhitvāt, yathā, yad[41] āgneyo 'ṣṭākapālo bhavatī[42] 'ty etadvihitasya karmaṇaḥ phalaviśeṣasaṁbandhamātraṁ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajete[43] 'ti vākyaṁ vidhatta iti tasyā 'dhikāravidhitvam, no 'tpattividhitvam.

48. syād etat: darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ity etasya no 'tpattividhitvaṁ saṁbhavati, āgneyo 'ṣṭākapāla ityādivākyānarthakyāpatteḥ; na hi tadā tena karma vidhīyate, tasya darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ity anena vihitatvāt; nā 'pi guṇavidhānaṁ saṁbhavati, prāpte karmaṇy anekaguṇavidhāne vākyabhedāpatteḥ. ata āgneyo 'ṣṭākapāla ity asyo 'tpattividhitvaṁ darśapūrṇamāsābhyām ity asya cā 'dhikāravidhitvaṁ yuktam. jyotiṣṭomene 'ty asya tv adhikāravidher udbhidā yajeta paśukāma ityādivad utpattividhitve 'pi svīkriyamāṇe na kasyacid ānarthakyam. somena yajete 'ty asya guṇavidhitvād yāgoddeśena somamātravidhānāc ca na vākyabheda iti cet—

49. mai 'vam. yady api somena yajete 'ty atra na vākyabhedaḥ, tathā 'pi jyotiṣṭomene 'ty asmin vākye karmasvarūpe tasya ca phalasaṁbandhe vidhīyamāne gauravalakṣaṇo vākyabhedo 'sty eva; somena yajete 'ty etadvākyavihitakarmaṇaḥ phalasaṁbandhamātravidhāne tadabhāvāt. udbhidā yajete 'ty atra tu vacanāntarābhāvenā 'gatyā tadāśrayaṇam.

50. na ca somena yajete 'ty atrā 'pi karmaṇaḥ svarūpe guṇe ca vidhīyamāne vākyabhedaḥ syād iti vācyam; śrūyamāṇena vidhinā guṇasyā 'vidheyatvād viśeṣaṇavidher ārthikatvāt. sarvatra hi viśiṣṭavidhau viśeṣaṇavidhir ārthikaḥ. jyotiṣṭomene

[41] B. P. om.

[42] TS. 2.6.3.3, abbreviated by the omission of the words *'māvāsyāyāṁ ca paurṇamāsyāṁ cācyuto* before *bhavati*.

[43] I find no closer approach to this than ĀpŚS. 3.14.8 *svargakāmo darśapūrṇamāsau* (sc. *kuryāt*).

'ty asya tū 'tpattividhitve karmasvarūpaṁ phalasaṁbandhaś ce 'ty ubhayaṁ śrūyamāṇenai 'va vidhinā vidhātavyam iti dṛḍho gauravalakṣaṇo vākyabhedaḥ. yathā 'huḥ:

51. śrautavyāpāranānātve śabdānām atigauravam
ekoktyavasitānāṁ tu nā 'rthākṣepo virudhyate.[44] iti.

52. na ca somena yajete 'ty asyo 'tpattividhitve yady api na vākyabhedas tathā 'pi matvarthalakṣaṇā syād eve 'ti vācyam; tasyāḥ svīkriyamāṇatvāt; lakṣaṇāto vākyabhedasya jaghanyatvāt. lakṣaṇā hi padadoṣo vākyabhedas tu vākyadoṣaḥ; padavākyayor[45] madhye pada eva doṣakalpanāyā ucitatvāt: guṇe tv anyāyyakalpanā,[46] iti nyāyāt.

53. ata eva jātaputraḥ kṛṣṇakeśo 'gnīn ādadhīta,[47] ity atrā 'dhānānuvādena jātaputratvakṛṣṇakeśatvavidhāne vākyabhedāt padadvayenā 'vasthāviśeṣo lakṣyata ity uktam; tasmād vākyabhedaprasaktau lakṣaṇai 'va svīkāryā. tasmāt somena yajete 'ty ayam evo 'tpattividhir na jyotiṣṭomene 'ty ayam, gauravalakṣaṇavākyabhedāpatteḥ.

54. kiṁ ca somena yajete 'ty atra yāgavidhāne śrutyarthavidhānaṁ guṇavidhāne tu vākyārthavidhānam; tac ca śrutyarthavidhānasaṁbhave 'yuktam. yathā 'huḥ:

55. vākyārthavidhir anyāyyaḥ śrutyarthavidhisaṁbhave.[48] iti.

56. vākyārthaḥ padāntarārtha ity arthaḥ. jyotiṣṭomene 'ty atrā 'pi phaloddeśena yāgasyai 'va vidhānān na vākyārthavidhānam, tadutpattividhitvavādinā 'pi tadaṅgīkārāc ca. tasmāj jyotiṣṭomene 'ty ayam adhikāravidhir eva.

57. api ca, karmasvarūpavidhis tatra svīkāryo yatra karmaṇo rūpam upalabhyate. yāgasya ca dve rūpe, dravyaṁ devatā ce 'ti. somena yajete 'ty atra yady api devatā no 'palabhyate, somayāgasyā 'vyaktatvāt,—avyaktatvaṁ ca svārthacoditadevatārāhityam, na tu devatārāhityamātram, aindravāyavaṁ gṛhṇātī[49] 'tyādivākyavihitagrahadevatānāṁ sattvāt, grahaṇārthābhir api devatābhiḥ prasaṅgato yāgopakārasya kriyamāṇa-

[44] TV. 2.2.6, p. 476.
[45] B. P. *padavākyadoṣayor* (B. v. l. text).
[46] J. 9.3.15 (reading *anyāya°*).
[47] I have not located this passage.
[48] ŚD. on J. 1.4.4, p. 66, l. 2 (reading *vākyārtho na vidhātavyo dhātvarthavidhisaṁbhave*).
ĀpŚS. 12.14.8, MŚS. 2.3.5.4, KŚS. 9.6.6.

tvāt,—tathā 'pi dravyam upalabhyata eva; tenā 'pi yāgasvarūpaṁ jñātuṁ śakyam eva. jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajete 'ty atra na dravyaṁ devatā vā śrūyate. atas tasyo 'tpattividhitve yāgaviśeṣajñānaṁ yāgasāmānyasyā 'vidheyatvād viśeṣasyai 'va vidheyatvād ityādikleśena syād ato nā 'yaṁ karmotpattividhiḥ.

58. nanv evam apy agnihotraṁ juhotī[50] 'ty ayam api homotpattividhir na syād rūpāśravaṇāt; tacchravaṇāc ca dadhnā juhotī[51] 'ty ayam evo 'tpattividhiḥ syāt. tathā cā 'ghārāgnihotrādhikaraṇavirodhaḥ.[52] tatra hy agnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty asyo 'tpattividhitvaṁ dadhnā juhotī 'tyādīnāṁ ca guṇavidhitvam uktam iti cet,—

59. satyam. agnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty atra yady api rūpaṁ no 'palabhyate, agnihotraśabdasya tatprakhyanyāyena[53] nāmadheyatvāt, tad etad agre[50] vakṣyāmaḥ, tathā 'pi tasyo 'tpattividhitvaṁ svīkriyate, anyathā 'narthakyāpatteḥ. dadhnā juhotī 'ty asya ca nā 'narthakyaṁ guṇavidhitvāt. ato 'gnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty ayaṁ karmotpattividhir iti yuktam. jyotiṣṭomene 'ty asya ca nā 'narthakyam adhikāravidhitvopapatteḥ. ataḥ kimarthaṁ saṁbhavati rūpavati vākye karmavidhāne tadrahite tat svīkāryam.

60. kiṁ ca dadhnā juhotī 'ty asya karmotpattividhitve payasā juhotī[54] 'ty anenai 'tatkarmānuvādena na payo vidhātuṁ śakyate, utpattiśiṣṭadadhyavarodhāt. utpattiśiṣṭaguṇāvaruddhe hi na guṇāntaraṁ vidhīyate, ākāṅkṣāyā utpattiśiṣṭenai 'va nivṛttatvāt.[55] atas tenā 'pi viśiṣṭaṁ karmāntaraṁ vidheyam. tathā cā 'nekādṛṣṭakalpanāgauravam. agnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty asya tū 'tpattividhitva etadvākyavihitasya[56] karmaṇo dravyākāṅkṣāyāṁ yugapad eva khalekapotanyāyena[57] dadhnā juhoti, payasā juhotī 'tyādivākyair guṇā vidhīyanta iti nā 'nekādṛṣṭakalpanāgauravam.

61. ato 'gnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty ayam utpattividhiḥ, payasā juhotī 'tyādayas tu guṇavidhaya iti yuktam. somena yajete 'ty atra tu rūpavati vākye karmotpattividhāne svīkriyamāṇe na

[50] See 273.
[51] See 24.
[52] See 45.
[53] J. 1.4.4.
[54] TB. 2.1.5.4 *payasā juhuyāt;* KS. 6.3 (51.11) *payasāgnihotraṁ juhoti.*
[55] J. 2.2.23 is the authority for this.
[56] B. *etadvākyāvi°.*
[57] C. *khala°.* See note in Translation.

kiṁcid dūṣaṇam, pakṣadvaye 'py ekasyā 'dṛṣṭasya tulyatvāt. tasmād yuktaṁ somena yajete 'ty ayam evo 'tpattividhir ity alam anayā vidhinirūpaṇānugataprapañcanirūpaṇacintayā.[58] prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddhaṁ vidhiḥ prayojanavantam aprāptam arthaṁ vidhatta iti.

62. sa ca vidhiś caturvidhaḥ: utpattividhir viniyogavidhiḥ prayogavidhir adhikāravidhiś ce 'ti.

Utpatti-vidhi

63. tatra karmasvarūpamātrabodhako vidhir utpattividhiḥ; yathā 'gnihotraṁ juhotī[59] 'ti. utpattividhau ca karmaṇaḥ karaṇatvenai 'vā 'nvayaḥ, homene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed iti, na tu homaṁ kuryād iti sādhyatvena. tathā sati sādhyasya sādhyāntarānvayāyogenā 'dhikāravākyāvagataphalasaṁbandho na syāt. karaṇatvena tv anvaye homene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayet, kiṁ tad iṣṭam ity ākāṅkṣāyāṁ phalaviśeṣasaṁbandho ghaṭate.

64. na co 'tpattividhāv iṣṭavācakapadābhāvena karmaṇe 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed iti kathaṁ vākyārtha iti vācyam; vidhiśruter eve 'ṣṭabodhakatvāt. sā hi puruṣārthe puruṣaṁ pravartayantī karmaṇaḥ phalasaṁbandhamātraṁ bodhayati. tasmād yuktam utpattividhau karma karaṇatvenā 'nvetī 'ti. ata evo 'dbhidā yajete[60] 'tyādau tṛtīyānta udbhicchabda upapadyate, udbhidā yāgene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed ity anvayopapatteḥ. yeṣām apī 'ṣṭasādhanatvaṁ liṅarthas teṣām api tṛtīyāntānāṁ karmanāmadheyānām anvayo 'nupapanna eva. na hi saṁbhavati yāga iṣṭasādhanam udbhide 'ti; tṛtīyopāttasya kārakasya liṅgasaṁkhyānvayāyogyasya kriyayai 'vā 'nvayāt.

65. nanu tavā 'py agnihotraṁ juhotī 'tyādiṣu karmotpattividhiṣu dvitīyāntānāṁ karmanāmadheyānām anvayo 'nupapannaḥ; na hi saṁbhavati homena bhāvayed agnihotram iti. satyam; śrūyamāṇā tāvad dvitīyā 'rthākṣiptasādhyatvānuvādaḥ; homasya hi karaṇatvenā 'nvayād asādhitasya ca karaṇatvānupapatteḥ. tasyāś cā 'nanvayopasthitau[61] sā saktūñ juhotī[61a] 'tivat tṛtīyārthaṁ lakṣayati: agnihotreṇa homene 'ṣṭaṁ bhāvayed

[58] C. *vidhinirūpaṇagataprasaṅgacintayā;* P. *aprasakta-vidhi°* etc. as text.
[59] See 273.
[60] See 249.
[61] B. *'nvayopa°*.
[61a] See 230, note in Transl.

itī 'ty uktaṁ pārthasārathimiśraiḥ.[62] ataś ca dvitīyāntānāṁ karmanāmadheyānām anvayo nā 'nupapannaḥ. tat siddham utpattividhau karma karaṇatvenā 'nvetī 'ti.

Viniyoga-vidhi; six pramāṇas

66. aṅgapradhānasaṁbandhabodhako vidhir viniyogavidhiḥ. yathā dadhnā juhotī 'ti. sa hi tṛtīyāpratipannāṅgabhāvasya dadhno homasaṁbandhaṁ vidhatte, dadhnā homaṁ bhāvayed iti.

67. etasya ca vidheḥ sahakāribhūtāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni, śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyārūpāṇi. etatsahakṛtena vidhinā 'ṅgatvaṁ paroddeśapravṛttakṛtivyāpyatvarūpaṁ pārārthyāparaparyāyaṁ jñāpyate.

1st pramāṇa; śruti

68. tatra nirapekṣo ravaḥ śrutiḥ. sā ca trividhā, vidhātrī, abhidhātrī, viniyoktrī ce 'ti.

69. tatra vidhātrī liṅādyātmikā. abhidhātrī vrīhyādiśrutiḥ. yasya ca śabdasya śravaṇād eva saṁbandhaḥ pratīyate, sā viniyoktrī. sā ca tridhā: vibhaktirūpā, samānābhidhānarūpā, ekapadarūpā ce 'ti.[63]

70. tatra vibhaktiśrutyā 'ṅgatvam, yathā vrīhibhir yajete[64] 'ti tṛtīyāśrutyā vrīhīṇāṁ yāgāṅgatvam. na co 'tpattiśiṣṭapuroḍāśāvaruddhe yāge kathaṁ vrīhīṇām aṅgatvam iti vācyam; puroḍāśaprakṛtitayo 'papatteḥ, paśor iva hṛdayādirūpahaviṣprakṛtitayā yāgāṅgatvam. na ca sākṣāt paśor evā 'ṅgatvaṁ kiṁ na syād iti vācyam, tasya viśasanāt, avadīyamānatvāc ca hṛdayādīnām. avadīyamānaṁ hi haviḥ, yathā puroḍāśādiḥ: madhyāt pūrvārdhāc cā 'vadyatī[64] 'ti vākyāt. hṛdayādīni cā 'vadīyamānāni na paśuḥ, hṛdayasyā 'gre 'vadyatī[65] 'ti vākyāt. ato hṛdayādīny eva havīṁṣi, paśus tu prakṛtidravyam. pātnīvatayāge tu sākṣāt paśur evā 'ṅgam, tasya jīvata eva paryagnikṛtaṁ pātnīvatam utsṛjatī[66] 'ty utsargavidhānāt. yatra tu

[62] Viz. in ŚD. on J. 1.4.4, p. 68, l. 8ff. (in general sense, not precise language).

[63] Closely follows Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 123.

[64] See notes in Translation.

[65] TS. 6.3.10.4. See J. 10.7.2.

[66] TS. 6.6.6.1; KS. 30.1 (182.11).

viśasanaṁ tatra paśuḥ prakṛtidravyam ity eva siddham. evaṁ vrīhayo 'pi prakṛtidravyatayā yāgāṅgaṁ tṛtīyāśrutye 'ti. āruṇyasyā[67] 'pi krayāṅgatvaṁ tṛtīyāśrutyā. na cā 'mūrtasya tasya kathaṁ krayāṅgatvam iti vācyam; ekahāyanīrūpadravyaparichedadvārā tadupapatteḥ.

71. vrīhīn prokṣatī[68] 'ty atra prokṣaṇasya vrīhyaṅgatvaṁ dvitīyāśrutyā. tac ca prokṣaṇaṁ na vrīhisvarūpārtham, svarūpa ānarthakyāt, vrīhisvarūpasya prokṣaṇaṁ vinā 'nupapattyabhāvāt, kiṁ tv apūrvasādhanatvaprayuktam, yadi vrīhiṣu prokṣaṇaṁ kriyate tadā tair yāge 'nuṣṭhite 'pūrvaṁ bhavati nā 'nyathe 'ti. ataḥ prakaraṇasahakṛtayā dvitīyāśrutyā taṇḍulanirvṛttipraṇāḍyā yad apūrvasādhanaṁ tad aṅgatvaṁ prokṣaṇasyo 'cyata iti. evaṁ sarveṣv apy aṅgeṣv apūrvaprayuktatvaṁ veditavyam.

72. evam imām agṛbhṇan raśanām ṛtasye 'ty aśvābhidhānīm ādatta[69] ity atrā 'pi dvitīyāśrutyā mantrasyā 'śvābhidhānyaṅgatvam. yat tu vākyīyo 'yaṁ viniyoga iti, tan na. tathā sati vākyāl liṅgasya balīyastvena yāvad vākyād aśvābhidhānyaṅgaṁ[70] bhavati,[70] tāval liṅgād raśanāmātrāṅgatvam eva syāt, syonaṁ te sadanaṁ kṛṇomī[71] 'ty asye 'va sadanāṅgatvam. śrautaviniyogapakṣe tu yāval liṅgād raśanāmātrāṅgatvaṁ saṁbhavati, tāvac chrutyā, aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhata[72] ity atra tṛtīyāśrutyai 'ndryā ṛco gārhapatyopasthānāṅgatvavat, aśvābhidhānyāṁ viniyogaḥ kriyata iti yuktaṁ mantrasyā 'śvābhidhānyaṅgatvam. tasmāc chrauta evā 'yaṁ viniyogaḥ.

73. yad āhavanīye juhotī[73] 'ty āhavanīyasya homāṅgatvaṁ saptamīśrutyā. evam anyo 'pi vibhaktiśrutyā viniyogo jñeyaḥ.

74. paśunā yajete[74] 'ty atrai 'katvapuṁstvayoḥ samānābhidhānaśrutyā kārakāṅgatvam; yajete 'ty ākhyātābhihitasaṁkhyāyā bhāvanāṅgatvaṁ samānābhidhānaśruter ekapadaśrutyā ca yāgāṅgatvam.

[67] See note in Translation.

[68] TB. 3.2.5.4 *enān* (sc. *vrīhīn*) *prokṣati*. Cf. MS. 4.1.6 (7.17), KS. 31.4 (5.3) *prokṣati* (sc. *vrīhīn*).

[69] TS. 5.1.2.1.

[70] Both B. and C. v. l. °*aṅgatvaṁ saṁbhavati*.

[71] See 104.

[72] See 89.

[73] See note in Translation.

[74] See note in Translation.

Subject is implied—not exprest—in the verb-form

75. na cā 'mūrtāyās tasyāḥ kathaṁ yāgāṅgatvam iti vācyam; kartṛparichedadvārā tadupapatteḥ. kartā cā 'kṣepalabhyaḥ. ākhyātena hi bhāvano 'cyate; sā ca kartāraṁ vinā 'nupapannā tam ākṣipati.

76. nanu kiṁ ity evaṁ varṇyate, ākṣepalabhyaḥ karte 'ti. ākhyātavācya eva kiṁ na syāt; ākhyātaśravaṇe bhāvanāyā iva kartur api pratipatteḥ. na ca bhāvanayai 'vā 'kṣepasaṁbhave kim iti tadvācakatvaṁ kalpanīyam iti sāṁpratam; tathā saty ākhyātavācyakartrai 'va bhāvanākṣepasaṁbhave tadvācakatvam api na syāt. kiṁ ca bhāvanāyā na kevalaṁ kartrai 'va saṁbandhaḥ, kārakāntareṇā 'pi saṁbandhāt. ataḥ sā na jhaṭ-iti kartāram evā 'kṣiped viśeṣābhāvāt. kartā tu bhāvanayai 'va saṁbaddho na kārakāntareṇa, guṇānāṁ ca parārthatvād asaṁbandhaḥ samatvāt syāt,[75] iti nyāyāt. ataḥ sa jhaṭ-iti tām ākṣiped iti sa evā 'khyātavācyaḥ. bhāvanā tv ākṣepalabhyai 'va kiṁ na syāt. kiṁ cai 'vaṁ tṛtīyādivibhaktīnām api karaṇādivācakatvaṁ na syāt, teṣām api kartṛvad ākṣepalābhasaṁbhavāt.

77. kiṁ ca yadi kartā na vācyaḥ syāt katham ekatvaṁ tenā 'nviyāt. na hi śābdam aśābdenā 'nvetī 'ti yuktam; anyatho 'hādilopaprasaṅgaḥ. kiṁ ca devadattaḥ pacatī 'ti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ na syāt. na hi kevalaṁ bhāvanāvācakasyā 'khyātasya devadattapadena sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapadyate, ekārthaniṣṭhatvābhāvāt. kartṛvācakatve tū 'papadyata eva.

78. laḥ kartarī[76] 'ti vyākaraṇasmṛtivirodhas tu kartur anabhidheyatve spaṣṭa eva. kiṁ ca kartur anabhidheyatve devadattena pacatī 'ti prayogaprasaṅgaḥ. tṛtīyā hy anabhihitayoḥ kartṛkaraṇayor vihitā,[77] ākhyātena kartā nā 'bhihita iti kartṛvācinī tṛtīyā syād eva. kartur abhidhāne tv abhihitatvād eva tṛtīyā na prāpnoti, tasyā anabhihitādhikārasthatvāt.[78] devadattaḥ pacatī 'ti prathamā tu prāpnoty eva, prathamāyā abhihitakārakavibhaktitvāt, prātipadikārthamātravācitvād[79] vā.

79. na ca tadā prātipadikenai 'vā 'rthasyo 'ktatvāt prathamā-

[75] J. 3.1.22.
[76] See note in Translation.
[77] See note in Translation.
[78] B. P. °*kāratvāt.*
[79] P. 2.3.46.

vaiyarthyam; liṅgasaṁkhyāpratipattyarthaṁ tasyā[80] āvaśyakatvāt,[80] kevalaprātipadikasya prayogāsādhutvāc ca. tataś ca yadi kartā na vācyaḥ syād devadattena pacatī 'ti prayogaḥ syāt. tasmād ākhyātavācyaḥ karte 'ti siddham iti pūrvapakṣasaṁkṣepaḥ.

80. atrā 'huḥ: sa eva hi śabdasyā 'rtho yaḥ prakārāntareṇa na labhyate, ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārtha iti nyāyāt. ata eva na gaṅgāpadasya tīram arthaḥ, lakṣaṇayai 'va pratipattisaṁbhavāt. ata eva ca na vākyārthe śaktiḥ. evaṁ cā 'khyātavācyabhāvanā kartāraṁ vinā 'nupapannā tam ākṣipatī 'ty ākṣepād eva kartuḥ pratipattisaṁbhave kim iti tadvācakatvam ākhyātasya kalpanīyam.

81. na ca vinigamanāvirahaḥ. kṛtimān hi kartā; evaṁ ca kṛter eva bhāvanāparaparyāyāyā ākṛtyadhikaraṇanyāyenā[81] 'khyātavācyatvasaṁbhave na tadvataḥ kartur vācyatvaṁ kalpanīyam, gauravaprasaṅgāt. na ca bhāvanā kārakāntareṇā 'pi saṁbaddhā tad ujjhitvā na jhaṭ-iti kartāram ākṣipatī 'ti vācyam. sā hi yathā niyamena kartrā saṁbaddhā, na tathā karaṇādikārakāntareṇa, tiṣṭhatī 'tyādiṣu tayā tadanākṣepāt. ataḥ prathamaṁ sā kartāram evā 'kṣipati, na kārakāntaram. ata eva cā 'khyātābhihitā saṁkhyā na kārakāntareṇa saṁbadhyate, tasya prathamam anupasthiteḥ.

82. ata eva tṛtīyādivibhaktīnāṁ karaṇādivācitvam, bhāvanāyās taiḥ saha niyatasaṁbandhābhāvena tayā teṣāṁ niyamenā 'nākṣepāt; ākhyātaśravaṇāt prāg api tṛtīyādivibhaktiśravaṇe karaṇādipratīter jāyamānatvāc ca. na ca śābdī saṁkhyā katham aśābdena kartrā 'nvetī 'ti vācyam; kartur lakṣaṇāṅgīkārāt. yathā ca lakṣitaṁ tīraṁ śābdena ghoṣeṇā 'nveti, evaṁ lakṣitaḥ kartai 'katvenā 'nveṣyati. ata eva devadattaḥ pacatī 'ti sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapadyate, kartur lakṣaṇāt.

83. na ca mukhye saṁbhavati kim iti lākṣaṇikatvaṁ svīkāryam iti vācyam; ananyalabhyaśabdārthatvasya vyavasthāpitatvāt. anyathā siṁho devadatta ity api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ mukhyaṁ syāt. kiṁ cā 'khyātavācyaḥ karte 'ti vādino 'pi mate devadattaḥ pacatī 'ti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ na mukhyam; tanmata ākhyātena tṛtīyāvan niṣkṛṣṭaśaktimātrarūpakartṛkārakābhidhānāt, śakti-

[80] B. P. *tasyāvaśyakatvāt.*

[81] J. 1.3.10th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 30–35, particularly 33.

maddravyasyā 'kṛtyadhikaraṇanyāyenā[82] 'nabhidhānāt, devadattaśabdena ca dravyamātrābhidhānāt. ataś ca bhinnārthaniṣṭhatvāt tanmate 'pi na mukhyaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam, kiṁ tu lākṣaṇikam eve 'ti na kaścid viśeṣaḥ.

84. na ca laḥ kartarī 'ti vyākaraṇasmṛtibalād ākhyātavācyaḥ karte 'ti vācyam. na hi vācyavācakabhāvo vyākaraṇasmṛtyadhīnaḥ, tasya nyāyasahitānvayavyatirekagamyatvāt. bhavatu vā smṛtigamyaḥ: tathā 'pi ne 'yaṁ smṛtiḥ kartur ākhyātavācyatve pramāṇam, kiṁ tu kartur ekatva ekavacanātmako lakāraḥ, dvitve dvivacanātmakaḥ, bahutve bahuvacanātmaka ity asminn arthe pramāṇam, dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane bahuṣu bahuvacanam[83] ity anenā 'syāḥ smṛter ekavākyatvāt.

85. yat tū 'ktam, kartur anabhidhāne devadattena pacatī 'ti tṛtīyāprasaṅga iti, tan na. tṛtīyā hi kartuḥ pratipattyarthaṁ tadgatasaṁkhyāpratipattyarthaṁ vā. tatra kartā tu bhāvanākṣepād eva labhyata iti na tatra tṛtīyāpekṣā; tatsaṁkhyā tv ākhyātenai 'va pratīyata iti na tatrā 'py apekṣā. yathā 'huḥ:

86. saṁkhyāyāṁ kārake vā dhīr vibhaktyā hi pravartate[84]
ubhayaṁ cā 'tra tat siddhaṁ bhāvanātiṅvibhaktitaḥ.[85] iti.

87. yatra tu nā 'khyātena tadgatā saṁkhyo 'cyate tatra bhavaty eva tṛtīyā; yathā devadattenau 'danaḥ pacyata iti. tasmān na kartur anabhidhāne kiṁcid dūṣaṇam ity alam ativistareṇa. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddhas trividhaḥ śrutiviniyogaḥ.

88. se 'yaṁ śrutir liṅgādibhyaḥ prabalaṁ pramāṇam. liṅgādiṣu hi na pratyakṣo viniyojakaḥ śabdo 'sti, kiṁ tu kalpyaḥ. yāvac ca tair viniyojakaḥ śabdaḥ kalpyate, tāvat pratyakṣayā śrutyā viniyogasya kṛtatvāt teṣāṁ kalpakatvaśaktir vihanyata iti śruteḥ prābalyam.

89. ata evai 'ndryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhata[86] ity atra yāval liṅgād aindryā indropasthānāṅgatvaṁ kalpyate, tāvat pratyakṣayā śrutyā gārhapatyopasthānāṅgatvaṁ kriyata ity aindrī gārhapatyopasthānāṅgam.

[82] See prec. note.
[83] P. 1.4.22 and 21.
[84] C. *pravartyate.*
[85] TV. 3.4.13, p. 970.
[86] MS. 3.2.4 (20.13). See note in Translation.

2d pramāṇa; liṅga

90. sāmarthyaṁ liṅgam. yad āhuḥ:
sāmarthyaṁ sarvabhāvānāṁ liṅgam ity abhidhīyate.[87] iti. tenā 'ṅgatvam; yathā barhir devasadanaṁ dāmī[88] 'ty asya lavanāṅgatvam. sa hi lavanaṁ prakāśayituṁ samarthaḥ.

91. tac ca liṅgaṁ dvividham, sāmānyasaṁbandhabodhakapramāṇāntarānapekṣaṁ tadapekṣaṁ ca. tatra yadantareṇa yan na saṁbhavaty eva, tasya tadaṅgatvaṁ tadanapekṣaṁ kevalaliṅgād eva. yathā 'rthajñānasya karmānuṣṭhānāṅgatvam. na hy arthajñānam antareṇā 'nuṣṭhānaṁ saṁbhavati.

92. yadantareṇa yat saṁbhavati, tasya tadarthatvaṁ tadapekṣam, yatho 'ktasya mantrasya lavanāṅgatvam. lavanaṁ hi mantraṁ vinā 'py upāyāntareṇa smṛtvā kartuṁ śakyam. ato na mantro lavanasvarūpārthaḥ saṁbhavati, kiṁ tv apūrvasādhanībhūtalavanaprakāśanārthaḥ. tattvaṁ ca na sāmarthyamātrād avagamyate, lavanaprakāśanamātre sāmarthyāt. ato 'vaśyaṁ prakaraṇādi sāmānyasaṁbandhabodhakaṁ svīkāryam. darśapūrṇamāsaprakaraṇe hi mantrasya pāṭhād evam avagamyate: anena mantreṇa darśapūrṇamāsāpūrvasaṁbandhi kiṁcit prakāśyata iti; anyathā prakaraṇapāṭhavaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt. kiṁ tad apūrvasaṁbandhi prakāśyam ity apekṣāyāṁ sāmarthyād barhirlavanam ity avagamyate. tad dhi barhiḥsaṁskāradvārā 'pūrvasaṁbandhī 'ti mantrasya sāmarthyāt tadarthatve sati nā 'narthakyaṁ prasajyate. tasmād barhir devasadanaṁ dāmī 'ty asya prakaraṇād darśapūrṇamāsasaṁbandhitayā 'vagatasya sāmarthyāl lavanāṅgatvam iti siddham.

93. pūṣānumantraṇamantrāṇāṁ[89] tu yāgānumantraṇasamākhyayā yāgasāmānyasaṁbandhe 'vagate sāmarthyāt pūṣayāgasaṁbandho 'vagamyate.

94. nanu teṣāṁ yāvat samākhyayā pūṣayāgena sāmānyasaṁbandho 'vagamyate, tāvat prakaraṇād darśapūrṇamāsābhyām eva sāmānyasaṁbandho 'vagataḥ, samākhyātas tasya balīyastvāt. ata eva pauroḍāśikam iti samākhyāte brāhmaṇa[90]

[87] This, I believe, is a misquotation of Nyāyaratnamālā p. 131, l. 1, *sarvabhāvagatā śaktir liṅgam ity abhidhīyate,* contaminated with TV. 1.3.23, p. 225, *sāmarthyaṁ sarvabhāvānām arthāpattyāvagamyate.*

[88] MS. 1.1.2 (1.9).

[89] See note in Translation.

[90] See note in Translation.

āmnātānām api prayājānāṁ prakaraṇāt sāṁnāyyopāṅśuyājāṅgatvam[91] apī 'ty uktam.[92] kiṁ ca yāgānumantraṇasamākhyayā 'pi na pūṣayāgena sāmānyasaṁbandho 'vagamyate, kiṁ tu yāgamātreṇa, prakaraṇena tu darśapūrṇamāsābhyām eva viśeṣasaṁbandho 'vagamyate. ataḥ prakaraṇāj jhaṭ-iti tatsaṁbandhasyai 'vā 'vagatatvāt tadarthatvam eva teṣāṁ yuktam; pūṣe 'tiśabdasya puṣṇātī 'ti vyutpattyā kathaṁcid agnyādyabhidhāyitvāt.

95. mai 'vam. pūṣānumantraṇamantre hi śrūyamāṇa evam avagamyate: pūṣābhidhānasamarthatvād ayaṁ mantras tatprakāśanārtha iti, lavanamantra iva lavanaprakāśanārthaḥ. na tatra prakaraṇādyapekṣā, yena teṣām upajīvyatvena prābalyaṁ syāt. prakaraṇāt tu darśapūrṇamāsārthatve tasya vākyaliṅgaśrutikalpanena viniyojakatvāl liṅgasyo 'pajīvyatvena prābalyam. ato liṅgāt pūṣaprakāśanārthatve 'vagate tanmātraprakāśanam anarthakam ity apūrvasādhanapūṣaprakāśanārthatvaṁ vaktavyam. kiṁ tad apūrvam ity apekṣāyāṁ yāgānumantraṇasamākhyānugṛhītāl liṅgāt pūṣayāgāpūrvasaṁbandhidevatāprakāśanārtho 'yam ity avagamyate. ato yady api samākhyātaḥ prakaraṇaṁ balīyas tathā 'pi tasya liṅgena bādhitatvāt samākhyāyā durbalāyā api prabalaliṅgāśritatvena prābalyāt sai 'va sāmānyasaṁbandhe pramāṇaṁ saṁbhavati, durbalasyā 'pi prabalāśritasya prābalyāt.

96. ata eva śrutyapekṣayā durbalāyā api smṛter ācamanarūpaprabalapadārthāśritatvena prābalyāt padārthadharmaguṇabhūtaśrautakramatyāgena vedakaraṇānantaraṁ kṣuta ācamanam eva kāryam ity uktam.[93] yathā 'huḥ:

97. atyantabalavanto 'pi paurajānapadā janāḥ
durbalair api bādhyante puruṣaiḥ pārthivāśritaiḥ.[94] iti.

98. yat tu pūṣe 'tiśabdaḥ kathaṁcid agnyādyabhidhāyī 'ti, tan na; tasyā 'dantako hi sa[95] ityādivākyaśeṣeṇa vaidikaprasiddhyā cā 'rthaviśeṣe rūḍhatvāt; rūḍheś cā 'vayavārthālocanasavyapekṣād yogād balīyastvāt. ata eva varṣāsu rathakāro 'gnīn ādadhīte[96]

[91] B. P. °*yāgāṅgatvam.*
[92] TV. 3.3.14, p. 857, middle (very loosely quoted).
[93] J. 1.3.5–7.
[94] TV. 3.3.14, p. 863.
[95] TS. 2.6.8.5 (omitting *sa*).
[96] BŚS. 2.12 (53.17) *varṣāsu rathakāraḥ* (sc. *agnim ādadhīta*).

'ty atra rathakāraśabdena saudhanvanāparaparyāyo varṇaviśeṣa ucyate, rūḍheḥ prābalyāt, na tu rathaṁ karotī 'ti vyutpattyā dvijātīyaḥ,[97] yogasya daurbalyād ity uktaṁ ṣaṣṭhe.[98]

99. tasmād yuktaṁ samākhyayā sāmānyasaṁbandhe 'vagate sāmarthyāt pūṣayāgasaṁbandhaḥ pūṣānumantraṇamantrāṇām iti. yathā 'huḥ:

100. yāgānumantraṇānī 'ti samākhyā kratuyojikā
tasmāc chaktyanurodhena prāptis taddevate[99] kratau.[100]

iti.

101. tat siddhaṁ pramāṇāntarasiddhasāmānyasaṁbandhasya padārthasya viniyojakaṁ liṅgam iti.

102. tatra mantraviniyojakaṁ liṅgaṁ mukhya evā 'rthe viniyojakaṁ, na gauṇe; mukhyārthasya prathamam upasthitatvena tatrai 'va viniyogabuddhau paryavasannāyāṁ punar gauṇe 'rthe viniyogakalpanāyāṁ gauravaprasaṅgāt. ata eva barhir devasadanaṁ dāmī[101] 'ti mantraḥ sāmarthyāt kuśalavanāṅgam, teṣāṁ mukhyatvāt, no 'laparājilavanāṅgam ity uktam.[102]

103. tad idaṁ liṅgaṁ vākyādibhyo balavat. teṣāṁ hi na sākṣād viniyojakatvaṁ kiṁ tu liṅgaṁ śrutiṁ ca kalpayitvā; na cā 'samarthasya śrutiṁ kalpayitvā viniyogakalpanā saṁbhavatī 'ti sāmarthyasyā 'pi kalpyatveno 'pajīvyatvāt. atas tair yāvat sāmarthyaṁ kalpayitvā śrutiḥ kalpyate, tāvad eva kḷptena sāmarthyena śrutiṁ kalpayitvā viniyogaḥ kriyata iti tasya prābalyam.

104. ata eva syonaṁ te sadanaṁ kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṁ kalpayāmī[103] 'ty asya sadanāṅgatvaṁ liṅgāt, na tu vākyāt sādanāṅgatvam, tasya daurbalyād iti.

3d pramāṇa; vākya

105. samabhivyāhāro vākyam. samabhivyāhāro nāma sādhyatvādivācakadvitīyādyabhāve vastutaḥ śeṣaśeṣiṇoḥ saho

[97] C. P. *dvijātayaḥ.*
[98] J. 6.1.12th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 44–50; cf. below, 229.
[99] C. *taddaivate.*
[100] TV. 3.2.2, p. 768, reading *kratuyojinī* in b.
[101] MS. 1.1.2 (1.9).
[102] Cf. Bhāṣya on J. 3.2.1.
[103] See note in Translation.

'ccāraṇam. yathā, yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śṛṇotī[104] 'ti. atra hi na dvitīyādivibhaktiḥ śrūyate, kevalaṁ parṇatājuhvoḥ samabhivyāhāramātram. tasmād eva ca parṇatāyā juhvaṅgatvam.

106. na cā 'narthakyam, juhūśabdenā 'pūrvalakṣaṇāt. tad ayaṁ vākyārthaḥ: parṇatayā 'vattahavirdhāraṇadvārā yad apūrvasādhanaṁ tad bhāvayed iti. evaṁ ca parṇatayā yadi juhūḥ kriyate tadai 'va tatsādhyam apūrvaṁ bhavati, nā 'nyathe 'ti gamyate, iti na parṇatāyā vaiyarthyam. avattahavirdhāraṇadvāre 'ti cā 'vaśyaṁ vaktavyam, anyathā sruvādiṣv api parṇatāpatteḥ.

107. sā ce 'yaṁ parṇatā 'nārabhyādhītā na sarvakratuṣu gacchati, vikṛtiṣu codakenā 'pi prāptisaṁbhavena dviruktatvāpatteḥ; kiṁ tu prakṛtiṣu. tad uktam: prakṛtau vā 'dviruktatvāt.[105] iti.

108. atra vikṛtir yato 'ṅgāni gṛhṇāti sā prakṛtir iti na prakṛtiśabdena vivakṣitam, gṛhamedhīye parṇatāyā aprāptiprasaṅgāt; na hi gṛhamedhīyāt kācana vikṛtir aṅgāni gṛhṇāti mānābhāvāt; kiṁ tu codakād yatrā 'ṅgāprāptis tat karma prakṛtiśabdena vivakṣitam; yathā darśapūrṇamāsau. tatra hi na codakād aṅgaprāptiḥ, prakaraṇapaṭhitair evā 'ṅgair nairākāṅkṣyāt. gṛhamedhīyādiṣv api na codakād aṅgaprāptiḥ, kḷptopakārair evā 'jyabhāgādibhir nairākāṅkṣyāt. ato yatra codakāpravṛttis tatrā 'nārabhyādhītānāṁ saṁniveśaḥ.

109. sāptadaśyaṁ tv anārabhyādhītam api na prakṛtau gacchati, prakṛteḥ pāñcadaśyāvarodhāt; kiṁ tu vikṛtiṣu gacchati. tatrā 'pi na sarvāsu gacchati, codakaprāptapāñcadaśyabādhaprasaṅgāt; kiṁ tu pratyakṣaśrutasāptadaśyāsu mitravindādiṣu gacchati.[106] yathā 'huḥ:

110. evaṁ ca prakṛtāv etat pāñcadaśyaṁ pratiṣṭhitam
vikṛtau ca na yatrā 'sti sāptadaśyapunaḥśrutiḥ.[107] iti.

111. na ca vākyavaiyarthyam; anārabhyādhītasyai 'va sāptadaśyasya mitravindādiprakaraṇasthena vākyeno 'pasaṁhārāt. upasaṁhāro nāma sāmānyaprāptasya viśeṣe niyamanam. yathā 'huḥ:

[104] TS. 3.5.7.2 (omitting *sa*).
[105] J. 3.6.2.
[106] See note in Translation.
[107] TV. 3.6.9, p. 1078.

112. sāmānyavidhir aspaṣṭaḥ saṁhriyeta viśeṣataḥ.[108] iti.

113. tatrā 'nārabhyavidhiḥ sāmānyavidhiḥ; mitravindādiprakaraṇasthas tu viśeṣavidhir ity āstāṁ tāvat: prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddhaṁ vākyād aṅgatvam.

114. tad idaṁ vākyaṁ prakaraṇād balīyaḥ. prakaraṇaṁ hi na sākṣād viniyojakam; tad dhy ākāṅkṣārūpam. na cā 'kāṅkṣā svayaṁ pramāṇaṁ kiṁ tu sākāṅkṣaṁ vākyaṁ dṛṣṭvā bhavaty etādṛśī matiḥ: nūnam idaṁ vākyaṁ kenacid vākyenai 'kavākyabhūtam iti. tataś cā 'kāṅkṣārūpaṁ prakaraṇaṁ vākyasya vākyāntaraikavākyatve pramāṇam. evaṁ ca yāvat prakaraṇaṁ vākyaṁ kalpayitvā viniyojakaṁ bhavati, tāvad vākyaṁ liṅgaśrutī kalpayitvā viniyojakaṁ bhavatī 'ti prakaraṇād vākyaṁ balīyaḥ.

115. ata eve 'ndrāgnī idaṁ havir ajuṣetām avīvṛdhetāṁ maho jyāyo 'krātām[109] ity atre 'ndrāgnīpadasya liṅgād darśāṅgatve siddha idaṁ havir ityāder api tadekavākyatvād darśāṅgatvam, na tu prakaraṇād darśapūrṇamāsāṅgatvam, prakaraṇād vākyasya balīyastvād iti.

4th pramāṇa; prakaraṇa

116. ubhayākāṅkṣā prakaraṇam; yathā prayājādiṣu. samidho yajatī[110] 'ty atra hī 'ṣṭaviśeṣasyā 'nirdeśāt samidyāgena bhāvayet kim ity asty upakāryākāṅkṣā. darśapūrṇamāsavākye 'pi darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargaṁ bhāvayet katham ity asty upakārakākāṅkṣā. ata ubhayākāṅkṣayā prayājādīnāṁ darśapūrṇamāsāṅgatvaṁ sidhyati.

117. nanu yadi prayājādivākya iṣṭaviśeṣo na śrūyate, tarhi viśvajinnyāyena svargaḥ phalaṁ kalpyatām. viśvajidadhikaraṇe[111] hi viśvajitā yajete[112] 'ty atra phalasyā 'śravaṇāt, phalam antareṇa ca vidhiśruter anupapatter avaśyaṁ phale kalpayitavye, sarvābhilaṣitatvena svargaḥ phalam ity uktam. tad uktam: sa svargaḥ syāt sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvād[113] iti.

118. rātrisattranyāyena vā 'rthavādikaṁ phalaṁ kalpyatām.

[108] TV. 3.4.47, p. 1020.
[109] TB. 3.5.10.3; MS. 4.13.9 (212.5).
[110] See 204.
[111] J. 4.3.5th–7th adhikaraṇas, sūtras 10–16.
[112] See note in Translation.
[113] J. 4.3.15.

rātrisattrādhikaraṇe[114] hi, pratitiṣṭhanti ha vai ya etā rātrīr upayantī[115] 'ty atra vidhyuddeśe, phalāśravaṇāt phalam antareṇa ca vidhiśruter anupapatter avaśyaṁ phale kalpayitavye, ārthavādikaṁ pratiṣṭhākhyaṁ phalam ity uktam; viśvajidadhikaraṇanyāyenā 'nupasthitasvargakalpane tasya prakṛtasaṁbandhakalpane gauravād arthavādopasthitasyai 'va prakṛtaphalatvakalpane lāghavāt. tad uktam: phalam ātreyo nirdeśād aśrutau hy anumānaṁ syād[116] iti.

119. tasmād viśvajinnyāyena rātrisattranyāyena vā svatantraphalārthatve saṁbhavati kim iti darśapūrṇamāsāṅgatvaṁ svīkriyata iti.

120. mai 'vam. svatantraphalārthatve 'nyatarākāṅkṣayā[117] saṁbandhaḥ syāt. na hy atra phalasya sādhanākāṅkṣā 'sti. śrūyamāṇaṁ hi phalaṁ sādhanam ākāṅkṣati; na cā 'tra tac chrūyate. evaṁ ca phalasyā 'kāṅkṣābhāvāt kevalaṁ kiṁ bhāvayed iti prayājānāṁ bhāvyākāṅkṣayai 'va svatantraphalārthatvaṁ syāt. darśapūrṇamāsārthatve tū 'bhayākāṅkṣā pramāṇam; prayājānāṁ bhāvyākāṅkṣāyā itaratra ca kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāḥ sattvāt. anyatarākāṅkṣātaś co 'bhayākāṅkṣā balīyasī 'ti vakṣyate. tataś ca darśapūrṇamāsārthatvam eva yuktam, na svatantraphalārthatvam iti. tad uktam: dravyasaṁskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutir arthavādaḥ syād[118] iti.

121. atra dravye phalaśrutir yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ ślokaṁ śṛṇotī[119] 'ty evamādyā. saṁskāre phalaśrutir yad āṅkte[120] cakṣur eva bhrātṛvyasya vṛṅkta[121] ity evamādyā. karmaṇi phalaśrutir varma vā etad yajñasya kriyate yat prayājānuyājā ijyanta[122] ityādyā. karmapadaṁ cā 'rādupakārakakarmaparaṁ draṣṭavyam, saṁskārakarmaṇaḥ pṛthaksaṁkīrtanād ity āstāṁ tāvat.

114 J. 4.3.8th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 17–19.
115 See note in Translation.
116 J. 4.3.18.
117 B. *'ntarākā°*.
118 J. 4.3.1.
119 See 105.
120 B. P. *aṅkte*.
121 TS. 6.1.1.5.
122 TS. 2.6.1.5 *yat... ijyante, varmaiva tad yajñāya kri°*. C. with TS. *°nūyājā*. But cf. below, 341, note 363.

Prakaraṇa applies only to actions

122. tad idaṁ prakaraṇaṁ kriyāyā eva viniyojakam, na dravyaguṇayoḥ; tayos tu kriyāyogād viniyojakam. kuta iti cet: śṛṇu.

123. yajeta svargakāma ity atrā 'khyātāṅśenā 'rthī bhāvanā 'bhidhīyate: bhāvayed iti. sā cā 'ṅśatrayam apekṣate: kiṁ bhāvayet, kena bhāvayet, kathaṁ bhāvayed iti. tatra bhāvyākāṅkṣāyāṁ ṣaṣṭhādyanyāyena[123] svargo bhāvyatayā 'nveti, svargaṁ bhāvayed iti. karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṁ samānapadopātto yāgo bhāvārthādhikaraṇanyāyena[124] karaṇatayā 'nveti, yāgena svargaṁ bhāvayed iti. tataḥ katham iti kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṁ yat saṁnidhau paṭhītam aśrūyamāṇaphalakaṁ ca kriyājātaṁ tad evo 'pakāryākāṅkṣaye 'tikartavyatātvenā 'nvayam anubhavituṁ yogyam, kriyāyā eva loke kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyām anvayadarśanāt. na hi kuṭhāreṇa chindyāt katham ity ākāṅkṣāyāṁ hasta iti kevalam uccāryamāṇo 'pi hasto 'nvayaṁ prāpnoti. kiṁ tarhi hasteno 'dyamya nipātye 'ty uccāryamāṇe udyamananipātane eva. hasto 'pi taddvāreṇai 'vā 'nvayaṁ prāpnotī 'ti sarvajanīnam[125] etat.

124. kiṁ ca kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā nāma karaṇagataprakārākāṅkṣā; thamoḥ prakāravācitvāt. sāmānyasya bhedako viśeṣaḥ prakāraḥ. sāmānyaṁ ca kriyārūpam evā 'khyāteno 'cyate. yajeta svargakāma ity asya hy ayam arthaḥ: yāgena tathā kartavyaṁ yathā svargo bhavatī 'ti. kriyāsāmānyasya ca viśeṣaḥ kriyai 'va bhavati. na hi brāhmaṇaviśeṣaḥ parivrājakādir abrāhmaṇo bhavati. evaṁ ca karaṇagatakriyāviśeṣākāṅkṣāparanāmadheyakathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṁ kriyai 'vā 'nvetī 'ti yuktam.

125. sa ca karaṇagataḥ kriyāviśeṣo 'nvādhānādibrāhmaṇatarpaṇāntakriyārūpa eve 'ti yuktaṁ tasya prakaraṇena grahaṇam. tasya ca karaṇagatatvaṁ tadupakārakatvam eva, tena vinā yāgenā 'pūrvājananāt. na hy udyamananipātanavyatirekeṇa kuṭhāreṇa dvaidhībhāvo janyate. tat siddhaṁ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṁ kriyai 'vā 'nvetī 'ti. ata eva dravyadevatayor yāgasaṁpādanadvārā 'nvayaḥ sāṁpradāyikair uktaḥ. vikṛtau ca kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyām upakārasaṁpādanam atidiśyata ity uktam.

[123] J. 6.1.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–3.

[124] J. 2.1.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–4.

[125] C. P. *sārva°*.

126. yadi ca kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṁ siddhaṁ vastv anvayayogyaṁ syāt, tadā saṁpādanaparyantaṁ dhāvanaṁ granthakṛtām anarthakaṁ syāt. ataś ca kriyāyā eve 'tikartavyatātvam, kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāgṛhītasye 'tikartavyatātvāt, itiśabdasya ca prakāravācitvāt. kartavyasye 'tiprakāra itikartavyatā. prakāraś ca sāmānyasya bhedako viśeṣa ity uktam. kartavyasya ca viśeṣaḥ kartavya eva bhavatī 'ti na siddhasya vastuna itikartavyatātvam, kiṁ tu kriyāyā eva. siddhasya tu dravyādeḥ kevalam aṅgatvam. tad api śrutyādinā na tu prakaraṇāt. yathā 'huḥ:

127. nā 'vāntarakriyāyogād ṛte vākyopakalpitāt
guṇadravye kathaṁbhāvair gṛhṇanti prakṛtāḥ kriyāḥ.[126]
iti.

128. ata eva barhir devasadanaṁ dāmī[127] 'tyādimantrāṇāṁ liṅgād aṅgatvam, na tu prakaraṇād ity uktam arthavādādhikaraṇapūrvapakṣasamāptau rāṇake.[128] kvacid dravyasye 'tikartavyatātvābhidhānam aṅgatvābhiprāyaṁ draṣṭavyam; bahugranthasvarasād uktayukteś ce 'ti. tat siddhaṁ prakaraṇaṁ kriyāyā eva viniyojakam iti.

Mahā-prakaraṇa; applies only in prakṛti

129. tac ca prakaraṇaṁ dvividham: mahāprakaraṇam avāntaraprakaraṇaṁ ce 'ti.[129] tatra phalabhāvanāyāḥ prakaraṇaṁ mahāprakaraṇam.[129] tac ca prayājādīnāṁ grāhakam.[129] tac ca prakṛtāv eva. yatra samagrāṅgopadeśaḥ sā prakṛtiḥ, yathā darśapūrṇamāsādiḥ. tatra co 'bhayākāṅkṣārūpaṁ prakaraṇaṁ saṁbhavati, ākāṅkṣānuparamāt.

130. vikṛtau tu na prakaraṇaṁ saṁbhavati. yatra na samagrāṅgopadeśaḥ sā vikṛtiḥ, yathā sauryādiḥ.[130] tatra ca yāny apūrvāṇy aṅgāni paṭhyanta upahomādīni,[131] teṣāṁ na prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakam. tatra yady api teṣāṁ kiṁ bhāvayed ity asty

[126] TV. 1.4.3, p. 293; quoted above, 22.
[127] See 90.
[128] The *arthavādādhikaraṇa* is J. 1.2.1st *adhi°*, sūtras 1–18, of which 1–6 state the *pūrvapakṣa*, that *arthavādas* are non-eternal and useless. The passage in R. referred to is p. 20, lines 3ff.
[129] Closely follows Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 133, lines 23ff.
[130] See note in Translation.
[131] This may refer to or include the offering of *kṛṣṇalas* at the fore-offerings of the rite to Sūrya, prescribed by MS. 2.2.2 (16.6), TS. 2.3.2.3. On *upahomas* cf. TB. 2.4 and 5; cf. comm. on TB. 2.4, introduction.

ākāṅkṣā, tathā 'pi pradhānasya na kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā 'sti, prākṛtair evā 'ṅgair nirākāṅkṣatvāt. na ca prākṛtānām aṅgānām atrā 'paṭhitatvenā 'pratyakṣatvād vaikṛtānāṁ tu paṭhitatvena pratyakṣatvāt tair evā 'kāṅkṣopaśama iti vācyam; teṣāṁ paṭhitatve 'py akḷptopakāratvena jhaṭ-ity ākāṅkṣopaśamane 'sāmarthyāt, prākṛtānāṁ tu kḷptopakāratvena tacchamane sāmarthyāt.

131. na cā 'tra teṣām upasthāpakābhāvaḥ, upamitilakṣaṇa-pramāṇena teṣām upasthitatvāt. sauryavākye hi dṛṣṭa auṣadha-dravyatvenai[132] 'kadaivatyatvena[133] sādṛśyenā 'gneyavākyam upamīyate, gavayadarśanād gor upamānavat. tasmiṅś co 'pamite tena tadartho jñāyate. sā tryaṅśā bhāvanā. tatra sauryavākye bhāvanāyā bhāvyakaraṇayoḥ sattvād itikartavyatākāṅkṣāyām upakārapṛṣṭhabhāvenā 'gneyetikartavyatā 'tidiśyate: sauryayāgena brahmavarcasaṁ bhāvayed āgneyavad upakṛtye 'ti. tathā ca tayai 'vā 'kāṅkṣopaśamān na vikṛteḥ prakaraṇam asti. anyatarākāṅkṣārūpasthānād eva cā 'pūrvāṅgagrahaṇam.

132. na ca prākṛtāṅgagrahaṇam eva vikṛtau prakaraṇāt kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; teṣām api prakṛtyupakārakatayā 'kāṅkṣopaśamāt.

133. nanu prākṛtānām aṅgānām ākāṅkṣābhāve teṣāṁ vikṛtau saṁbandhaḥ kevalaṁ sthānāt syāt; apūrvāṇāṁ tv ākāṅkṣāsattvād vikṛter apy ākāṅkṣāvattvāt teṣāṁ tatsaṁbandhaḥ prakaraṇāt syāt, prakaraṇaṁ ca sthānāj jhaṭ-iti viniyojakam ity apūrvāṇām eva prathamaṁ saṁbandhaḥ syāt, na prākṛtānām iti.

134. atro 'cyate: satyaṁ prakaraṇaṁ jhaṭ-iti viniyojakam. tathā 'pi pramāṇabalābalāt prameyabalābalasya jyāyastvād uktavidhayo 'pasthitānāṁ prākṛtānām eva saṁbandho yuktaḥ syāt kḷptopakāratvāt, na vaikṛtānāṁ kalpyopakāratvāt. vikṛteś co 'pakārakapadārthākāṅkṣā na padārthamātrāṇām iti yuktaḥ prathamaṁ prākṛtāṅgasaṁbandhaḥ. tataś ca na vikṛtau prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakam.

135. yat tu vikṛtau prākṛtāṅgānuvādena vidhīyate, yathā, audumbaro yūpo bhavatī[134] 'ti yūpānuvādenau 'dumbaratvam,

[132] C. °*dravyakatvena.*

[133] C. *ekadaivatyakatvena ca;* P. *ekadev°.*

[134] TS. 2.1.1.6. Cf. J. 10.7.61–63. This occurs in an optional animal-rite to Soma-Pūṣan.

tat prakaraṇād gṛhyate. nanu na tat prakaraṇād gṛhyate 'kriyātvāt, kriyāyā eva prakaraṇagrāhyatvād iti cet, satyam. tathā 'pi tu tāvad vidhīyamānasyau 'dumbaratvasyā 'sty evā 'kāṅkṣā, kiṁ bhāvayed iti. na ca yūpānuvādena tasya vidhīyamānatvād yūpasya cā 'dṛṣṭarūpatvāt tenai 'vau 'dumbaratvasya nairākāṅkṣyam, āhavanīyene 'vā 'dhānasye 'ti vācyam; yūpasya kevalādṛṣṭarūpatvābhāvāt. tasya hi tadrūpatve khādiratvādikaṁ kevalādṛṣṭārthaṁ syāt. na ca tat saṁbhavati. tathā sati khadirābhāve pratinidhitvena kadaropādānaṁ na syāt, adṛṣṭārthasya pratinidhyabhāvāt; na hi khadirajanyam adṛṣṭaṁ kadareṇa kriyata ity atra pramāṇam asti. ata eva nā 'dṛṣṭārthānāṁ pratinidhiḥ. tad uktam: na devatāgniśabdakriyam anyārthatvād[135] iti. anyārthatvād ity[136] adṛṣṭārthatvāt. pratinidhitvena co 'pādānaṁ kadarāder uktaṁ grantheṣu. tasmān na yūpasya kevalādṛṣṭarūpatvam, api tu dṛṣṭādṛṣṭasaṁskāragaṇo yūpa iti sāṁpradāyikāḥ.

136. evaṁ cau 'dumbaratvasya na yūpamātreṇa nairākāṅkṣyam, dṛṣṭasaṁskārasya prakārāntareṇā 'pi saṁbhavāt. ataś cā 'sty audumbaratvasyā 'kāṅkṣā. vikṛter apy asti kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā. sā ca tadā śāmyati yado 'pakārās tatpṛṣṭhabhāvena ca padārthā anvīyante; na tū 'pakāramātrānvayena śāmyati. ataś ca yathe 'ndriyabhāvanāyāḥ[137] karaṇākāṅkṣā dadhnaḥ karaṇatvenā 'nvaye jāte siddhasya karaṇatvānupapattyā homasyā 'śrayatvenā 'nvayaṁ yāvad anuvartate, na tu dadhyanvayamātreṇa nivartate, āśrayatvena ca gṛhyamāṇo homaḥ karaṇākāṅkṣayai 'va gṛhyata ity ucyate, na tv āśrayākāṅkṣā nāma caturthy asti; evaṁ vikṛteḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā no 'pakārānvayamātreṇa nivartate, upakārapṛṣṭhabhāvena yāvat padārthānvayam anuvartate. ataś co 'pakārapṛṣṭhabhāvena gṛhyamāṇāḥ padārthāḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣayai 'va gṛhyante.

137. tatra prākṛtāḥ padārthāḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣayā gṛhyamāṇā api na prakaraṇagrāhyāḥ, prakṛtyupakārakatayā teṣām ākāṅkṣābhāvāt. audumbaratvādayas tv anyānupakārakatayā sākāṅkṣāḥ paśuniyojanayūpapṛṣṭhabhāvena yāvat khādiratvam āyāti tāvad vidhīyante; iti yuktaṁ teṣāṁ prakaraṇād grahaṇam ubhayākāṅkṣāsattvāt. yadi hi yūpapṛṣṭhabhāvena khādiratvaṁ

[135] J. 6.3.18, reading *anyārthasaṁyogāt.*
[136] C. om.
[137] See 33-38.

vihitaṁ syāt tato vikṛter ākāṅkṣābhāvād audumbaratvaṁ na prakaraṇagrāhyaṁ syāt. na cai 'tad asti, codakasya khādiratvāviṣayatvāt.

138. nanu yadi yāvat khādiratvam āyāti tāvad evau 'dumbaratvaṁ vidhīyate, tadā tena khādiratvabādho 'prāptabādhaḥ syāt, tārtīyabādhavat.[138] tathā hi bādho dvividhaḥ: aprāptabādhaḥ prāptabādhaś ce 'ti. tatra tārtīyo bādho 'prāptabādhaḥ. tatra hi yāvad durbalena viniyogaḥ kartum ārabhyate, tāvad eva prabalapramāṇena viniyogaḥ kriyata iti tadbodhitene 'tarabādho 'prāptabādhaḥ, durbalapramāṇasyā 'pravṛttatvāt.

139. prākṛtasya tv aṅgasya vikṛtau codakaprāptasya pratyāmnānād arthalopāt pratiṣedhād vā yo bādhaḥ sa prāptabādhaḥ: yathā prākṛtānāṁ kuśānāṁ pratikūlaśarāmnānāt,[139] yathā vā 'vaghātasya kṛṣṇaleṣu vaituṣyarūpaprayojanalopāt,[140] yathā vā pitryeṣṭau hotṛvaraṇasya na hotāraṁ vṛṇīta[141] iti pratiṣedhāt. audumbaratvena ca khādiratvabādhaḥ prāptabādha eva vaktavyaḥ śarakuśanyāyena. codakasya ca khādiratvāviṣayatve prāptyabhāvāt tadanupapattiḥ syād iti.

140. ucyate: tārtīyapramāṇaviniyuktene 'tarasya bādhanaṁ tāvad aprāptabādhanam. prakaraṇaṁ ca tārtīyam. tena tadviniyuktaudumbaratvene 'tarasya bādhanam aprāptabādha eva. na hi vaikṛtena prākṛtabādhaḥ prāptabādha eve 'ti kuladharmaḥ.

141. vastutas tu prāptabādha evā 'yam. na ca khādiratvasya codakāviṣayatvena prāptyabhāvāt kathaṁ tadbādhaḥ prāptabādhaḥ, tadviṣayatve vā tenai 'va nairākāṅkṣyān nau 'dumbaratve prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakaṁ syād iti vācyam. na hi prāptabādhasthale codakena padārthāḥ prāpyante; tathā sati śāstraprāptatvena bādho na syāt. kiṁ tarhi tān eva padārthān vastutaḥ prāpayati ye vikṛtau na bādhyante. te ca padārthāḥ prakṛtivacchabdena prāpyanta iti bhavati puruṣasya bhrāntiḥ: yathā prakṛtau kṛtaṁ tathā vikṛtau kartavyam iti sarve padārthāḥ prākṛtāḥ kartavyā iti.

142. ataś ca bhrāntiprāptāḥ khādiratvādayaḥ śāstrapratipannair audumbaratvādibhir bādhyanta iti bhavati tadbādhaḥ

[138] Cf. J. 3.3.14, particularly TV. on that sūtra; especially TV. p. 852f.
[139] See note in Translation.
[140] See note in Translation.
[141] MS. 1.10.18 (158.3). Cf. J. 10.8.1–4.

prāptabādhaḥ. na ca bhrāntipratipannena vaidhy ākāṅkṣā nivartayituṁ śakyate. tasmād yuktam uktam ubhayākāṅkṣārūpaprakaraṇasaṁbhavād vikṛtau prākṛtāṅgānuvādena vidhīyamānānām audumbaratvādīnāṁ prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakam iti.

143. evaṁ pṛṣadājyenā 'nuyājān yajatī[142] 'ti prākṛtānuyājānuvādena vidhīyamānaṁ pṛṣadājyam api prakaraṇād vikṛtyaṅgam iti kecid ācāryāḥ.[143] asmattātacaraṇās tv evam āhuḥ: pṛṣadājyaṁ hy anuyājānuvādena vidhīyate. tatsvarūpe cā 'narthakyaprāptau tair na vikṛtyapūrvaṁ lakṣayituṁ yuktaṁ viprakarṣāt, kiṁ tu dīksaṇīyāvāñniyamanyāyena[144] svāpūrvam eva lakṣayituṁ yuktaṁ saṁnikarṣāt. ata evo 'tpavanādīnāṁ prokṣaṇādyapūrvaprayuktatvam uktaṁ navame.[145] ataś ca vidhīyamānasya pṛṣadājyasya vākyapratipannenā 'nuyājāpūrveṇai 'va nairākāṅkṣyān na prakaraṇād vikṛtyapūrvārthatvam iti.

144. vayaṁ tv aṅgīkṛtyā 'pi vikṛtyarthatvaṁ brūmaḥ: bhavatu vā vikṛtyarthatvaṁ pṛṣadājyasya. tathā 'pi na prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakaṁ bhavati. yūpapṛṣṭhabhāvena hi yāvat khādiratvam āyāti, tāvad audumbaratvavidhānād ubhayākāṅkṣāsaṁbhavād yuktaḥ prakaraṇaviniyogaḥ. evaṁ yāvad anuyājapṛṣṭhabhāvenā 'jyam āyāti tāvad eva yadi pṛṣadājyaṁ vidhīyate, tado 'bhayākāṅkṣāsaṁbhavāt prakaraṇaviniyogo bhavet. na tv etad asti. na hi pṛṣadājyaṁ nāma dravyāntaraṁ kiṁcid asti yad ājyasthānāpannaṁ vidhīyeta, audumbaratvam iva khādiratvasthānāpannam; pṛṣacchabdasya pṛṣanmaṇir ityādau citratāvācitvena dṛṣṭatvāt, pṛṣadājyaśabdasya citrājyavācitvāt. ata eva nigameṣv[146] ājyapān ity eva[147] vaktavyaṁ na tu pṛṣadājyapān ity uktam.[148]

145. na ca yāvat prākṛtam ājyam āyāti tāvad eva citrājyavidhānāt prakaraṇaviniyogaḥ saṁbhavatī 'ti vācyam. na hi pṛṣadājyaśabdena citratāguṇaviśiṣṭam ājyaṁ vidhīyate; viśiṣṭavidhāne gauravāpatteḥ. kiṁ tu prākṛtājyānuvādena citratā-

142 TS. 6.3.11.6 (*'nūyājān*); see note in Translation.
143 Viz. Someśvara, in R. on J. 3.3.29, p. 1309, l. 21ff.
144 See note in Translation.
145 J. 9.1.2–3, 1st varṇaka. The rites referred to are described ĀpŚS. 2.6.7, 2.7.1f., etc. (Hillebrandt, *NVMO*. p. 61, n. 2).
146 B. *nigadeṣv*.
147 B. P. *etad*.
148 J. 10.4.26th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 50–59, especially 55.

guṇamātraṁ vidhīyate, lohitoṣṇīṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracarantī[149] 'tivat. tad uktaṁ daśamacaturthacaraṇānte: na vā guṇaśāstratvād iti.[150] prākṛtasyai 'vā 'jyasya citratāguṇamātravidhānam iti ca śāstradīpikā.[151] evaṁ ca vikṛteḥ prākṛtenā 'jyena kḷptopakāraiś cā 'nuyājair nairākāṅkṣye paścād vidhīyamānasya citratāguṇasyo 'pahomādyapūrvāṅgavan[152] na prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakaṁ saṁbhavati.

146. yadi hi prākṛtasya kasyacid guṇasya sthāne citratā guṇo vidhīyeta, tadā sa guṇo yāvad āyāti tāvad vikṛter nairākāṅkṣyābhāvāc citratāguṇasya ca tāvad eva vidhānād ubhayākāṅkṣāsaṁbhavāt prakaraṇaviniyogo bhavet. na ca tādṛśaḥ prākṛto guṇo 'sti; ājyasyā 'nuyājānāṁ ca citratāguṇāt prāg eva vidhānāt, tasya tatsthānāpannatvābhāvāt.

147. na cā 'jyapṛṣṭhabhāvena yāvat prākṛtaṁ nirguṇatvam āyāti, tāvad evā 'sya vidhānāt prakaraṇasaṁbhava iti vācyam; nirguṇatvasyā 'vihitatvena pāṇikaṇḍūyanavad anaṅgatvād vikṛtes tadākāṅkṣābhāvāt. tathā hi jyotiṣṭome dakṣiṇādānasamaye vihitakṛṣṇaviṣāṇatyāgasya[153] dvirātrādiṣu[154] codakaprāptasya prathame 'hny ananuṣṭhānam, uttare 'hni dakṣiṇādānapūrvakālīnaiḥ padārthaiḥ kṛṣṇaviṣāṇakaṇḍūyanasya śāstravihitatvenā 'pekṣitatvāt. jyotiṣṭome ca dakṣiṇādānottarakālaṁ pāṇikaṇḍūyanaṁ dṛṣṭam api dvirātrādiṣu prathame 'hny anuṣṭhīyamānair dakṣiṇādānottarakālīnaiḥ padārthair nā 'pekṣyate, tasya prakṛtāv arthasiddhatvenā 'śāstrīyatvād iti.

148. evaṁ nirguṇatvasyā 'vihitatvena vikṛtes tadapekṣā nā 'stī 'ti. tasmād ubhayākāṅkṣāyā asaṁbhavāt pṛṣadājyasya na prakaraṇaviniyogaḥ saṁbhavatī 'ty alam ativistareṇa.

149. tat siddhaṁ mahāprakaraṇaṁ prakṛtāv eva viniyojakam. vikṛtau tu yat prākṛtadṛṣṭārthāṅgānuvādena vidhīyate, tasya viniyojakam, na tu kevalaṁ vidhīyamānasyā 'pūrvāṅgasye 'ti.

150. yat tu vikṛtāv api prākṛtadharmānuvādena vidhīyamānayor dharmayor antarāle 'pūrvam apy aṅgaṁ kevalaṁ paṭhyate, tad api prakaraṇena viniyujyate.

[149] ĀpŚS. 22.4.23; ṢB. 3.8.22. Both are longer than our quotation.

[150] J. 10.4.59, adding *syāt* after *vā*.

[151] On this adhikaraṇa of J; p. 716, 1.17 (adding *haviṣaś* after *ājyasya*).

[152] For *upahoma* see 130.

[153] Cf. TS. 6.1.3.8.

[154] See note in Translation.

151. yady api vikṛteḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā prākṛtair evā 'ṅgaiḥ śāmyati, tathā 'pi yatra prākṛtāṅgānuvādena dharmavidhānaṁ tatra tadvidhānaṁ yāvad bhavati tāvat kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā na nivartate. ato vikṛter ākāṅkṣāvattvād antarāle vihitasyā 'py apūrvāṅgasya bhāvyākāṅkṣāsattvād yuktaṁ tasya prakaraṇād vikṛtyarthatvam. yathā 'manahomeṣu.[155] te hi prākṛtāṅgānuvādena vidhīyamānayor dharmayor antarāle vidhīyanta ity uktaṁ tantraratnādāv ity āstāṁ tāvat.

Avāntara-prakaraṇa

152. phalabhāvanāyā antarāle yad aṅgabhāvanāyāḥ prakaraṇaṁ tad avāntaraprakaraṇam.[156] tac cā 'bhikramaṇādīnāṁ prayājādiṣu viniyojakam.[156] tac ca saṁdaṅśena jñāyate, tadabhāve 'viśeṣāt sarveṣāṁ phalabhāvanākathaṁbhāvena grahaṇāt.

153. saṁdaṅśo nāmai 'kāṅgānuvādena vidhīyamānayor aṅgayor antarāle vihitatvam; yathā 'bhikramaṇam. tad dhi samānayata upabhṛta[157] ityādinā prayājānuvādena kiṁcid aṅgaṁ vidhāya vidhīyate. paścād api prayājānuvādena, yo vai prayājānāṁ mithunaṁ vede[158] 'tyādinā kiṁcid aṅgaṁ vidhīyate. ataḥ prayājāṅgamadhye paṭhitam[159] abhikramaṇaṁ tadaṅgaṁ bhavati, tatkathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyā aśānteḥ. yathā 'huḥ:

154. paraprakaraṇasthānām aṅge śrutyādibhis tribhiḥ
jñāte punaś ca tair eva saṁdaṅśena tad iṣyate.[160] iti.

155. na cā 'ṅgabhāvanāyāḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣābhāvāt kathaṁ prayājabhāvanākathaṁbhāvenā 'bhikramaṇaṁ gṛhyata iti vācyam; bhāvanāsāmyena sarvatra kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāḥ sattvāt. prayājair apūrvaṁ kṛtvā yāgopakāraṁ bhāvayed ity ukte yo nāma na jānāti prayājair apūrvaṁ kartuṁ tasyā 'sty eva kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā: katham ebhir apūrvaṁ kartavyam iti. sā ca saṁdaṅśapatitair vācanikaiḥ smārtaiś cā 'camanādibhiḥ śāmyati.

156. tadabhāve ca svarūpaniṣpādanena darvihomanyāyena nivartate. darvihomeṣu hi svarūpaniṣpādanātiriktas tathā-

[155] See note in Translation.
[156] Follows closely Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 133, foot.
[157] TS. 2.6.1.2.
[158] TS. 2.6.1.4.
[159] *abhikrāmaṁ juhoti*, TS. 2.6.1.4.
[160] TV. 3.1.24, p. 758.

vyāpāro na śrūyate, nā 'py atideśena tatprāptiḥ; yāgīyānāṁ dharmāṇāṁ tāvan nā 'tideśo yāgatvena homatvena vailakṣaṇyāt; nā 'pi homīyānām, kasya homasya dharmaḥ kasmin home pravartata iti viśeṣanirṇaye pramāṇābhāvāt. ato dharmaprāptyabhāvād darvihomair iṣṭaṁ bhāvayet katham ity utpannā 'py ākāṅkṣā svarūpaniṣpādanenai 'va śāmyati.

157. evaṁ yeṣv aṅgeṣu saṁdaṅśādyabhāvas tatro 'tpannā 'py ākāṅkṣā tenai 'va nivartate; na tu sarvathā tadabhāvaḥ. tasmād yuktam uktam abhikramaṇaṁ prayājāṅgam iti.

158. tac ce 'dam avāntaraprakaraṇaṁ mahāprakaraṇād balīyaḥ; saṁdaṅśapatitānāṁ dharmāṇāṁ kaimarthyākāṅkṣāyāṁ pradhānāpūrvāt prayājādyapūrvasya jhaṭ-ity upasthiter iti. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddham ubhayavidhasya prakaraṇasya viniyojakatvam.

159. tad idaṁ sthānādipramāṇād balavat. yatra hi sthānād aṅgatvam, tatrā 'nyatarasya prakārāntareṇa nirākāṅkṣatvam. na ca sākāṅkṣaṁ nirākāṅkṣeṇa saṁbaddhuṁ yogyaṁ vinā 'kāṅkṣotthāpanena. ataś cā 'nyatarākāṅkṣayā yāvad ubhayākāṅkṣārūpaprakaraṇakalpanadvārā vākyādi kalpayitum ārabhyate, jhaṭ-iti tāvat prakaraṇena vākyādikaṁ kalpayitvā viniyogaḥ kriyata iti sthānāt prakaraṇasya balīyastvam.

160. ata eva videvanādayo[161] dharmā abhiṣecanīyasaṁnidhau paṭhitā api nā 'bhiṣecanīyasyā 'ṅgam; teṣāṁ tadaṅgatvaṁ bhavat sthānād bhavet, na tu prakaraṇāt, abhiṣecanīyasyā 'vyaktacodanācoditatvena jyotiṣṭomavikāratvāt prākṛtair eva dharmair nirākāṅkṣatvāt. kiṁ tu prakaraṇād rājasūyāṅgam.

161. nanu rājā rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajete[162] 'ty atra rājasūyaśabdas tāvan nāmadheyatvād ākhyātaparatantro yatrā 'khyātaṁ tatrai 'va pravartate. na ca darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajete[163] 'ty atra yathā darśapūrṇamāsapadaṁ nāmadheyam api nā 'khyātaparatantram—tatra hi yajete 'ty ākhyātam aviśeṣāt sarvān eva prakṛtān āgneyādīn prayājādīṅś cā 'bhidhātuṁ samarthaṁ darśapūrṇamāsapadaṁ tv āgneyādīn eva vadati na sarvān, ataś ca na tad ākhyātaparatantram—tathā rājasūyapadam api kiṁ na syād iti vācyam. prasiddhena hi padenā 'prasiddhaṁ nirṇīyate. yathā 'huḥ:

161 See note in Translation.
162 See note in Translation.
163 See 47.

162. padam ajñātasaṁdigdhaṁ prasiddhair apṛthakśruti nirṇīyate nirūḍhaṁ tu na svārthād apanīyate.[164] iti.

163. darśapūrṇamāsapadaṁ ca kālanimittam, tadyogaś cā 'gneyādiṣū 'tpattivākyair avagataḥ. atas tadvācitvena darśapūrṇamāsapadaṁ prasiddham. na cā 'gneyādīnāṁ bahutvād dvivacanāntatvam asyā 'nupapannam iti vācyam; vidvadvākyadvayasiddhasamudāyadvayābhiprāyeṇa[165] tadupapatteḥ. evaṁ ca darśapūrṇamāsapadasyā 'gneyādivācitve nirṇīte yajete 'ty ākhyātam api tān eva vadati. na hi taduktau svārthatyāgo bhavati.

164. rājasūyapadaṁ tv anirṇītārtham, atas tad ākhyātaparatantram eva. tac cā 'viśeṣāt sarveṣv iṣṭipaśusomeṣu vidyate; tatparatantratvād rājasūyapadam api tān eva vadati.

165. na ca rājasūyaśabdasya rājā sūyate yatre 'ti vyutpattyā somābhiṣavanimittatvāt, tasya ca somam abhiṣuṇotī[166] 'ti vākyena somayāge 'vagatatvāt, tadvācitvam eva ne 'ṣṭipaśuvācitvam iti vācyam. na hy abhiṣecanīyādisomayāgeṣv abhiṣavaḥ pratyakṣeṇa vākyena codito 'sti, tadvākyasya jyotiṣṭome sattvāt.[167] atideśāt tatsaṁbandho 'vagata iti cen na; atideśasya phalasaṁbandhottarakālīnatvena rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajete 'ty etadvākyārthāvagatyuttarakālīnatvāt; anena hi vākyena phalasaṁbandhe bodhite paścāt kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyām atideśakalpanāt. atas tataḥ prāg evai 'tadvākyārtho varṇanīyaḥ; tadā cā 'bhiṣavasyā 'navagatatvād rājasūyapadam aprasiddhārtham eva. ata eva rājasūyapadam avyutpannam aśvakarṇaśabdavad ity uktaṁ sāṁpradāyikaiḥ.

166. evaṁ cā 'prasiddhārthatvenā 'khyātaparatantratvād rājasūyapadene 'ṣṭipaśusomayāgā ucyante. te ca tais taiḥ prākṛtair dharmair nirākāṅkṣā iti na prakaraṇaṁ videvanādīnāṁ rājasūye viniyojakam, ubhayākāṅkṣāyā abhāvāt. na ca prātisvikarūpair nairākāṅkṣye 'pi na rājasūyatvena rūpeṇa nairākāṅkṣyam iti vācyam; ākāṅkṣādvaye pramāṇābhāvāt.

167. kiṁ ca prātisvikarūpair yā kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣā sā 'pi phalasaṁbandhottarakālam. sa ca rājasūyatvena na tu prāti-

[164] TV. 1.4.2, p. 286, reading *ajñātasaṁbandhaṁ* in a, but v. l. text.

[165] TS. 1.6.9.1–2 *ya evaṁ vidvān paurṇamāsīṁ yajate,* and *ya evaṁ vidvān amāvāsyāṁ yajate.*

[166] Perhaps refers to TS. 6.4.5.1 *abhiṣuṇoti* (sc. *somam*).

[167] B. P. *'sattvāt.*

svikarūpaiḥ. rājasūyatvena ca phalasaṁbandha utpannāyāḥ kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyā videvanādibhiḥ śānter atideśakalpanam eva na syāt. yadi hi sāmānyarūpeṇa prātisvikarūpeṇa ca phalasaṁbandhavidhāyi vākyadvayaṁ bhavet, tadā yujyetā 'py ākāṅkṣādvayānusāreṇa videvanādīnām ātideśikānāṁ cā 'ṅgānāṁ saṁbandhaḥ. na tu tad asti. tasmāt prākṛtair dharmair nairākāṅkṣyān na videvanādīnāṁ prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakam iti cet—

168. satyam. ata eva sāṁpradāyikair videvanādīnāṁ saṁdaṅśo darśitaḥ. rājasūyatvapuraskāreṇa ye dharmā vidhīyante, rājasūyāya hy enā utpunātī[168] 'ty evamādayas tanmadhye videvanādayaḥ paṭhyante. atas te sarve rājasūyāṅgam, prayājānuvādena vidhīyamānadharmamadhye paṭhitaprayājāṅgābhikramaṇavat. tasmād yuktam uktaṁ videvanādīnāṁ prakaraṇād rājasūyāṅgatvam iti. tat siddhaṁ prakaraṇasya sthānād balīyastvam iti.

5th pramāṇa; sthāna

169. deśasāmānyaṁ sthānam. tac ca dvividham: pāṭhasādeśyam anuṣṭhānasādeśyaṁ ce 'ti. yathā 'huḥ:

170. tatra kramo dvidhai 've 'ṣṭo deśasāmānyalakṣaṇaḥ
pāṭhānuṣṭhānasādeśyād viniyogasya kāraṇam.[169] iti.

171. sthānaṁ kramaś ce 'ty anarthāntaram. pāṭhasādeśyam api dvividham: yathāsaṁkhyapāṭhaḥ saṁnidhipāṭhaś ce 'ti. tatrai 'ndrāgnam ekādaśakapālaṁ nirvapet,[170] vaiśvānaraṁ dvādaśakapālaṁ nirvaped[171] ity evaṁ kramavihiteṣṭiṣv indrāgnī rocanā diva[172] ityādīnāṁ yājyānuvākyāmantrāṇāṁ yathāsaṁkhyaṁ prathamasya prathamaṁ dvitīyasya dvitīyam ity evaṁ yo viniyogaḥ sa yathāsaṁkhyapāṭhāt; prathamapaṭhitamantrasya hi kaimarthyākāṅkṣāyāṁ prathamato vihitaṁ karmai 'va prathamam upatiṣṭhate samānadeśatvāt.

[168] TB. 1.7.6.4.
[169] TV. 3.3.12, p. 832.
[170] MS. 2.1.1 (1.1); cf. also TS. 2.2.1.1, TB. 1. 6.1.7.
[171] MS. 2.1.2 (2.5), reading *vaiśvānarāya;* TS. 2.2.5.1 has °*raṁ.*
[172] MS. 4.11.1 (159.1). See Bhāṣya on J. 3.3.12. In MS. 4.11.1ff. are given, in the same order as the *brāhmaṇa* section 2.1.1ff., the *mantras* belonging to various optional rites prescribed in 2.1.1 (to Indrāgnī), 2.1.2 (to Agni Vaiśvānara), etc.

172. yāni tu vaikṛtāny aṅgāni prākṛtāṅgānanuvādena[173] vihitāni saṁdaṅśāpatitāni teṣāṁ vikṛtyarthatvaṁ saṁnidhipāṭhāt. teṣāṁ hi kaimarthyākāṅkṣāyāṁ phalavadvikṛtyapūrvam[174] eva bhāvyatvena saṁbadhyate, upasthitatvāt. ata eva teṣu na viśvajinnyāyāvatāraḥ; svatantraphalārthatve vikṛtisaṁnidhipāṭhānarthakyāpatteś ca.

173. paśudharmāṇām agnīṣomīyārthatvam anuṣṭhānasādeśyāt. aupavasathye 'hny agnīṣomīyaḥ paśur anuṣṭhīyate, tasminn eva dine te dharmāḥ paṭhyante. atas teṣāṁ kaimarthyākāṅkṣāyām anuṣṭheyatveno 'pasthitaṁ paśvapūrvam eva bhāvyatvena saṁbadhyate. ato yuktam anuṣṭhānasādeśyāt tadarthatvaṁ teṣām.

174. na ca pāṭhasādeśyād eva tat kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; agnīṣomīyasya paśoḥ krayasaṁnidhau pāṭhāt.[175] na ca krayasaṁnidhau tasya pāṭhe tadanuṣṭhānam api tatra syād iti vācyam; sa eṣa dvidaivatyaḥ paśur aupavasathye 'hany ālabdhavya[176] iti vacanāt tadanupapatteḥ. na ca sthānāt prakaraṇasya balīyastvena paśudharmāṇāṁ jyotiṣṭomārthatvam eva kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; tasya somayāgatvena paśudharmagrahaṇe 'yogyatvāt. ata ānarthakyapratihatānāṁ viparītaṁ balābalam iti nyāyāt sthānāt paśuyāgārthatvam eva dharmāṇāṁ yuktam.

175. na ca teṣāṁ tadarthatvaṁ prakaraṇād eva kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; agnīṣomīyakathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāḥ kḷptopakāraiḥ prākṛtadharmair evo 'paśāntatvāt. sa hi sāṁnāyyayāgaprakṛtikaḥ, ubhayoḥ paśuprabhavadravyatvasāmānyāt. tad uktam: sāṁnāyyaṁ vā tatprabhavatvād[177] iti. sāṁnāyyaṁ dadhipayasī. tatra paśuyāgaḥ payoyāgaprakṛtikaḥ sākṣāt paśuprabhavatvāt. ataś codakaprāptais taddharmair nirākāṅkṣatvān na paśuyāge[178] dharmāṇāṁ prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakaṁ kiṁ tu sthānam eva. tad evaṁ nirūpitaḥ saṁkṣepataḥ sthānaviniyogaḥ.

176. tac ca samākhyātaḥ prabalam. sthānaviniyoge hi padārthayor deśasāmānyalakṣaṇaḥ saṁbandhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ.

[173] B. *prākṛtāṅgānuvādena.*

[174] B. *phalatad°.*

[175] See note in Translation.

[176] This sentence I have not located. The difference of days is alluded to MS. 3.7.8 (87.17f.).

[177] J. 8.2.13.

[178] B. *paśu* (om. *yāge*).

samākhyāviniyoge tu saṁbandho na pratyakṣaḥ, padārthayor bhinnadeśatvāt. na ca sā saṁbandhavācikā; yaugikānāṁ śabdānāṁ dravyavācakatvena saṁbandhāvācakatvāt. tathā hi: samākhyā saṁbandhasāmānyavācikā syāt, tadviśeṣavācikā vā. nā 'dyaḥ, taduktau prayojanābhāvāt, sarvayaugikaśabdānāṁ paryāyatāpatteś ca. dvitīye 'vaśyaṁ saṁbandhinau vācyau, tadantareṇa saṁbandhe viśeṣābhāvāt, tatpratipattim antareṇa tadapratipatteś ca. ataś cā 'vaśyaṁ saṁbandhivācakatvaṁ samākhyāyā vaktavyam. tathā ca na saṁbandhavācakatvaṁ saṁbandhipratipattyai 'va vākyārthapratipattinyāyena tatpratipattisaṁbhave tatra śaktikalpane gauravāt. yathā 'huḥ:

177. sarvatra yaugikaiḥ śabdair dravyam evā 'bhidhīyate
na hi saṁbandhavācitvaṁ saṁbhavaty atigauravāt.[179]

iti. tathā:

178. pākaṁ tu pacir evā 'ha kartāraṁ pratyayo 'py akaḥ
pākayuktaḥ punaḥ kartā vācyo nai 'kasya kasyacit.[180]

iti.

179. tathā ca samākhyā na saṁbandhavācikā. hotṛcamasa[181] ityādikā tu vaidikī samākhyā niṣādasthapatiśabdavan na ṣaṣṭhyarthasaṁbandhavācikā; nā 'pi vākyavat tadbodhikā, tasyāḥ padatvenā 'pramāṇatvāt. pauroḍāśikam[182] ityādisamākhyās tv atidurbalāḥ; laukikatvena puruṣapratyayasāpekṣatvāt, kāṇḍagocaratvena tattatpadārthāgocaratvāc ca. kāṇḍavācakatvam api na kāṇḍatvena kiṁ tu pauroḍāśikatvādinai 'va. na hy ekahāyanīśabdo dravyavācako 'pi gotvena tad vadati, kiṁ tarhy ekahāyanītvenai 'va.

180. sthānaviniyoge tu padārthayor viśeṣapuraskāreṇai 'va saṁbandhaḥ pratyakṣapramāṇapratipannaḥ. ataś ca samākhyām upalabhya nūnam anayoḥ padārthayoḥ saṁbandho 'stī 'ti yāvat kalpyate, tāvat pratyakṣapratipannena saṁbandhena parasparam ākāṅkṣā, tadabhāve ca saṁbandhānupapatteḥ. kalpitasaṁbandhena ca yāvad itaratrākāṅkṣādikalpanā tāvad anyatrā-

[179] TV. 3.1.12, p. 688 (reading °*vācyatvam* in c).

[180] Quoted, without indication of source, in Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 101; this is undoubtedly the immediate source of our quotation.

[181] E.g. TS. 6.5.2.2.

[182] Means TB. 3.2 and 3, or equivalent (cf. Weber, *ISt.* 3.375, 385), MS. 4.1, or similar *brāhmaṇa* sections, and the corresponding *mantra* sections, as TS. 1.1, MS. 1.1; see 94.

kāṅkṣayā vākyādikalpanayā viniyogaḥ kriyata iti siddhaṁ sthānasya samākhyātaḥ prābalyam. ata eva śundhanamantraḥ[183] sāṁnāyyapātrāṅgaṁ pāṭhasādeśyān na tu pauroḍāśikasamākhyayā puroḍāśapātrāṅgam iti.

6th pramāṇa; samākhyā

181. samākhyā yaugikaḥ śabdaḥ. sā ca dvividhā, vaidikī laukikī ce 'ti. tatra hotuś camasabhakṣaṇāṅgatvaṁ hotṛcamasa[181] iti vaidikyā samākhyayā. adhvaryos tattatpadārthāṅgatvaṁ laukikyā 'dhvaryavam[184] iti samākhyaye 'ti saṁkṣepaḥ.

Classification of aṅgāni

182. tad evaṁ nirūpitāni saṁkṣepataḥ śrutyādīni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni. etatsahakṛtena viniyogavidhinā samidādibhir upakṛtya darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajete 'ty evaṁrūpeṇa yāni viniyujyante tāny aṅgāni. tāni dvividhāni, siddharūpāṇi kriyārūpāṇi ce 'ti.

183. tatra siddharūpāṇi jātidravyasaṁkhyādīni. tāni ca dṛṣṭārthāny eva. kriyārūpāṇi ca dvividhāni: guṇakarmāṇi pradhānakarmāṇi ce 'ti. etāny eva saṁnipatyopakārakāṇy ārādupakārakāṇī 'ti co 'cyante. tatra karmāṅgadravyādyuddeśena vidhīyamānaṁ karma saṁnipatyopakārakam; yathā 'vaghātaprokṣaṇādi. tac ca dṛṣṭārtham adṛṣṭārthaṁ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthaṁ[185] ca. dṛṣṭārtham avaghātādi; adṛṣṭārthaṁ prokṣaṇādi; dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthaṁ paśupuroḍāśayāgādi. tad dhi dravyatyāgāṅśenā 'dṛṣṭaṁ devatoddeśena ca devatāsmaraṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ karoti. idam eva cā 'śrayi karme 'ty ucyate.

184. tac ca saṁnipatyopakārakaṁ dvividham: upayokṣyamāṇārtham upayuktārthaṁ ce 'ti. tatrā 'vaghātaprokṣaṇādy upayokṣyamāṇārtham, vrīhīṇāṁ yāga upayokṣyamāṇatvāt. pratipattikarme 'ḍābhakṣaṇādy upayuktapuroḍāśādisaṁskārakam.[186] upayuktasyā 'kīrṇakaratānivartakaṁ[187] karma pratipattikarma.

[183] *śundhadhvaṁ daivyāya karmaṇe*, TS. 1.1.3.1 and 5.1, TB. 3.2.3.1 and 5.5, MS. 1.1.3 (2.5), 4.1.3 (4.10); cf. preceding note.

[184] Probably means TS. 1.2 and 3 and TB. 1.1.1 and 1.4.8 (also the *brāhmaṇa*, TS. 6 etc.?); so BGS. 2.1 quoted by Keith, HOS. 18, p. xliii.

[185] C. om by error, corrected in śuddhipattrikā.

[186] B. P. *puroḍāśasaṁ°*. For the act alluded to, see e.g. ĀpŚS. 3.2.11.

[187] P. and v. l. of B. C. *ākīrṇatāniv°*.

185. upayuktasaṁskārārthaṁ co 'payokṣyamāṇasaṁskārārthād durbalam; upayuktāpekṣayo 'payokṣyamāṇe 'tyādarāt. ata eva prāyaṇīyaniṣkāsa udayanīyam anunirvapatī[188] 'ty atra niṣkāsasya nirvāpārthatvam, na tu tasya tadarthatvam, niṣkāsasyo 'payuktatvād ity uktam ekādaśe.[189]

186. tac ca saṁnipatyopakārakam ārādupakārakād balīyaḥ.

187. nanv avaghātādi bhavatu balīyaḥ, tasya dṛṣṭārthatvāt, ārādupakārakasya cā 'dṛṣṭārthatvāt, dṛṣṭe saṁbhavaty adṛṣṭasyā 'nyāyyatvāt. prokṣaṇādi saṁnipatyopakārakaṁ tu kathaṁ balīyaḥ, ubhayor adṛṣṭārthatvāviśeṣāt. kiṁ cā 'rādupakārakaṁ sākṣāt pradhānāṅgaṁ tasyā 'nyoddeśenā 'vidhānāt. saṁnipatyopakārakaṁ tv aṅgāṅgam, karmāṅgavrīhyādyuddeśena vidhānāt. aṅgāṅgāpekṣayā ca sākṣādaṅgaṁ balīyaḥ, aṅgaguṇavirodhe ca tādarthyād[190] iti nyāyāt. ata eva ya iṣṭyā paśunā somena[191] yajeta so 'māvāsyāyāṁ paurṇamāsyāṁ vā yajete[192] 'ty aviśeṣavidhāne 'pi parvānugrahaḥ somayāgasyai 'va kriyate na tu dīkṣaṇīyādeḥ. ataḥ kathaṁ saṁnipatyopakārakasya balīyastvam.

188. ucyate: saty apy adṛṣṭārthatvāviśeṣe saṁnipatyopakārakam ārādupakārakād balīyaḥ. saṁnipatyopakārake hi karmaṇy upakāryopakārakayor vrīhiprokṣaṇayoḥ saṁbandho vākyakḷptaḥ, upakāramātraṁ tu kalpyam. ārādupakārakasthale tu darśapūrṇamāsayoḥ prayājānuyājayoḥ[193] saṁbandhaḥ kalpya upakāro 'pi.

189. kiṁ ca: ārādupakārakasthale hi prakaraṇaṁ viniyojakam, itaratra tu vrīhīn prokṣatī 'ti vākyam eva vrīhipadenā 'pūrvasādhanalakṣaṇāṁ kṛtvā kratau viniyojakam iti balīyastvam.

190. yad uktam: aṅgaguṇavirodhe ca[194] tādarthyād iti nyāyena durbalatvam iti, tad asat. na hi vrīhyādyuddeśena vidhīya-

[188] TS. 6.1.5.5, reading *prāyaṇīyasya niṣ°* and *abhi* for *anu*. Bhāṣya on J. 11.2.64 *anu*, but *prāyaṇīyasya*.

[189] J. 11.2.66.

[190] J. 12.2.25. (B. P. omit *ca*.)

[191] C. adds *vā*.

[192] So Bhāṣya on J. 12.2.25 (adding *vā* after *somena* and reading *pūrṇamā°*); close to but not identical with ĀpŚS. 10.2.8; less close to KS. 8.1 (84.3); see notes in Translation 12, 74, and Introduction, p. 31. (Qy: KapS. 6.6?)

[193] C. *darśapūrṇamāsaprayājayoḥ* (v. l. text).

[194] B. P. om.

mānaṁ prokṣaṇādi tadarthaṁ bhavati, tatsvarūpa ānarthakyāt, kiṁ tu tatsaṁskāradvārā kratvartham eva, saṁnipatyopakārakāṇām utpattyapūrvaprayuktatvasya ca vakṣyamāṇatvāt. ata ubhayavidham apy aṅgajātaṁ kratvartham eve 'ti nā 'ṅgaguṇavirodhanyāyāvatāraḥ. dīkṣaṇīyādeḥ parvānugrahas tu dīkṣaṇīyādyartha eva, tasya tadapūrvaprayuktatvāt. ato yuktaṁ sākṣātpradhānāṅgena pradhānaparvānugraheṇa sa bādhyata iti. tat siddhaṁ saṁnipatyopakārakasyā 'rādupakārakād balīyastvam.

191. ata eva sthāṇau sthāṇvāhutiṁ juhotī[195] 'ti vihitā sthāṇvāhutir yūpavraścanasthāṇudvārā yūpasaṁskārārthā, devadattadhāritāyāḥ srajaḥ śucideśanidhānam iva devadattasaṁskārārtham; na tu sthāṇvāhutir ārādupakārike 'ty uktaṁ daśame.[196] iti dik.

Aṅgāni always related to apūrva

192. dravyādy anuddiśya kevalaṁ vidhīyamānaṁ karmā 'rādupakārakam: yathā prayājādi. tad evaṁ nirūpitaṁ dvividham apy aṅgajātam. tac ca na yāgādisvarūpaprayuktam, svarūpa ānarthakyāt, tadantareṇā 'pi tatsiddheḥ; kiṁ tv apūrvaprayuktam eva. na hi tadantareṇā 'pūrvaṁ bhavatī 'ty atra kiṁcit pramāṇam asti, tasyā 'dṛṣṭatvāt.

193. na cai 'vaṁ prādhānyād adṛṣṭatvāc ca phalaprayuktam eva kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; phalabhāvanāyāṁ yāgasyai 'va karaṇatvād aṅgānāṁ ca karaṇānugrāhakatvāt, tadarthatve buddhe, tatra cā 'narthakyaprasaktau tena svāpūrvam evo 'pasthāpyate saṁnikarṣāt, dīkṣaṇīyādiśabdene 'va tadapūrvam; na tu phalam upasthāpyate viprakarṣāt. ato na tatprayuktatvam aṅgānām. ata evā 'ganma suvaḥ suvar aganme[197] 'ti mantro vikṛtāv ūhitavya ity uktaṁ navame phaladevatayoś ce[198] 'ty atra. phalaprayuktatve tu sauryādivikṛtiṣu svargarūpaphalābhāvān mantro na pravarteta, nataräṁ co 'hitavyaḥ syād iti. tat siddham aṅgānām anyaprayuktatvānupapatter apūrvaprayuktatvam.

194. tatrā 'pi saṁnipatyopakārakāṇāṁ dravyadevatādisaṁ-

[195] See note in Translation.
[196] J. 10.1.6th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 10–13.
[197] See note in Translation.
[198] J. 9.1.4.

skāradvārā yāgasvarūpa upayogād utpattyapūrvārthatvam. ata evau 'ṣadhadharmāvaghātādīnām ājye na pravṛttiḥ, teṣām āgneyāpūrvaprayuktatvāt, ājyasya ca tadarthatvābhāvād ity uktaṁ tṛtīye.[199]

195. ārādupakārakāṇāṁ tu svarūpe 'nupayogāt paramāpūrvārthatvam. tatro 'tpattyapūrvasya yāgasvarūpānuṣṭhānānantaram evo 'tpadyamānatvāt saṁnipatyopakārakāṇāṁ pūrvāṅgānāṁ tadutpattāv upayogaḥ, uttarāṅgānāṁ tu teṣāṁ tatsthitāv upayogaḥ. paramāpūrvasya tu sāṅgaprayogānuṣṭhānānantaram evo 'tpadyamānatvāt sarveṣām ārādupakārakāṇāṁ tadutpattau, prayogabahirbhūtasya tu tatsthitāv upayogaḥ. yathā bṛhaspatisavasya vājapeyene 'ṣṭvā bṛhaspatisavena yajete[200] 'ti vājapeyottarakālam aṅgatvena vihitasya vājapeyāpūrvasthitāv upayogaḥ; tasya prāg evo 'tpannatvād ity uktaṁ caturthe.[201] tat siddhaṁ sarvathā 'ṅgānām apūrvārthatvam. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tad evaṁ nirūpitaḥ saṁkṣepato viniyogavidhiḥ.

Prayoga-vidhi

196. prayogaprāśubhāvabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhiḥ. sa cā 'ṅgavākyaikavākyatām āpannaḥ pradhānavidhir eva. sa hi sāṅgaṁ pradhānam anuṣṭhāpayan vilambe pramāṇābhāvād avilambāparaparyāyaṁ prayogaprāśubhāvaṁ vidhatte. na ca vilambavad avilambe 'pi pramāṇābhāva iti vācyam. vilambe hy aṅgapradhānavidhyekavākyatāvagatatatsāhityānupapattiḥ prasajyate. na hi vilambena kriyamāṇayoḥ padārthayoḥ sahakṛtam iti sāhityaṁ vyavaharanti. na cai 'vaṁ sāhityānupapattyā samānakālatvam eva syān na tv avilambaḥ, avyavadhānena pūrvottarakāle kriyamāṇapadārthayor avilambena kṛtam iti vyavahārād iti vācyam; anekapadārthānām ekasmin kāle 'nuṣṭhānānupapatteḥ. na ca tāvatkartṛsaṁpādanenā 'nuṣṭhānaṁ[202] kiṁ na syād iti vācyam; tasyai 'tasya yajñakratoś catvāra ṛtvija[203] ityādinā kartṝṇāṁ niyatatvāt.

197. tasmād aṅgavākyaikavākyatām āpannaḥ pradhānavidhir ekavākyatāvagatatatsāhityaṁ vidadhad uktavidhayai 'kakā-

[199] J. 3.1.4th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 7–10.
[200] Cf. (for inexact equivalents) ĀpŚS. 18.7.17, ŚŚS. 15.4.1.
[201] J. 4.3.13th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 29–31.
[202] B. *'nuṣṭhāne.*
[203] See note in Translation.

lānuṣṭhānānupapatter avilambaṁ vidhatta iti siddhaṁ prayogaprāśubhāvabodhako vidhiḥ prayogavidhir iti.

198. sa cā 'vilambo niyate krama āśrīyamāṇe bhavati; anyathā hi kim etadanantaram etat kartavyam etadanantaraṁ ve 'ti prayogavikṣepāpatteḥ. ataḥ prayogavidhir eva svavidheyaprayogaprāśubhāvasiddhyarthaṁ niyataṁ kramam api padārthaviśeṣaṇatayā vidhatte. tatra kramo nāma vitativiśeṣaḥ paurvāparyarūpo vā.

Six pramāṇas for order; 1st, śruti

199. tatra ca ṣaṭ pramāṇāni: śrutyarthapaṭhanasthānamukhyapravṛttyākhyāni. tatra kramaparaṁ[204] vacanaṁ śrutiḥ. tac ca dvividham: kevalakramaparaṁ tadviśiṣṭapadārthaparaṁ ce 'ti. tatra vedaṁ kṛtvā vediṁ karotī[205] 'ti kevalakramaparam, vedikaraṇāder vacanāntareṇa vihitatvāt. vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamabhakṣa[206] iti tu kramaviśiṣṭapadārthaparam; ekaprasaratābhaṅgabhayena bhakṣānuvādena kramamātrasya vidhātum aśakyatvāt.

200. se 'yaṁ śrutir itarapramāṇāpekṣayā balavatī; teṣāṁ vacanakalpanadvārā kramapramāṇatvāt. ata evā 'śvinasya pāṭhakramāt[207] tṛtīyasthāne grahaṇaprasaktāv āśvino daśamo gṛhyata[208] iti vacanād daśamasthāne grahaṇam ity uktam.[209]

2d pramāṇa; artha

201. yatra tu prayojanavaśena nirṇayaḥ sa ārthaḥ kramaḥ: yathā 'gnihotrahomayavāgūpākayoḥ. atra hi yavāgvā homārthatvena[210] tatpākaḥ prayojanavaśena pūrvam anuṣṭhīyate. sa cā 'yaṁ pāṭhakramād balavān. yathāpāṭhaṁ hy anuṣṭhāne kḷptaprayojanabādho 'dṛṣṭārthatvaṁ ca syāt. na hi homānantaraṁ kriyamāṇasya kiṁcid dṛṣṭaṁ prayojanam asti.

[204] C. *kramapara-*.
[205] E.g., MŚS. 1.1.3.3; cf. ĀpŚS. 7.3.10, 8.13.2.
[206] See note in Translation.
[207] Viz. MS. 1.3.8 (33.2), KS. 4.2 (30.10), *mantra*, and MS. 4.6.1, KS. 27.4,5, *brāhmaṇa*, after the cups to Indra-Vāyu and Mitra-Varuṇa, MS. 1.3.6, 7; 4.5.8; KS. 4.2 (30.2, 6); 27.3, 4.
[208] MS. 4.6.1 (78.1), KS. 27.5 (144.11). Not in TS.
[209] J. 5.4.1.
[210] *yavāgvāgnihotraṁ juhoti* KS. 6.3 (51.13); cf. TB. 2.1.5.6 *yavāgvā* (sc. *agni° ju°*).

3d pramāṇa; pāṭha

202. padārthabodhakavākyānāṁ yaḥ kramaḥ sa pāṭhakramaḥ. tasmāc ca padārthānāṁ krama āśrīyate. yena hi krameṇa vākyāni paṭhitāni tenai 'va krameṇā 'dhītāny arthapratyayaṁ janayanti; yathārthapratyayaṁ ca padārthānām anuṣṭhānāt.

203. sa ca pāṭho dvividhaḥ: mantrapāṭho brāhmaṇapāṭhaś ce 'ti. tatrā 'gneyāgnīṣomīyayos tattadyājyānuvākyākramād[211] yaḥ krama āśrīyate sa mantrapāṭhāt. sa cā 'yaṁ mantrapāṭho brāhmaṇapāṭhād balavān, anuṣṭhāne brāhmaṇavākyāpekṣayā mantravākyasyā 'ntaraṅgatvāt. brāhmaṇavākyaṁ hi prayogād bahir eve 'dam evaṁ kartavyam ity evam avabodhya kṛtārtham iti na punaḥ prayogakāle vyāpriyate. mantrāḥ punar ananyaprayojanāḥ prayogasamavetārthasmārakā iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tenā 'nuṣṭhānakramasya smaraṇakramādhīnatvāt tatkramasya ca mantrakramādhīnatvād antaraṅgo mantrapāṭha itarasmād iti balavān. ata evā 'gneyāgnīṣomīyayor brāhmaṇapāṭhād[212] ādāv agnīṣomīyānuṣṭhānaṁ paścād āgneyānuṣṭhānam ity evaṁ kramaṁ bādhitvā mantrapāṭhād ādāv āgneyānuṣṭhānaṁ paścād agnīṣomīyasye 'ty eva[213] krama ity uktam.[214]

204. prayājānāṁ samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajatī[215] 'ty evaṁ vidhāyakavākyakramād yaḥ kramaḥ sa brāhmaṇapāṭhakramaḥ. atra ca yady api brāhmaṇavākyāny arthaṁ vidhāya kṛtārthāni, tathā 'pi prayājānāṁ smārakāntarasyā 'bhāvāt tāny eva smārakatvena svīkriyante. tathā ca yena krameṇa tāny adhītāni tenai 'va krameṇā 'rthasmaraṇaṁ janayantī 'ti yuktaṁ tenai 'va krameṇa teṣām anuṣṭhānam iti. tat siddhaṁ prayājānāṁ brāhmaṇapāṭhakramāt krama iti.

205. nanu prayājeṣu prayogasamavetārthasmārakatvaṁ vidhāyakatvena kṛtārthānāṁ brāhmaṇavākyānāṁ kim iti svīkriyate, prayogasamavetārthasmārakāṇāṁ yājyāmantrāṇām[216] āgneyādiṣv ivā 'trā 'pi sattvāt. na ca teṣāṁ devatāsmārakatvāt karmasmārakatvena brāhmaṇavākyaṁ svīkriyata iti vācyam; āgneyādiṣv

[211] See note in Translation.
[212] See note in Translation.
[213] B. *evaṁ*.
[214] J. 5.1.16.
[215] TS. 2.6.1.1; ŚB. 1.5.3.9, 10; KB. 3.4; cf. 300, 116.
[216] Cf. 207, and notes on 300, 94.

api karmasmārakatvena tatsvīkārāpatteḥ. na ce 'ṣṭāpattiḥ. tathā sati brāhmaṇapāṭhān mantrapāṭhasya balīyastvaṁ na syāt. tadbalīyastve hi mantrāṇāṁ prayogasamavetārthasmārakatvam itarasya tadasmārakatvaṁ hetuḥ. yadi ca karmasmārakatvaṁ brāhmaṇavākyasya svīkriyate, tadā pradhānasmārakatvena brāhmaṇavākyasyā 'ntaraṅgatvād aṅgabhūtadevatāsmārakatvena ca mantrāṇāṁ bahiraṅgatvān mantrapāṭhād brāhmaṇapāṭhasyai 'va balīyastvaṁ syāt. tathā ca mantratas tu virodhe syād[217] iti pāñcamikādhikaraṇavirodhaḥ. tatra hi brāhmaṇapāṭhān mantrapāṭhasya balīyastvād ādāv āgneyānuṣṭhānaṁ paścād agnīṣomīyasye 'ty uktam.

206. athā 'gneyādiṣu yājyāmantrā eva devatāprakāśanadvārā karmaprakāśakās tyajyamānadravyoddeśyatvarūpatvād[218] devatātvasye 'ti cet tulyaṁ prayājeṣu. tatrā 'pi hi yājyāmantrā devatāprakāśakāḥ; prayājeṣu devatāyā māntravarṇikatvāt. tathā ca prayājeṣu yājyāmantrāṇāṁ devatāprakāśanadvārā karmaprakāśakatvāt tatkramo mantrapāṭhād eva syān na tu brāhmaṇapāṭhakramāt.

207. na ca mantrapāṭhasyā 'nyādṛśatvāt prayājakramo brāhmaṇapāṭhakramād eve 'ti vācyam. anyādṛśatve tasyai 'va kramasyā 'nuṣṭhānaṁ syāt, mantrakramasya balīyastvāt. abhyāsādhikaraṇe[219] ca vārtikakṛtā kramaviniyuktai[220] 'vaṁliṅgakamantravarṇe[221] 'tyādinā prayājeṣu yājyāmantrāṇāṁ kramaviniyoga uktaḥ. navame[222] tantraratne[223] samidhaḥ samidho 'gna ājyasya vyantv[224] ityādibhiḥ kramaprakaraṇaprāptair[225] mantrair[225] devatā guṇatvena samarpyanta ity uktam. mantrāṇām anyādṛśakramatve tadanupapattiḥ syāt. tat kathaṁ prayājeṣu brāhmaṇapāṭhakramāt krama iti cet,—

208. ucyate: satyam etat. tathā 'pi yatrā 'rthasmārakā mantrā na santy eva, yathā tūṣṇīṁ vihiteṣu karmasu, teṣāṁ

[217] J. 5.1.16.
[218] C. °*deśyatvād.*
[219] J. 2.2.2.
[220] B. °*yuktyai.*
[221] TV. 2.2.2, p. 457 (*'va liṅgamantra°*).
[222] C. and v. l. of B. add *'pi* (v. l. of C. omits).
[223] Probably on J. 9.1.9, which proves that the *devatā* is not of primary importance but a *guṇa* of the rite.
[224] See 300.
[225] C. *prāpta-mantra-*; P. om. *mantrair.*

kramo brāhmaṇapāṭhakramāt, tatra teṣām eva prayogasamavetārthasmārakatvāt. prayājodāharaṇaṁ tu kṛtvācintayā, tatra brāhmaṇavākyānāṁ prayogasamavetārthasmārakatvābhāvāt. yathā 'hur arthavādacaraṇe[226] vārtikakārāḥ: prayājādivākyāny arthaṁ samarpya caritārthāni svarūpasaṁsparśe saty api prayojyatāṁ na pratipadyanta[227] iti. tasmāt samantrakakarmaṇāṁ mantrapāṭhakramāt kramaḥ; amantrakakarmaṇāṁ kramas tu brāhmaṇapāṭhakramād eve 'ti dik.

4th pramāṇa; sthāna

209. prakṛtau nānādeśasthānāṁ[228] padārthānāṁ vikṛtau vacanād ekasmin deśe 'nuṣṭhāne kartavye yasya deśe 'nuṣṭhīyante tasya prathamam anuṣṭhānam itarayoś ca paścāt, ayaṁ yaḥ kramaḥ sa sthānakramaḥ.[229] sthānaṁ nāmo 'pasthitiḥ. yasya hi deśe 'nuṣṭhīyate tatpūrvatane padārthe kṛte sa eva prathamam upasthito bhavatī 'ti yuktaṁ tasya prathamam anuṣṭhānam. ata eva sādyaskre 'gnīṣomīyasavanīyānubandhyānāṁ savanīyadeśe sahānuṣṭhāne kartavya ādau savanīyapaśor anuṣṭhānam, tasmin deśa āśvinagrahaṇānantaraṁ savanīyasyai 'va prathamam upasthiteḥ, itarayos tu paścāt.

210. tathā hi, jyotiṣṭome trayaḥ paśuyāgā agnīṣomīyaḥ savanīya ānubandhyaś ce 'ti. te ca bhinnadeśāḥ. agnīṣomīya aupavasathye 'hni, savanīyaḥ sutyākāle, ānubandhyas tv ante. sādyaskro nāma somayāgaviśeṣaḥ. sa cā 'vyaktatvāj jyotiṣṭomavikāraḥ. atas te trayo 'pi paśuyāgāḥ sādyaskre codakaprāptāḥ. teṣāṁ ca tatra sāhityaṁ śrutam, saha paśūn ālabhete[230] 'ti. tac ca sāhityaṁ savanīyadeśe tasya pradhānapratyāsatteḥ sthānātikramasāmyāc ca.

211. savanīyadeśe hy anuṣṭhāne kriyamāṇe 'gnīṣomīyānubandhyayoḥ svasvasthānātikramamātraṁ bhavati; agnīṣomīyadeśe hy anuṣṭhāne kriyamāṇe savanīyasya svasthānātikramamātram, ānubandhyasya tu svasthānātikramaḥ savanīyasthānātikramaś ca syāt. evam ānubandhyadeśe 'gnīṣomīyasya draṣṭavyaḥ.

[226] J. 1.2d pāda.
[227] TV. 1.2.31, p. 51.
[228] C. °*deśānām;* v. l. text.
[229] Cf. Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 155; it is here called *kāṇḍakrama.*
[230] KŚS. 22.3.28 (*ālabhate*). Cf. J. 5.1.13.

212. tathā ca savanīyadeśe[231] sarveṣām anuṣṭhāne kartavye savanīyasya prathamam anuṣṭhānam. āśvinagrahaṇānantaraṁ hi savanīyadeśaḥ, prakṛtāv āśvinaṁ grahaṁ gṛhītvā trivṛtā yūpaṁ parivīyā 'gneyaṁ savanīyaṁ paśum upākarotī[232] 'ty āśvinagrahaṇānantaraṁ tasya vihitatvāt. tathā ca sādyaskre 'py āśvinagrahaṇe kṛte savanīya evo 'pasthito bhavatī 'ti yuktaṁ tasya sthānāt prathamam anuṣṭhānam itarayoś ca paścād ity uktam.[233]

5th pramāṇa; mukhya

213. pradhānakrameṇa yo 'ṅgānāṁ krama āśrīyate sa mukhyakramaḥ. yena hi krameṇa pradhānāni kriyante tenai 'va cet krameṇa teṣām aṅgāny anuṣṭhīyante, tadā sarveṣām aṅgānāṁ svaiḥ pradhānais tulyaṁ vyavadhānaṁ bhavati; vyutkrameṇa tv anuṣṭhāne keṣāṁcid aṅgānāṁ svaiḥ pradhānair atyantam avyavadhānam anyeṣām atyantaṁ vyavadhānaṁ syāt. tac cā 'yuktam, prayogavidhyavagatasāhityabādhāpatteḥ. ataḥ pradhānakramo 'py aṅgakrame hetuḥ.

214. ata eva prayājaśeṣeṇā 'dāv āgneyahaviṣo 'bhighāraṇaṁ[234] paścād aindrasya dadhnaḥ, āgneyayāgaindrayāgayoḥ paurvāparyāt. atra hi dvayor abhighāraṇayoḥ svena svena pradhānena tulyam ekāntaritavyavadhānaṁ[235] bhavati; āgneyahavirabhighāraṇāgneyayāgayor aindrayāgahavirabhighāraṇena[236] vyavadhānāt, aindrayāgahavirabhighāraṇaindrayāgayoś[236] cā 'gneyayāgena vyavadhānāt.

215. ataś cā 'dāv āgneyahavirabhighāraṇaṁ tata aindrasya haviṣas tata āgneyayāgas tataś cai 'ndro yāga ity evaṁkramo mukhyakramāt siddho bhavati. yadi tv ādāv aindrahaviṣo 'bhighāraṇaṁ tata āgneyasya kriyate, tadā yājyānuvākyākramavaśād ādāv āgneyasyā 'nuṣṭhānād āgneyayāgatadaṅgahavirabhighāraṇayor atyantam avyavadhānam aindrayāgatadaṅgahavirabhighāraṇayor atyantaṁ vyavadhānaṁ syāt. tac ca na yuktam.

[231] B. P. *savanīye deśe.*
[232] See note in Translation.
[233] J. 5.1.13, 2d *varṇaka.*
[234] See note in Translation.
[235] B. *ekāntaritaṁ vya°.*
[236] B. om. *yāga* before *havir.*

ato yuktaḥ prayājaśeṣeṇā[237] 'bhighāraṇasya mukhyakramāt krama iti.

216. sa cā 'sau mukhyakramaḥ pāṭhakramād durbalaḥ. mukhyakramo hi pramāṇāntarasāpekṣapradhānakramapratipattisāpekṣatayā vilambitapratipattikaḥ, pāṭhakramas tu nirapekṣasvādhyāyapāṭhakramamātrasāpekṣatayā na tathe 'ti balavān.

217. ata evā 'gneyopāṅśuyājāgnīṣomīyāṇāṁ krameṇā 'nuṣṭhīyamānānām[238] apy upāṅśuyājājyanirvāpo mukhyakramān na pūrvam anuṣṭhīyate, tasya durbalatvāt, pāṭhakramāt tu paścād anuṣṭhīyate,[239] tasya prabalatvād iti.

218. sa cā 'yaṁ mukhyakramaḥ pravṛttikramād balavān. pravṛttikrame hy āśrīyamāṇe bahūnām aṅgānāṁ pradhānaviprakarṣo bhavati, asmiṅs tv āśrīyamāṇe saṁnikarṣaḥ. tad yathā: darśapūrṇamāsayor ādāv āgneyānuṣṭhānaṁ tataḥ sāṁnāyyasya.[240] taddharmāś[241] ca kecit pūrvam anuṣṭhīyante. tatra yadi pravṛttikramam āśritya taddharmāḥ sarve pūrvam anuṣṭhīyeraṅs tata āgneyadharmās tata āgneyānuṣṭhānaṁ tataḥ sāṁnāyyānuṣṭhānaṁ tadā taddharmāṇāṁ svapradhānena saha dvābhyām āgneyadharmatadanuṣṭhānābhyāṁ viprakarṣaḥ syāt. yadā tu sāṁnāyyadharmāṇāṁ keṣāṁcit pūrvam anuṣṭhāne 'py anye sarve mukhyakramam āśrityā 'gneyadharmānuṣṭhānānantaram anuṣṭhīyante, tadā sarveṣām āgneyadharmasāṁnāyyadharmāṇām ekaikena vijātīyena vyavadhānaṁ bhavati, āgneyadharmāṇāṁ svapradhānena saha sāṁnāyyadharmair vyavadhānāt sāṁnāyyadharmāṇāṁ ca svapradhānena sahā 'gneyānuṣṭhānena vyavadhānād iti na viprakarṣaḥ. tasmān mukhyakramaḥ pravṛttikramād balavān.

6th pramāṇa; pravṛtti

219. sahaprayujyamāneṣu pradhāneṣu saṁnipātinām aṅgānām āvṛttyānuṣṭhāne kartavye dvitīyādipadārthānāṁ prathamānuṣṭhitapadārthakramād yaḥ kramaḥ sa pravṛttikramaḥ.[242]

[237] C. °*śeṣā-bhi*°.
[238] By TS. 2.6.6.4.
[239] By TB. 3.2.4.6, TS. 1.1.4.2; cf. J. 5.1.15.
[240] Replacing the *agnīṣomīya* cake, cf. Hillebrandt, *Rituallliteratur*, 111f.
[241] *dharma* = *aṅga*. See note in Translation.
[242] This sentence is taken almost verbatim from Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 155.

yathā prājāpatyāṅgeṣu. prājāpatyā hi vaiśvadevīṁ kṛtvā prājāpatyaiś carantī[243] 'tivākyena tṛtīyānirdeśāt setikartavyatākā ekakālatvena vihitāḥ. atas teṣāṁ tadaṅgānāṁ co 'pākaraṇaniyojanaprabhṛtīnāṁ sāhityaṁ saṁpādanīyam.

220. tatra prājāpatyānāṁ saṁpratipannadevatākatvenai 'kasmin kāle 'nuṣṭhānād upapadyate sāhityam. tadaṅgānāṁ cai 'kasmin kāle 'nuṣṭhānam aśakyam. na hy anekeṣāṁ paśūnām upākaraṇam ekasmin kāle kartuṁ śakyam. atas teṣāṁ sāhityam avyavadhānenā 'nuṣṭhānāt saṁpādyam, ekasyo 'pākaraṇaṁ kṛtvā 'parasyo 'pākaraṇam iti.

221. ataḥ prājāpatyeṣv ekaṁ padārthaṁ sarvatrā 'nuṣṭhāya dvitīyaḥ padārtho 'nuṣṭheyaḥ. tatra prathamapadārthānuṣṭhānaṁ kasmāccit paśor ārabhya kartavyam. dvitīyas tu padārtho yena krameṇa prathamo 'nuṣṭhitaḥ, tenai 'va krameṇā 'nuṣṭheyaḥ, prayogavidhyavagatasya mitho 'ṅgasāhityasyo 'papattaye.

222. prayogavidhinā hi daikṣe tadaṅgānām upākaraṇaniyojanādīnāṁ mithaḥ sāhityam ānantaryāparaparyāyaṁ vihitam. tac ca sāhityaṁ savanīyapaśau codakena prāptam, tasya prāṇidravyakatvena daikṣavikṛtitvāt. savanīyāc cai 'kādaśineṣu prāptaṁ sutyākālatvasāmānyāt; tebhyaś ca prājāpatyeṣu prāptaṁ gaṇatvasāmānyāt. prājāpatyeṣu ca pratipaśu yāgabhedāc codakā bhidyante. ataś codakāt tattatpaśvaṅgabhūtānām upākaraṇaniyojanādīnāṁ sāhityam ānantaryāparaparyāyaṁ prāptam. ata ekasya paśor upākaraṇānantaram eva niyojanaṁ codakabalāt kartavyatvena prāptam. tat tu na kriyate, pratyakṣavacanāvagatasarvapaśvaṅgasāhityānupapatteḥ.

223. ata ekasmin paśāv upākaraṇe kṛte tadanantaram eva kartavyatvena prāptam api niyojanaṁ na kriyate. pratyakṣavacanabalāt tu paśvantareṣu ṣoḍaśasū 'pākaraṇam eva kriyate. kṛte tu teṣū 'pākaraṇe prathamapaśor niyojanasya tadīyopākaraṇena vyavadhāne pramāṇābhāvāt prathamapaśāv eva niyojanaṁ kāryam. ataś ca yena krameṇo 'pākaraṇaṁ kṛtaṁ tenai 'va krameṇa niyojanaṁ kāryam. evaṁ ca tattatpaśūpākaraṇānāṁ svasvaniyojanais tulyaṁ ṣoḍaśakṣaṇair vyavadhānaṁ bhavati. anyathā keṣāṁcid atyantavyavadhānaṁ keṣāṁcic cā 'vyavadhānaṁ syāt. tac ca na yuktam. tasmād yena krameṇa prathamapadārtho 'nuṣṭhitas tenai 'va dvitīyo

[243] See note in Translation.

'nuṣṭheyaḥ. tat siddhaṁ prathamānuṣṭhitapadārthakramād yo dvitīyapadārthakramaḥ sa pravṛttikrama iti.

224. tad evaṁ nirūpitaḥ saṁkṣepataḥ ṣaḍvidhakramanirūpaṇena prayogavidhivyāpāraḥ.

Adhikāra-vidhi

225. phalasvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhiḥ. phalasvāmyaṁ ca karmajanyaphalabhoktṛtvam. sa ca yajeta svargakāma ity evaṁrūpaḥ. anena hi svargam uddiśya yāgaṁ vidadhatā svargakāmasya yāgajanyaphalabhoktṛtvaṁ pratipādyate. yasyā 'hitāgner agnir gṛhān dahet so 'gnaye kṣāmavate 'ṣṭākapālaṁ puroḍāśaṁ nirvaped[244] ityādibhis tu gṛhadāhādau nimitte karma vidadhadbhir nimittavataḥ karmajanyapāpakṣayarūpaphalasvāmyaṁ pratipādyate.

226. tac ca phalasvāmyaṁ tasyai 'va yo 'dhikāriviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaḥ. adhikāriviśeṣaṇaṁ ca tad eva yat puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvena śrutam. ata eva rājā rājasūyena svārājyakāmo yajete[245] 'ty anena svārājyam uddiśya rājasūyaṁ vidadhatā 'pi na svārājyakāmamātrasya tatphalabhoktṛtvaṁ pratipādyate, kiṁ tu rājñaḥ satas tatkāmasya.

227. kiṁcit tu puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvenā 'śrutam apy adhikāriviśeṣaṇaṁ bhavati; yathā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhā vidyā, agnisādhyeṣu ca karmasv ādhānasiddhāgnimattā, sāmarthyaṁ ca. eteṣāṁ puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvenā 'śravaṇe 'py adhikāriviśeṣaṇatvam asty eva; uttarakratuvidhīnāṁ jñānākṣepaśakter abhāvenā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānavantaṁ praty eva pravṛtteḥ, agnisādhyakarmaṇāṁ cā 'gnyapekṣatvena tadvidhīnām ādhānasiddhāgnimantaṁ praty eva pravṛtteḥ.

228. ata eva ca śūdrasya na yāgādāv adhikāraḥ; tasyā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānābhāvāt, ādhānasiddhāgnyabhāvāc ca, adhyayanasyo 'panītādhikāratvād upanayanasya cā 'ṣṭavarṣaṁ brāhmaṇam upanayīte[246] 'tyādinā traivarṇikādhikāratvāt; ādhā-

[244] TS. 2.2.2.5 (inexact; not found elsewhere).

[245] See 161.

[246] PGS. 2.2.1 is closest to this, but reads *upanayet.* No other GS. seems to read *aṣṭavarṣam.* See J. 6.1.25–38 (7th adhikaraṇa).

nasyā 'pi vasante brāhmaṇo 'gnīn ādadhīte[247] 'tyādinā traivarṇikādhikāratvāt.[248]

229. yady api ca varṣāsu rathakāro 'gnīn ādadhīte[249] 'ty anena rathakārasya saudhanvanāparaparyāyasyā 'dhānaṁ vihitam, yogād rūḍher balīyastvāt, tathā 'pi nā 'syo 'ttarakarmasv adhikāraḥ, adhyayanavidhisiddhajñānābhāvāt. na ca tadabhāva ādhāne 'pi katham adhikāras tadanuṣṭhānasya tatsādhyatvād iti vācyam; tasyā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānābhāve 'pi varṣāsu rathakāro 'gnīn ādadhīte 'ty anenai 'va vidhinā 'dhānamātraupayikajñānākṣepaṇāt; anyathai 'tasyai 'va vidher anupapatteḥ. ataś ca rathakārasyā 'dhānamātre 'dhikāre 'pi no 'ttarakarmasv adhikāro vidyābhāvāt.

230. evaṁ ca tadādhānaṁ nā 'gnisaṁskārārtham, saṁskṛtānām agnīnām uttaratro 'payogābhāvāt, kiṁ tu tadādhānaṁ laukikāgniguṇakaṁ viśvajinnyāyena svargaphalaṁ ca svatantram eva pradhānakarma vidhīyate. agnīn iti ca dvitīyā saktūñ juhotī[250] 'tivat tṛtīyārthe 'ti.

231. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tat siddhaṁ śūdrasyā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānābhāvād ādhānasiddhāgnyabhāvāc ca no 'ttarakarmasv adhikāra iti.

232. nanv evaṁ striyā adhikāro na syāt, tasyā adhyayanapratiṣedhena tadvidhisiddhajñānābhāvāt. na ca nā 'sty eve 'ti vācyam; yajeta svargakāma ityādau svargakāmapadasyo 'ddeśyasamarpakatvena puṁstvasyo 'ddeśyāviśeṣaṇatvād[251] grahaikatvavad avivakṣitatvena striyā adhikārasya sādhitatvād iti cet,—

233. satyam. adhikāraḥ sādhito na tu svātantryeṇa, na strī svātantryam arhatī[252] 'tyādinā tasya niṣiddhatvāt, svātantryeṇa kartṛtve prayogadvayasyā 'pi vaiguṇyāpatteś ca, yajamānaprayoge patnīkartṛkājyāvekṣaṇādilopāt, patnīprayoge ca yajamānakartṛkājyāvekṣaṇādilopāt. ato dampatyoḥ sahādhikāraḥ; sahādhikāratvena yajamānavidyayai 'va patnyā api kāryasiddher na jñānaṁ vinā tasyā adhikāre 'nupapattiḥ;[253] pāṇigrahaṇāt tu sahatvaṁ karmasu tathā puṇyaphaleṣv[254] iti vacanena striyā

[247] TB. 1.1.2.6 (*agnim;* Poona ed. *vasantā,* cf. KS. 8.1 [83.14]); BŚS. 2.12 (53.16), 24.16 (200.4); both TB. and BŚS. *agnim.*

[248] B. °*dhikāritvāt.* [249] See 98.

[250] See note in Translation.

[251] B. P. C. all *uddeśyaviś*°; my em., see note in Translation.

[252] Manu 9.3. [253] C. *adhikārānupa*°.

[254] ApDhS. 2.14.16, 17 (*hi* for *tu*).

adhikāranirṇayāc ca, niṣādasthapater ivā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānavirahiṇo 'py etayā niṣādasthapatiṁ yājayed[255] iti vacanān niṣādeṣṭyām. niṣādasthapatiśabde hi niṣādaṁ sthapatiṁ ce 'ti karmadhārayo na tu niṣādānāṁ sthapatir[256] iti ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣaḥ,[257] ṣaṣṭhyarthe lakṣaṇāpatteḥ.

234. etāvāṅs tu viśeṣaḥ: niṣādasyā 'dhyayanavidhisiddhajñānābhāvenai 'tasyai 'va vidhes tatkarmaupayikajñānākṣepakatvam. patnyās tu tādṛśajñānābhāve 'pi yajamānena sahādhikārāt tasya ca tādṛśajñānavattvāt tenai 'va ca tasyāḥ kāryasiddher no 'ttarakratuvidhīnāṁ jñānākṣepakatvam. ye tu patnīmātrakartṛkāḥ padārthā ājyāvekṣaṇādayas te jñānaṁ vinā 'śakyānuṣṭhānā iti tadvidhīnāṁ tadākṣepakatvaṁ svīkriyata iti.

235. tat siddham adhyayanavidhisiddhajñānasyā 'dhānasiddhāgnimattāyāś co 'ttarakarmasv adhikāriviśeṣaṇatvam iti.

236. evaṁ sāmarthyasyā 'py adhikāriviśeṣaṇatvam; asamarthaṁ prati vidhyapravṛtteḥ, ākhyātānām arthaṁ bruvatāṁ śaktiḥ sahakāriṇī[258] 'ti nyāyāt. tac ca sāmarthyaṁ kāmye karmaṇy aṅgapradhānaviṣayam; na tv aṅgāsamarthaḥ pradhānamātrasamarthaś ca kāmye karmaṇy adhikārī; pradhānavidher aṅgavidhyekavākyatāpannasya sāṅgakarmasamarthaṁ praty eva pravṛtteḥ; yathāviniyogam adhikārāt.[259] yadi hi samarthaṁ praty eva pravṛttau kayācic chrutyā virodhaḥ syāt, tadā 'samarthasyā 'py adhikāraḥ syāt. na ca virodho 'sti, svargakāmaśruteḥ samarthaṁ praty eva pravṛttau virodhābhāvāt, pratyutā 'samarthaṁ prati pravṛttau pradhānavidher aṅgavākyaikavākyatayā pratipannasyā 'ṅgasāhityasya bādhāpatteḥ, nityavacchrutānām aṅgānāṁ pākṣikatvaprasaṅgāc ca. ataḥ sāṅge prayoge samarthasyai 'va kāmye karmaṇy adhikāraḥ.

237. nityakarmaṇāṁ tv aṅgeṣu yathāśaktinyāyaḥ.[260] tāni hi yāvajjīvaśrutyā yāvajjīvaṁ kartavyatvena coditāni.[261] na ca yāvajjīvaṁ kenāpi sāṅgaḥ prayogaḥ kartuṁ śakyate. ato nityakarmasu pradhānamātrasamartho 'dhikārī; aṅgāni tu yā-

[255] MS. 2.2.4 (18.15), reading *tayā*. See J. 6.1.51, 52, where the Bhāṣya reads as our text.

[256] B. *sthapatim*.

[257] B. adds: *tadapekṣayā karmadhārayasya balīyastvāt.*

[258] Bhāṣya on J. 1.4.30 (*ākhyātaśabdānām*). Cf. J. 6.1.42.

[259] J. 6.3.8–10.

[260] J. 6.3.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–7.

[261] See note in Translation.

vanti kartuṁ śakyante, tāvanti kāryāṇī 'ty āstāṁ bahūktyā, sūribhiḥ parākrāntatvāt.

238. tat siddhaṁ phalasvāmyabodhako vidhir adhikāravidhir iti. tad evaṁ nirūpitaṁ caturvidhabhedanirūpaṇena vidheḥ prayojanavadarthaparyavasānam.

[ity āpadevakṛtau mīmāṅsānyāyaprakāśe pūrvārdham.[262]]

[Atho 'ttararārdham.[262]]

Mantra; niyama-vidhi

239. mantrāṇāṁ ca prayogasamavetārthasmārakatayā 'rthavattvam. na tu taduccāraṇam adṛṣṭārtham, dṛṣṭe saṁbhavaty adṛṣṭasyā 'nyāyyatvāt. na ca dṛṣṭasya prakārāntareṇā 'pi saṁbhavān mantrāmnānam anarthakam; mantrair eva smartavyam iti niyamavidhyāśrayaṇāt.

240. sādhanadvayasya pakṣaprāptāv anyatarasya sādhanasyā 'prāptatādaśāyāṁ yo vidhiḥ sa niyamavidhiḥ. yathā 'huḥ:

241. vidhir atyantam aprāpte niyamaḥ pākṣike sati
tatra cā 'nyatra ca prāpte[263] parisaṁkhye 'ti gīyate.[264] iti.

242. asyā 'yam arthaḥ: yasya yadarthatvaṁ pramāṇāntareṇā 'prāptaṁ tasya tadarthatvena yo vidhiḥ so 'pūrvavidhiḥ; yathā yajeta svargakāma ityādiḥ. yāgasya hi svargārthatvaṁ na pramāṇāntareṇa prāptaṁ[265] kiṁ tv anenai 'va vidhine 'ti bhavaty ayam apūrvavidhiḥ.

243. pakṣe 'prāptasya tu yo vidhiḥ sa niyamavidhiḥ; yathā vrīhīn avahantī[266] 'tyādiḥ. anena hi vidhinā 'vaghātasya na vaituṣyārthatvaṁ bodhyate, anvayavyatirekasiddhatvāt; kiṁ tu niyamaḥ. sa cā 'prāptāṅśapūraṇam; vaituṣyasya hi nānopāyasādhyatvād yasyāṁ daśāyām avaghātaṁ parihṛtyo 'pāyāntaraṁ grahītum ārabhate, tasyāṁ daśāyām avaghātasyā 'prāptatvena tadvidhānātmakam aprāptāṅśapūraṇam evā 'nena vidhinā kriyate. ataś ca niyamavidhāv aprāptāṅśapūraṇātmako niyama eva vākyārthaḥ; pakṣe 'prāptatādaśāyām avaghāta-

[262] These lines only in C. Probably there was no such division made by the author.

[263] B. P. *prāptau.*

[264] TV. 1.2.42, p. 59 (printed as prose; *kīrtyate* for *gīyate*).

[265] P. and v. l. of B. C. *jñāyate.*

[266] Cf. TB. 3.2.5.6 *avahanti* (sc. *vrīhīn*).

vidhānam iti yāvat; na tv apūrvavidhāv ivā 'tyantāprāptatayā[267] vidhānam iti.

Parisaṁkhyā-vidhi

244. ubhayasya yugapat prāptāv itaravyāvṛttiparo vidhiḥ parisaṁkhyāvidhiḥ; yathā pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā[268] iti. idaṁ hi vākyaṁ na bhakṣaṇavidhiparam, tasya rāgataḥ prāptatvāt; nā 'pi niyamaparam, pañcanakhāpañcanakhabhakṣaṇasya yugapatprāpteḥ pakṣe 'prāptyabhāvāt; ata idaṁ pañcātiriktapañcanakhabhakṣaṇanivṛttiparam[269] iti bhavati parisaṁkhyāvidhiḥ.

245. sā ca parisaṁkhyā dvividhā, śrautī lākṣaṇikī ce 'ti. tatrā 'tra hy evā 'vapantī[270] 'ty atra śrautī parisaṁkhyā; evakāreṇa pavamānātiriktastotravyāvṛtter abhidhānāt.

246. pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā ity atra tu lākṣaṇikī; itaranivṛttivācakasya padasyā 'bhāvāt. ata evai 'ṣā tridoṣagrastā. doṣatrayaṁ ca śrutahānir aśrutakalpanā prāptabādhaś ce 'ti; śrutasya pañcanakhabhakṣaṇasya hānād aśrutapañcātiriktapañcanakhabhakṣaṇanivṛttikalpanāt[269] prāptasya ca pañcātiriktapañcanakhabhakṣaṇasya[269] bādhanād[271] iti. asmiṅś ca doṣatraye doṣadvayaṁ śabdaniṣṭham, prāptabādhas tu doṣo 'rthaniṣṭha iti dik.

247. tat siddhaṁ mantrair eva smartavyam iti niyamavidhyāśrayaṇān na mantrāmnānam anarthakam. ataś ca yuktaṁ mantrāṇāṁ prayogasamavetārthasmārakatayā 'rthavattvam.

248. tatra ye mantrā yatra paṭhitās teṣāṁ tatra yady arthaprakāśanaṁ prayojanaṁ saṁbhavati, tadā tatrai 'va viniyogaḥ. yeṣāṁ tu na saṁbhavati, teṣāṁ yatra saṁbhavati tatro 'tkarṣaḥ; yathā pūṣānumantraṇamantrāṇām[272] ity uktam. yeṣāṁ kvāpi na saṁbhavati, taduccāraṇasya tv agatyā 'dṛṣṭārthatvam. sarvathā 'pi tu teṣāṁ nā 'narthakyam iti.

267 B. P. °*prāptayāga-vi*°.

268 See note in Translation.

269 B. P. *apañcanakhabhakṣaṇa*° for *pañcātiriktapañca*° etc.; see note in Translation.

270 B. P. '*vayantī*; see note in Translation.

271 C. *bādhād.*

272 C. *pūṣādyanu*°; see 93ff.

Nāmadheya

249. nāmadheyānāṁ vidheyārthaparichedakatayā 'rthavattvam. tathā hi: udbhidā yajeta paśukāma[273] ity atro 'dbhicchabdo yāganāmadheyam. tena ca vidheyārthaparichedaḥ kriyate. anena hi vākyenā 'prāptatvāt phaloddeśena yāgo vidhīyate. yāgasāmānyasya cā 'vidheyatvād yāgaviśeṣa eva vidhīyate. tatra ko 'sau viśeṣa ity apekṣāyām udbhicchabdād udbhidrūpo yāga iti jñāyate; udbhidā yāgene 'ti sāmānādhikaraṇyena nāmadheyānvayāt.

250. tasya ca yajinā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ na nīlotpalādiśabdavat. tatra hy utpalaśabdasyā 'rthād utpalād anyo nīlaśabdasya vācyārtho 'sti nīlaguṇaḥ. lakṣaṇayā tu nīlaśabdasya dravyaparatvena sāmānādhikaraṇyam. udbhicchabdasya tu yajyavagatayāgaviśeṣān nā 'nyo vācyo 'rtho 'sti viśeṣavācitvāt tasya.

251. ataś cā 'rthāntaravācitvābhāvena na nāmadheyasya nīlaśabdavat sāmānādhikaraṇyam, kiṁ tarhi vaiśvadevy āmikṣe[274] 'ty atrā 'mikṣāśabdavat. vaiśvadevīśabdasya hi devatātaddhitāntatvāt taddhitasya ca sā 'sya devate[275] 'ti sarvanāmārthe smaraṇāt sarvanāmnāṁ co 'pasthitaviśeṣavācitvena viśeṣaparatvam. tatra ko 'sau vaiśvadevīśabdopātto viśeṣa ity apekṣāyām āmikṣāpadasāṁnidhyād āmikṣārūpo viśeṣa ity avagamyate. yathā 'huḥ:

252. āmikṣāṁ devatāyuktāṁ vadaty evai 'ṣa taddhitaḥ
āmikṣāpadasāṁnidhyāt tasyai 'va viṣayārpaṇam.[276] iti.

tathā:

253. śrutyai 'vo 'papadasyā 'rthaḥ sarvanāmnā 'bhidhīyate
tadarthas taddhitenai 'vaṁ trayāṇām ekavācyatā.[277] iti.

254. tasmād yathā vaiśvadevīśabdopāttaviśeṣasamarpakatvenā 'mikṣāpadasya vaiśvadevīśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyam evaṁ sāmānyasyā 'vidheyatvād yajyavagatayāgaviśeṣasamarpakatvena nāmadheyasya yajinā sāmānādhikaraṇyam. tat siddhaṁ nāmadheyānāṁ vidheyārthaparichedakatayā 'rthavattvam. yathā 'huḥ: tadadhīnatvād yāgaviśeṣasiddher[278] iti.

[273] PB. 19.7.2; the word *udbhidā* is there supplied from the preceding sentence.

[274] MS. 1.10.1 (140.9); KS. 9.4 (107.4); TB. 1.6.2.5.

[275] P. 4.2.24.

[276] TV. 2.2.23, p. 533.

[277] TV., ibid. (In b, B. P. have *pratīyate* for *'bhidhīyate* of C. and TV.)

[278] TV. 1.4.2, p. 287, l. 1.

255. nāmadheyatvaṁ ca nimittacatuṣṭayāt: matvarthalakṣaṇābhayāt, vākyabhedabhayāt, tatprakhyaśāstrāt, tadvyapadeśāc ce 'ti.

Udbhid is a name

256. tatro 'dbhidā yajeta paśukāma ity atro 'dbhicchabdasya yāganāmadheyatvaṁ matvarthalakṣaṇābhayāt.

257. tathā hi: udbhicchabdasya guṇasamarpakatve yāgānuvādena tāvan na guṇavidhānaṁ yujyate, phalapadānarthakyāpatteḥ. na cā 'nena vākyena phalaṁ prati yāgavidhānaṁ tasmiṅś ca guṇavidhānaṁ yujyate, vākyabhedāpatteḥ. nā 'pi guṇaphalasaṁbandhavidhānaṁ saṁbhavati, parapadārthavidhānena viprakṛṣṭārthavidhānāpatteḥ, dhātvarthasya svarūpeṇā 'vidhānāt taduddeśena vā 'nyasya kasyacid avidhānād dhātor atyantapārārthyāpatteś ca, yajyānarthakyāpatteś ca. na hi tadā 'nena karaṇaṁ samarpyate, guṇasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayāt; nā 'pi phalam, paśor bhāvyatvenā 'nvayāt.

258. atha guṇaphalasaṁbandhavidhāne yāgasyā 'śrayatvena saṁbandha iti cet, na: yajete 'ty atrā 'śrayatvavācakapadābhāvāt. atha siddhānte karaṇatvam ivā 'śrayatvam api lakṣyam iti cet, na: āśrayatvāpekṣayā karaṇatvasya laghutvena tallakṣaṇāyā eva yuktatvāt. phalāya vidhīyamāno guṇo yatra kārakatām āpadyate sa āśrayaḥ, tattvaṁ cā 'śrayatvam; karaṇatvaṁ ca niṣkṛṣṭā śaktir iti lāghavam.

259. kiṁ ca guṇaphalasaṁbandhavidhāne karaṇībhūto guṇas tanniṣṭhaṁ vā karaṇatvaṁ phaloddeśena vidheyam. tatrā 'dye pakṣe karaṇatvasya guṇopasarjanatvena pratītir lakṣaṇayai 'va vācyā, tasya tṛtīyāpratyayārthatvāt prādhānyeno 'pasthiteḥ.

260. yadā 'pi guṇaniṣṭhaṁ karaṇatvaṁ phaloddeśena vidheyaṁ tadā 'pi phalabhāvanāyāṁ karaṇatvenā 'nvayayogyaguṇaniṣṭhakaraṇatvopasthitir lakṣaṇayai 'va vācyā, tṛtīyābhihitasya karaṇakārakasya kriyānvayayogyasya karaṇatvenā 'nvayāyogyatvāt. karaṇaśabdenā 'bhihitaṁ hi karaṇakārakaṁ tattvenā 'nvayayogyaṁ na tṛtīyābhihitam, karaṇaśabdād iva tṛtīyātas tṛtīyotpattiprasaṅgāt.

261. ataś ca karaṇatvenā 'nvayayogyaguṇaniṣṭhakaraṇatvopasthitir lakṣaṇayai 'va vācyā. lakṣaṇayā co 'pasthitakaraṇatvasya karaṇībhūtasya vā guṇasya phalabhāvanāyāṁ yat

karaṇatvaṁ tad api lakṣaṇayai 'va vācyam, śrūyamāṇayā tṛtīyayā guṇamātrasya yāgaṁ prati karaṇatvābhidhānāt. ata eva tantraratne caturthe[279] karaṇībhūtagodohanādeḥ paśvarthatvaṁ samabhivyāhārād ity uktam.

262. ataś ca guṇaphalasaṁbandhavidhāne dhātor atyantapārārthyādibahudoṣavattvād udbhicchabdasya guṇasamarpakatve guṇaviśiṣṭakarmavidhānam eva svīkāryam. tathā sati hi yajinā laghubhūtaṁ karaṇatvamātraṁ lakṣyate, udbhicchabdena ca prakṛtyaṅśena matvarthamātraṁ lakṣyam iti guṇaphalasaṁbandhavidhānāl lāghavaṁ bhavati. dhātor atyantapārārthyādikaṁ tu na bhavaty eva, dhātvarthasyai 'va phaloddeśena vidhānāt. ataś co 'dbhicchabdasya guṇasamarpakatve tena matvarthaṁ lakṣayitvā guṇaviśiṣṭakarmavidhānaṁ svīkāryam, udbhidvatā yāgena paśuṁ bhāvayed iti.

263. karmanāmadheyatve tū 'dbhicchabdasya na matvarthalakṣaṇā, mukhyayai 'va vṛttyā yajisāmānādhikaraṇyena tasyā 'nvayasaṁbhavāt, udbhidā yāgena paśuṁ bhāvayed iti. saṁbhavati ca mukhye 'rthe lakṣaṇā 'śrayituṁ na yuktā. saṁnikṛṣṭavidhānaṁ tu samānam eva.

264. na cai 'vaṁ somena yajete 'ty atrā 'pi somapadasya yāganāmadheyatvāpāto guṇasamarpakatve[280] matvarthalakṣaṇāpatter iti vācyam, somapadasya latāyāṁ rūḍhatvena yāganāmadheyatvānupapatter agatyā lakṣaṇāśrayaṇāt. udbhicchabdasya tu nai 'vaṁ vācyo 'rthaḥ kaścit prasiddhaḥ; udbhidyate 'nene 'ti yogasya tu guṇa iva yāge 'pi phalodbhedanakāriṇy upapatteḥ. tat siddham udbhicchabdasya matvarthalakṣaṇābhayād yāganāmadheyatvam iti.

Citrā is a name

265. citrayā yajeta paśukāma[281] ity atra citrāśabdasya vākyabhedabhayāt karmanāmadheyatvam. tathā hi: na tāvad atra guṇaviśiṣṭayāgavidhānaṁ saṁbhavati, dadhi madhu payo ghṛtaṁ dhānā udakaṁ taṇḍulās tat saṁsṛṣṭaṁ prājāpatyam[282] ity anena vihitatvād yāgasya viśiṣṭavidhānānupapatteḥ. prāp-

[279] See note in Translation.

[280] C. *guṇavidhitve.*

[281] This sentence occurs in TS. 2.4.6.1, and only there so far as I have found; no other *citrā*-sacrifice is known. But see next note, and 269.

[282] See note in Translation.

tasya ca yāgasya phalasaṁbandhe guṇasaṁbandhe ca vidhīyamāne vākyabhedaḥ.

266. atha citrāśabdāc citratvastrītvayoḥ pratipatteḥ strītvasya ca svabhāvataḥ prāṇidharmatvāt prakṛte dadhyādidravyake karmaṇi niveśāyogān nā 'nena vākyena prakṛte karmaṇi guṇavidhānaṁ kiṁ tu prāṇidravyake karmaṇi. tatrā 'sya vākyasyā 'nārabhyādhītatvād anārabhyādhītānāṁ ca prakṛtau vā 'dviruktatvād[283] iti nyāyena prakṛtigāmitvāt, prāṇidravyakāṇāṁ ca yāgānāṁ daikṣasya ce 'tareṣv[284] iti nyāyenā 'gnīṣomīyaprakṛtikatvāt tadanuvādenā 'nena vākyena guṇo vidhīyate.

267. daikṣasya ca jyotiṣṭomāṅgatvena svatantraphalākāṅkṣāyā abhāvāt paśukāmapadaṁ na phalasamarpakam, kiṁ tv agnīṣomīyapaśvarjanāṅgatayā prāptakāmanānuvādaḥ. tathā ca na vākyabheda iti cet, tathā 'pi daikṣānuvādena citratvastrītvavidhāne vākyabhedād viśiṣṭakārakavidhāne 'pi gauravalakṣaṇo vākyabheda eva; kārakasyā 'pi prāptatvena viśiṣṭavidhānānupapatteś ca; kāmapadasyā[285] 'pi svarasataḥ phalaparasya kāmanānuvādatva ānarthakyāpatteś ca. na ca niyamataḥ paśvarjanakāmanā bhavati, kāmanātaḥ prāg eva kenacid datte paśau tadabhāvāt. tathā ca paśukāmapadasya nityavacchravaṇabādhaḥ.

268. daikṣasyo 'tpattiśiṣṭapuṁstvāvaruddhatvena tatra strītvavidhānānupapatteś ca, āmikṣāyāgānuvādena vājinavidhānavat; kṛṣṇasāraṅgo 'gnīṣomīya[286] iti viśeṣavihitena svasaṁnidhipaṭhitena ca kṛṣṇasāraṅgavarṇenā 'varuddhe citratvasyā 'nārabhyādhītena sāmānyaśāstreṇa vidhānānupapatteś ca, pāñcadaśyāvaruddha iva sāptadaśyavidhānam.

269. atha mā bhūd agnīṣomīyapaśvanuvādena citratvastrītvavidhānam; sārasvatī meṣī[287] 'ti vākyavihitayāgāṅgameṣyanuvādena tu guṇavidhānaṁ syāt, citraye 'ti strīkārakānuvādena citratvamātravidhānāt. na ca prākṛtena kṛṣṇasāraṅgavarṇena

[283] J. 3.6.2.
[284] J. 8.1.13.
[285] C. *paśukāma°* (v. l. text); P. and v. l. of B. likewise.
[286] Cf. ĀpŚS. 10.29.5.
[287] Acc. to comm., MS. 4.7.8 (103.6), which reads *meṣī sārasvatī*. This rite is part of the soma-sacrifice (cf. TS. 6.6.5.1, KS. 29.9 etc.), and cannot be related to the *citrā iṣṭi* of TS. 2.4.6.1. This is an additional reason for doubting whether the *citrā* example is meant to refer to that TS. passage; cf. notes on 265.

nairākāṅkṣyān na citratvavidhānaṁ yuktam iti vācyam; upadiṣṭena citratvenā 'tidiṣṭasya varṇāntarasya bādhopapatter iti cet—

270. mai 'vam. na hi citraye 'ty ekena padena strīkārakasyo 'ddeśaḥ citratvasya ca vidhānaṁ saṁbhavati; ekaprasaratābhaṅgalakṣaṇavākyabhedāpatteḥ; uddeśyavidheyabhāvasyā 'nekapadasādhyatvāt. ata eva vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamabhakṣa[288] ity atra viśiṣṭabhakṣavidhir na tu bhakṣānuvādena prāthamyavidhir ity uktaṁ tṛtīye.[289]

271. meṣyanuvādena citratvavidhāne phalapadānarthakyāpatteś ca; ubhayavidhāne vākyabhedāt, prakṛtasya ca yāgasya phalākāṅkṣāyā anivṛtteḥ. viśvajinnyāyena phalakalpane gauravam; dadhimadhvityādyutpattivākyenai 'tasyā 'dhikāravākyasya pratipannaikavākyatābādhena vākyabhedaprasaṅgāc ca.

272. citrāśabdasya tu karmanāmadheyatve prakṛtasya karmaṇaḥ phalākāṅkṣasya phalasaṁbandhamātrakaraṇān na vākyabhedaḥ; prakṛtāyā iṣṭer anekadravyakatvena citrāśabdasya tatro 'papatteḥ. tat siddhaṁ vākyabhedabhayāc citrāśabdaḥ karmanāmadheyam iti.

Agnihotra is a name (*tatprakhya-nyāya*)

273. agnihotraṁ juhotī[290] 'ty atrā 'gnihotraśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvaṁ tatprakhyaśāstrāt. tasya guṇasya prakhyāpakasya prāpakasya śāstrasya vidyamānatvenā 'gnihotraśabdaḥ karmanāmadheyam iti yāvat. tathā hi:

274. vidhinā tāvat tad eva vidheyaṁ yat prakārāntareṇā 'prāptam; aprāpte śāstram arthavad[291] iti nyāyāt. agnihotraśabdasya ca guṇavidhitve yo guṇas tena vidheyaḥ sa śāstrāntareṇa prāptaḥ. katham iti cet, śṛṇu.

275. yadi tāvad agnau hotram asminn iti saptamīsamāsam āśritya homādhāratvenā 'gnir vidheya ity ucyeta, tadā yad āhavanīye juhotī[292] 'ty anenai 'va prāptatvād vidhyānarthakyam.

276. athā 'gnaye hotram asminn iti caturthīsamāsam āśrityā 'gnirūpadevatā 'nena samarpyata iti cet, na; śāstrāntareṇa

[288] See 199.
[289] J. 3.5.31.
[290] See note in Translation.
[291] See note in Translation.
[292] See 73.

prāptatvāt. kiṁ tac chāstrāntaram iti ced atra kecid yad agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhotī[293] 'ti śāstrāntareṇa homānuvādenā 'gniprajāpatyor vidhānān nā 'gnihotrapadaṁ devatāsamarpakam. na co 'bhayavidhāne vākyabhedaḥ. parasparanirapekṣavidhāne hi vākyabhedaḥ syāt, agnaye juhoti prajāpataye juhotī 'ti pratyekaṁ vidhivyāpārāt. caśabdaśravaṇāt tu parasparasāpekṣasyai 'va padadvayasyā 'khyātānvayān na vākyabhedaḥ.

277. ata evar 'tvigbhyo dakṣiṇāṁ dadātī[294] 'ti vākyavihitadakṣiṇānuvādena gauś cā 'śvaś cā 'śvataraś ca gardabhaś cā 'jāś cā 'vayaś ca vrīhayaś ca yavāś ca tilāś ca māṣāś ca tasya dvādaśaśataṁ dakṣiṇā[295] itivākyena gavādīnāṁ vidhānaṁ daśamoktaṁ[296] saṁgacchate, parasparasāpekṣāṇāṁ gavādīnāṁ vidhānena vākyabhedābhāvāt. anyathā dakṣiṇānuvādenā 'nekeṣāṁ gavādīnāṁ vidhānaṁ nai 'va saṁgacchete 'ti.

278. agniprajāpatyoś ca devatayoḥ satoḥ samuccayo na tu samuccitayor devatātvam, pṛthakkārakavibhaktiśravaṇāt; cakārārthasya vibhaktyarthenā 'nvayāt tasyā 'prādhānyāt. ataś ca nā 'gnīṣomādivad agniprajāpatyor devatātvam iti.

279. anye tv ācāryā āhuḥ: yad[297] agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhotī 'tivākyaṁ nā 'gneḥ prāpakam, homānuvādena prajāpatividhānāt. na ca vinigamanāvirahād ubhayavidhānaṁ yuktam iti vācyam; vidhinā hi tad eva vidhīyate yat prakārāntareṇā 'prāptam. tatra yathā 'nena vākyena sāyaṁkālo na vidhīyate, sāyaṁ juhotī[298] 'ti vacanāntareṇa prāptatvāt, tathā 'gnir api na vidhīyate 'gnir jyotir jyotir agniḥ svāhe[299] 'ti mantravarṇād eva prāptatvāt. mantravarṇasyā 'pi devatāsamarpakatvam asty eva. ata evo 'pāṅśuyāje viṣṇvādīnāṁ māntravarṇikaṁ devatātvam ity uktam.[300]

280. nanv evaṁ prajāpatidevatayā 'gner bādhaḥ syāt. caturthyā hi prajāpater devatātvam avagamyate, agnes tu māntravarṇikam. tatra sā 'sya devate[301] 'ti devatātve tad-

[293] See note in Translation.
[294] Cf. MS. 4.8.3 (110.1) *ṛtvigbhyo dadāti;* J. 10.2.22ff.
[295] Cf. PB. 16.1.10–11; see note in Translation.
[296] J. 10.3.57.
[297] B. P. om.
[298] MS. 1.8.1 (115.7), 6 (124.11) etc., TB. 2.1.2.7, etc.
[299] MS. 1.6.10 (102.11), 1.8.1 (115.2), 1.8.5 (121.1); TB. 2.1.9.2.
[300] J. 2.2.9, 10.
[301] P. 4.2.24.

dhitasmaraṇavad yady api devatātve caturthīsmaraṇaṁ nā 'sti, saṁpradāne caturthī[302] 'ti saṁpradāne tasyāḥ smaraṇāt, tathā 'pi tyajyamānadravyoddeśyatvaṁ tāvad devatātvam. tac ca saṁpradānasvarūpāntargatam, tyajyamānadravyoddeśyatve sati pratigrahītṛtvasya saṁpradānatvāt. ataś caturthītaḥ saṁpradānaikadeśatayā devatātvapratītir asty eva. mantravarṇāt tu na devatātvaṁ pratīyate, kiṁ tv adhiṣṭhānamātram. ataś ca mantravarṇaś caturthīto durbalaḥ. yathā 'huḥ:

281. taddhitena caturthyā vā mantravarṇena vā punaḥ
devatāyā vidhis tatra durbalaṁ tu paraṁ param.[303] iti.

282. ataś ca prabalapramāṇabodhitaprajāpatidevatayā durbalapramāṇabodhitāgner bādhaḥ syād iti cet—

283. satyam. syād bādho yadi prajāpataye juhotī 'ti kevalaṁ prajāpatividhānaṁ syāt. vidhīyamānas tu prajāpatir mantravarṇaprāptam agnim anūdya tatsamuccito homoddeśena vidhīyate; samuccitobhayavidhānāpekṣayā 'nyataḥ prāptam agnim anūdya tatsamuccitaprajāpatimātravidhāne lāghavāt. ataś ca na bādhakatvam, nirapekṣavidhānābhāvāt. yathā ca tvanmate 'gniprajāpatyor ekahomoddeśena vidhānāt tulyārthatvena vikalpe prasakte prajāpater na pākṣikam agnibādhakatvam, samuccayavidhānāt; evaṁ mantravarṇaprāptam agnim anūdya tatsamuccitaprajāpatividhāne 'pi na bādhakatvam iti tulyam.

284. yat tv agner māntravarṇikatve 'gnir jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhe[304] 'ti miśraliṅgamantravarṇabalāt sāyaṁhomasya dvidaivatyatvāpattir iti, tan na; agnisamuccitaprajāpatividhānavat sūryasamuccitasyā 'vidhānāt prabalapramāṇabodhitena prajāpatinā mantravarṇaprāptasya sūryasya bādhitatvāt.

285. yat tv agner māntravarṇikatve prajāpatividher ekenai 'va vākyena siddheḥ,[305] yad agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhotī 'ti, yat sūryāya ca prajāpataye ca prātar juhotī[306] 'ti, vākyadvayaṁ vyartham iti, tan na. bhaved vyarthaṁ yadi prajāpatimātravidhānaṁ vivakṣitaṁ syāt, sāyaṁhome 'gnisa-

[302] P. 2.3.13 (transposing the words).

[303] TV. 2.2.23, p. 531: reading *ceṣyate* for *vā punaḥ*, *devatāsaṁgatis tatra* for pāda c, and *ca* for *tu*.

[304] TB. 2.1.2.10. Apparently only the Tait. school used this mantra; see Concordance.

[305] B. P. *siddhe* (B. v. l. text).

[306] Cf. MS. 1.8.7 (125.5), *sūryāya ca prajāpataye ca prātaḥ;* as in 276, q. v. with note in Translation.

muccitaprajāpatividhānam, prātarhome sūryo jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhe[307] 'ti mantravarṇaprāptasūryasamuccitaprajāpatividhānaṁ ca vivakṣitam. na cai 'tad ekena vākyena sidhyati. ato 'rthavad vākyadvayam.

286. yat tv agner māntravarṇikatve mantravarṇasyā 'gnir jyotir jyotir agniḥ svāhe 'ti sāyaṁ juhotī[308] 'tivākyena sāyaṁhome viniyuktatvāt tatprakāśyasyā 'gner api prajāpatisamuccitasya tatrai 'va devatātvāvagater yad agnaye ce 'ti vākye sāyaṁśabdo vyartha iti. evaṁ yat sūryāya ce 'ti vākye prātaḥśabdo vyartha iti. kiṁ ca mantravarṇena jyotiṣṭvaguṇaviśiṣṭasyā 'gneḥ prakāśanād viśiṣṭasyai 'va devatātvāpāta iti—

287. tad api na, homānuvādena devatādvayavidhāne 'pi mantravarṇayor liṅgād eva prāptisaṁbhavāt tadvidhyānarthakyāt; miśraliṅgamantravidhiparyudastayoḥ pratiprasavārthaṁ vidhāne 'pi tadvidhigatayoḥ sāyaṁprātaḥśabdayor ānarthakyam, vidhīyamānayor mantrayor vyavasthayai 'va prāptisaṁbhavāt tatprakāśyayor devatayor vyavasthitatvāt. anuvādatvoktis tū 'bhayatra tulye 'ti.

288. māntravarṇikatve 'py agneḥ kevalasyai 'va devatātvaṁ na guṇaviśiṣṭasya, yad agnaye ce 'tivākye 'gneḥ pūrvāhutir[309] ity atra ca kevalasyai 'vā 'gneḥ saṁkīrtanāt kevalasyai 'va devatātvāvagateḥ. yathā hy upāṅśuyāje viṣṇvāder māntravarṇikatve 'pi na guṇaviśiṣṭasya devatātvaṁ viṣṇur upāṅśu yaṣṭavya[310] ity arthavāde kevalasyai 'va saṁkīrtanāt, tadvad iti.

289. ataś ca māntravarṇikatve doṣābhāvād devatādvayavidhāne ca gauravāpatter anyataḥ prāptam agnim anūdya tatsamuccitaḥ prajāpatir evā 'tra vidhīyate; homānuvādeno 'bhayavidhāne vākyabhedaprasaṅgāc ca.

290. na ca cakāraśravaṇān na vākyabheda iti vācyam. cakārārtho hi samuccayaḥ. taṁ ca samuccayaṁ yadi cakāraḥ prādhānyena brūyāt, tadā pradhānasyā 'nekaviśeṣaṇasaṁgrāhakatvād āruṇyādiviśiṣṭakrayavidhāna iva kārakadvayasamuccayavidhāne vākyabhedo na bhavet. na ca cakāraḥ samuccayaṁ prādhānyena brūte, paropasarjanatvenai 'vā 'bhidhānāt.

291. ata eva daśame[311] bhāṣyakāraiś cakārasya samuccaya-

[307] MS. 1.6.10 (102.12); TB. 2.1.9.2.
[308] TB. 2.1.9.2.
[309] TB. 2.1.7.1.
[310] See note in Translation.
[311] On J. 10.3.57.

śabdād vailakṣaṇyaṁ pratipāditam. samuccayaśabdo hi taṁ prādhānyena brūte, na cakāraḥ. yadi hi prādhānyena brūyāt tadā tatpratipannaḥ samuccayaḥ kriyāguṇaiḥ saṁbadhyeta; samuccayaḥ śobhanaḥ, samuccayo draṣṭavya itivat, ca śobhanaś ca draṣṭavya iti prayogaḥ syāt; samuccayaśabdavac cakārasya prādhānyena samuccayavācitve dhavakhadirayoḥ samuccaya itivad dhavakhadirayoś ce 'ty api prayogaḥ syād iti.

292. ataś cakāraḥ samuccayaṁ prādhānyena na brūte, yena pradhānasyai 'kasya vidhānān na vākyabhedo bhavet. kiṁ tu kārakadvayopasarjanatvenai 'va sa taṁ brūte. samuccitāv agniprajāpatī iti pradhānadvayavidhāne ca vākyabhedaḥ syād eva; yathā grahoddeśena saṁmārgaikatvavidhāne.

293. yady api cakāraḥ samuccayaṁ prādhānyena brūyāt, tathā 'pi tasya kārakadvayaṁ prati prādhānyam anupapannam, vibhaktyabhihitasya kārakadvayasya kriyopasarjanatvena samuccayopasarjanatvābhāvāt. kṛdantādiśabdair upasthitaṁ hi kārakaṁ kriyāto 'nyena saṁbadhyate; kārakasamuccayaḥ karaṇasamuccaya iti. vibhaktyabhihitaṁ tu kriyayai 'va, kārakāṇāṁ tayai 'vā 'nvayāt. ataś cakāreṇo 'cyamānaḥ sa kārakopasarjanatvenai 'vo 'cyate. kārakadvayaṁ ca pradhānam. ekoddeśena ca pradhānadvayavidhāne vākyabheda eva. yathā 'huḥ:

294. anekapadasaṁbaddhaṁ yady ekam api kārakam
tathā 'pi tad anāvṛttaiḥ pratyayair na vidhīyate.[312] iti.

295. yac ca yathā dakṣiṇānuvādena gavādīnām anekeṣāṁ vidhāne na vākyabhedas tathā kārakadvayavidhāne 'pī 'ti, tan na. na hi gauś cā 'śvaś ce 'ty asmin vākye dakṣiṇānuvādena gavādayo vidhīyante, uktarītyā vākyabhedāpatteḥ. cakāreṇa kathaṁcit parihāre 'pi gavādīnām anekeṣāṁ dvādaśaśatasaṁkhyāyāś ca vidhāne vākyabheda eva. ādhvaryavaśākhāyāṁ gauś ce 'tyādes tasya dvādaśaśatam ityantasya sahaśrutatvena cā 'syai 'kavākyatvam ity uktaṁ daśame.[313]

296. ato 'nena vākyeno 'bhayaviśiṣṭā dakṣiṇai 'va vidhīyate. viśiṣṭavidhānāc ca na vākyabhedaḥ. ata eva pārthasārathimiśrair daśame tatra tatra so 'bhayaviśiṣṭā vidhīyata[314] iti, anekagavādyātmikai 'kā dakṣiṇā vidhīyata[315] iti co 'ktam.

[312] TV. 2.2.16, p. 503.
[313] J. 10.3.57.
[314] ŚD. on J. 10.3.11th adhikaraṇa, p. 687, 1.5.
[315] ŚD. on J. 10.3.15th adhikaraṇa (14th in ŚD.), p. 691, 1.1.

297. na cai 'vam ṛtvigbhyo dakṣiṇāṁ dadātī 'ty asyā 'narthakyam, tasyā 'nuvādatvāt, ṛtviksaṁbandhaparatvād vā. dakṣiṇāśabdasāmarthyād dhy ṛtvijāṁ camasādhvaryvādīnāṁ ca tatsaṁbandhaḥ syāt. etadvākyasattve ca na bhavati, ṛtvikśabdasya brahmādigatartuyajananimittatvena camasādhvaryūṇām ṛtviktvābhāvasya tṛtīya[316] uktatvāt.

298. ataś ca gauś cā 'śvaś ce 'ty asmin vākye viśiṣṭavidhānān na vākyabhedaḥ. yad agnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhotī 'ti tu na viśiṣṭavidhānam, homasyā 'gnihotraṁ juhotī 'ty anena prāptatvāt. ataś ca homānuvādena samuccitobhayavidhāne vākyabhedād gauravāpatteś ca nā 'nena vākyena devatādvayaṁ vidhīyate, kiṁ tu mantravarṇaprāptam agnim anūdya tatsamuccitaḥ prajāpatir homoddeśena vidhīyate.

299. ataś ca ne 'dam agneḥ prāpakaṁ kiṁ tu mantravarṇa eva. ataś ca tenā 'gneḥ prāptatvān nā 'gnihotrapadaṁ devatāsamarpakaṁ kiṁ tarhi nāmadheyam eva. tat siddham etat tatprakhyaśāstrād agnihotraśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvam iti.

300. evaṁ prayājeṣu samidādidevatānāṁ samidhaḥ samidho 'gna ājyasya vyantv[317] ityādimantravarṇebhyaḥ prāptatvāt samidho yajatī[318] 'tyādiṣu samidādiśabdās tatprakhyaśāstrāt karmanāmadheyāni. yathā 'huḥ:

301. vidhitsitaguṇaprāpi śāstram anyad yatas tv iha
tasmāt tatprāpaṇaṁ vyartham iti nāmatvam iṣyate.[319]

iti dik.

Śyena is a name

302. śyenenā 'bhicaran yajete[320] 'ty atra śyenaśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvaṁ tadvyapadeśāt, tena vyapadeśa upamānaṁ tadanyathānupapattye 'ti yāvat. tathā hi, yad vidheyaṁ tasya stutir bhavati. tad yady atra śyeno vidheyaḥ syāt, tadā 'rthavā-

[316] J. 3.7.33.

[317] TB. 3.5.5.1, MS. 4.10.3 (149.2), KS. 20.15 (35.12); but *samidhaḥ* is not repeated in these. It is repeated, among texts found in the Concordance, only in AŚS. 2.8.6 (which repeats *agne*), MŚS. 5.1.2.6 (where Knauer by a different punctuation eliminates one *samidhaḥ*), and ŚSS. 1.7.1.

[318] KB. 3.4, TS. 2.6.1.1, etc.; cf. 116, 94 with note in Translation.

[319] TV. 1.4.4, p. 296.

[320] ĀpŚS. 22.4.13; cf. ṢB. 3.8.2. Bhāṣya on J. 1.4.5 *athaiṣa śye°* etc.; cf. ṢB. 3.8.1 *athaiṣa śyenaḥ*, 2 *abhicaran yajeta*.

dais tasyai 'va stutiḥ kāryā. na ca yathā vai śyeno nipatyā 'datte, evam ayaṁ dviṣantaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ nipatyā 'datta[321] ity anenā 'rthavādena śyenaḥ stotuṁ śakyaḥ, śyenopamānenā 'rthāntarastuteḥ kriyamāṇatvāt. na ca śyenopamānena sa eva stotuṁ śakyate, upamānopameyabhāvasya bhinnaniṣṭhatvāt. yadā tu śyenasaṁjñako yāgo vidhīyate, tadā 'rthavādena śyenopamānena tasya stutiḥ kartuṁ śakyata iti śyenaśabdasya tadvyapadeśād yāganāmadheyatvam. tat siddhaṁ nimittacatuṣṭayān nāmadheyatvam.[322]

No fifth criterion for names (*vaiśvadeva-nyāya*)

303. utpattiśiṣṭaguṇabalīyastvam api pañcamaṁ kecin nāmadheyatve nimittam āhuḥ; vaiśvadevena yajete[323] 'ty atra vaiśvadevaśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvam utpattiśiṣṭaguṇabalīyastvāt, uktamatvarthalakṣaṇādiprakāracatuṣṭayāsaṁbhavāt.

304. tathā hi: na tāvan matvarthalakṣaṇābhayān nāmadheyatvaṁ yuktam iti vaktuṁ śakyam,[324] vaiśvadevene 'ti taddhitenai 'va matvarthasya yāgasyo 'ktatvāt. sā 'sya devate[325] 'ty asminn arthe hi taddhitasmaraṇam. tatrā 'syaśabdasya taddhitāntargatasya yady api sūktahaviṣor iti smṛteḥ[326] sūkte haviṣi vā mukhyatvam avagatam, tathā 'pi sarvanāmnām upasthitavācitvāt sūktahaviṣoś cā 'trā 'nupasthitatvād yajete 'ty upasthitaṁ yāgam evā 'syaśabdo 'bhidhatta iti na yāge matvarthalakṣaṇā. viśvadevarūpaikadevatāvidhānāc ca na vākyabhedaḥ.

305. nā 'pi tatprakhyaśāstrān nāmatvam. yatra hi vidhitsito guṇo 'nyataḥ prāptaḥ, tatra tatprakhyaśāstrān nāmadheyatvam, yathā 'gnihotraśabde. atra cā 'gneyādayo 'ṣṭau yāgāḥ prakṛtāḥ. tatrā'mikṣāyāge yady api viśvedevāḥ prāptā vaiśvadevy āmikṣe[327] 'ti, tathā 'pi[328] saptasu teṣām aprāptatvād vaiśvadevena yajete

[321] Cf. ṢB. 3.8.3 (inexact).

[322] C. and v. l. of B. *karmanāma°* (v. l. of C. text).

[323] MS. 1.10.8 (148.20); cf. TB. 1.4.10.1 (*yajate*), KS. 36.3 (70.13; *yajate*).

[324] C. and v. l. of B. *°dheyatvaṁ vaktuṁ yuktam* (v. l. of C. text).

[325] P. 4.2.24.

[326] Seems to refer to Kāśikāvṛtti on this rule of Pāṇini, from which this principle can be deduced.

[327] See 251.

[328] B. om.

'ty anena tatra tadvidhāne na tatprakhyaśāstram anyad yena tadvaśān nāmatvaṁ syāt.

306. na cā 'mikṣāyāgasyai 'vai 'tan nāme 'ti vācyam; vaiśvadevena yajete 'ti vākyavaiyarthyāpatteḥ. vaiśvadevaśabdasyā 'mikṣāyāgamātranāmatve sa eva yāgo 'nenā 'nūdyeta. na ca tadanuvādenā 'sti kiṁcit kṛtyam; prācīnapravaṇe vaiśvadevena yajete[329] 'ti vidhīyamānasya prācīnapravaṇadeśasya vinā 'py etad vākyam āmikṣāyāga eva saṁbandhopapatteḥ, viśvadevasaṁbandhāt tasya.

307. āgneyādyaśeṣaprakṛtayāganāmatve tu na vaiśvadevena yajete 'ti vākyānarthakyam. tadā hy anenā 'ṣṭau yāgā anūdyante. anuvādena cai 'kapratītyārūḍhatvāt samuditānām aṣṭānām api vaiśvadevaśabdo nāmadheyaṁ sidhyati. evaṁ ca prācīnapravaṇe vaiśvadevena yajete 'ty atra vaiśvadevaśabdenā 'ṣṭau yāgān anūdya prācīnapravaṇavidhānaṁ tatra siddhaṁ bhavati. tadvākyasyā 'sattve[330] 'nena vākyenā 'mikṣāyāga eva prācīnapravaṇadeśasaṁbandhaḥ syāt. ataś cā 'ṣṭasu yāgeṣu prācīnapravaṇadeśasaṁbandha evai 'tadvākyaprayojanam.[331] evaṁ ca vaiśvadevaśabdo 'ṣṭānāṁ nāmadheyam.

308. na ca tatra tatprakhyaśāstraṁ nimittaṁ saṁbhavati, saptasu viśvedevāprāpteḥ.[331a] ato na vaiśvadevaśabdasya tatprakhyaśāstrān nāmadheyatvam iti. nā 'pi tadvyapadeśāt, tādṛśasya vyapadeśasyā 'nupalambhāt. ataś ca vaiśvadevaśabdasya nāmadheyatva uktaprakāracatuṣṭayasyā 'nimittatvād utpattiśiṣṭaguṇabalīyastvam eva nimittam. tathā hi:

309. vaiśvadevena yajete 'ty atra na tāvad aprakṛtakarmānuvādena devatāvidhānaṁ saṁbhavati, teṣām atrā 'nupasthiteḥ. nā 'pi devatāviśiṣṭakarmāntaravidhānaṁ saṁbhavati, gauravāpatteḥ; aṣṭau havīṅṣī[332] 'ty ananyagatikaliṅgavirodhāt.

310. ato 'nena prakṛtakarmānuvādena[333] devatā vidhīyanta iti vaktavyam. tatrā 'mikṣāyāge viśvadevaprāpteḥ saptasu yāgeṣv anena vākyena viśvedevā vidhīyanta iti vaktavyam. na ca tat saṁbhavati, teṣām utpattiśiṣṭāgnyādyavarodhāt. ākāṅkṣayā hi

[329] MŚS. 1.7.1.5; cf. KS. 36.2 (69.15) *pravaṇe yajeta*, MS. 1.10.7 (147.13) *pravaṇe yaṣṭavyam.*

[330] C. inserts *tu.*

[331] C. *eva tadvāk°.*

[331a] C. *viśva°.*

[332] MS. 1.10.8 (148.5); TB. 1.6.3.3.

[333] B. *prākṛta°.*

saṁbandho bhavati. āgneyādiyāgānāṁ hi devatākāṅkṣo 'tpattiśiṣṭair agnyādibhir eva nivṛtte 'ti na tatra viśvadevavidhānaṁ yuktam. ataś co 'tpattiśiṣṭaguṇabalīyastvād vaiśvadevaśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvam iti. yathā 'huḥ:

311. guṇāntarāvaruddhatvān nā 'vakāśyo guṇo 'paraḥ
vikalpo 'pi na vaiṣamyāt tasmān nāmai 'va yujyate.[334]

iti.

312. anye tv ācāryā āhuḥ: yaḥ śabdo yatra karmaṇi yadguṇasaṁbandhaṁ bodhayati, sa cet saṁbandhaḥ śāstrāntarapratipannaḥ, tadā tasya śabdasya tannāmadheyatvaṁ tatprakhyaśāstrāt. tac ca śāstrāntaraṁ vidhir vā 'rthavādo ve 'ty atrā 'nādaraḥ. tatrā 'gnihotraśabde 'gnisaṁbandhabodhakaṁ śāstrāntaraṁ vidhir eva. vaiśvadevaśabdaś ca viśvadevasaṁbandhaṁ karmaṇi bodhayati. viśvadevasaṁbandhaś cā 'ṣṭasu yāgeṣu yad viśvedevāḥ samayajanta tad vaiśvadevasya vaiśvadevatvam[335] ity arthavādāvagataḥ.

313. na ca vidhir eva tatprakhyaśāstraṁ nā 'rthavāda ity atra kiṁcit pramāṇam asti. ata eva jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajete[336] 'ty atra jyotiṣṭomaśabda etāni vāva tāni[337] jyotīṅṣi ya etasya stomāḥ,[338] ity arthavādāvagataṁ jyotiḥsaṁbandhaṁ nimittīkṛtya somayāge pravartamānas tatprakhyaśāstrān nāmadheyaṁ bhavati. evaṁ prakṛte 'pi draṣṭavyam, pañcamaprakārakalpane pramāṇābhāvāt. ata eva vaiśvadevādhikaraṇe[339] vārtikakārair evam upasaṁhṛtam: tatprakhyatayai 'va sarveṣāṁ nāmadheyatvam[340] iti. yac co 'tpattiśiṣṭaguṇabalīyastvam uktaṁ tadguṇavidhyasaṁbhave yuktyabhyuccayamātram. tat siddhaṁ tatprakhyaśāstrād vaiśvadevaśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvam iti.

314. nanu paśusomādhikaraṇa[341] aindravāyavaṁ gṛhṇātī[342] 'tyādau na yajikalpanaṁ somena yajete[343] 'ti pratyakṣayajiśruter

[334] TV. 1.4.13, p. 309 (*'vakāśo* in b).
[335] TB. 1.4.10.5.
[336] See 23.
[337] B. P. *tāni vā etāni* for *etāni* etc.
[338] TB. 1.5.11.2.
[339] J. 1.4.10th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 13–16.
[340] TV. 1.4.13, p. 310.
[341] J. 2.2.6th adhikaraṇa, sūtras 17–20.
[342] ĀpŚS. 12.14.8, MŚS. 2.3.5.4, KŚS. 9.6.6.
[343] See 12.

ity uktam.[344] tena nyāyena vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ty atrā 'pi yajikalpanā mā 'stu, vaiśvadevena yajete 'ty atra pratyakṣayajiśruteḥ. evaṁ cā 'nenai 'va vākyena devatāviśiṣṭakarmavidhānam astu. tasya ca dravyākāṅkṣāyāṁ vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ti dravyavidhānam astu. evaṁ ca na vākyadvayasyā 'py anuvādatvam; nā 'py aṣṭau havīṅṣī 'ty ananyagatikaliṅgavirodho bhaved iti cet—

315. mai 'vam. vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ty atra yajyakalpana āmikṣā kimanuvādena vidhīyata iti vaktavyam. viśvadevānuvādena dravyavidhāne dravyasya devatāṅgatvam eva syāt, na yāgāṅgatvam. kiṁ ca vaiśvadevīśabdo devatātaddhitatvād āmikṣāṁ tattvena[345] brūta ity uktam. tatra viśvadevānuvādena dravyavidhānaṁ vaiśvadevīśabdenai 'va kartavyam, padaśruteḥ; yathā bhāvanāyāṁ karaṇasamarpaṇaṁ dhātunai 'va kriyate padaśruteḥ, na tū 'papadene 'ty uktaṁ bhāvārthādhikaraṇe,[346] tadvat. tatra ca vaṣaṭkartuḥ prathamabhakṣa[347] itivad ekaprasaratāvirodhaḥ. ato yāgānuvādenā 'pi dravyavidhānārthaṁ vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ty atra yajikalpanaṁ tāvad avaśyaṁ kartavyam.

316. ataś[348] ca paśusomādhikaraṇanyāyavaiṣamyam, aindravāyavaṁ gṛhṇātī 'ty atra devatāviśiṣṭagrahaṇavidhānena yajyakalpanāt; yajikalpane ca vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ty atrai 'va dravyadevatāviśiṣṭakarmavidhānaṁ yuktaṁ rūpadvayaśravaṇāt. evaṁ cā 'gneyo 'ṣṭākapālaḥ saumyaś carur[349] ityādivākyair vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'tivākyasya prāyapāṭho rakṣito bhavati. anyathā hi teṣu sarveṣu dravyadevatāsaṁbandhakalpitayāgavidhānam atra ca dravyamātravidhānam iti vairūpyaṁ prasajyeta.

317. kiṁ ca vaiśvadevena yajete 'ty atra vaiśvadevaśabdasya devatāsamarpakatve yad viśvedevāḥ samayajanta tad vaiśvadevasya vaiśvadevatvam ity etasyā 'rthavādasyā 'tyantam eva nirālambanatvaṁ syāt. etadarthavādād dhi vaiśvadevaśabdo

[344] J. 2.2.18.
[345] P. and v. l. of C. *āmikṣāntar-gatatvena;* v. l. of B. and of C. *āmikṣāntargatārtha* (omitting *brūte?*).
[346] J. 2.1.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–4. See 44.
[347] See 199, 270.
[348] P. and v. l. of B. C. *tataś*.
[349] MS. 1.10.1 (140.8), KS. 9.4 (107.3).

viśvadevakartṛkatvena karmaṇi pravṛtta iti jñāyate, na[350] devatāsamarpakatvena.[351]

318. kiṁ ca vaiśvadevena yajete 'ty asya yāgavidhitva āmikṣāyā no 'tpattiśiṣṭatvam. tathā ca tayā na vājinaṁ bādhituṁ śakyata ity ubhayor apy āmikṣāvājinayor yāgāṅgatvaṁ syāt. tathā ca vikalpaḥ; sa cā 'ṣṭadoṣa iti. tasmād vaiśvadevy āmikṣe 'ty atrai 'va yāgavidhānam, itarasya tv anuvādatvam. anuvādatve ca yathā nā 'narthakyaṁ tatho 'ktam ity āstāṁ tāvat. tat siddhaṁ vaiśvadevaśabdasya karmanāmadheyatvam.

319. tad evaṁ nirūpitaṁ matvarthalakṣaṇādiprakāracatuṣṭayanirūpaṇena nāmadheyasya vidheyārthaparichedakatvenā 'rthavattvam.

Niṣedha

320. anarthahetukarmaṇaḥ sakāśāt puruṣasya nivṛttikaratvena niṣedhānāṁ puruṣārthānubandhitvam. tathā hi: yathā vidhayaḥ pravartanām abhidadhataḥ svapravartakatvanirvāhārthaṁ vidheyasya yāgādeḥ śreyaḥsādhanatvam ākṣipantaḥ puruṣaṁ tatra pravartayanti, evaṁ na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayed[352] ityādayo niṣedhā api nivartanām abhidadhataḥ svanivartakatvanirvāhārthaṁ niṣedhyasya kalañjabhakṣaṇāder anarthahetutvam ākṣipantaḥ puruṣaṁ tato nivartayanti.

321. nanu kathaṁ niṣedhānāṁ nivartanāpratipādakatvam. yāvatā na bhakṣayen na hantavya ity evamādāv avyavadhānena nañarthasyā 'bhāvasya dhātvarthenā 'nvaye dhātvarthavarjanakartavyatai 'va sarvatra vākyārthaḥ pratīyate.[353] tataś ca yathā yajete 'tyādau yāgakartavyatā vākyārthaḥ, evaṁ niṣedheṣu tattaddhātvarthavarjanakartavyatā vākyārtho na nivartane 'ti cet—

322. mai 'vam; avyavadhāne 'pi dhātvarthasya pratyayārthopasarjanatveno 'pasthitasya nañarthenā 'nvayāyogāt. na hy anyopasarjanam anyenā 'nveti, mā bhūd rājapuruṣam ānaye 'ty atra rājña ānayanānvayitvam. tataś cā 'vyavadhāne 'pi nañarthasya na dhātvarthenā 'nvayaḥ, āruṇyasye 'vai 'kahāyanyā;

[350] C. P. *tat.*
[351] C. P. °*tve* and add *virudhyate* (but C. v. l. text).
[352] See note in Translation.
[353] B. *pratīyeta.*

nā 'pi kalañjādipadārthair anvayaḥ; teṣām api kārakopasarjanatayo 'pasthitatvena bhinnapadasya naño 'rthenā 'nvayāyogāt, ekahāyanyā ivā 'ruṇyena.

323. ataś cā 'nyenā 'nvayāyogān nañarthaḥ pratyayārthena saṁbadhyate, tasya prādhānyāt, krayabhāvanaye 'vā 'ruṇyādīni. tatrā 'pi nā 'khyātāṅśavācyayā 'rthabhāvanayā, tasyā api liṅtvāṅśavācyapravartanopasarjanatveno 'pasthitatvāt. ato liṅtvāṅśena nañ saṁbadhyate, tasya sarvāpekṣayā prādhānyāt.

324. nañaś cai 'ṣa svabhāvo yat svasaṁbandhipratipakṣabodhakatvam. nā 'stī 'ty atra hy astī 'ti sattvaśabdena saṁbadhyamāno nañ sattvapratipakṣam asattvaṁ gamayati. tad iha liñarthas tāvat pravartanā. atas tena saṁbadhyamāno nañ pravartanāpratipakṣāṁ nivartanāṁ gamayati; vidhivākyaśravaṇe 'yaṁ māṁ pravartayatī 'ti pravartanāpratītivan niṣedhavākyaśravaṇe 'yaṁ māṁ nivartayatī 'ti nivṛttyanukūlavyāpārarūpanivartanāyāḥ pratīteḥ.

325. ataś ca sarvatra niṣedheṣu nivartanai 'va vākyārthaḥ. evaṁ ca vidhiniṣedhayor bhinnārthatvaṁ siddhaṁ bhavati. hananādivarjanakartavyatāvākyārthapakṣe tu kartavyatāyā evo 'bhayatra pratipādyatvāt tayor ekārthatvaṁ syāt. tac ca na yuktam. yathā 'huḥ:

326. antaraṁ yādṛśaṁ loke brahmahatyāśvamedhayoḥ
dṛśyate tādṛg eve 'daṁ vidhānapratiṣedhayoḥ.[354] iti. tathā:

327. phalabuddhiprameyādhikāribodhakabhedataḥ
pañcadhātyantabhinnatvād bhedo vidhiniṣedhayoḥ.[355] iti.

328. yanmata iṣṭasādhanatvaṁ liñarthas tanmate 'pi liñsaṁsṛṣṭo nañ iṣṭasādhanatvapratipakṣam aniṣṭasādhanatvaṁ gamayati. sarvathā 'pi tu nañaḥ prādhānyāt pratyayenā 'nvayaḥ.

Paryudāsa, when niṣedha is impossible; two cases

329. yadā tu tadanvaye kiṁcid bādhakaṁ tadā 'gatyā dhātvarthenā 'nvayaḥ. tac ca bādhakaṁ dvividham: tasya vratam

[354] R. 1.3.7, p. 201, where it is quoted from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā. According to Hall, *Contribution towards an index to the bibliography of the Indian philosophical systems* (Calcutta, 1859), this is mentioned in Kṛṣṇadeva's Tantracūḍāmaṇi as one of the five works of Kumārila. It seems to be little known today; it is not mentioned in Jha, Keith, or any other modern authority, so far as I know.

[355] R., ibidem.

ity upakramo vikalpaprasaktiś ca. tena ca bādhakadvayena nañyukteṣu vākyeṣu paryudāsāśrayaṇaṁ bhavati. tadabhāve niṣedha eva.

330. paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatro 'ttarapadena nañ, iti,
pratiṣedhaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ kriyayā saha yatra nañ,[356]

331. iti ca tayor lakṣaṇam.[357]

(1) *Introduction by 'tasya vratam'*

332. tatra ne 'kṣeto 'dyantam ādityam[358] ityādau paryudāsāśrayaṇaṁ tasya vratam[359] ity upakramāt. tathā hi: vrataśabdena kartavyo 'rtha ucyate. ataś ca snātakasya kartavyārthānāṁ vaktavyatveno 'pakramāt kiṁ tat kartavyam ity apekṣāyām agre ne 'kṣeto 'dyantam ityādau kartavya evā 'rtho vaktavyaḥ, ākāṅkṣitābhidhānāt. arthāntaroktau ca pūrvavākyasya sākāṅkṣatvenā 'prāmāṇyaṁ syāt. na hi kartavyārthasya vaktavyatveno 'pakrame 'gre ca tadanabhidhāne pūrvavākyasya nirākāṅkṣatvaṁ saṁbhavati. na ca sākāṅkṣasya prāmāṇyam, gaur aśvaḥ puruṣa ityādāv api tatprasaṅgāt.

333. kiṁ ca ne 'kṣete 'ty asyo 'pakrameṇa pratīyamānai 'kavākyatā ca na syād arthāntarokteḥ. ataś cā 'smin vākye kaścit kartavya evā 'rtho vaktavyaḥ. taduktau ca na nañaḥ pratyayena saṁbandho ghaṭate, tatsaṁbandhe kartavyārthokter anupapatteḥ. pratyayāc cā 'vatārito nañ dhātunā saṁbadhyate. tatsaṁbandhe ca na nañaḥ pratiṣedhakatvam, vidhāyakasaṁbandhenai 'va tasya pratiṣedhakatvāt; pratiṣedhakatvasya vidhāyakapratipakṣatvāt. nāmadhātuyoge tu na nañaḥ pratiṣedhakatvam, tayor avidhāyakatvāt. yathā 'huḥ:

334. nāmadhātvarthayogī tu nai 'va nañ pratiṣedhakaḥ
vadaty abrāhmaṇādharmāv anyamātravirodhinau.[360] iti.

335. ataś ca ne 'kṣete 'ty atra naño dhātuyogān nañīkṣatibhyām īkṣaṇavirodhī kaścanā 'rthaḥ pratipādyate.

[356] B., by em., *yatra pūrvapadena nañ* for b, om. *iti*, and reads our b as its d. See note in Translation.

[357] B. adds: *uttarapadaṁ pratyayaḥ, tadanyatpadaṁ pūrvapadam* (apparently inserted by the editor, see preceding note).

[358] Manu 4.37; but see note in Translation.

[359] See note in Translation.

[360] ŚV. Apohavāda, 33, p. 575, reading *ca* for *tu* in a, and *vadato 'brā°*, in c (= "they two, i.e. the negatived noun and verb, express"); P. also reads *vadalo*, misprint for *°to*.

336. nanu tadanyatadviruddhatadabhāveṣu nañ iti saty api smaraṇe nañaḥ svasaṁsṛṣṭābhāva eva śaktiḥ, lāghavāt; na tu tadanyatadviruddhayoḥ, tayor abhāvaghaṭitatvena gauravāt, anekārthatvasya cā 'nyāyyatvāt. ato naño dhātuyoge dhātvarthābhāvabodhakatvam eva, na tu tadviruddhārthabodhakatvam iti cet—

337. satyam. naño 'bhāva eva śaktiḥ. smaraṇaṁ tu pratītyabhiprāyam, na śaktyabhiprāyam. nāmadhātvarthayogī 'ty api pratītyabhiprāyam.

338. tathā 'pi ne 'kṣete 'ty atra pratyayasya nañā 'saṁbandhāt tena tāvat kaścid artho vidheyaḥ. tatra na tāvad dhātvartho vidhātuṁ śakyate, nañā tadabhāvabodhanāt. nā 'pi tadabhāvo vidhātuṁ śakyate, abhāvasyā 'vidheyatvāt. ataś ca nañīkṣatibhyāṁ vidhānayogyaḥ kaścane 'kṣaṇavirodhy artho lakṣaṇayā pratipādyate.

339. sa ce 'kṣaṇavirodhī lakṣyamāṇaḥ padārtho ne-kṣe, ity anīkṣaṇasaṁkalpaḥ, tasye 'kṣaṇavirodhitvāt; saty api padārthāntarasye 'kṣaṇavirodhitve sarvakriyāvinābhūtatvena saṁkalpasyai 'va lakṣaṇāt. sa eva ne 'kṣete 'ty atra kartavyatayā vidhīyate: anīkṣaṇasaṁkalpena bhāvayed iti. bhāvyākāṅkṣāyāṁ cai 'tāvatā hai 'nasā viyukto bhavatī[361] 'ti vākyaśeṣāvagataḥ pāpakṣayo bhāvyatayā saṁbadhyate.

340. evaṁ cā 'tra pāpakṣayārthasaṁkalpasya[362] kartavyatayā vidhānāt tasya vratam ity anenai 'kavākyatā siddhā bhavati. tat siddhaṁ ne 'kṣete 'ty atra tasya vratam ity upakramāt paryudāsāśrayaṇam iti.

(2) *Contingence of option*

341. nā 'nuyājeṣu[363] yeyajāmahaṁ karotī[364] 'ty atra vikalpaprasaktyā tadāśrayaṇam. tathā hi: yady atra pradhānasaṁbandhalobhān nañaḥ pratyayasaṁbandhaḥ svīkriyate, tathā saty anena vākyenā 'nuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaḥ pratiṣidhyata iti vaktavyam, anuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṁ na kuryād iti. na ca tatra tasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāptiṁ vinā saṁbhavati, prāptisāpekṣatvāt pratiṣedhasya.

[361] See note in Translation.

[362] C. °*yārthaṁ saṁk*°.

[363] C. '*nūyājeṣu,* and so regularly below. The Bhāṣya on J. 10.8.1 reads *anu-*. The form with *ū* is characteristic of Tait. texts.

[364] ĀpŚS. 24.13.6 (*nānū*°). Cf. J. 10.8.1st adhikaraṇa, sūtras 1–4.

342. ata eva nā 'ntarikṣe na divī[365] 'ty asya na pratiṣedhatvam, antarikṣe cayanāprāpteḥ. ata eva brāhmaṇo na hantavya[366] ity asya nityavaddhanananivartakatvam upapadyate. sarvo hi puruṣaḥ kadācid dhananādau pravartate, kadācic ca rāgādyabhāve na pravartate. tatra yadi niṣedhasya prāptisāpekṣatvaṁ na syāt, tadā rāgādi[367] tirodhāya[367] hananādāv apravṛttaṁ praty eva śāstraprāmāṇyopapattau[368] rāgādinā hananādau pravṛttena puṅsā na tato nivartitavyam.

343. prāptisāpekṣatve tu svayam apravṛttaṁ prati prasaktyabhāvena niṣedhaśāstrāpravṛtte rāgādinā pravṛttaṁ praty eva bhrāntinimittarāgabādhena niṣedhaśāstrapravṛtter yuktā pravṛttasya tato nivṛttiḥ.

344. ataś ca brāhmaṇo na hantavya ity asya niṣedhasya nivṛttiniyamabodhakatvam, vrīhīn avahanyād[369] ity asye 'vā 'vaghātaniyamabodhakatvam. yathā khalu vrīhīn avahanyād iti śāstraṁ vaituṣyārtham avaghāte svataḥ pravṛttaṁ puruṣaṁ prati na pravartate vaiyarthyāt, kiṁ tu dalanādau pravṛttaṁ prati; evaṁ na hanyād iti śāstraṁ hananāt svayaṁ nivṛttaṁ puruṣaṁ prati na pravartate vaiyarthyāt, kiṁ tu hanane pravṛttaṁ puruṣaṁ prati kartavyatvena prasaktasya pratiṣedhāt, yat kartavyaṁ tan ne 'ti.

345. ataś ca prāptisāpekṣatvāt pratiṣedhānām anuyājeṣu yeyajāmahapratiṣedhe tasya tatra prāptir vaktavyā. sā ca[370] na tāvad dhananādāv iva rāgataḥ saṁbhavati. ato yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī[371] 'ti śāstrāt sā vaktavyā. śāstraprāptasya ca pratiṣedhe vikalpaḥ syāc chāstreṇa bhrāntinimittarāgasye 'va śāstrāntarasyā 'tyantabādhāyogāt.

346. na ca padaśāstreṇā 'havanīyaśāstrasye[372] 'va nā 'nuyājeṣv iti viśeṣaśāstreṇa yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī 'ti sāmānyaśāstrasya bādhaḥ syād iti vācyam. śāstrayor hi tatra bādhyabādha-

[365] MS. 3.2.6 (23.10); KS. 20.5 (23.6); TS. 5.2.7.1 (the words *agniś cetavyaḥ* precede in MS, and follow in KS, TS).

[366] Cf. Manu 8.380 etc. for the sense.

[367] B. *rāgāvirodhāya*, v. l. text; P. *rāgādiviro°*.

[368] B. *śāstrā°*.

[369] Cf. 243.

[370] B. P. om.

[371] See note in Translation.

[372] See note in Translation.

kabhāvo yatra parasparanirapekṣatā.[373] na hi padaśāstrasya svārthavidhānārtham āhavanīyaśāstrāpekṣā 'sti. niṣedhaśāstrasya tu prasaktyarthaṁ yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī 'ti vidher asty apekṣā.

347. evaṁ ca niṣedhaśāstrasya viśeṣaviṣayatvena prābalyavad vidhiśāstrasyā 'py upajīvyatvena prābalyam astī 'ti na niṣedhena vidher atyantabādho yukta iti vihitapratiṣiddhatvād vikalpaḥ syāt. sa ca na yuktaḥ. vikalpe hi pakṣe śāstrasyā 'prāmāṇyaṁ bhavati. na hy anuyājeṣu yeyajāmahakaraṇe nā 'nuyājeṣv ity asya prāmāṇyaṁ saṁbhavati, vrīhyanuṣṭhānasamaya iva yavaśāstrasya.

348. dviradṛṣṭakalpanā ca syāt. vidher hy evaṁ jñāyate, yad anuyājeṣu yeyajāmahakaraṇe kaścano 'pakāro bhavatī 'ti. niṣedhāc ca tadakaraṇād iti jñāyate, anṛtavadanākaraṇād iva darśapūrṇamāsayoḥ. sa co 'pakāro 'dṛṣṭarūpa iti dviradṛṣṭakalpanāprasaṅgaḥ. ataś ca vikalpo na yuktaḥ. pratiṣedhāśrayaṇe ca tadāpatter na tadāśrayaṇam.

349. kiṁ tu naño 'nuyājaśabdena saṁbandham āśritya paryudāsa āśrīyate, naññanuyājaśabdābhyām anuyājavyatiriktalakṣaṇāt: anuyājavyatirikteṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī 'ti. atra ca vākye yeyajāmahaḥ kartavyatayā na vidhīyate, yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī 'ty anenai 'va vihitatvāt. kiṁ tu sāmānyaśāstravihitayeyajāmahānuvādena tasyā 'nuyājavyatiriktaviṣayatā vidhīyate: yad yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karoti tad anuyājavyatirikteṣv iti.

350. evaṁ ca sāmānyaśāstrasya viśeṣāpekṣiṇo nā 'nuyājeṣv ity anenā 'nuyājavyatiriktaviṣayasamarpaṇād anuyājavyatirikteṣu yeyajāmahaḥ kartavyatayā prāptaḥ. anuyājeṣu tu sa na kartavyatayā prāpto na vā pratiṣiddha iti na vikalpaḥ. lakṣaṇayā cā 'nuyājavyatiriktaviṣayasamarpaṇān nā 'nuyājeṣv iti vākyasya nā 'prāmāṇyam, ataś ca paryudāsāśrayaṇe na kiṁcid bādhakam. tat siddhaṁ nā 'nuyājeṣv iti vākye vikalpabhayāt paryudāsāśrayaṇam iti.

Paryudāsa not upasaṁhāra

351. nanu paryudāsāśrayaṇe yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karotī 'ti śāstreṇa yāgasāmānye prāptasya yeyajāmahasya nā 'nuyājeṣv

[373] B. P. *parasya nir°*.

ity anenā 'nuyājavyatirikte saṁkocanāt paryudāsasyo 'pasaṁhārād abhedaḥ syāt. upasaṁhāre hi sāmānye prāptasya viśeṣe saṁkoco bhavati, yathā puroḍāśaṁ caturdhā karotī[374] 'ti puroḍāśasāmānye prāptaṁ caturdhākaraṇam āgneyaṁ caturdhā karotī[375] 'ty āgneye saṁkocyata iti cet,—

352. na, tanmātrasaṁkocārthatvād upasaṁhārasya, tadanyamātrasaṁkocārthatvāt paryudāsasye 'ti kecit.

353. anye tū 'pasaṁhāro nāma sāmānyataḥ prāptasya viśeṣe saṁkocanarūpo vyāpāraviśeṣo vidheḥ. paryudāsas tu, paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatro 'ttarapadena nañ, ity abhiyuktoktyā pratyayātiriktena dhātunā vā nāmnā vā nañaḥ saṁbandhaḥ. ataś cā[376] 'nayos tāvat svarūpataḥ spaṣṭa eva bhedaḥ.

354. evaṁ saty apy abheda āśaṅkyeta yadi yatra paryudāsas tatrā 'vaśyam upasaṁhāraḥ syāt. na cai 'tad asti, ne 'kṣeto 'dyantam ityādau saty api tasminn upasaṁhārābhāvāt. na hi tatrā 'gneyacaturdhākaraṇam iva sāmānye prāptaṁ kiṁcid viśeṣe saṁkocyate; pāpakṣayoddeśenā 'nīkṣaṇasaṁkalpamātravidhānāt.

355. prakṛtodāharaṇe tu yajisāmānye prāptasya yeyajāmahasyā 'nuyājavyatirikteṣu saṁkocanād yadi vidher upasaṁhāravidhitvaṁ saṁbhavati, nai 'tāvatā kiṁcid virudhyate. vidhyabhāve hi kathaṁ vidhikāryam upasaṁhāraḥ paryudāsena kriyata iti bhavati virodhaḥ. na cā 'tra vidhir nā 'sti, naño 'nuyājapadasaṁbandhena vidher vidhāyakatvasyā 'vyāghātāt. atra hi paryudāso 'nuyājavyatiriktaviṣayasamarpaka āgneyapadavat; upasaṁhārakas[377] tu vidhir eva.

356. na cā 'tra tanmātrasaṁkocābhāvān no 'pasaṁhāra iti vācyam. tanmātrasaṁkoca iti ko 'rthaḥ. āgneyamātre saṁkoco vā, sāmānyaprāptasya viśeṣamātre saṁkoco vā. ādye 'nārabhyādhītasāptadaśyasya mitravindādiprakaraṇasthena vākyeno 'pasaṁhāro na syād āgneye[378] saṁkocābhāvāt. dvitīye caturdhākaraṇasya puroḍāśamātre prāptasyā 'gneye saṁkocavad

[374] TB. 3.3.8.6 *caturdhā karoti*, sc. *puroḍāśam*. Some authorities prescribe division of other cakes than the *āgneya;* see Hillebrandt, *NVMO.* p. 127, n. 1.

[375] ĀpŚS. 3.3.2 *āg° puroḍāśaṁ ca° kṛtvā.* Cf. J. 3.1.26, 27.

[376] B. P. om.

[377] B. *upasaṁhāras.*

[378] B. *°ya-.*

anuyājānanuyājasādhāraṇyena prāptasyā 'nanuyājeṣu saṁkocād upasaṁhāraḥ syād eva.

357. etāvāṅs tu viśeṣaḥ. āgneyādivākyeṣv āgneyādayo viśeṣāḥ svapadopasthāpitāḥ.[379] prakṛte tu paryudāsena tasyo 'pasthitir iti. upasaṁhāranyāyas tv aviśiṣṭa eva. yac ca tadanyamātrasaṁkocanārthatvāt paryudāsasye 'ti, tan na; ne 'kṣete 'ty atra saty api paryudāse saṁkocābhāvāt. na hy atra sāmānye prāptaṁ tadanyamātre saṁkocyate, saṁkalpamātravidhānād ity uktam.

358. ity āstāṁ tāvat. tat siddhaṁ nā 'nuyājeṣv ity atra vikalpaprasaktyā paryudāsāśrayaṇam iti.

359. yatra tu sa āśrayituṁ na śakyate, tatra tatprasaktāv api niṣedha evā 'śrīyate. yathā nā 'tirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇātī[380] 'ty atra. atra hy atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇātī[380] 'ti śāstraprāptam atirātre ṣoḍaśigrahaṇaṁ pratiṣidhyata iti vihitapratiṣiddhatvād vikalpaprasaktāv api paryudāso nā 'śrīyate 'śakyatvāt. yady atra nañaḥ ṣoḍaśipadena saṁbandhaḥ svīkriyeta, tadā 'tirātre ṣoḍaśivyatiriktaṁ gṛhṇātī 'ti vākyārthaḥ syāt. tatra cā 'tirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇātī 'ti pratyakṣavidhivirodhaḥ. ata evā 'tirātrapadena na nañaḥ saṁbandho 'tirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇātī 'ti pratyakṣavidhivirodhāt. ataś cā 'tra paryudāsasyā 'nupapatter niṣedha eva svīkriyate, vikalpo 'pi svīkriyate 'nanyagateḥ.

360. ataś cai 'tat siddham: yatra tasya vratam ityādyupakramo vikalpaprasaktiś ca nā 'sti tatra pratiṣedhaḥ, yathā na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayed iti. yatra vā vikalpaprasaktāv api paryudāsa āśrayituṁ na śakyate tatra pratiṣedhaḥ, yathā nā 'tirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇātī 'ti.

361. etāvāṅs tu viśeṣaḥ: yatra vikalpāpādakaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, tatra pratiṣidhyamānasya nā 'narthahetutvam, ubhayor api vidhipratiṣedhayoḥ kratvarthatvāt. yatra tu na vikalpaḥ prasajyate[381] prāptiś ca rāgataḥ pratiṣedhaś ca puruṣārthas tatra niṣidhyamānasyā 'narthahetutvam, yathā kalañjabhakṣaṇasya.

362. dīkṣito na dadāti na juhotī[382] 'tyādiṣu tu dānahomādīnāṁ śāstraprāptāv api puruṣārthatvena prāptatvāt kratvarthatvena ca pratiṣedhāt tulyārthatvābhāvena vikalpāprasaktāv api na

[379] B. P. °*pasthitāḥ*.
[380] See note in Translation.
[381] C. om.
[382] MS. 3.6.5 (66.5) *dī° na da°;* 3.6.6 (66.12) *nāgnihotraṁ juhoti*. See J. 6.5.38, 39 and 10.8.12–15.

teṣām anarthahetutvam, rāgaprāptyabhāvāt. rāgataḥ prāptasyā 'pi kratvarthatvena pratiṣedhe tadanuṣṭhānāt krator vaiguṇyaṁ nā 'narthotpattiḥ, yathā svastryupagamanādipratiṣedhe.[383] rāgataḥ prāptasya puruṣārthatvena pratiṣedhe niṣidhyamānasyā 'narthahetutvam iti dik.

363. tat siddhaṁ niṣedhānāṁ puruṣārthānubandhitvam. evaṁ sarvasyā 'pi vedasya puruṣārthānubandhitvam.

Arthavāda

364. prakṛtam anusarāmaḥ. tad evaṁ yathā vidhyādīnām adhyayanavidhyupāttānāṁ nā 'narthakyam, evam arthavādānām api tadupāttatvenā 'narthakyānupapatteḥ svārthapratipādane ca prayojanābhāvāl lakṣaṇayā prayojanavadarthaparyavasānaṁ vaktavyam.

365. te cā 'rthavādā dvividhāḥ, vidhiśeṣā niṣedhaśeṣāś ca. tatra vāyavyaṁ śvetam ālabhete[384] 'tyādividhiśeṣāṇāṁ vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devate[385] 'tyādīnām arthavādānāṁ vidheyārthastāvakatayā 'rthavattvam.

366. barhiṣi rajataṁ na deyam[386] ityādiniṣedhaśeṣāṇāṁ so 'rodīd[387] ityādīnām arthavādānāṁ tu niṣedhyanindakataye 'ti.

367. ataś ca lakṣaṇayā prāśastyam arthavādair bodhyate. tac ca prāśastyajñānaṁ śabdabhāvanāyām itikartavyatātvena saṁbadhyate. paramaprakṛtam. tat siddhaṁ vakṣyamāṇārthabhāvanābhāvyikā liṅādijñānakaraṇikā prāśastyajñānetikartavyatākā śābdī bhāvanā liṅtvāṅśeno 'cyata iti.

Meaning of śābdī bhāvanā

368. nanu ke 'yaṁ śābdī bhāvanā. ucyate: puruṣapravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraviśeṣaḥ. sa eva vidhyarthaḥ, liṅādiśravaṇe 'yaṁ māṁ pravartayatī 'ti niyamena pratīteḥ. yat tv iṣṭasādhanatvaṁ vidhyartha iti[388] tan na. tathā satī 'ṣṭasādhanam iti śabdasya vidhiśabdaḥ paryāyaḥ syāt. na ca paryāyatvaṁ yujyate; saṁdhyopāsanaṁ ta iṣṭasādhanaṁ tasmāt tat tvaṁ

[383] B. °*ṣedhaḥ*, P. °*dho.*
[384] TS. 2.1.1.1.
[385] TS. 2.1.1.1.
[386] TS. 1.5.1.2 (*rajatam* is supplied from the context).
[387] TS. 1.5.1.1.
[388] B. P. om.

kurv[389] iti sahaprayogāt, paryāyāṇāṁ ca sahaprayogābhāvāt. ataś ca vyāpāraviśeṣa eva vidhyarthaḥ. sa ca loke puruṣaniṣṭho 'bhiprāyaviśeṣaḥ. vede tu puruṣābhāvāc chabdaniṣṭha eva preraṇāparaparyāya ity uktam.

369. nanu loke śabdaniṣṭhe preraṇāparaparyāye vyāpāre śabdaprayogābhāvena śaktigrahābhāvāt kathaṁ tasya vidhiśabdāt pratipattir iti cet, satyam etat.

370. tathā 'pi bālas tāvat stanyadānādau svakṛtarodanādijanitamātṛpravṛtteḥ svābhiprāyarūpapravartanājñānajanyatvāvadhāraṇāt savidhikaprayojakavākyaśravaṇasamanantarabhāvinīṁ prayojyavṛddhapravṛttim upalabhya tatkāraṇatvena tasya pravartanājñānam anumimīte. yady api bhojanādau svapravṛtteḥ samīhitasādhanatājñānapūrvakatvāvadhāraṇāt[390] prayojyavṛddhapravṛtter api tatpūrvakatvādhyavasānaṁ yuktam, tathā 'py anyapreritapravṛttau pravartanājñānajanyatvasyo 'ktamātṛpravṛttau darśanena prayojyavṛddhapravṛtter apy anyapreritapravṛttitvāt tatkāraṇatvena pravartanājñānasyai 'vā 'dhyavasānam. tac ca pravartanājñānam anvayavyatirekābhyāṁ prayojakavākyajanyam ity avadhārayati. tatra cā 'vāpodvāpābhyāṁ pravartanāyāṁ vidhiśaktim avadhārayati.

371. pravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ pravartanā. sa ca vyāpāraḥ praiṣādirūpo vividha iti pratyekaṁ vyabhicāritvād vidhiśabdavācyatvānupapatteḥ pravartanāsāmānyam eva vidhiśabdavācyam iti kalpayati. evaṁ ca vidhiśravaṇe praiṣādirūpasya vaktrabhiprāyasya pravartanātvenai 'va[391] rūpeṇa pratītir na viśeṣarūpeṇa, tathai 'va śaktigrahāt. viśeṣarūpeṇa tu pratītir lakṣaṇayai 'va.

372. evaṁ ca vaidikaliṅādiśravaṇe 'pi pravartanāsāmānyam eva pratīyate. tatra ko 'sau vyāpāra ity apekṣāyāṁ praiṣādirūpasya vaktrabhiprāyasyā 'pauruṣeye vede 'nupapatteḥ śabdaniṣṭha eva preraṇāparaparyāyaḥ kaścid vyāpāra iti kalpyate. ataś ca śabdaniṣṭha eva preraṇāparaparyāyo vyāpāraḥ śābdī bhāvanā. sai 'va ca pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vidhyartha iti. ayam eva cā 'rthaḥ—

373. abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ,[392]

[389] See note in Translation.
[390] C. *samāhita*°.
[391] C. om.
[392] TV. 2.1.1, p. 344.

374. iti vārtikasya. abhidhīyate 'nene 'ti vyutpattyā 'bhidhāśabdena vidhiśabda ucyate. tadvyāpārātmikā bhāvanā liṅādivācye 'ti kecid ācāryā[393] āhuḥ.[394]

375. anye tv āhuḥ: satyaṁ pravartanāsāmānyaṁ vidhyarthaḥ, tathai 'va śaktigrahāt. pravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ pravartanā. apauruṣeye ca vede praiṣāder asaṁbhavāt kaścit puruṣapravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraviśeṣaḥ kalpanīyaḥ; vidhiśabdābhidheyapravartanāsāmānyasya viśeṣam antareṇā 'paryavasānāt. tatra ko 'sau vyāpāraviśeṣa ity apekṣāyāṁ dhātvarthagataṁ samīhitasādhanatvam eve 'ti kalpyate, tasyā 'pi pravṛttyanukūlatvāt. sarvo[394a] hi samīhitasādhanatāṁ jñātvā pravartate. anyaprerito 'pi[395] yadī 'ṣṭasādhanatāṁ na jānāti tadā nai 'va pravartate.

376. svatantrapreraṇāvāde 'pi tadākṣiptasamīhitasādhanatājñānaṁ svīkriyata eva; anyathā vidheḥ pravartakatvānupapatteḥ. ataś cā 'vaśyakatvāt samīhitasādhanatai 'va pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vidhyarthaḥ. evaṁ ca vidhiśabdasyā 'nyaniṣṭhavyāpārabodhakatvaṁ lokasiddhaṁ siddhaṁ bhavati.

377. kiṁ ca śabda eko vyāpāraḥ spandādyatiriktaḥ kalpanīyaḥ. tasya ca svapravṛttau parādhīnapravṛttau vā kāraṇatvenā 'kḷptasya pravartanātvena rūpeṇa jñātasya pravṛttyanukūlatvaṁ śabdasya ca paraniṣṭhavyāpārajñāpakatvena kḷptasya svaniṣṭhavyāpārabodhakatvaṁ vidheś ca pravartakatvanirvāhārthaṁ dhātvarthasya samīhitasādhanatvam iti kalpanād varam āvaśyakasyai 'va samīhitasādhanatvasya svapravṛttihetutvena kḷptasya pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vidhyarthatvakalpanaṁ lāghavāt, anyaniṣṭhatvāc ca.

378. na ca vidheḥ pravartakatvanirvāhārthaṁ samīhitasādhanatvakalpanāt preraṇānabhidhāne ca vidheḥ pravartakatvābhāvād dhātvarthasya ca samīhitasādhanatvakalpakam eva nā 'stī 'ti vācyam; pravartanābhidhānenai 'va tanmate 'pi vidheḥ pravartakatvād vidhyabhihitasya ca pravartanāsāmānyasya viśeṣam antareṇā 'paryavasānāt samīhitasādhanatvākṣepakatvāt.

379. na ce 'ṣṭasādhanatvasya vidhyarthatve saṁdhyopāsanaṁ ta iṣṭasādhanaṁ tat tvaṁ kurv iti sahaprayogānupapattir iti vācyam; iṣṭasādhanatvasya viśeṣarūpeṇa vidhinā 'nabhidhānāt,

[393] C. om.

[394] B. and v.l. of C. om. (P. text).

[394a] C. adds *'pi*.

[395] B. P. om.

pravartanātvena rūpeṇā 'bhidhānāt. sāmānyaśabdasya ca viśeṣaśabdena dṛṣṭaḥ sahaprayogaḥ pāñcālarājo drupada ityādau. tasmāt samīhitasādhanatai 'va pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vidhyarthaḥ. sai 'va ca tena rūpeṇa śabdenai 'vā 'bhidhīyata iti śābdī bhāvanā.

380. uktavārtikasyā 'py ayam evā 'bhiprāyaḥ: abhidhīyate sā 'bhidhā samīhitasādhanatā, sai 'va pravartanātvenā 'bhihitā puruṣapravṛttiṁ bhāvayatī 'ti bhāvanā tāṁ liṅādaya āhur iti. yathā 'huḥ:

381. puṅsāṁ ne 'ṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ
pravṛttihetuṁ dharmaṁ ca pravadanti pravartanām.[396]

iti.

382. tat siddhaṁ yajete 'ty atra liṅtvāṅśena śābdī bhāvano 'cyata iti.

Meaning of ārthī bhāvānā

383. ākhyātatvāṅśenā 'rthī bhāvano 'cyate. nanu ke 'yam ārthī bhāvanā. kartṛvyāpāra iti cen na; yāgāder api tadvyāpāratvena bhāvanātvāpatteḥ. na ce 'ṣṭāpattiḥ; tasya prakṛtyarthatvena pratyayārthatvābhāvād iti cet—

384. atrā 'huḥ: satyaṁ na yāgo bhāvanā kiṁ tu svargecchājanito yāgaviṣayo yaḥ prayatnaḥ sa bhāvanā. sa eva cā 'khyātāṅśeno 'cyate; yajete 'ty ākhyātaśravaṇe yāgena[397] yatete 'ti pratīter jāyamānatvāt.

385. yaś ca prayatnapūrvakaṁ gamanādi karoti tasmin devadatto gamanaṁ karotī 'ti karotiprayogadarśanāt, vātādinā spandamāne[398] tu nā 'yaṁ karoti kiṁ tu vātādinā 'sya spando jāyata iti prayogāt karotyarthas tāvat prayatnaḥ. karotisāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ cā 'khyāte dṛśyate: yajeta yāgena kuryāt, pacati pākaṁ karoti, gacchati gamanaṁ karotī 'ti.

386. ataś ca karotisāmānādhikaraṇyāt prayatnasyā 'khyātavācyatvam. na ca ratho gacchatī 'ti prayogānupapattiḥ, rathe yatnābhāvād iti vācyam; voḍhraśvagataṁ prayatnaṁ ratha āropya prayogopapatteḥ. yanmate 'py anyotpādanānukūlaṁ vyāpārasāmānyaṁ bhāvanā, tanmate 'pi rathe gamanātirikta-

[396] Vidhiviveka, p. 243 (*Pandit*, N. S. 26, Benares 1904), reading *puṅso*, Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 53, quotes it as in our text.

[397] C. and v. l. of B. *yāge* (v. l. of C. text).

[398] C. *spandane*, v. l. text.

vyāpārānupalabdhe[398a] ratho gacchatī 'ti prayogasyau 'pacārikatvam eve 'ti. ataś ca prayatna evā 'rthī bhāvanā. yathā 'huḥ:

387. prayatnavyatiriktā 'rthabhāvanā tu na śakyate
vaktum ākhyātavācye 'ha prastute 'ty uparamyate.[399] iti.

388. anye tv āhuḥ: bhavitur bhavanānukūlo bhāvakavyāpāras tāvad bhāvanā. yasmin vyāpāre kṛte karaṇaṁ phalotpādanāya samarthaṁ bhavati tādṛśo vyāpāra iti yāvat. sa eva cā 'khyātārthaḥ. kuṭhāreṇa chinattī 'ty ākhyātaśravaṇe hi bhavaty etādṛśī matiḥ: kuṭhāreṇa tathā vyāpriyeta yasmin vyāpāre kṛte kuṭhāreṇa chedanaṁ bhavatī 'ti. evaṁ yajeta svargakāma ity asyā 'yam arthaḥ: yāgena tathā vyāpriyeta yasmin vyāpāre kṛte yāgāt svargo bhavatī 'ti. sa ca vyāpāraḥ kvacid udyamananipātanādiḥ, kvacic cā 'gnyanvādhānādibrāhmaṇatarpaṇāntaḥ, kathaṁbhāvākāṅkṣāyāṁ viśeṣarūpeṇa paścād avagamyate. anyotpādānukūlatvena sāmānyatas tv ākhyātād eva.

389. ratho grāmaṁ gacchatī 'ty atrā 'py ākhyātena grāmaprāptyanukūlo vyāpāra eva pratīyate; rathas tathā gamanena vyāpriyate yasmin vyāpāre kṛte gamanād grāmaprāptir bhavatī 'ti pratīteḥ. na tv atra gamanamātram ākhyātārthaḥ, tasya dhātuno 'ktatvāt. tatra ko 'sau vyāpāra ity apekṣāyāṁ pūrvottarāvāntaradeśavibhajanasaṁyojanarūpa iti paścād avagamyate: pūrveṇa pradeśena vibhajyo 'ttareṇa saṁyujya ratho grāmaṁ gacchatī 'ti prayogāt, udyamya nipātya kuṭhāreṇa chinattī 'tivat.

390. evaṁ devadattaḥ prayatata ity atrā 'pi devadattas tathā vyāpriyate yathā prayatno bhavatī 'ti prayatnānukūlo vyāpāra evā 'khyātārtho na tu prayatnaḥ; tasya dhātuno 'ktatvāt. vyāpāraviśeṣāpekṣāyāṁ ce 'cchādiḥ paścād avagamyate, udyamananipātanavat.

391. tathā ca sarvatrānugatatvād anyotpādānukūlavyāpārasāmānyam evā 'khyātārthaḥ, na tu prayatnamātram; ratho gacchati devadattaḥ prayatata ityādiṣu tadabhāvāt. na cā 'trau 'pacārikatvaṁ vaktuṁ yuktam, mukhye saṁbhavati tasyā 'nyāyyatvāt. karotyartho 'py anyotpādānukūlo vyāpāra eva na prayatnamātram, karoteś cetanācetanakartṛkākhyātasāmānādhikaraṇyād iti. tat siddham anyotpādānukūlo vyāpāra ārthī bhāvane 'ti.

[398a] Sc. °*dheḥ* (abl. of °*dhi*).

[399] R. 2.1.1, p. 579, reading *'rtha-* in a, which is quoted as v. l. in both C. and B.; they both (and also P.) print *'rthī bhāv°* in the text.

392. sai 'va cā 'khyātāṅśeno 'cyate, bhāvayed iti. tasyāś ca bhāvyākāṅkṣāyāṁ svargādir[400] bhāvyatvena saṁbadhyate. karaṇākāṅkṣāyāṁ yāgādiḥ karaṇatvena saṁbadhyate; prayājādaya itikartavyatātvena. evaṁ ca yajete 'tyādinā svargādyuddeśena yāgāder vidhānāt siddhaṁ yāgāder dharmatvaṁ prayojanam uddiśya vedena vihitatvād iti.

Salvation by ritual action

393. so 'yaṁ dharmo yaduddeśena vihitas[401] taduddeśena[401] kriyamāṇas taddhetuḥ. śrīgovindārpaṇabuddhyā kriyamāṇas tu niḥśreyasahetuḥ. na ca tadarpaṇabuddhyā 'nuṣṭhāne pramāṇābhāvaḥ:

394. yat karoṣi yad aśnāsi yaj juhoṣi dadāsi yat
yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kuruṣva madarpaṇam,[402]

395. iti smṛteḥ, asyāś cā 'ṣṭakādismṛtivat prāmāṇyād ity anyatra[403] vistaraḥ.

396. kvā 'haṁ mandamatiḥ kve 'yaṁ prakriyā bhāṭṭasaṁmatā
tasmād bhakter vilāso 'yaṁ govindagurupādayoḥ.

397. grantharūpo madīyo 'yaṁ vāgvyāpāraḥ suśobhanaḥ
anena prīyatāṁ devo govindo bhaktavatsalaḥ.

iti śrīmadanantadevasūnunā 'padevena kṛtaṁ mīmāṅsānyāyaprakāśasaṁjñakaṁ mīmāṅsāprakaraṇaṁ[404] samāptam.[405]

[400] C. °*di*.
[401] C. om.
[402] Bh. G. 9.27.
[403] See note in Translation.
[404] C. *pūrva-mī*°.
[405] P. om.

INDICES

INDICES

GLOSSARIAL INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS

On the purpose of this Glossarial Index, see Preface, p. v. No attempt has been made to index completely all occurrences of all words listed. It is hoped, however, that all important words are mentioned, with references to their most significant and illuminating occurrences in the Text. The Index is therefore a condensed encyclopedia of Mīmāṅsā technique, as represented by this work. The following Index of Quotations is, on the other hand, believed to be absolutely complete in its references. All references are to paragraphs.

agni, the sacrificial fire; *-mattā*, possession thereof thru having performed *ādhāna*, qualification of the *adhikārin* in fire-rites, 227ff.; *agnyabhāva*, nonexistence thereof, disqualifies for fire-rites, 228ff.

agnihotra, n. of a rite, 201, 273ff., 312.

agnīṣomīya, belonging to Agni-Soma; (1) the first animal-victim at the soma-rite, 173–175, 209–212, 266–269.—(2) a cake offered at the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa*, follows the *āgneya* from order of *mantras*, 203, 205; order of certain of its subsidiaries, 217.

aṅga, "member," subsidiary, opp. to *pradhāna*, *mukhya*, 40, 66 etc.; sometimes used as synonym of *guṇa*, 21, 126 (a *dravya*, such as *dadhi* or *vrīhi*, is a *guṇa* of the rite, 11, but an *aṅga*, 21, 66, 183 *karmāṅga* referring to *dravya*); *itikartavyatā* said to be used loosely for *aṅga*, 128; *aṅgas* classified as *siddha* and *kriyā*, q. v., 182f.; the latter subdivided into *guṇa-karmāṇi* or *saṁnipatyopakārakāṇi* and *pradhāna-k.* or *ārādupakārakāṇi* (qq. vv.), 183; in case of conflict, the purposes of the main act take precedence over those of an *aṅga*, 187–190; all *kriyā-aṅgas* are related to the *apūrva*, 71, 192ff., not to the external form of the principal on which they depend, 192 (see note in Translation), nor yet to the final result or *phala* directly, 193.—See also *apūrva* (adj.).—*aṅga-tva*, =*pārārthya*, subsidiariness, dependence, shown by *viniyoga-vidhi* and the six *pramāṇas*, 67ff.—*aṅga-bhāvanā*, efficient-force of a subsidiary (action), opp. to *phala-bh.* as that leading to the fruit of the whole rite, 152, 155; refutation of the theory that it has no requirement of *itikartavyatā*, 155–157.

ati-diś, to transfer (cf. next), 125.

atideśa, transfer (from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti*), 156, 165, 167 (cf. *codaka*).

adṛṣṭa, unseen, invisible, transcendental (effect), like that produced on rice by sprinkling, cf. *dṛṣṭa*, 14; it is improper to assume an *adṛṣṭa* effect in case of anything for which a *dṛṣṭa* effect is discernible, 187, cf. 201, 239, 248; no substitution can be made for things that are *adṛṣṭa*

in effect, hence *yūpa* not exclusively *adṛṣṭārtha*, 135f., cf. 183; not more than one *adṛṣṭa* may be assumed in a single thing, 14, 15, 43, 60f., 348 (cf. *dviradṛṣṭakalpanā*).—The concept of *adṛṣṭa* includes *apūrva* (n.), cf. 43, end, where it denotes the force which produces the fruit (such as heaven) of the sacrifice, which is precisely the *apūrva*; and 192 *tasya* (*apūrvasya*) *adṛṣṭatvāt*. But it is a broader concept than that. Such things as the effect of sprinkling on rice are *adṛṣṭa* and *lead to* the *apūrva*, but *are* not the *ap.*; cf. 71, and see *apūrva*.

adhikaraṇa, section; usually denotes a group of *sūtras* of Jaimini, a subdivision of the *pāda*, 31 etc.

adhikāra, qualification, right to perform a sacrifice with expectation of the fruit; *-vidhi*, or *-vākya*, injunction of qualification, 23, 26, 46, 62f., 225ff., 271; defined as *phalaviśeṣasaṁbandhabodhaka-vidhi*, 47, or *phalasvāmyabodhaka-* (=*karmajanyaphalabhoktṛtvabodhaka-*) *-vidhi*, 225; it should not be also an *utpatti-v.*, 47 (cf. *vākyabheda*). See next.

adhikārin, qualified person (to perform a rite and receive its fruit), 226ff.; characteristics thereof regularly stated in *adhikāravidhi*, 226, but certain characteristics are always implied tho not stated, viz. *vidyā* (*adhyayanavidhisiddhā*); in the case of fire-rites, *agnimattā* (*ādhānasiddhā*); and *sāmarthya* (qq. vv.), 227ff.

adhyayanavidhi, injunction to study (the Veda), =*svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*; implies that every part of the Veda is useful and meaningful, 9, 364; *upanayana* a necessary prerequisite, 228; results in the *vidyā* necessary for an *adhikārin*, 227ff.

Ananta(deva), father and guru of Āpadeva, 2, 143.

anarthahetu, injurious (to man *per se*, cf. *puruṣārtha*); *-tva*, 361f.

anārabhya-vidhi, disconnected injunction, defined as *sāmānya-v.* (see next), a rule not limited in application to one rite or group of rites, but of general application, 113.

anārabhyādhīta, prescribed by a disconnected or general injunction, not for a particular connexion, and hence applying generally only to *prakṛtis*, 107, 266, 268, 356, but in some exceptional cases to *vikṛtis*, 109, 111, 113.

anirṇītārtha, of meaning uninterpreted (by itself), opp. to *prasiddha*, 164.

anugraha, benefit, service, =*upakāra*, q. v., 190 etc.; *anugrāhaka* =*upakāraka*, 193.

anupapatti, logical non-consequence; abl. often ifc., "from the non-consequence (or impossibility) of...," "because...is logically impossible," 9 etc.

anuyāja, after-sacrifice; *pṛṣadājya* used therein in some *vikṛtis*, 143ff.; *yeyajāmaha*, q. v., not used in them, 341ff.

anu-vad, to refer to (something already establisht, cf. next), 46.

anuvāda, supplementary reference, allusion to something that has been laid down elsewhere, 27; contrasted with *vidhi*, injunction (of something not otherwise laid down), 28, 135; 287 (see note 193 in Translation).

karoti, does; as the general meaning of all verb-forms (*ākhyāta*), claimed to denote 'exertion,' *prayatna*, 385; this theory refuted, 391.

kartṛ, agent, subject (of a verb), is implied, not exprest, by the verb form, 75ff.

karmadhāraya, a descriptive compound; compounds are to be interpreted as such rather than as *tatpuruṣas* when possible, 233, cf. 179.

karman, rite of any sort, ritual action, =*kratu*, 11; in 120f. used, in a quotation from J., of directly-contributing subsidiary actions.

karmotpattividhi, see *utpattividhi*.

kalañja, (prob.) red garlic; *-bhakṣaṇa* (prohibited), 361; see *na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet*.

kalp-(ayati), to assume, understand by implication, 40.

kalpita, assumed, understood, opp. to *pratyakṣa*, 41f.

kalpya, to be assumed etc., 88; *kalpyopakāra*, whose *upakāra*, contribution, is yet to be establisht (opp. to *kḷptopakāra*), 134.

kalpana, 40f., or °*nā*, 21, 30, assumption.

kāṇḍa-krama, used in Nyāyaratnamālā for *sthāna-krama* (see *sthāna*, 2), see note to 209 in Text.

kāmya (*karman*), optional (rite), aimed at a special desire, opp. to *nitya-k.*; must be performed with all *aṅgas* to be effective, and one who cannot perform all *aṅgas* is not *adhikārin*, 236.

kāraka, a case-form of a noun dependent on a verb, or the meaning which pertains thereunto, 19, 258, 260; can be construed only with verbs, not nouns, 64, 293; includes not only oblique cases, but in 76, 81 also distinctly the subject-nominative; it is, like the *pratyaya* of a verb, the principal part of the word, the meaning of the stem being dependent upon it, 322, cf. 259.—Exceptionally, =*kartṛ*, agent, subject, 86; =*karaṇa* or *dravya-guṇa*, an 'instrument' used in a rite, 74, 267, 290, 292–294 (but with the other meaning of the word also in mind).

kuśa, a grass, replaced by *śara*-grass by *pratyāmnāna*, 139.

kṛtvā-cintā, 'supposition (by) making (assuming, a thing to be so),' an illustration of a hypothetical case, 'play'-example of a rule for which no actual instance is known to exist, 208.

kṛdanta, a primary formation, word ending in primary suffix (*kṛt*), 293.

kṛṣṇala, a kind of berries (imitated in gold), not husked, by *arthalopa*, 139.

kṛṣṇaviṣāṇa, black antelope's horn, used at *dīkṣā* for scratching, 147.

kḷpta, (already) fashioned, ready-made, not needing to be formed by inference (opp. to *kalpya*), 103; cf. next.

kḷptopakāra, (an *aṅga*) that has its contribution already establisht or provided, 108, 130, 134, 145, 175.

kratu, rite (of any sort), =*karman*, 9.

kratv-artha, for the sake of the rite, applied to things which are in themselves indifferent and have value for man only thru their relation to a rite (opp. to *puruṣārtha*), 361f.

krama, (1) =*sthāna*, order, position, as 5th *pramāṇa* for *aṅgas*, 170f., 207. (2) order (*paurvāparyarūpa*), as attribute of things enjoined, establisht by *prayoga-vidhi* to ensure promptness of performance, 198–

pradhāna, principal, chief thing, opp. to *aṅga*, 66 (cf. *prādhānya*), or to *guṇa* or *upasarjana*, 290, as in *pradhāna-karman* (=*ārādupakāraka*), opp. to *guṇa-k.*, 183, 230; the same is meant by *pradhāna* alone, 219; *pradhāna-vidhi*, main injunction (acc. to comm. =*adhikāra-v.*, not *utpatti-v.*), the expression of *prayoga-v.* in coordination with injunctions of subsidiaries, 196f.; see also *mukhya*, *prādhānya*; *pradhānāpūrva* = *paramāpūrva*, 158.

pramāṇa, mode of evidence, means of proof, *passim;* six *p.* for dependence (*aṅgatva*), 67; six *p.* for order (*krama*), 199. (=*māna*.)

prameya, thing to be evidenced or proved (more important than the mode of evidence, *pramāṇa*), 134.

prayatna, effort, acc. to Someśvara the meaning of the *ārthī bhāvanā*, 384–387, 390.

prayāja, fore-sacrifice (five in number), 117, 120, 153, 155, 161, 168, 188, 214; they are applied by *prakaraṇa* to all the *yāgas* of the *darśapūrṇamāsa*, 116, not by *samākhyā* to cake-offerings alone, 94; this is *mahā-prakaraṇa*, 129; their order, 204–208.

prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, 62; defined as one that indicates promptness in performance; it is the main injunction (*pradhāna-v.*, q. v.) in coordination with injunctions of subsidiaries, 196f.; accomplishes its end by enjoining a fixed order (see *krama*), 198; its six *pramāṇas*, 199.

pravartanā(*-sāmānya*), a (general) impellent force, the meaning of the optative form or *śābdī bhāvanā*, 371, 375 etc.

pravṛtti, procedure, the 6th of the six *pramāṇas* indicating order, 199, 218–223; weaker than *mukhya*, 218; defined, 219.

prasakti =*prasaṅga*, 53; cf. *vikalpa-p.*

prasaṅga, logical consequence; abl., 'because...would follow,' 8, 9; *-taḥ*, inferentially, by logical consequence, incidentally, 57.

prasiddha, known, familiar; an unknown word is interpreted by a known one, 161.

prākṛta, belonging to the archetype, *prakṛti*, 130ff., 269.

prājāpatya, dedicated to Prajāpati; designation of 17 animals offered in the Vājapeya, 219–223.

prātipadika (*artha*), (meaning) of the bare stem (of a word), 78f.

prātisvika, individual, taken each by itself (*prati-sva*), 166f.

prādhānya, state of being *pradhāna*, principal position, 13, 38, 278, 290–293.

prāpta, establisht, determined (cf. *aprāpta*, *prāpti*), 33ff.; *p.-bādha*, annulment of the establisht, 138–142, 246 (a *doṣa* inherent in the sense, not in words alone).

prāpti, establishment, a necessary prerequisite of prohibitions, 341ff.

prāya-pāṭha, 'reading of the general run,' the same general sense with other related expressions, 316.

prāśastya, glorification (function of *arthavāda*), 9, 367.

prāśubhāva, promptness, =*avilamba*, enjoined by *prayoga-vidhi*, 196.

preraṇā, instigation; the view that it is the meaning of the *śābdī bhāvanā*, exprest by *liṅ*, 368–374.

sthāna, position; (1) the 5th of the six *pramāṇas* indicating dependence, 67, 169–175; defined as *anyatarākāṅkṣā*, 131; as *deśasāmānya*, 169; synonym, *krama*, 170f.; weaker than *prakaraṇa*, 159, but stronger than *samākhyā*, 176ff.; two kinds, *pāṭha-sādeśya* and *anuṣṭhāna-s.*, 169; (2) the 4th of the six *pramāṇas* indicating order, 199, 209–212; defined, 209 (when several archetypal acts are performed together in a *vikṛti*, that one is performed first to which belongs, in the archetype, the place where all are performed).

spanda, motion (denied to a word), 377.

smārta, based on *smṛti*, 155.

smṛti, tradition, unrevealed or non-Vedic authority; may displace order of procedure derived from *śruti* where supported by stronger command, 96; authoritative force of, 395.

svarasa, very own nature, 267 etc.; evident tendency, essential substance (of a work), 128.

svarūpa, own nature, natural form or character of anything, 71, 156; (particularly) the general nature (of a rite), enjoined in the *utpatti-vidhi*, 47, 63, and defined as consisting of the *dravya* and the *devatā*, 57, 194; (the rite's) external form, natural character, as distinguisht from its ultimate transcendental effect (*apūrva*), 192, 194.

svarga, heaven; to be understood as fruit of rites where no other fruit is mentioned (the *viśvajin-nyāya*), 117.

svastryupagamana, approaching one's wife, prohibited during certain rites, 362.

havis, oblation-material, defined as that which is portioned out in the rite (as the cake, or the members of the animal-victim), 70; 214f.

hotṛ, a certain priest, not to be chosen in *pitryeṣṭi*, 139.

hotṛ-camasa, 'hotṛ-cup,' example of a Vedic *samākhyā*, 179, 181.

homa, oblation, distinguisht from *yāga*, 156.

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